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brought it to fruition. The project has advanced haltingly but collaboratively over the 
course of many years, taking a multiplicity of forms and interpellating a number of 
audiences and participants along the way. Our editorial efforts, moreover, have been 
matched unevenly by the rapid tempo of the unfolding “migrant crisis,” a temporality 
that made various forms of analysis impossible, even as it pushed us to generate new 
modes of thinking and academic engagement.
Some of our initial thinking was incubated at the Hemispheric Institute’s Encuentro 
in 2014 in Montréal / Tio‘tiá:ke, which helped f lesh out the possibilities and limitations 
of the concept “trespass” (a modality for us to think bodily crossings and mediated 
borders). We are grateful also to participants in a workshop at the National Women’s 
Studies Association Annual Conference in 2016 that sought to critically examine the 
representational regimes that frame and instantiate the European “migrant / refugee 
crisis” and consider the decolonizing potentials of various strategies of counter-map-
ping, critical reading, and collaborative knowledge production.
The anthology would not have been possible without the generous and generative 
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University supported through it. We are also grateful to the Fondation IMéRA — Institut 
d’Etudes Avancées for supporting this project in multiple ways, and concretely through 
a publication grant. This support was vital to making the anthology Open Access, a key 
political decision for us as editors. We also thank Transcript Verlag, and Jakob Horst-
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mann particularly, for receiving this manuscript so warmly and for working with us to 
both honor the visual contributions so vital to the anthology and to make the anthol-
ogy accessible. We thank also Fanny Gravel-Patry, our research assistant who indeed 
assisted indefatigably throughout the editorial process.
Finally, we feel it important to acknowledge how profoundly this project has been 
informed by the various sites at and across which it has taken shape. Though our ana-
lytic focus has for years now been trained on the European context, our thinking has 
been nourished by the places in which we have written, taught, and thought (togeth-
er and apart) over the course of this book’s creation. Humbly, we have learned, and 
continue to learn, from the struggles for migrant justice currently unfolding at and 
around the borders of Canada, the United States, and Mexico; from the struggle for 
Palestinian liberation in the West Bank and Gaza; from the decolonial aspirations and 
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ent, insurgent, and indefatigable demands of Black Lives Matter. Our thinking is quite 
impossible without the spaces of imaginative, political, and ethical possibility such 
projects, among innumerable others, manage to hold open amidst and against the re-
lentless forces of enclosure. We acknowledge our deep intellectual and political debts 
to this movement work, which is always knowledge work, and always theory.
Preface
Sandro Mezzadra
Labels matter. To speak of a “migrant crisis” with respect to what happened in Europe 
in and since the summer of 2015 is not neutral, as readers of this book will soon real-
ize. It has deep political implications and it also requires and nurtures specific forms 
of visualization — or a specific set of “image operations,” to employ a notion that fig-
ures prominently in this book. Shipwrecks at sea and corpses on a beach, ungovernable 
bodies in motion and scenes of destitution in informal camps: a whole humanitarian 
visual culture has developed around such images of crisis, with the aim to nurture 
compassion and engagement from afar. There was no shortage of such images in the 
summer of 2015. The point is of course not to downplay their relevance as iconic repre-
sentations of the events, nor is it to simply articulate once again a critique of humani-
tarian reason. Nevertheless, it is clear that the selection of those images obscures other 
aspects of the migratory turmoil at the borders of and in Europe in 2015 / 16. What if 
we take as guiding thread other images, for instance snapshots of the “march of hope” 
from Budapest to the Austrian border on September 4, 2015, or of the elementary force 
with which tens of thousands of women, men, and children on the move swept away 
border fences and walls from Macedonia to Hungary, across the “Balkan route” during 
that summer? A different picture of the events emerges. What strikes in those images 
is not so much “crisis,” as rather the sense of an uncontainable movement, of a radical 
challenge to Europe’s borders, of an even joyful practice of freedom. In emphasizing 
such images, activists and critical migration and border studies called the events of 
2015 / 16 the “long summer of migration.”1
It is important to recover the insurgent character of the movements of migration in 
Europe in the summer of 2015. A shift in migrants’ routes from the Central to the East-
ern Mediterranean as of May of that year made the crossing of the European maritime 
“external borders” significantly safer for the first time in the recent history of trans-
Mediterranean migration.2 Needless to say, this does not mean that there would be no 
deaths at sea in the following months. But thousands of migrants were able to get to 
the European shore of the Greek islands and continue their travel further North across 
the “Balkan route.” I am not proposing a naive celebration or even a romanticization 
of the “summer of migration.” Migratory routes at sea and on land were plagued by 
any kind of obstacle, threat, and violence; hunger, thirst, and death were continuing to 
1  See Kasparek and Speer, “Of Hope.” 
2  Heller and Pezzani, “Ebbing and Flowing.” 
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haunt migrants. But the subjective dimensions of migration, the search for freedom, 
and the desire for a better life that so often sustain the dynamics of migration were 
particularly apparent in the long summer of 2015. The passage across the Mediterra-
nean and the “Balkan route” clearly took the characteristic of a political movement, and 
at least for a moment it was understood in such terms by wide sections of the European 
public, which mobilized to welcome migrants in countries like Greece, Austria, and 
Germany.
The encoding of the events as a “migrant crisis” did not merely happen in the frame-
work of a humanitarian discourse sincerely responding to the perceived predicament 
and pain of migrants. It quickly became the mainstream reaction of EU institutions, 
national governments, and global media. While the events in the summer of 2015 had 
manifested a crisis of the European border regime, the discourse surrounding the “mi-
grant” (or “refugee”) crisis dramatically shifted the responsibility toward a threat com-
ing from the outside of a supposedly stable and ordered European space. The political 
dimension of the movements and struggles of migration was thus neutralized, and the 
image of the crisis — with its affective resonances and its visual instantiations — be-
gan to be mobilized against the challenges posed by the “summer of migration.” Far 
from responding to those challenges — envisaging a democratization of borders and 
taking the opportunity for imagining a different Europe as well as different relations 
between Europe and its multiple outsides — the institutions of the EU and national 
governments began to work in tandem to reinforce the border regime. The enhanced 
deployment of Frontex in Greece, the establishment of the hotspot approach of the 
European Commission, and the crackdown on so-called “secondary movements” of 
migrants and refugees were among the main steps of a strategy that was crowned by 
the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016. The externalization of European borders, under-
way since the 1990s, thus reached a further stage, leaving thousands of migrants and 
refugees stranded in Greece while maritime crossing shifted again toward the Central 
Mediterranean, definitely the most lethal border in the world.3
“Mediating migration as crisis is a global affair,” the editors of this book write in 
their introduction. Over the last years we have witnessed such a global scope in many 
parts of the world, in a political conjuncture that is characterized by the rise of old and 
new nationalisms, as well as by various degrees of combination between authoritari-
anism and neoliberalism. As far as Europe is concerned, the increasing nationaliza-
tion of political discourse and processes have led to multiple conf licts and tensions 
between the European Commission and member states, whose manifestations have 
been particularly apparent around issues of borders and migration. With the rise of 
a nationalist right in several European countries, including Hungary, Austria, and 
Italy, the cooperation between the EU and national governments has become far from 
smooth in the wake of the EU-Turkey deal. Even the neoliberal version of “migration 
management,” built upon the primacy of “human capital” and advocated by the Euro-
pean Commission and by various governmental bodies around Europe, has become 
increasingly criticized by nationalist forces and governments. “Migration” as such is 
the privileged target for such forces and governments, both rhetorically and politically. 
While this implies an increasing harshness of conditions for migrants and refugees 
3   See Bojadžijev and Mezzadra,  “‘Refugee crisis’ or Crisis of European Migration Policies?”; New Key-
words Collective, “Europe / Crisis;” De Genova, The Borders of “Europe.”
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living in Europe (often for many years), with an entrenchment of discrimination and 
racism, a hardening of borders (even of “internal” borders within the Schengen space) 
is apparent.
Since the summer of 2018 in particular, the Italian government has waged a war 
not only against migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean (and often escaping 
from detention centers in Libya, whose dire conditions have been denounced by sev-
eral organizations, including the UNHCR), but also against NGOs and humanitarian 
interventions at sea. The criminalization of humanitarianism, parallel to a more gen-
eral trend toward the criminalization of solidarity,4 has partially shifted the ground 
for political conf licts around migration. While humanitarianism had long been con-
sidered a constitutive component of the border regime,5 its criminalization necessarily 
implies a politicization of the issue of intervention and migrant rescue at sea. Activists 
and social organizations have attempted to respond to that challenge by establishing a 
platform that aims at combining rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean with 
the building of bridges with migrant and social struggles on land, openly defying the 
government.6 While the attack on migrants intensifies in many parts of the world, this 
is just an instance of the multifarious forms of political and social intervention that at-
tempt to prompt a counter-offensive. Cultural and artistic practices as the ones docu-
mented in this book can make crucially important contributions to this project.
What is even more important is to emphasize the stubbornness of migration in 
such a global predicament as the one we are living through. The dynamics of migra-
tion continue to be characterized and prompted by elements of autonomy (from the 
hardening of borders as well as from the imagined equilibrium of “migration man-
agement”) that are dramatically apparent in the Central Mediterranean no less than 
along the border between the U.S. and Mexico and elsewhere in the world. It is this 
autonomy that sustains the “fugitivity” (a notion borrowed from Fred Moten) of mi-
grant movement that — as the editors write in their introduction — this book “seeks 
to hold open.” La frontera está cerrada, pero vamos a pasar (“the border is closed, but we 
will cross”), a phrase from a Honduran song circulating among migrants’ caravans 
across Mexico, effectively instantiates what I call the stubbornness of migration. This 
is a constitutive feature of global migration today. It crisscrosses what we could term 
its “political anatomy,” and it sheds light on the subjective stakes surrounding con-
temporary conf licts around borders and migration. Such a stubbornness of migration 
challenges us to invent a notion of freedom of movement capable of foreshadowing 
a different society, a different way to live together beyond the asphyxiating “double 
pincer” of nationalism and neoliberalism. This book makes an outstanding contribu-
tion to this project, connecting “moving media” and “mobile positions” and building 
archives that invite readers to turn them into weapons for struggle.
4   Tazzioli, “Crimes of Solidarity.” 
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Through the Black Country, or, The Sources of the Thames 
Around the Great Shires of Lower England and Down  
the Severn River to the Atlantic Ocean
Allan deSouza
The following extracts are from the expedition diaries of the Zanzibari crypto-ethnologist, Ha-
feed Sidi Mubarak Mumbai, the fictional great-grandson of the historical figure, Sidi Mubarak 
Bombay, (1820-1885). Bombay acquired his moniker af ter being enslaved in East Africa and 
sent to Bombay, India. Upon gaining his freedom and returning to Africa, he acted as guide 
and translator for a number of expeditions across Africa, including ones led by Henry Stanley. 
Bombay became renowned as the most widely traveled person in C19th Africa. Almost a hun-
dred and fif ty years later, Mumbai fulfilled his great grandfather Bombay’s unrealized wish to 
lead an expedition to England.
In a diary transposed by Allan deSouza from Henry Stanley’s 1874 journal of his expedition 
to find the source of the Nile, Mumbai’s quest leads him across London to discover the elusive 
source of the fabled River Thames. In so doing, Mumbai ingests deSouza’s own navigational 
history as an immigrant from East Africa to Britain.
Chapter 1
Arrival at London — Life in the city of London, its peoples, roads, f lora and buildings — Some 
customs of the English — Europeans in London — Encounters with the Cockney — Selection 
and purchase of goods for the journey — The ferment of Barking and beginning the journey.
May 21.—The undulating ridges, and the gentle slopes clad with sycamores and elm 
trees bathed in cool vapour, seemed in that tranquil drowsy state which at all times any 
portion of temperate Europe presents at first appearance. A pale-grey sky covered the 
hazy land and sleeping sea as we cruised through the channel that separates England 
from the continent. Every stranger, at first view of the shores, proclaims his displeas-
ure. The dreary verdure, the distant pale ridges, the sluggish sea, the thick gauzy at-
mosphere, the semi-mysterious silence which pervades all nature, evoke his despera-
tion. For it is probable that he has sailed through the stif ling North Sea, with the grim, 
frowning camps of Calais on the one hand, and on the other the dreary, ochreous-
coloured ridges of the English Peninsula; and perhaps the aspect of the arid limestone 
rocks of Folkstone and the dry white bluffs of Dover is still fresh in his memory.
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But a great change has taken place. As he passes close to the concrete works and docks 
of Gravesend and Tilbury, he views nature robbed of its greenest verdure, with a nox-
ious drabness of colour, sweating stench to the incoming wanderer. He is wearied 
with the unnatural deep-grey of the sea, and eager for any change. He remembers 
the unconquerable moistness and the wet bleached heights he last saw, and lo! What 
a change! Responding to his half formed wish, the ground rises before him arid, con-
cretic, eructive with gaseousness. Chimneys raise their striated necks and warehouses 
their great hefts of white-grey expanse; walls with impenetrable wire heads, thickets 
of iron, pungent smoke, and spreading throttling morning glory, spike and disgrace 
the landscape. Ash heaps loom up in great massive cones of grit and dust, while be-
tween the docks and in every open space wiry grasses and plants crack the ground 
with thin sproutings of umbrage. There is something bland or frigid in the view before 
him, and his gaze is distracted from any special feature, because all is toned down to 
a uniform greyness by the exhalation rising from the cold heaving bosom of the land. 
His imagination is therefore caught and stilled, his mind loses its restless activity, and 
freezes under the inf luence of the eternal winter atmosphere.
Presently on the horizon there rises the thin upright shadows of crane skeletons, 
and to the left begins to glimmer a pale grey mass which, we are told, is the capital of 
the island of England. Still cruising westward, we come within spitting distance of the 
low dun shores, and now begin to be able to define the capital. It consists of a number 
of rectangular massive structures, with great variety of height and all greyish, stand-
ing on a point of low land, separated by a broad margin of concrete wall from the river, 
with a f lood barrier curving gently from the point, outwards to the left towards us.
Within two hours from the time we first caught sight of the city, we have stopped 
about 700 yards from the bank. The arrival of the ferry causes a sensation. It is the 
daily “migrant train” from Calais and Europe! 
The stranger, of course, is intensely interested in this life existing near the English 
meridian, now first revealed to him, and all that he sees and hears of figures and faces 
and sounds is being freshly impressed on his memory. Figures and faces are pictur-
esque enough. Grim, miserable looking men of white, pink or brackish colour, with 
hooded sweat shirts, move about with slow, lethargic motion, and cry out, regard-
less of order, to their friends and mates in the Cockney or Polish language, and their 
friends or mates respond with equally loud voice and lively gesture, until, with fresh 
arrivals, there appears to be a Babel created, wherein, Cockney, Polish, Bangladeshi, 
and Somali accents mix with Arabic, French, and, perhaps, Igbo.
May 26.—Life at London is a busy one to the intending explorer. Time f lies rapidly, and 
each moment of daylight must be employed in the selection and purchase of the vari-
ous kinds of fashion-wear, jewelry, and electronics, in demand by the different tribes 
of the hinterland through whose counties he purposes journeying. Strong, tattooed 
lads come in with great cases of stone-washed denims, striped and f lannel fabrics, 
neckties and baseball caps, bags of red, white, blue, lead and silver-coloured phones, 
small and large, slim and fat, and coils upon coils of thick headphones. These have to 
be inspected, assorted, arranged, and numbered separately, have to be packed in port-
able boxes, stacks, or packages, or boxed according to their character and value. The 
house-f loors are littered with cast-off wrappings and covers, box-lids, and a medley 
of rejected paper, cloth, phone covers and broken screens, styrofoam and other debris. 
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Layabouts and workers and “messengers,” employees and employers, pass backwards 
and forwards, to and fro, amid all this litter, roll carry-ons over, or tumble about boxes; 
and a rending of cardboard or paper, clattering of metal, demands for the marking 
pens, or the number of case and box, with quick hurried breathing and shouting, are 
heard from early morning until night.
Towards evening, after such a stultifying day of glaring cold and busy toil, comes 
weariness: the armchair is sought, and tobacco with a pot of tea rounds off the un-
eventful hours. Or, as sometimes the case would be, we would strike work early, and 
after an unwholesome dinner at 6:30 p.m., would get on the Tube and ride out into 
the interior of the city, returning during the long twilight. Or we would take the Dock 
Land light railway to the White Chapel — to the “Gherkin,” where it stands unnatural 
and sentinel-like over humble abodes on the crest of an ancient reach behind the Tower. 
Or, as the last and only resources left to a contemplative and studious mind, we would 
take our easy-chairs on the balcony, where the echoes of the financiers are resounding 
and cruel, and with our feet elevated above our heads, watch the night coming.
If we take our ride, in a few minutes we may note, at the pleasantest hour, those lo-
cal features which, with the thermometer at 45 Fahr., might have been a dubious pleas-
ure, or, at any rate, disagreeable. Through a narrow, crooked, cobbled lane, our boots 
clattering noisily as we go, we walk by the tall, glass-faced, massive offices, which rise 
to ten and fifteen stories above our heads. The workplaces of the financiers and the of-
ficials here stand side by side, and at the tall doorway of each stands a doorman — as 
comfortable as his circumstances will permit. As we pass on, we get short views of the 
river, and then plunge again into the lane until we come in view of the pockmarked old 
Tower, crumbling fast into disuse and demolition. Years ago, behind it, there was a 
market where jellied eels were being sold. Happily there is no such market now.
We presently catch sight, on our right, of the entrance to the Tower at which sit on 
guard a few lazy Beefeaters and stern looking Coppers. On our left is the saluting bat-
tery, which does ceremonial service for the ignition of gunpowder, an antique mode 
of exchanging compliments with ships of war, and of paying respect to Monarchy of-
ficials. The customs warehouses are close by, and directly in front of us rises the lofty 
house and brothel of the Prince Harry. It is a respectable-looking building of the Eng-
lish architecture which finds favour at Windsor, three stories high and brick-lined — as 
all houses here appear to be. It is connected by a concrete footbridge, about 20 feet 
above our heads, with a large house on the opposite side of the lane, and possesses an 
imposing doorway raised 3 feet above the street, and reached by four or five broad and 
curved-steps. Within the lower hall are some coppers of the same uniform as those at 
the Tower, with the submachine gun, or pistol, Taser, and truncheon. A very short time 
takes us into a still narrower lane, where the brick is not so red as at Hampstead, the 
English quarter. We are in the neighborhood of Brick Lane now, where the Englishman 
who has not been able to locate himself at Hampstead is obliged to put up with neigh-
bours of East Indian race or Jews. Past and beyond Brick Lane is a medley of tall white 
offices and low sweatshops, where wealth and squalor jostle side by side, and then we 
find ourselves at the Thread Needle street, which extends down to Pudding Lane and 
the Monument.
Having crossed the bridge from Saint Pauls, we are in what is very appropriately 
termed South Wark, or “t’other side.” The street is wide, but the quarter is more squal-
id. It is here we find the “Riffraff,” whose services the traveler will require as guide 
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in the country. Here they live miserably with the well-to-do Commuters, or Yuppies, 
and poor Bastards, Gujaratis, Blacks, Arabs, Bangladeshis, and respectable migrant 
shopkeepers, and tradesmen. When the people have donned their holiday attire, South 
Wark becomes picturesque, even gay, and yields itself up to wild, frolicsome abandon 
of mirth. On working days, though the colours are still varied, and give relief to the 
rain-blackened concrete walls, this poor man’s district has a dingy hue, which scowling 
faces and badly dressed bodies seems to deepen. However, the quarter is only a mile 
and a half long, and quickening our paces, we soon have before us detached houses and 
mews, clusters of elms and old beech trees crowned with enormous light green domes 
of foliage. For about three miles one can enjoy a gallop along an ochreous-coloured 
road of respectable width, bordered with hedges. Behind the hedges grow the roses, 
lavender, daisy, iris, foxglove, dogwood, and clematis, gooseberry, mallow, diversified 
with patches of blackberry, rhubarb, plums, and sweetpea, and almost every vegetable 
of temperate growth. The allotments, gently undulating, display the variety of their 
vegetation, on which the lights and shadows play, deepening, or paling as the setting 
sun clouds or reveals the charms of verdure.
Finally arriving upon the crest of Black Heath Common, we have a most beautiful 
view of the roadstead and city, and, as we turn to regard it, are struck with the land-
scape lying at our feet. Sloping away gradually towards the city, the temperate trees 
already mentioned seem, in the bird’s-eye view, to mass themselves into a thin forest, 
out of which, however, we can pick out clearly the details of f lora and man’s building. 
Whatever of beauty may be in the scene, it is Nature’s own, for man has done little; 
he has but planted a root, or a seed, or a tender sapling carelessly. Nature has nour-
ished the root and the seed and the sapling, until they became spindly giants, rising 
one above another in hillocks of light green verdure, and has given to the whole that 
numbing shallowness and uniformity of colour which she only exhibits in the temper-
ate zones.
June 17.—The English have turned their backs on the modern world and its cosmopoli-
tan exchanges, and have retreated into their tribal ranks. I find this narrow-minded-
ness unfathomable, but it must be surmised from their low intelligence. I fear their 
rejection of the outside world, their “Brexit,” will cause them to return to their nutri-
tionally-lacking traditional diet, whose evidence is painfully displayed in their sallow 
skin and poor dental health. It is a wonder that they have survived this long, though 
they have learned to consume and do so in great quantities the foods, such as curries 
and kebabs, of other shores.
June 21.—The English never appear particularly friendly, and they seem to have a phys-
ical inability to smile, especially in the males. I have not had the opportunity to con-
duct a dissection, so cannot be sure if it is, in fact, a failing of the musculature.
When asking directions, which I occasionally have cause to do, given the impen-
etrability of the terrain, the natives seem for the most part willing to assist. One can 
never be sure, however, of their trustworthiness, and I make it a point to ask a second 
or third, sometimes in deliberate view of the first. It’s important to let them see that I 
won’t be fooled.
It is of potential danger to speak with their women, though with polite banter 
about the weather and about the prices of goods, they seem to be open. Their men, 
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however, watch these interactions carefully for any infringement on what they see as 
impropriety towards their women. I have seen groups of young males suddenly turn 
violent, hurling vitriolic epithets towards the outsider and towards their own women, 
should they be seen to be “too friendly.”
The men are daily intoxicated on a warm, f lat, bitter brew which they consume in 
spectacularly large quantities at communal drinking holes. They watch “matches” (not 
to be confused with fire-lighting materials) in which two groups of men identified by 
ritual colours interminably kick back and forth a spherical pig- or cow-skin, to no ap-
parent purpose. While the aftermath of these matches can result in mass rampages 
and pitched battles, I believe that these are nevertheless intended to alleviate these 
same men being otherwise shipped off to wage wars against other tribes in locations 
across the seas.
July 9.—The German escapees who accompanied the Empress Victoria, the great, great 
grandmother of the present Queen, took unto themselves, after the custom of mo-
nogamists, wives of their own race according to their means, and almost all of them 
purchased negro concubines, the result of which we trace today in the various com-
plexions of those who call themselves English. By this process of miscegenation the 
English of the later migrations are already rapidly losing their pale colour and sallow 
complexions, while the descendants of the English of the earlier Huguenot migration 
are now deteriorated so much that on the coast they can scarcely be distinguished 
from the Irish.
July 12.—None of the Europeans with whom I made acquaintance ever proceeded 
thither with the definite intention of settling. Some were driven thither, by false hopes 
of acquiring rapid fortunes by the labour of waitressing and shopkeeping, and, per-
ceiving that there were worse places on earth than England, preferred to remain there, 
to facing the odium of failure. Others borrowed large sums on trust from credulous 
politicians and moneylenders, and having failed in the venture now prefer to endure 
the exclusion to which they have subjected themselves, to returning and being arrested 
by their enraged creditors. Others again are not merely bankrupts, but persons who 
have f led the vengeance of the law for political offences, as well as ordinary crimes. 
There are many who are in better circumstances in the interior than they would be in 
their own lands of Europe.
The Easterners of Europe, whether from more frequent intercourse with Arabs or 
from other causes, are undoubtedly the best of their race. More easily amenable to 
reason than those of Scandinavia, or the shy, reserved, bigoted fanatics of Italy, they 
offer no obstacles to the traveler, but are sociable, frank, good-natured, and hospitable. 
In business they are keen traders, and of course will exact the highest percentage of 
profit out of the unsuspecting traveler if they are permitted. They are staunch friends 
and desperate haters. Blood is seldom satisfied without blood, unless extraordinary 
sacrifices are made.
The conduct of an Eastern gentleman is perfect. Indelicate matters are never 
broached before strangers; impertinence is hushed instantly by the elders, and rude-
ness is never permitted. Naturally, they have the vices of their education, blood, and 
race, but these moral blemishes are by their traditional excellence of breeding seldom 
obtruded upon the observation of the stranger.
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July 16.—Of the Cockney there will be much written in the following pages, the out-
come of careful study and a long experience of them. Few travelers have recorded an-
ything greatly to their credit. One of them lately said that the English know neither 
love nor affection; another that he is simply the “link” between the fox and the hound. 
Another says, “The wretches take a trouble and display an ingenuity in opposition and 
disobedience, in perversity, annoyance, and villainy, which rightly directed would 
make them invaluable.” Almost all have been severe in their strictures on the English 
of London.
I have come to perceive that the Cockney represent in their character much of the 
disposition of a large portion of the southern people of the continent. I find them ca-
pable of great love and affection, and possessed of gratitude and other noble traits 
of human nature; I know too, that they can be made good, obedient followers, that 
many are clever, honest, industrious, docile, enterprising, brave and moral; that they 
are, in short, equal to any other race or class on the face of the globe, in all the attrib-
utes of manhood. But to be able to perceive their worth, the traveler must bring an 
unprejudiced judgment, a clear, fresh, and patient observation, and must forget that 
lofty standard of excellence upon which he and his class pride themselves, before he 
can fairly appreciate the capabilities of the London Englishman. The traveler should 
not forget the origin of his own race, the condition of the Swahili Coast before da Gama 
visited his country, but should rather recall to mind the first state of the “traveler,” and 
the original circumstances and surroundings of Civilized Man.
July 21.—Being, I hope, free from prejudice of cast, colour, race, or nationality, and 
endeavouring to pass what I believe to be a just judgment upon the English of London, 
I find that they are a people just emerged into the Culinary Epoch, and now thrust 
forcibly under the notice of nations who have left them behind by the improvements of 
over 400 years. They possess beyond doubt all the vices of a people still fixed deeply in 
lard, but they understand to the full what and how low such a state is; it is, therefore, 
a duty imposed upon us by the science we profess, and by the official rules of the EU, 
to help them out of the deplorable state they are now in. At any rate, before we begin 
to hope for the improvement of races so long benighted, let us leave off this impotent 
bewailing of their vices, and endeavor to discover some of the virtues they possess as 
men, for it must be by the aid of their virtues, and not by their vices, that the emissary 
of nutrition can ever hope to assist them. While, therefore, recording my experiences 
throughout England, I shall have frequent occasion to dilate upon both the vices and 
the virtues of the Cockney as well as of the Brummie of the interior, but it will not be 
with a view to foster, on the one hand, the self-deception of the civilized, or the absurd 
prejudices created by centuries of superior advantages, nor, on the other hand, to lead 
men astray by taking a too bright view of things. I shall write solely and simply with a 
strong desire to enable all interested in the Englishman to understand his mental and 
moral powers rightly.
July 24.—The Cockney or native of London, who dwells at Bow, is a happy, jovial soul. 
He is fond of company, therefore sociable. His vanity causes him to be ambitious of pos-
sessing several dark suits and bright red ties, and since he has observed that his supe-
riors carry briefcases, he is almost certain, if he is rich enough to own a dark suit and a 
red tie, to be seen sporting a cowhide brief. The very poorest of his class hire themselves, 
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or are hired out by their wives, to carry bales, boxes, and goods, from the custom house 
to the ship, or store-room, or vice versa, and as a general beast of burden, for donkeys 
are few, and of robotic vehicles there are none. Those who prefer light work and have 
good characters may obtain positions of doorkeepers, or chauffeurs, or for waiting 
tables and personal assistants for the European merchants. Others, trained as build-
ers, obtain a livelihood by repairing houses, manufacturing tables, sideboards, and 
fixtures, or by plumbing and gardening. There is a class of Cockney living at Bow, in 
the small estates of the interior of the city, and along the banks of the river, who prefer 
the wandering life offered to them by lorry driving and long-distance routes to be-
ing subject to the caprice, tyranny, and meanness of small business proprietors. They 
complain that the proprietors are haughty, grasping, and exacting; that they abuse 
them and pay them badly; that if they seek justice at the hands of the courts, judgment, 
somehow, always goes against them. They say, on the other hand, that, when driving 
lorries or cabs, they are well paid, have an abundance to eat, and comparatively but 
little work.
August 4.—It is a most sobering employment, the organizing of an English tour. You 
are constantly engaged, mind and body; now in casting up accounts, and now trav-
elling to and fro hurriedly to receive scouts, inspecting purchases, bargaining with 
keen-eyed, relentless Hindi merchants, writing memoranda, haggling over extor-
tionate prices, packing up a multitude of small utilities, pondering about your lists 
of articles, wanted, purchased, and unpurchased, groping about in the recesses of a 
highly exercised imagination for what you ought to purchase, and cannot do without, 
superintending, arranging, assorting, and packing. And this is under a temperature 
of 45 Fahr.
August 14.—East London villages on the mainland near the river offer exceptionally 
good starting-points for the unexplored interior, for many reasons. First. Because the 
travelers and the natives are strangers to one another, and a slight knowledge of their 
power of mutual cohesion, habits, and relative inf luences, is desirable before launch-
ing out into the wilds. Second. The natives of those estuarine villages are accustomed 
to having their normally languid and peaceful life invaded and startled by the bustle of 
foreigners arriving by sea and from the continent, Indian traders bound for the interi-
or and youthful American missionaries from Utah. Third. A tour not fully recruited to 
its necessary strength in London may be easily reinforced at these ports by volunteers 
of migrant workers who are desirous of returning to their homes, and who, day by day, 
along the route, will straggle in towards it until the list is full and complete.
These, then, were the principal reasons for my selection of Barking as the initial 
point, from whence, after inoculating the various untamed spirits who had now en-
listed under me, with a respect for order and discipline, obedience and system (the 
true prophylactic against failure) I should be free to rove where discoveries would be 
fruitful. This “inoculation” will not, however, commence until after a study of their 
natures, their deficiencies and weaknesses. The exhibition of force, at this juncture, 
would be dangerous to our prospects, and all means gentle, patient, and persuasive, 
have, therefore, to be tried first. Whatever deficiencies, weaknesses, and foibles the 
people may develop must be so manipulated that, while they are learning the novel 
lesson of obedience, they may only just suspect that behind all this there lies the strong 
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unbending force which will eventually make men of them, wild things though they 
now are. For the first few months, then, forbearance is absolutely necessary. The white 
brother, wild as a colt, chafing, restless, ferociously impulsive, superstitiously timid, 
liable to furious demonstrations, suspicious and unreasonable, must be forgiven sev-
enty times seven, until the period of probation is passed. Long before this period is 
over, such temperate conduct will have enlisted a powerful force, attached to their 
leader by bonds of good-will and respect, even, perhaps, of love and devotion, and by 
the moral inf luence of their support even the most incorrigible “skin head” will be re-
strained, and finally conquered.
Many things will transpire during the first few weeks which will make the travel-
er sigh and wish that he had not ventured upon what promises to be a hopeless task. 
Maddened by strong drinks and drugs, jealous of their status in the EU, regretting 
also, like ourselves, that they had been so hasty in undertaking the exit, brooding over 
the joys of the land fast receding from them, anxious for the future, susceptible to 
the first and every inf luence that assails them with temptations to return to the f lock, 
these people require to be treated with the utmost kindness and consideration, and the 
intending traveler must be wisely circumspect in his intercourse with them. From my 
experiences of such men, it will be readily believed that I had prepared for the scenes 
which I knew were to follow at Barking, and that all my precautions had been taken.
Within three hours Barking was in a ferment, “The traveler has brought all the rob-
bers, rapists, and murderers of Europe to take possession of the land,” was the rumour 
that ran wildly through all the streets, lanes, courts, and pubs. Men with bloody faces, 
wild, bloodshot eyes, bedraggled, rumpled and torn clothes, reeled up to our orderly 
and nearly silent quarters clamouring for retribution and snacks. Islingtonians with 
raised shovels, and tanned Hampsteadites with brollies ready to be drawn, came up 
threatening, and, following them, a miscellaneous rabble of excited men, while, in the 
background, seethed a mob of frantic women and mischievous children.
“What is the matter?” I asked, scarcely knowing how to begin to calm this turbulent 
mass of passionate beings.
“Matter!” was echoed. “What is the matter?” was repeated. “Matter enough. The 
land is in an uproar. Your men are stealing, lying, robbing goods from the shops, 
breaking plates, killing our pigeons, assaulting everybody, drawing knives on our 
women after abusing them, and threatening to burn down the town and exterminate 
everybody. Matter indeed! Matter enough! What do you mean by bringing this savage 
rabble from Europe?” so fumed and sputtered a Riffraff of some consequence among 
the magnates of Shepherd Bush.
“Dear me, my friend, this is shocking; terrible. Pray sit down, and be patient. Sit 
down here by me, and let us just talk this over like wise men,” I said in soothing tones 
to this enfant kutisha, for he really looked in feature, dress, and demeanour, what, had 
I been an imaginative raw youth, I should have set down as the “incarnate scourge of 
England,” and he looked wicked enough with his besuited, striped sleeves, his bran-
dished cowhide brief, and fierce blue eyes, to chop off my innocent head.
Introduction
In and Against Crisis
Tyler Morgenstern, Krista Lynes, and Ian Alan Paul
On March 6, 2019, as the initial manuscript of this book — the product of a years-long, 
collaborative effort to think what has, since 2015, been known as the European Mi-
grant Crisis — was nearing completion, the official Twitter account of the European 
Commission posted this brief message: “In very difficult circumstances, we acted to-
gether. Europe is no longer experiencing the migration crisis of 2015, but structural 
problems remain. Today we discuss the European Agenda on Migration & the progress 
made over the past 4 years.” The post concludes with a URL that points to a brief press 
release, detailing achievements made and work yet to be done, or in the Commission’s 
parlance, “Immediate Measures Needed.” 
In our years spent working with others to track and grasp this crisis, we had only 
seen it expand in every direction and dimension, radiating outward from the itinerar-
ies around which it had initially coalesced, the Syria-Turkey-Greece-Western Europe 
route in particular. We had seen it wend its way into sub-Saharan Africa, where na-
tions like Niger, under EU supervision and sponsorship, now play a key role in policing 
the movements of migrants from elsewhere on the continent, defraying and preempt-
ing their arrival to more northerly transit nations like Morocco and Algeria (themselves 
now mired in violent border disputes to which cries of “build a wall” are by no means 
alien). We had seen it produce peculiar and unexpected new forms of (im)mobility, so-
ciality, and inhabitation. And along with much of the rest of the world, we had watched 
as it engendered new and vexing forms of diplomacy, transnational governance, and 
legislative (non)-collaboration.
Having drummed up a potent wave of anti-migrant sentiment, for instance, the 
British right in 2016succeeded in its quest to make withdrawal from the EU a matter 
of national policy. Meanwhile, Germany — in many ways the architect of EU-wide im-
migration enforcement policies — forged a new agreement with Turkey that promised 
accelerated EU membership for the latter in exchange for its taking an increased role in 
the sequestration and resettlement of Syrian refugees. On the one side, the shibboleth 
of border security fractures and rends the imagined space of Europe; on the other, it 
extends it. It was striking, then, to learn that, in the midst of these dramatic geopo-
litical realignments, the “crisis” around which this anthology is centered had ended, 
at least as far as the European Commission was concerned; that whatever calamity 
it once portended for the EU project had been successfully defrayed, attenuated, and 
contained.
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But surprises can often be clarifying. Here, stated more or less explicitly, was the 
thesis under which we had first envisioned this collection: that the unspoken object 
of ‘crisis’ in the formation ‘migrant crisis’ was and always had been Europe, imagined 
as a site of right action and just governance, and never the migrant as such; that the 
legislative and geopolitical maneuvers taken under the auspices of ‘responding to the 
migrant crisis’ since 2015 had been less about rescuing the migrant in peril, and more 
about rescuing the idea of Europe from this same migrant, about restoring a vision of 
territorial governance and administrative right-headedness that had been imperilled 
by the arrival of the migrant to European shores.
But if our sustained consideration of the crisis has taught us anything, it is that 
this once-implicit formulation, now explicit, does little to change the fact that since 
and well prior to 2015, it has been the migrant — a radically plural subject, a population 
vastly more expansive, variegated and lively than the discourse of crisis has ever been 
able to grasp — who has most directly shouldered the violent intensities of the EU’s at-
tempts at mitigation and control, at rescuing itself from a peril of its own making. As 
Thomas Nail, a contributor to this collection, writes: 
“If the mistreatment, marginalization, and death of recent European migrants is so de-
plorable, it is because Europe has created a social system that has made this a reality. 
The subject of the crisis should be flipped right side up: Europe is a crisis for migrants. 
Therefore, the critical question (in the Greek sense of the word ‘krisis’ as a decision) is 
not what is to be done with the migrants, but rather what is to be done with Europe?”1
Gathering scholars, activists, and artists working across a variety of geopolitical con-
texts, disciplines and media, this anthology takes steps toward unpacking this diffi-
cult, often bewildering question, and does so specifically by interrogating how a wide 
range of mediating processes and representational practices work to constitute “mi-
grant crises” as objects of political contention, affective investment, and legal maneu-
ver. The anthology’s title, Moving Images, summons the f luidity and dispersal of these 
processes, referencing the contemporary dynamics of mediation and migration in at 
least four overlapping ways. First, it invokes the specificity of mediating technologies 
themselves, pointing to the different ways in which still vs. moving-image technolo-
gies have been brought to bear on the task of representing the migrant crisis. Second, 
it refers to the iconography of the crisis as such, to those images of movement and mo-
bility, often under duress, that have rendered the crisis legible for differently situated 
yet still global publics. Third, it touches on the movement of the image in and of itself, 
and the politics that inevitably attends this movement, pointing up the important role 
of various data infrastructures, social media platforms, and communicative networks 
in putting certain visions of migration and / as crisis into circulation and keeping them 
there, in moving images of migration into and through discrepant scenes of political 
action and cultural practice. Finally, and just as significantly, it points to the potent af-
fective charge that often accretes to popular images of “crisis,” and thus to the moving 
quality of images that hold viewers in their grip and bind them to others, with pro-
found political and social consequences.
1   Nail, “The Hordes Are Banging on the Gates of Europe?”
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In focusing on the European “migrant crisis,” Moving Images takes up the eruptive 
and contestatory events of 2015–16 critically, not as a self-evident historical object or 
political enterprise, but rather as a tangle of processes, ideas, legal frameworks, ac-
tions, bodies, and images whose very contours eclipse its precedents and afterlives. 
We begin in the predicament that the term “crisis” poses, conscious that its framing of 
mass displacement, refugeeism, and migration in and across the Mediterranean oc-
cludes the longue durée in which the very question of Europe has been articulated — so-
cially, juridically, geopolitically and economically.2 
The elaborate response to the question of Europe, over time, has been a violent 
and regionally-differentiated shuttling back and forth between free movement and 
control, a decades-long choreography of willed and unwilled movement, interminable 
delay, cosmopolitan transgression, and fierce essentialism. The very idea of Europe in 
the latter part of the twentieth-century — with its economic integration and lessening 
of internal controls, coordination of judicial practices, and regulation of movement 
within its territory — has been accompanied by a coextensive focalization and fierce 
securitization of its so-called “external” frontiers. The internal mobility afforded to 
citizens of EU member states under the Schengen Rules of 1995, for instance, finds not 
so much its negative image as its enabling condition in the unified measures against 
“illegal” immigration and trans-border organized crime (which transnationalized the 
governance of migration), formalized as the private border policing agency Frontex (a 
contraction of frontières extérieurs, or external borders) a decade later.3 Thinking such 
policies less as action and reaction than as the twin products of a shared imperative to 
strategically manage the movement of people, capital, and information into and across 
European territory suggests that Schengen did not so much abolish the operations of 
European border control as spatially redistribute them, pushing them outwards to 
various continental boundaries and frontiers as well as into a number of transit spaces 
within the Eurozone (railway stations, motorways, etc.).4 
Thus, though it is tempting to regard these geographies of mobility and constraint 
as essentially new formations in the light of the configuration of “crisis,” in many cases 
they follow paths that are all-too-familiar. While the 2015–16 migration “crisis” is cer-
tainly a result of instability and conf lict in certain areas of East and North Africa, the 
Middle East, and even South Asia5—all of which, of course, find themselves bound to 
Europe in part through the long history of empire and its afterlives, which is to say, 
2   It should be noted that Fernand Braudel develops his formulation of longue durée (among other plac-
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of European migration, invasion, and settlement abroad — it is at the same time the 
culmination of a dialectical movement of mobility and constraint, cosmopolitical in-
tegration and “retrograde” ethnic, national, and racial differentiation, through which 
Europe as such has sought to define itself at least since the 1957 Treaty of Rome.6 How 
the aftershocks of crisis have been negotiated re-animate various elements of this dif-
fuse but pervasive historical trajectory.
That Frontex’s first major deployments have been along the Turkey-Greece border 
(considered by the agency to be both its operational “center of gravity” and a tactical 
“laboratory”), for instance, comes as little surprise, pointing to the ways in which West-
ern and Northern European nation-states have long sought to strategically recruit 
their Eastern and Southern counterparts — particularly those that border the Medi-
terranean — to the task of shoring up a coherent, integrated vision of Europe Proper.7 
Such strategies remain very much in play in the contemporary moment, and are ampli-
fied by European attempts to establish bordering regimes across an expanding and re-
mote frontier (including in Chad, Niger and Libya).8 As these arrangements make clear, 
“Europe” as an ideological, legal, economic, and political construction leans heavily on 
well-trodden repertoires of cultural and ethnic differentiation, distributing both the 
specter of threat and the necessity of control to the borders of the former Soviet Un-
ion, to the Mediterranean and the Aegean seas, to the former African colonies, and to 
what was once “the Orient.” While these discourses are clearly racialized, ethnic, and 
nationalist, they are also profoundly gendered and sexualized, marked not only by dif-
ferential vulnerabilities and capacities for movement but also by shifts in affective la-
bor, reduced programmes for ‘family reunification,’ sexual violence and persecutions, 
trafficking and sex work.
We thus ask, in what meaningful sense does the ongoing and in many ways regu-
larized production of Europe vis-à-vis both licit and illicit modalities of human migra-
tion constitute a “crisis,” a term which suggests a certain suddenness, an all-at-once 
that shatters expectation? Further, how does this crisis take shape as an object of po-
litical contention? Through what repertoire of images, trajectories of movement, chan-














As the open data project The Migrants’ Files carefully records, what has quite suddenly 
been deemed a “crisis” has in fact been unfolding continuously and coterminously 
with the shifting configurations that take the name “Europe” for nearly two decades. 
Since 1993, more than 35,000 migrants have been lost during the perilous crossing to 
Europe — a staggering disaster by any measure.9 And yet these deaths only seemed 
to emerge as a “crisis” proper in 2013, as traumatic images surfaced of 360 migrants 
drowned off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa. Against the spectral back-
ground of Lampedusa’s haunting image repertoire of overcrowded boats and drowned 
bodies (itself a resonant refocusing of the afterlives of the violence of the transatlan-
tic crossing), a cascade of piercing images began to surface and circulate in 2015, and 
in their surfacing gave shape to the event of the European “migrant crisis.” The cas-
cading surge of iconic images produced the contours of a regional emergency whose 
narrative structure postdated the very sea of images themselves. Between the two 
constructions — regularized migrant death and humanitarian crisis demanding re-
sponse — something happened; the task of this collection is to show how this something 
involves a substantial degree of media work and a particular set of “image operations.”
At stake is not only the spatial and geopolitical dynamics that shore up forms of 
belonging and unbelonging in the face of a movement that certainly precedes them. 
The impetus for this anthology also lies in a shared interest among its contributors in 
interrogating and disrupting the peculiar, oftentimes wrenching temporality of the 
migrant crisis as a visual phenomenon.10 We could not help but be overwhelmed by the 
sheer volume of harrowing images emerging from the region — large crowds huddled 
into disastrously insufficient vessels; asylum seekers crowded into rail stations, deten-
tion facilities, and more-or-less formal encampments in Greece, Turkey, France, Bul-
garia, Serbia; corpses, including those of young children, washed ashore in otherwise 
“pristine” Mediterranean resort towns. Particularly in its early months of 2015, the 
“migrant crisis” emerged as an object of contention through an overwhelming surfeit 
of images hailed by the international press as “iconic.” All the while, a number of ter-
rorist incidents behind the walls of Fortress Europe elicited ever-more fearsome per-
formances of national and ethnic absolutism, many of which drew directly on the very 
same iconography (one can hardly forget Nigel Farage’s noxious “BREAKING POINT” 
Brexit billboard in which a endless queue of migrants subtends the statement “The EU 
has failed us all”).
9   UNITED for Intercultural Action, “List of 35,597 documented deaths.” 
10   The collaboration among the editors began as a working group focused on the the notion of  ‘tres-
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To think in these terms is in fact to put the mediatic, discursive and rhetorical 
framework of “crisis” in question from the outset. As such, our thinking is animated 
by Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos’s claim that social change might be effected 
otherwise than through “events,” a manner of organizing historical time according to 
ruptures and breaks rather than the “practices which are at the heart of social trans-
formation long before we are able to name it as such.”11 Where we depart from their 
framework, however, is with respect to their claim that events are never “in the pre-
sent” and can only be named as such retrospectively or in anticipation.
We return to these processes of mediation in the image regime from the vantage 
point of the European commission’s avowed end to the “migrant crisis,” an end that is 
symbolized vividly by a project by the Swiss-Icelandic artist Christoph Buchel at the 
2019 Venice Biennale. Through a series of complicated negotiations with the Italian 
state, Buchel and his collaborator, the curator Maria Chiara di Trapani, had arranged 
to install on the Venetian Arsenale — for centuries the beating heart of the city’s formi-
dable maritime economy, and thus inseparable from the history of imperial plunder 
and racial slavery — the rusted remains of the 90-foot fishing vessel which, on April 
15, 2015, sank off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa, killing somewhere be-
tween 700 and 1100 migrants (itself a devastating rehearsal of another wreck two years 
prior, in which upwards of 400 migrants, mostly from Eritrea, Somalia, and Ghana, 
also drowned off the coast of Lampedusa when their boat sank). In comment to the 
Guardian, di Trapani describes the project in somewhat contradictory terms, both as a 
monumental memorial to the ongoing calamity of migrant death at sea, and as a clar-
ion call to action, a cry uniquely capable of piercing the media din that has since 2015 
accumulated around this loss. “We are living in a tragic moment without memory,” di 
Trapani asserts. “We all look at the news, and it seems so far away: someone is dead at 
sea and we change the channel.” The boat, she suggests, pleads for — demands — a dif-
ferent kind of engagement, its sheer scale asking that we “feel respect for it and look at 
it in silence — just keep two minutes of silence to listen and ref lect.”12 
What di Trapani does not indicate, however, is how this reverent silence is distinct 
from the reverent silence that so often greets the art object, symptomatic not so much 
of a sudden ethicality, but of the embodied and social codes of aesthetic looking, of the 
institutional conventions of the art world and, more importantly, the globalized art 
market, which descends on the Arsenale as so many trades before it: in naval equip-
ment, in weaponry, in captive bodies. In di Trapani’s comments, then, there is a latent 
sense that in cutting through one representational regime — that of the twenty-four 
hour news cycle, which produces migrant death as a grotesquely recursive yet utterly 
inconsequential spectacle — Buchel’s project may risk simply entombing it in another: 
that of the aesthetic gaze. Though perhaps installed as memorial, the boat quickly slips 
into the register of sculpture, liberated from the churn of commercial news only to be 
assimilated to the category ‘art,’ which even in its participatory forms (see Milevska, 
this volume) has fared little better in resisting dehumanizing, objectifying, and spec-
tacularizing modes of migrant representation.
That Buchel’s work would follow so closely on the EU’s declaration of the so-called 




suming present into a recent past, it becomes apt as well to pass from ongoing specta-
cle to museal object, demanding not urgent defensive maneuver but rather restrained 
aesthetic contemplation. This peculiar dovetailing of political and aesthetic maneuver, 
though perhaps incidental in this case, is nonetheless ref lective of the tight coupling 
between crisis as visual regime and crisis as object of political and legislative response 
that this collection attempts to interrogate and, even if only provisionally, prise apart.
As a group of scholars and cultural producers more or less anchored in some form 
of media and visual studies, we were increasingly preoccupied with the character, 
volume and movement of these visual and political regimes, as the discourse of crisis 
consolidated into a kind of shorthand for migration as such. And while we had initially 
sought to respond to a glut of photojournalistic and documentary images that spectac-
ularized, or risked spectacularizing, the migrant body as corpse, f lood, hoard, and so 
on, today we face a rather different situation. As Buchel’s oeuvre makes clear, the mi-
grant crisis, and indeed the migrant body, has become the locus of a highly formalized 
and notably more conventional regime of textual and aesthetic production. What was 
once an unruly and seemingly boundless f low of iconic images produced under severe 
duress has, in recent years, re-emerged as a set of professionalized and semi-profes-
sionalized image-making practices, ranging from glossy, BBC-produced docuseries 
like Exodus to a wide range of VR installations and smartphone apps that allow users 
to temporary inhabit the position of the migrant either stranded precariously at sea or 
in the midst of an overland crossing (in a particularly grim twist, such projects have 
become something of a mainstay at major international summits like Davos, where 
they play a role eerily similar to that of a carnival attraction for the world’s financial 
and political elites). And this is to say nothing of the innumerable responses that have 
emerged from the European and global art world, among which we might highlight the 
epic tableaux of Richard Mosse’s Heat Maps series (2017), Ai Weiwei’s Law of the Journey 
(2018), which repurposes Zodiac boats and life vests as sculptural works conceived on 
a colossal scale, as well as nuanced and moving filmic works as Gianfranco Rosi’s Fuo-
coammare (2016) and Philip Scheffner’s Havarie (2017).
In tracking these different media configurations, our point is not to reduce the cri-
sis as such or the larger structures of which it is symptomatic to mere representation, 
forgetting or simply discarding the severe and relentless material costs of European 
border security and immigration control. Rather, following Bishnupriya Ghosh’s con-
tribution to this collection, the aim is to develop a rigorous understanding of the visual 
as a series of “image operations,” that is, as emphatically real interventions into the 
whole field of institutional, political, and social relations within which migrant prac-
tices unfold. Jens Eder and Charlotte Klonk, in an anthology that follows from a confer-
ence held in Berlin in 2014, argue specifically that images are not only representational, 
referential or illustrative, but augment and create significant events, and thus have 
material effects.13 Combined with text, speech and music, images form part of mul-
timodal publications, intertextual networks and complex referential chains. They are 
put into operation through a complex, diffuse, multiple and sometimes simultaneous 
network of agencies — personal, technological, affective, and political. Images have a 
dynamic of their own, have a kind of “liveliness,” gathering velocity and accruing value.
13  Eder and Klonk, Image Operations.
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Particularly in the context of crisis, image production and consumption must be 
understood as attempts at action, as efforts to do something, or to make something 
happen: to express solidarity, to dis / affiliate oneself politically, to demand that par-
ticular kinds of rights be extended or withdrawn, to either occasion or retroactively 
justify the closure of checkpoints, border crossings, and points of entry. Image op-
erations are enacted immediately in the various state and para-state surveillance and 
border triage politics that regulate and contain people on the move, most obviously, 
but they also operate through the circuits of news media, NGOs and international or-
ganizations, and broadly across social media platforms. Images taken in one context 
have significant afterlives in the theaters of contestation around refugee rights and 
emergent forms of nationalism. Such mediating processes are, in some respects, noth-
ing new (there has been a daily instrumentality to image culture for at least a cen-
tury). They nevertheless have a new operational force deriving from their capacity to 
circulate rapidly, producing and fracturing common sentiment as they unfold across 
varied territories and constituencies. If this is the case, then how, politically, does the 
visual iconography of contemporary migration — overburdened boats, tattered life 
vests abandoned on the shore, throngs of would-be refugees pressed up against bor-
der fences, and now, sculptural and screen installations of various sorts — operate as a 
mode of seeing, sensing, and knowing what migration is? What is at stake when “crisis” 
becomes the affective and temporal ground against which the movement of human 
populations toward and across Europe’s terrestrial and maritime borders gains figu-
ration? When “crisis” animates and puts into motion an image repertoire with real and 
unpredictable political and material effects?
Across the essays, interventions and artistic works that comprise this collection, 
we track the wide-ranging itineraries and mercurial material, iconic, and discursive 
form of the “migrant crisis,” considering how it variously draws upon, shores up, but 
also potentially rends the very idea of Europe, inf laming fearsome ethnic national-
isms and prompting aggressive bordering operations while simultaneously resisting 
capture by given legal and semiotic categories. In doing so, we take aim at the ways 
in which “crisis” as both a discursive formation and a tightly-articulated visual re-
gime is conjured so as to naturalize European mechanisms of inclusion and belonging, 
and moreover, to secure a very particular vision of Europe — defined, as noted above, 
against particular sites and forms of difference — as a seat of just governance, moral 
integrity, and liberal freedom.
While we bind these questions to the case of contemporary Europe, the questions 
we pose are broader, opening up to the intersections of mediating processes (moving 
media) and migratory movement (mobile positions) as twinned modalities of a politics 
of “crisis.” The manufacture of emergencies along the US / Mexico border, expulsory 
measures in Australia, temporary labor movements into the United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia, signal that mediating migration as crisis is a global affair — both in its 
scope and its entanglement with the structures and apparatuses of capitalist f lows 
and embargoes. This collection is thus meant to think both the historical specificity 
and the abstract generalization of migration as crisis at once.
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Thinking From a Double Estrangement
For obvious reasons, the task of accounting for this peculiar trajectory calls directly on 
our respective disciplinary formations as researchers, scholars, artists, curators and 
editors. Many, though not all, interlocutors in the long dialogue from which the pre-
sent book emerges claim allegiance to some branch of media study, or perhaps more 
broadly cast, to the critical analysis of visual culture through a variety of media and 
genres. Our collective training, then, encompasses such approaches and methods as 
critical discourse analysis, art history and contemporary art practice, the politics of 
representation, feminist and queer theory, critical race studies, (new) media theory, 
curatorial practice, and to a lesser though still important extent, science and technol-
ogy studies. With several important exceptions, many of us wield these tools from the 
context of the North American and European academy,14 an institutional space that is 
in the grips of its own set of crises, many of which overlap explicitly and importantly 
with the politics of immigration, refugeeism, securitization, and state power. In some 
sense, then, we write, produce and curate from a position of double estrangement. In 
the first place, our training equips us to think the European migrant crisis not so much 
from an anthropological, sociological, or legal-theoretical perspective, but rather in 
terms of the way it circulates as a set of images, texts, processes, genres, and formats, 
and how these circulations proliferate particular understandings of “the migrant,” 
“the refugee,” and just as importantly, “Europe.” 
Given this mediatic framing of “crisis,” we ask: What happens when image cul-
tures becomes turbulent? Might something else be thought? Another theory of the po-
litical? A way of trespassing Europe — the territory, the project, ‘the very idea’—that 
does not finally locate the possibility of freedom within a fantasy of knowing hinged 
to the transparency of images? That looks to the social conditions of (forced) migra-
tion, listening for the hums of an otherwise that reverberate at and across the limits 
of figuration, straddling the turbid zone between excess and exhaustion — however 
narrow? “Turbulence,” writes Nicole Starosielski, “is a chaotic form of motion that is 
produced when the speed of a fluid exceeds a threshold relative to the environment it 
is moving through […] When a fluid — whether air, water, or blood — becomes turbu-
lent, it breaks down into smaller swirling currents, called eddies, which in a cascade 
break down into smaller and smaller irregular flows.”15 Our particular training posi-
tions us to home in on these procedures, interrogating and tracing how specific forms 
of representation — the forensic, the documentary, the photo-journalistic, the abstract 
or non-figurative, the participatory — seek to establish or extend certain programs of 
response and intervention, often to the exclusion of alternatives.
The second estrangement from and within which we think and write concerns our 
own position as editors (and, in a number of cases, as contributors) within the pre-
dominantly Anglophone North American academy. Over the course of our lengthy 
collaboration, our own scholarly and professional itineraries have, of course, passed 




15   Starosielski, The Undersea Network, 17.
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tent that the crisis has, in much popular discourse, been powerfully identified with 
certain bounded geographies, among them the Mediterranean, the Middle East and 
North Africa, and so forth). As a result, our discussions have been often discontinuous 
and elliptical, variously extended and distended by all manner of technical glitches and 
institutional forces — among them poor Internet connections and halting video feeds, 
multiple time zones, and more distressingly, the violent operations of state power and 
military force. To this extent, our thinking and writing has been profoundly condi-
tioned by very infrastructures of circulation and containment that we have these last 
four years attempted to theorize. There is (however and of course) a limit to what these 
experiences of distension and interruption can actually dislodge. We remain for bet-
ter and for worse the products of particular disciplinary formations and intellectual 
trajectories, with all their attendant methodological, analytic, and epistemic baggage. 
To be plain: we are not ‘Europeanists’ in any strict sense of the term.
Nevertheless, the anthology collects and enfolds a frictional contact among very 
different positionalities, critical, creative and political inheritances, and modes of ex-
pression and action. Located across North American, Europe, Africa and Asia, with 
personal trajectories that are more diverse and differentiated than this, many of us 
are nevertheless historically positioned to inherit the political, social, and institutional 
affordances of European imperialism and settler citizenship. Because this is an inher-
itance that we cannot simply elect to refuse, as if through some supreme act of political 
will, we are also positioned to reproduce and proliferate those affordances through 
our modes of affiliation and the infrastructures of critical and creative publication 
within which this anthology finds its place.
Located within institutions and intellectual communities that rigorously engage 
the settler-colonial formation of the Canadian and US nation-states, for instance, that 
participate differently but robustly in the contemporary politics of migration and bor-
dering as they unfold across the North American continent (not only at its putative 
edges, such as the US-Mexico and US-Canada borders), and that critically engage the 
relentless violence of white supremacist statecraft, interrogating its grotesque en-
semble of operations and techniques (mass incarceration, police brutality, systemic 
neglect, punishing surveillance, severe forms of deprivation and impoverishment), we 
are positioned to think questions of refugeeism, migration, and “crisis” in ways that 
perhaps trouble or at least qualify, for instance, investments in the capacity of nomi-
nally liberal-democratic nation-states to meaningfully respond to or ameliorate the 
regularized production of migrant death at the border, in prisons, in transit. We learn 
from scholarly and activist networks that make clear the structural entanglements of 
various programs of migrant inclusion and exclusion with ongoing efforts to extin-
guish Indigenous political orders (within which one can often glimpse radically differ-
ent articulations of sovereignty, nationhood, and belonging) as well as with the whole 
spectrum of governmental and institutional projects that operationalize a virulent 
and pervasive (though still nationally-inf lected) anti-blackness.16
16   And this is to say nothing of what we, and this book, have learned from our students. Variously po-





What such positioning produces, methodologically, is a theoretical debt to con-
temporary scholarship on movement that is more firmly located in critical race stud-
ies, feminist and queer theory, and postcolonial studies than in the literatures that 
frequently explain migration, exclusion, state and para-state governmentality and 
identity formation in a European context. It is also, nevertheless, allied with Marxian 
frameworks that insist upon the “autonomy of movement.” The insistence in Papado-
poulos et al, as well as Nicholas De Genova and others, on the “autonomy of movement,” 
reconfigures movement itself as a form of political action that resists structures of so-
cial and political control. In this respect, current “economic migrants” act in continu-
ity with vagabonds, pirates, maroons, rebelling slaves and others.17 Movement entails a 
potential form of f light from the political categories that organize and attribute rights 
and responsibilities in relation to the granting function of the nation-state (“citizen,” 
“laborer,” “family,” etc.).
Thus, while we raise the shorthands that make short work of the complexity of mi-
gration in and across the shifting territories that constitute the “crisis” (“Europe,” “mi-
grant,” for instance), our aim is not simply to critique them but also to trace other de-
parture and arrival points, focal lenses, and subjective and social dynamics that bring 
into view the primacy of movement (more broadly) to the constitution of social life. 
In line with a theory of movement’s autonomy, we assert that the European Union’s 
border control apparatuses entail not an overarching resistance to movement, but the 
selective and differentiating porousness of entry and exit points in a larger heteroge-
neous and hierarchized space of global circulation. Beyond the sanctioned movement 
of goods in the architectures of “free trade,” there are also the permit structures that 
have historically granted more-or-less-temporary-workers visas (without the accom-
panying rights of citizenship), as well as the sanctioned movements of Europeans out 
of the European territory. Indeed, the history of Europe might be conceived as one 
of overarching imperial movement: a history of violently displacing the sovereignty 
of territories abroad through (ongoing) processes of invasion, occupation, and settle-
ment; a history contingent on the forcible capture, enslavement, and global circulation 
of bodies made chattel.
“We are the Freedom of Movement:” Fugitivity and Autonomy
Beneath these patterned and bureaucratically-sanctioned circulations, however, there 
are other forms of movement that precede, subtend, shadow, or stray from the circu-
latory dynamics that constitute the “global system.” Prior to the “migrant crisis,” and 








17   See  for  instance Boutang, Economie politique des migrations clandestines de main-d’oeuvre  and Neilson 
and Mezzadra, Border as Method.
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prior even to “migration” or “refugeeism,” there is nevertheless movement. Prior to the 
deliberation of asylum claims, to the patterning of trajectories, to the interception of 
Zodiac boats, or to processing zones, there are displacements that do not name their 
routes, their motivations or their points of entry or exit. Papadopoulos et al. name 
this movement “escape,” by which they mean imperceptible moments in everyday life 
which trigger social transformation through the “refusal to subscribe to some aspects 
of the social order that seem to be inescapable and indispensable for governing the 
practicalities of life.”18 They call such acts “fugitive occurrences.”
In a vivid example of such an act, on May 20th, 2019, hundreds of protesters, most 
of African origin, many “sans-papiers,” descended on Charles De Gaulle International 
Airport north of Paris. In a nod to the Gilets Jaunes movement — whose tactics of sus-
tained urban protest had in the preceding months thrown cities like Paris into upheav-
al, turning them into sites of insurgent violence and dramatic clashes between dem-
onstrators and riot police — the protesters called themselves Gilets Noirs, or black vests. 
Occupying terminals 2F and 2G, they concretely demanded an end to Air France’s par-
ticipation in the deportation of asylum seekers, refugees, migrants, and sans-papiers, 
while couching the action within a total refusal of the larger project of racialized mi-
grant exclusion and exploitation, connecting the specific struggle against corporate-
backed deportation, for instance, to the fight against migrant detention elsewhere in 
France. In a statement posted to Twitter the day of the occupation — a fitting rejoin-
der to the EU Commission’s earlier use of the platform to declare the migrant crisis 
over — the gilets noirs wrote: “We will attack all those who exploit and draw profit from 
the sans papiers, just as we will attack all those who organize and live off of racism in 
France. We do it with the determination of those who are on hunger strike, those who 
evade, and all those who struggle against detention centers, in Hendaye last Saturday, 
in Rennes last week, and elsewhere.”19
The action, to be sure, evinced a certain media savvy. The adoption of the mantle 
gilet inscribes the protests within an extant interpretive and discursive framework, 
even as the substitution of noirs for jaunes strategically and politically disidentifies the 
two movements, subtly throwing into relief the latter’s investments in a broadly white 
working class politic that demands economic justice, yet by and large neglects the ex-
ploitation of migrant labor as a particular strategy of European and global capital in the 
present conjuncture.20 And yet, in their communiqués to the press, the gilets noirs also 







20   As the gilets jaunes movement has circulated globally,  this  investment  in whiteness has become all 
the more explicit, as in Canada, where a nascent ‘yellow vest’ movement, nominally concerned with 
the continued expansion of  the  fossil  fuel  industry as guarantor of working-class  jobs, has quickly 





cial media virality, in particular. And with good reason: as multiple contributors to this 
volume make clear, these modes of cultural circulation have since 2015 been absolutely 
central to the production of migration as a crisis. “The airport is not a symbolic site for us, 
it’s the rear base and the outpost of the war against the sans papiers and immigrants. 
We have come today to block this base to take it back, to reconquer it.”21 To inhabit the 
circuits of mediated visibility in a globalized present, yet to resist the pull of the sym-
bolic; to engage in the production and proliferation of communiqués, digital images, 
and other medial artefacts, yet to insist on the absolute materiality of the action, on the 
airport not as a symbolic site but as the “rear base and forward post in the war against 
the sans-papiers and immigrants.” This is the gamble of the gilets noirs. To be visible as 
immigrants, as sans-papiers, yet to refuse all those ways of being visible — as anony-
mous bodies amassed at the border fence, as viral symbols of an undifferentiated and 
unspecified struggle, as hypervisualized targets of state surveillance, as ghostly ab-
sences hovering around the rusted hull of a ship — that do not materially disrupt those 
mechanisms of exploitation and expulsion that allow the EU Commission to declare 
an end of the migrant crisis; those mechanisms, indeed, that make clear that Europe 
remains a crisis for migrants — a crisis that did not begin in 2015 and did not end in 2019.
In the taking-and-holding place of the Gilets Noirs occupation, there is both an au-
tonomy and a fugitivity; a willful acting and moving in open contravention of those 
sanctioned (im)mobilities that would avow the separability of ‘Europe’ and ‘migrant.’ 
This is, quite literally, a retaking (reprendre), a reconquering (reconquérir), a defiant 
declaration of f light from and against the final, expulsive f light of airborne deporta-
tion. As the Gilets write in their statement, “Nous sommes la liberté de circuler:” We 
are the freedom of movement.22 In emphasizing such sites and modes of autonomous 
movement, the present anthology owes a substantial debt to Fred Moten’s notion of 
“fugitivity,” even as we hasten to acknowledge the historical and political specificities 
of the “migrant crisis.”23 For Moten, a liberatory arc may be traced in what he calls 
“fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed social 
logic — a movement of escape, the stealth of the stolen that can be said, since it inheres 
in every closed circle, to break every enclosure.”24 This fugitive movement is not a se-
miotic strategy for breaking apart the framing mechanisms of our visual apparatuses. 
It constitutes instead a material persistence, what he calls “stolen life,” life that per-
21   “L’aeroport n’est pas un lieu symbolique pour nous, c’est la base arrière et l’avant post de la guerre contre 
les sans papiers et les immigrées. Nous sommes venues aujourd’hui bloquer cette based pour la re-
prendre, la reconquérir.” [translation ours]
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sists beyond the reaches of governmentality and biopolitical power. In Moten’s view, 
this fugitive movement, a “fugitive coalescence of and against,” makes black social life 
productively “ungovernable.”25 The image repertoire of the migrant crisis has circled 
around failures of governmentality — around the specter of fascist bureaucratic excess, 
transportation infrastructures, border controls, passport and visa regulations, quo-
tas and debt obligations. The iconic images which surface articulate the threat to Eu-
rope’s exertions of governmentality, invite retrenchments that rearticulate the idea of 
Europe and its debt to its others, but equally visualize moments of breakdown which 
put into crisis the structures of belonging / unbelonging that constitute the biopolitical 
lever of European consolidation, and thus might open onto modes of resistance to the 
persistence and totalizing nature of the language of “crisis.” 
The concept of an a priori or autonomous movement, however, should not be taken 
to metaphorize migration (and the figure of the migrant) to represent the universal 
condition of estrangement and malaise that constitutes twentieth- and twenty-first-
century affect. For Sara Ahmed, the generalization of migration transforms histor-
ically-specific complex displacements of peoples into a “mechanism for theorizing 
how identity itself is predicated on movement or loss.”26 Such theoretical tendencies, 
in universalizing conditions of displacement and loss, displace the specificity of what 
Ahmed calls “the contingent and worldly relations that mark out habitable terrains.”27 
Movement is thus not necessarily or mechanistically transgressive, although it may 
provide a set of actions and escape routes for potent forms of political transgression.
To commit to the autonomy of movement as such, then, guarantees little in and of 
itself; its possible meanings risk being mischaracterized, remaining thus monopolized 
by the very imaginative and political projects we aim to contest. The forms of affective 
and political excess with which images of a borderless world are sometimes associated 
(post- or extra-nationalism, global citizenship, the cosmopolitan, and so on) may also 
sit closely astride what Elizabeth Povinelli calls the “conditions of exhaustion and en-
durance” that suffuse “our world’s scenes of abandonment.”28 We center this ambigu-
ity in our thinking so as to complicate the “simple ethical investment in the thresholds 
and transitions of becoming within biopolitics,” holding close to hand the proviso that 
in the face of exhaustion, elimination, deprivation, and displacement, “to be the same, 
to be durative, may be as emancipatory as being transitive.”29 
We understand fugitive movement, then, not as a simple investment in movement 
over stasis, or as a merely descriptive tool for categorizing illicit and unsanctioned 
modes of transit, but rather as an embodied, often perilous, migratory praxis that 
demands the committed work of what many feminist, postcolonial, and Indigenous 
scholars have called decolonizing methodologies. Such methodologies would mobi-
lize specific standpoints of “opposition” (Chela Sandoval), “refusal” (Audra Simpson) 




28   Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment, 130.




(or the refugee, or the internally displaced) as a mere “emblem” or “figure” of either 
post-national freedom or Agambenian bare life. The ways in which acts of movement 
are engendered across a contemporary landscape of dislocation are multiple, and we 
can presume to know neither the conditions nor the outcomes of those performances 
in advance. Chela Sandoval’s strategies of “differential movement,” for instance, do 
not cede vision and visuality to imperial power but rather seek to counter unlocatable 
vision with the multidimensional and mobile positioning of situated knowledges. This 
movement allows for consciousness to challenge its own perimeters from within ide-
ology, to decipher an ideology according to its own dynamics and imperatives, which 
Sandoval calls the very “methodology of the oppressed.” Similarly, we take seriously 
the positional quality of Christina Sharpe’s “wake work,” her demand to “stay in the 
wake,” to understand the relation between slavery’s violences in the conditions of “spa-
tial, legal, psychic, material, and other dimensions of Black non / being as well as in 
Black modes of resistance.”30 She calls “wake work” an analytic that imagines new ways 
to live in the wake of slavery, a new mode of inhabiting the contemporary conjuncture 
in the present horizon. It is for this reason that the critical and creative, the declara-
tive and poetic, the material and immaterial co-exist in this anthology, as a method of 
imagining beyond “crisis” and committing such imaginaries to social change.
We are therefore compelled by Sandro Mezzadra’s preface to this anthology, to his 
insistence on recovering “the insurgent character of the movements of migration” in 
2015, an insurgency that is distant to the rhetorics of “crisis.” His attention to the pos-
sibilities that movement creates for prefiguring different relations between Europe 
and its outsides is vital to not remaining within the architecture of “crisis”— even as a 
modality of critique. His preface reminds us that — like with his Mare Jonio rescue ship 
project — scholars, activists and artists must resist the terms and structures that bind 
and narrow potential liberatory futures.31
Moving Images thus seeks to hold open the fugitivity of migrant movement, its de-
colonial logic, and its capacity to put under erasure the global state of things by going 
beyond the limits of legibility. Or, to countenance those limits as an index of that which 
resists, even if that resistance is not strictly ‘activist’ in character and less purposive 
than the language of agency might suggest. Even if the resistance is a hum, a churning; 
“what can be attained in [a] zone of unattainability, to which the eminently attainable 
ones have been relegated, which they occupy but cannot (and refuse) to own.”32 It sees 
in movement the possibility of tuning our instruments to other frequencies where the 
crisis extends beyond an event, and “Europe” is properly set in its place as a pitted po-
litical strategy of the contemporary global order. Thus, while our thinking is focused 
on — and focalized by — the crisis’ particular visual regime, these predicaments have 
broad implications for the visualization of social movement and political movements 
more generally, and for the manner in which technologies of vision and modes of cir-
culation give shape not only to the contours of various political crises, but to the racial-
ized, ethnic, gendered and sexual ideologies that surface certain bodies and invisibi-
lize others, both with severe and relentless social costs.
30   Christina Sharpe, In the Wake, 14.
31   See in this regard the exceptionally potent essay by Mezzadra and Caccia, “What can a ship do?”
32   Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” 179.
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At the conjunction of the interrelated episodes of the crisis’ end, the Venice Bien-
nale’s sculptural shipwreck and the defiant occupations of the Gilets Noirs, a critical 
terrain opens: a field of political, aesthetic, and representational negotiation in which 
the meanings and implications of the now-familiar phrase “Migrant Crisis,” and in-
deed the very notion of crisis as such, are put at stake. Far from mere description, cri-
sis in this space is revealed as a multivalent and intensely contested framework for 
knowing the body in motion, for marshalling and distributing the resources (and forc-
es) of the state, and for animating particular strategies of governance and administra-
tion that obtain at a variety of scales and across multiple locales. What’s more, in this 
space it becomes abundantly clear that “crisis” as a modality for thinking migration is 
intimately, even essentially, bound up with strategies of figuration and representation, 
interpellating various domains of cultural and aesthetic practice, from the global art 
market to the social media platform, and from the television news broadcast to the 
activist communiqué.
Moving Images is an attempt to inhabit this terrain. It aims to intervene critically in 
the various visual regimes — documentary, photojournalistic, forensic, abstract, par-
ticipatory — through which both the figure of the migrant and the category Europe 
have been refracted in recent years. And in staging such an intervention, we aim to dis-
rupt the temporality of crisis itself. Though certainly a powerful vehicle for mobilizing 
specific kinds of political and cultural response, in framing contemporary practices of 
migration as unanticipated outbreaks — foisted as if from without and all at once on an 
unsuspecting European continent — crisis shears migration (and indeed the migrant) 
of any substantive historicity. The cut is both strategic and profoundly political, for 
this is a historicity that may well speak of the violences of empire and its proliferating 
afterlives, of the everyday exclusions and expulsions that give late liberal statecraft 
its distinctive texture, and of those quotidian forms of reason, judgment, and moral 
sense that innervate both. As such, the temporality of crisis and its attendant visual 
language(s) are productive of the social worlds and subjectivities produced at and 
around the borders of Europe, as Mezzadra and Neilson persuasively argue in Border 
as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor, of the struggles that take shape in the changing 
relations of domination, dispossession and exploitation that take place there. Think-
ing in and against the panicky rhythms of crisis and the spatially-distributed acts of 
bordering it sponsors, we seek to return to migration something of its social fullness.
***
The anthology thus begins not with this introduction, but with Allan deSouza’s potent 
critical fiction “Through the Black Country”— a text-based artwork which takes up and 
wryly inverts the conventions of the 19th-century colonial travelogue so to produce a 
“reverse exploration” of England and Europe that originates, rather than terminates, 
in Asia and West Africa. Appropriating through a disidentificatory gesture the figure 
of the “explorer,” the account considers Europe (and London specifically) as a site for 
discovery. The project’s journals, maps, photographs, sketches and artifacts mimic the 
archival record of innumerable colonial expeditions, and locate contemporary move-
ment patterns within counter-readings of historical relations between Europe and the 
global South. Seizing upon a literary form that abrogates to itself the right of colonial 
and imperial movement, “Through the Black Country” displaces and reverses both the 
Introduction 43
relation between those who move and those who stay put, and the anthropological 
gaze through which such determinations have historically been made. It thus poses 
from the outset a set of challenges for the collection as a whole, demanding that the 
anthology recalibrate its emphases, question its terms, refocus its visions, and closely 
interrogate its assumptions — and attend closely to the task of representing and inter-
rogating “crisis.” 
The remainder of the collection is divided into two sections, “Moving Media” and 
“Mobile Positions,” which together gather a series of interrelated ref lections on the 
often troubled transit between mediation and migration. If the essays in the former 
section are more weighted towards the infrastructures, techniques, and operations 
that propel images of migration-as-crisis through and across global circuits of con-
sumption and interpretation, the latter focalize more sharply the figures that animate 
those operations, steeped as they are in a set of racial, gendered, sexual and classed 
imaginaries. Nevertheless, these emphases refuse to hold their distinct positions 
within the entangled social dynamics of refugeeism, migration, asylum, deportation, 
nationalism, border securitization, trafficking, separatism, civil disobedience, occu-
pation, blockade, and trade. Because these phenomena are integrally entwined sites 
of mediation and mediatization, the anthology argues precisely for the inseparability 
of thinking moving images and mobile positions separately, despite the chasms that 
isolate certain forms of movement from others. Each section begins and ends with 
imaging practices — some artistic, some activist, and some both at once. These images 
and documents do not take sides on the “to show / not to show” dilemma that so often 
informs the ethical framework for witnessing traumatic images, so much as displace 
the binary itself to make room for other practices of figuration and documentation, as 
well as other modes of social action.
Section One begins with Zineb Sedira’s SeaPath, an artistic project consisting of a 
series of images taken from ferry crossings between Algiers and Marseille. They pre-
sent, as Tyler Morgenstern poetically theorizes in “The Literal, at Sea,” not a document 
but a turbulent and indeterminate imaging practice, one in which the “literal is already 
littoral,” severed from reference and set adrift as f leeting bits of form (and foam) on 
the sea’s surface. In their poignant abstraction and — paradoxically — their obdurate 
material and contextual specificity, they both dramatize and obscure what Morgen-
stern refers to as the scene of “vectoralized movement, determinate starting points 
and ending points, definitive boundaries between this and that, here and there” that 
since 2015 has given the Migrant Crisis so much of its political and affective texture.
Following this, Bishnupriya Ghosh’s “A Sensible Politics: Image Operations of Eu-
rope’s Refugee Crisis” tracks the sprawling, socially mediated itineraries of the iconic 
image of the young Syrian boy, Alan Kurdi, who was found dead on a Turkish beach re-
sort in 2015. Rather than engaging questions of representation or attempting to parse 
whether such images can be read straightforwardly as ethically good or bad, Ghosh 
argues that the image, shared globally through a torrent of affectively-charged Tweets 
and mournful news broadcasts created a mode of public participation prior to the de-
termination of the image’s significance. In this modality of participation — precari-
ously and indeed improperly demotic — Ghosh locates a form of sensible, or affective, 
politics antecedent to the emergence of any conventionally deliberative public that 
could be represented through the bureaucratic and quantitative strategies of state and 
market.
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Extending this focus on the mechanisms of circulation and their often mercu-
rial politics, Ian Alan Paul’s “Controlling the Crisis” proposes that the instruments of 
securitization and governmentality that today intensively mediate the movement of 
migrants toward and across European territories are not simply an effect of crisis — a 
reasoned response to irregular movement — but rather an “output of societies organ-
ized by the desire to control crises.” Through an account of several theories of cybernet-
ics (Haraway, Deleuze, Tiqqun), Paul traces how the complex regime of sensing, sur-
veillance, and policing elaborated in recent years by Frontex — the EU’s primary border 
security agency — emerges co-constitutively and recursively with the “crisis” of 2015 and 
2016. Fleshing out a logic of “crisis-control” that mediates the transitory space between 
those liberal theories of freedom, right, and subjectivity that continue to anchor EU 
border imaginaries in important ways and those cybernetic techniques, favored by 
agencies like Frontex, that seem to evacuate the liberal project of its substance, Paul 
locates both a new modality of governance and a vital new terrain of resistance and 
subversion.
Paul’s concern with the structural entanglement of crisis and control in the cy-
bernetic dispensation finds a ready counterpart in Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pez-
zani’s “Forensic Oceanography: Tracing Violence Within and Against the Mediterra-
nean Frontier’s Aesthetic Regime.” In this contribution, Heller and Pezzani trace the 
technologies, legal apparatuses, political regimes and image operations that have har-
nessed the sea’s geopower to a more or less organized “form of killing,” and map their 
efforts, through their Forensic Oceanography initiative, to document and understand 
these malleable configurations. Specifically, they trace three of these shifts (the move-
ment from practices of non-assistance to policies of non-assistance, and the further 
move to criminalize rescue initiatives and outsource border control to overseas part-
ners). Throughout, they attend to the forms of violence ensuing from these shifts, and 
the shifting visualizing practices and ethico-political stakes they entailed for Forensic 
Oceanography.
Similarly attuned to the mercurial movements of EU border policy is Lonnie Van 
Brummelen and Siebren de Haan’s “Reframing the Border,” which documents the art-
ists’ ongoing efforts to represent Europe’s external frontiers — a domain written and 
rewritten since the consolidation of the Eurozone by an array of trade agreements 
and friendship treaties that tie former colonies to Europe in relations of dependency 
and, more to the point, form the foundations of contemporary migrant governance 
projects. Both Heller & Pezzani and Van Brummelen & de Haan locate their practices 
within a configuration of power that is (post)colonial and (neo)imperialist, and as such, 
both essays reveal how negotiating these inheritances is bound to a set of representa-
tional technologies, epistemic conventions, and power relations that affect where and 
how they position their (metaphorical and literal) cameras. Together, the essays stress 
how artistic and activist image operations are always coextensive with other mediat-
ing processes, whether the transformation of the NGO Sea Watch into an immense 
audio-visual recording device designed to counter the “factual lies” of EU border en-
forcement agencies, or French President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to repatriate 
artefacts of colonial plunder from French museums to their countries of origin. 
Providing a kind of conceptual scaffold for these varied and variable image-mak-
ing practices, Thomas Nail’s “Migrant Images” seeks to develop a kinetic theory of the 
migrant and the image alike, centering social migrancy (rather than static notions of 
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state-based belonging) and a vision of the image as an object on the move (rather than 
simply a representation of a static object external to it) as primary and intercalated 
features of our historical juncture. Moving away from the specificity of image-making 
practices by or for migrant or refugee populations, Nail focuses instead on the broader 
implications of philosophies of movement (Lucretius, Marx, Henri Bergson, and oth-
ers) for the figure of the migrant and the mobile image, exploring what it might take to 
develop a coherent theory of “migrant images.”
Finally, Thomas Keenan & Sohrab Mohebbi’s “Listing,” and the accompanying doc-
umentation of Banu Cennetoğlu’s ongoing project, “The List,” draw from the Amster-
dam-based organization UNITED for Intercultural Action’s “List of Deaths of refugees 
and migrants due to the restrictive policies of ‘Fortress Europe.’” Collaborating with 
numerous curators and art institutions, Cennetoğlu has facilitated the publication and 
exhibition of UNITED’s up-to-date list in multiple languages and formats, from public 
displays in cities like Amsterdam, Barcelona and Los Angeles to newspaper supple-
ments. Documentation of this work is included here. Keenan & Mohebbi, for their part, 
provide a poetic ref lection on the act of “listing,” f leshing out its polyvalent meanings 
as an act of itemizing, hearing, tilting, drifting, and documenting. Together, these 
pieces question what it means to document the dead as a political act, to make these 
deaths legible or visible, and how such acts might make particular demands on highly 
differentiated publics. As such, their questions and ref lections evoke the abiding con-
cerns of this section, pointing up how overlapping infrastructures, policies, and prac-
tices of mediation are constituted and conditioned by the intensities of crisis.
The contributions collected in Section Two, by contrast, follow the vexed itinerar-
ies of certain key figures around whom crisis as a political and visual modality has 
crystallized in recent years. Together, the authors in this section follow such figures as 
the migrant and the refugee, asking what happens politically as they assume a variety 
of social roles and positions — form the entrepreneurial subject of late capitalism to 
the art participant, and from the potential “terrorist” to the “trafficked woman”— and 
as they pass through different spaces of cultural practice and consumption. How do 
these figures move and for whom? What role do they play in consolidating particular 
kinds of political events, subjectivities, and communities around the issues of migra-
tion and refugeeism? Moreover, building on the concerns raised in Section One, what 
kinds of technical infrastructures, communications markets, and social networks are 
required to put these images into circulation and keep them there? How do such net-
works siphon individual and collective forms of affect, aspiration, and desire? How, 
finally, do these visual and cultural itineraries intersect with the uneven movement 
of bodies, commodities, capital, and information across a European continent at once 
globalized and deeply fractured by resurgent nationalisms? 
Section Two begins with Abdessamad El Montassir’s “The Adouaba Project” (2019), 
which traces and visualizes two communities — the adwaba villages in Mauritania and 
the tranquilos communities in the hills and forests outside the Moroccan city of Tan-
giers. In El Montassir’s complex artistic project, these communities constitute a con-
temporary form of marronage, built by those who have f led conditions of enslavement 
yet now await the emergence of new routes of passage to an elsewhere and otherwise, 
suspended in the administrative time of European statecraft without ever having 
touched European shores. The accompanying collaborative text, deriving from conver-
sations between El Montassir and Krista Lynes, seeks to f lesh out what the verb form 
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marronner might signify for thinking migratory movement differently, away from the 
pull of Europe and its presumed association with rights or freedom.
El Montassir’s efforts to rethink the figure of the migrant, and to articulate visually 
an other formation of migrant subjectivity, are echoed in the essays that comprise the 
remainder of the section. Veronika Zablotsky’s “Unsanctioned Agency: Risk Profiling, 
Racialized Masculinity, and the Making of Europe’s ‘Refugee Crisis’” focuses on the 
reception and circulation of so-called “refugee selfies.” She argues incisively that gen-
dered and racialized scripts govern the construction of unaccompanied refugee men, 
painting them as “suspiciously agential” and therefore less vulnerable. She unpacks 
the construction of the “single, male refugee” through a feminist and postcolonial re-
f lection on humanitarianism, whiteness, and neoliberalism in Europe.
Farah Atoui also examines the racialized and gendered imaginaries that govern 
mediation of the “migrant crisis,” focusing particularly on how the category shifts be-
tween “refugee” and “migrant” are mobilized strategically in order to illegalize people 
in movement and preempt their entry into the United Kingdom. Through a careful 
historical reading of media coverage of the refugee camps at Calais — alongside an ac-
count of the Sangatte Center that preceded it — Atoui argues that anti-migrant dis-
course in the UK articulates and instantiates a “political ontology of threat” (Massumi) 
that hinges on a clear distinction between the migrant and the refugee; a distinction 
which itself cloaks economic determinations regarding properly and improperly gov-
erned labor power in the supposedly neutral formalities of domestic law.
But while the figures of improper or suspect arrival that Zablotsky and Atoui exam-
ine have certainly been central to the production of crisis as a visual regime, prompting 
all manner of border securitization and deterrence projects, they are at the very least 
matched in their potency by their inverse: the figure of the migrant who never arrives 
at all, who drowns at sea. In her aptly-titled contribution, “SOPHIA: The Language 
of Trafficking in the Mediation of Gendered Migration” Krista Lynes considers how 
this figure has become visually and discursively enfolded within the gendered, racial, 
and class politics of recent European anti-trafficking initiatives operating under the 
name Sophia, which comes to denominate ships and infants, radio signals and impe-
rial navies. These initiatives bind the seemingly discrepant logics of humanitarianism 
and securitization to one another in and through the body of the “trafficked woman.” 
Developed in sustained conversation with postcolonial and Black feminisms, Lynes’s 
essay considers what such a conjunction forecloses, what complicated and difficult 
agencies it puts under erasure, and what is at stake politically in the semiotic drift that 
collapses “woman” into “traffic” in the long wake of racial slavery.
Suzana Milevska, for her part, pursues these thorny questions of agency and ob-
jectification into different disciplinary quarters, exploring the question of refugee 
representation in contemporary art practice, examining in particular the “participa-
tory turn” in artworks which aim to intervene in the “migrant crisis.” Beginning with 
an analysis of the ethical implications of the slogan “We Refugees,” invoked often by 
a humanitarian politics in the contemporary moment as a gesture of solidarity with 
displaced and migratory peoples, Milevska ultimately offers a critical appraisal of re-
cent artworks that require refugees and migrants to complete the work through their 
action, participation, or labor, examining whether or to what degree such an approach 
might offer a corrective to the political quandaries that so often befall efforts to simply 
represent the marginalized or vulnerable Other.
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Appropriately, the section ends with documentation of a very differently participa-
tory artistic-activist action by the collective LGBTQIA+ Refugees in Greece, performed 
on the occasion of Documenta 14’s exhibit in Athens, Greece in 2017.33 The action, which 
involved a performative “rock-napping” of a public sculpture by the artist, Roger Ber-
nat, meant both to emphasize the instrumentalization and exoticization of queer mi-
grant life, and to foreground the specific vulnerabilities of this community, and the 
work of the collective. The documentation is accompanied by a conversation between 
Krista Lynes and Sophia Zachariadi, ref lecting on the action, the role of art activism in 
mobilizing for refugee and migrant rights, and the politics of solidarity.
Throughout, each contribution mobilizes different crafts and practices, languages 
and media, to intervene in the iconography of the migrant “crisis,” to challenge its set-
tings and locations, its figures, its imagined audience, and its evidentiary nature. This 
experimental strategy, with its risks and potential failures, is meant also to position 
the potentials of these forms of academic inquiry within the inescapable politics of 
positioning, conscious that the location from which we intervene matters to the move-
ments and mediations we describe and in which we participate.
Together, all the contributions gathered here take up the task of thinking critically 
about “eventfulness,” when the very terms of analysis keep taking new objects through 
and in relation to a highly circulatory media environment. How might processes of 
scholarly inquiry track and keep pace with the ephemeral but perpetually catastrophic 
rhythms of the mediation of “crisis”? How might we devise tools and positionings re-
sponsive to the continual opening up of new spaces of vulnerability and exposure? Such 
questions are ever more urgent in the light of intensifying and accelerating processes 
of displacement, detention and deportation in Europe, even as the visual economy of 
the migrant crisis has shifted once again.
Moving Images attempts to take these questions seriously, in the interests of imag-
ining and building something that makes an otherwise elusive mode of engagement 
possible. We wish to develop not only a visual and aesthetic politics that reveals the 
European project as always-already subtended by a long, ongoing history of migration 
and displacement, but also a space where this politics can be put into practice; a space 
where emerging scholarly and artistic responses to contemporary forms of population 
displacement can be brought into conversation with one another, linked in ways that 
trouble the epistemic and political parameters of prevailing geopolitical, legislative, 
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The Literal, at Sea
Tyler Morgenstern
Reference, though discernable, has been reduced to an absolute minimum. In each im-
age, a wake — or is it a wave?—cuts across the frame, a bit of turbulence that, lacking 
any visible origin, reads as little more than graphical abstraction. What remains are 
f leeting bits of form that froth, fold and foam at the edges, rising out of their aqueous 
ground just long enough to register photographically; gradient fields that are not quite 
gradient fields, pockmarked by the accidental pointillism of the wave caps that dot 
the sea’s surface, striated here and there by bands of dark and light that suggest the 
presence of something machinic, some vessel or engine capable of carving the ocean 
into geometric pieces, carefully, methodically, with intention. But even these slip away 
at the edges, drifting hazily into one another, making things murky, maybe brackish, 
depending on how far we happen to be from shore. If the photograph aspires to or 
carries with it the promise of the literal, of registering what is or what has been, here it 
captures only littoral, the watery recession of tidy edges, discernible causes, and leg-
ible itineraries.
Small wonder that the images, produced by the artist Zineb Sedira, are gathered 
under a title that proves equally slippery. SeaPath, read aloud, speaks in the impera-
tive, almost like a command: “See Path.” Rendered textually, however, the imperative 
is set adrift. The title becomes a proper noun, a name for something. But at sea, as it 
turns out, there is remarkably little to see; that something, that path, has already be-
gun to wash away, its source already outside the frame, the literal already littoral. If 
these are images of anything, they are images of movement, of passage, of circula-
tion; a moment, a cut, into some journey for which we are given no point of origin, no 
destination, and no trajectory. Or, they are visual intervals in which clear distinctions 
between coming and going, directionality and drift, intention and turbulence, indeed 
the constructed and the natural (wave and wake blend imperceptibly together) break 
down, swirling together in arresting (and arrested) eddies. These eddies fill the frame, 
staging a confrontation with motion that seems overwhelming, almost frustrating, 
one that refuses to resolve, to vectoralize.
But these images are, of course, of something in particular. To generate SeaPath, 
Sedira photographed the wakes left by the ferries that transit regularly between Al-
giers, in North Africa, and Marseille, on France’s Mediterranean coast. This same route 
is also frequented, however, by Harragas — young Algerian border crossers who seek 
differently licit means of maritime entry to France or Spain. This is indeed something, 
quite something: a scene of embodied action that puts immediately at stake precisely 
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those things Sedira’s images render so turbulent and elusive: vectoralized movement, 
determinate starting points and ending points, definitive boundaries between this 
and that, here and there. Indeed, it is largely within and through scenes like this one 
that such categories are constituted in the contemporary juncture, circumscribed as 
it is within the temporal and political imaginary of (migrant) crisis. As we know well, 
for instance, the figure of the illicit or illegalized border crosser, the one who arrives 
from without (allegedly) intent on exploiting the humanitarian goodwill and economic 
possibilities that (allegedly) attend admission into the European body politic, prompts 
fearsome performances of national integrity that manifest variably as border securiti-
zation, maritime interception, and indefinite detention.
In the optic of crisis, the migrant appears as a vector of, or vectoralized, risk — an im-
proper intentionality, an unwanted willfulness, a suspect directionality. Such an optic 
assumes and demands a here and a there, a point of origin and a destination, a clear 
set of intentions (whether economic, humanitarian, criminal, or terroristic) that moti-
vates the passage between the two, and firm boundaries to be protected. Sedira’s im-
ages suggest, however, that much more churns just below the surface of things. More 
is in motion, more circulates, than just those who cross, and that those who cross do 
so in ways and for reasons as littoral as they are literal. Things cannot be made quite so 
tidy. These circulations, again as Sedira’s images suggest, are profoundly unstable; co-
alescing into some coherent form or pattern here and now, only to dissolve or distend 
a moment later. As SeaPath disaggregates “See Path” into a series of f luid interfaces 
between the machinic and the natural, wake and wave, licit and other-than-licit, alter-
native modalities of movement bubble to the surface, ways of moving and crossing that 
do not resolve into the cartographies of crisis.
A Sensible Politics
Image Operations of Europe’s Refugee Crisis
Bishnupriya Ghosh
Refugee image cultures are the dangerous supplement to refugee crises. As such, they 
invite critical opprobrium, sometimes for the unethical sensationalism of particular 
images and sometimes for the desensitizing effects of image overloads. At first glance, 
the steady stream of images serves only to numb rather than to incite real-time respon-
sibility toward the migrant waves that seek passage into new territorial enclosures. Or 
the deluge of images invokes withdrawal and aggression, once host polities confront 
the thorny questions of resource distribution. Or indeed, especially sensational im-
ages are considered unethical in the extraction of surplus value from subaltern tribu-
lations. Such allegations are well-founded, but they obscure the complex politics of the 
images that find unanticipated distributions across media forms and platforms. My 
essay tracks the trajectories of one iconic image that became an instant cultural mne-
monic for the highly mediated European refugee crisis, ongoing since 2015. The po-
etic and circulatory effects of the image are exemplary instances of the problems that 
accompany the image production / distribution of the refugee crisis. The image of a 
two-year old Syrian boy found dead upon the beach of a fancy resort in Turkey became 
a social media event within hours of its first distribution as a news photo. The “event” 
inheres in the proliferation of a single image, its accumulating mediatic traces turning 
it into a media phenomenon. I focus on the Twitter storm ensuing from passing on the 
image — retweeting, liking, and sharing it — which further ricocheted between media 
platforms. This media explosion preceded deliberations on what the image meant or 
what was to be done.
Habitual as micro-actions on Twitter are, I argue that they signal an important 
mode of participatory political life: an affective-performative rather than deliberative 
publicness widely regarded as improper in more ways than one. The murky and often-
opaque politics of social media users who seek to participate in the large and small 
decisions appear unruly. Often seeking to partake in political decisions, often unin-
volved in civil deliberations or institutional politics, their participation is nevertheless 
an assured fact of political life. So much so that social media is now an unfettered 
political beast that invites scorn, dismissal, and opprobrium — and certainly critical 
conjecture. I join media theorists and political thinkers to think about the group form 
that social media users inhabit as participants in a viral spread. What kind of affec-
tive publics are these? Where do they stand on the refugee crisis? My analysis has the 
advantage of quantitative data on the viral spread of the iconic image in question. 
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The University of Sheffield’s Visual Social Media Lab (henceforth, VSML) conducted a 
rapid research response of the Twitter storm and the discussions that followed in its 
wake, collating news items, forums and blogs, Twitter feeds and Google searches on 
the Pulsar platform.1 Their data visualizations tracked the amplification of the image 
beyond its anticipated distribution, therein offering a rare opportunity to think about 
its popular purchase.
For some years, I have been preoccupied with the sensible politics of popular images.2 
Popular by dint of their wide distribution, these images can be heroic or epic, banal or 
trashy; they are of particular interest when they generate strong political affects. One 
can hardly find a better instance than the Alan Kurdi photograph, a poetically poign-
ant, tailored image that later found elaboration in memes, artworks, graffiti, and even 
live performances. My pursuit of this image as affective-performative mediation leads 
me to track its viral circulation and not its representational capacities. In this regard, 
my essay builds on previous arguments that I have made elsewhere on the circulation 
of iconic images and their popular reception.3 As we shall see, the Alan Kurdi image 
assumed astronomic proportion, so much so that there is documentation of a “before” 
and “after” to the Twitter storm it provoked. The VSML dossier records this temporal-
ity as a discursive shift enacted with image + hashtag (#refugeeswelcome, #refugee-
crisis …). Within a day, the image + hashtag turned talk of a “migrant crisis” into that 
of a “refugee crisis.” Thus the Twitter storm that punctured and reoriented existing 
plans and programs, policies and agendas was a creative event: in its distribution, the 
image produced a perceptual shift in the relation between social media users and the 
oncoming “wave” or “horde.” With the child refugee as worthy beneficiary of humani-
tarian intervention, something new entered the perceptual register, something that 
demanded real-time responsibility in all the ways refugees can — at least, historically, 
1   I’d like to thank Joshua Neves for his insights on the first version of this essay, as well as the editors of 
this volume for their invitation to the workshop for which this was written, and thereafter their many 
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in context of the 1951 Refugee Convention.4 In Jacques Rancière’s schema, a hitherto 
invisible part of the demos crossed the partition of the sensible, heightening exposure 
to deadly states of injury. The Kurdi image focalized an undefined “horde” or undiffer-
entiated “wave” pouring across European borders and spilling onto beaches through 
the singular image of the injured child — pre-political, innocent, non-threatening, 
demanding benevolent dispensation. An image cut-out from the ground of endless 
numbers, this “image operation” reconstituted migrant f lows as a refugee crisis and 
reframed them as a matter of human rights.5 
But, as we know, while the initial response to the Kurdi image was forceful, po-
litical legislation was another matter altogether.6 Since that Twitter storm, more than 
one European nation has closed borders, erected fences, deployed coastal regulations. 
More importantly, the invocation of the injured refugee worthy of special dispensa-
tions became muddier still within a very short span of time. In November 2015, the 
Paris attacks — the deadliest in Europe since the Madrid bombings of 2004 — turned 
the refugee into potential threat, even though subsequent investigations established 
the attackers as French and Belgian citizens who had not entered Europe as refugees. 
Following closely on the heels of this debacle came the New Year’s Eve attacks in the 
city center of Cologne (mass sexual attacks, rapes, theft). When the attackers were 
identified as men of Arab or North African descent, the single male refugee / migrant 
came to embody not just threat but aggression toward the historical West.7 In this con-
text, the Kurdi image had a short lifespan as the lightning rod for affective intensities 
around the unadulterated figure of the refugee. And it is precisely this brief tempo-
rality that makes it a plum instance of a surging affective-performative politics that 
seems to go nowhere and whose causal relation to structural change remains obscure. 
These politics and the affective publics they disclose are the subject of this essay.
The figure of the injured refugee immediately raises the question of culpability. 
Who was responsible for these deaths? Who exactly was the “we” that confronted a 
coming “they?” The VSML visualizations provide some insight into the locations of so-
cial media users who passed on the image, and I will turn to these more substantially. 
The first tweets emerged from Turkey, and shortly thereafter from West Asia, before 
entering European and North American Twitter feeds; international organizations 
played a major role in the latter distributions of the image. These visualizations tell us 
there were European social media users for whom the highly mediatized crisis was on 
4   See, Xenos, “Refugees.” Writing about the ethical fictions of incorporation even in the heydays of the 
Refugee Convention, Hannah Arendt noted posing refugee crises as a problem of numbers actually 
concealed political  inefficacies:  there  is,  in  fact, not a  “material problem of overpopulation,” she ar-












their shores and at their borders; after all, at the time of this Twitter storm, the Syrian 
refugee crisis had been ongoing for months. No doubt the image generated heightened 
affective intensities for these users. And then there were remote social media users 
that engaged the “refugee crisis” as a distinctly “European problem,” and not directly 
relevant to their lives; but, even here, one may think of proximate remoteness of dif-
ferent kinds. For instance, Californians or Texans living in the borderlands may have 
had greater investments in the politics of incorporating migrants into the body politic. 
Finally, a more complex category of social media users were intimately involved with 
Europe’s migration policy because of intertwined regional histories. With Turkey’s lo-
cation at Europe’s edge, Turkish social media users, for example, exemplify the latter; 
no doubt the concerted European effort to make Turkey a triage center for the f low of 
Syrian refugees would impart greater intensities to their responses. These distinctions 
complicate the “we” that approached the “they” as refugee-migrants. Yet despite such 
distinctions, it is not a stretch to argue that the problem of a demos that exceeds the 
rights-bearing formulation “the people,” a demos invisible within and at the border, is 
now a global concern, and especially in times when democratic institutions are under 
attack from myriad authoritarianisms. In other words, the Syrian refugee crisis was 
not only an international negotiation of quotas but also a political dilemma resonant 
across national and regional contexts. Hence, the European incitement to refugee in-
corporation hit a collective nerve. The ensuing public culture around the Kurdi image 
tells us that there was little consensus as to what could be done in concrete terms. Yet 
the sensuous image made the refugee sensible in a visual translation of a hitherto ab-
stract politico-juridical category.
Social media users who passed on the image turned the numbers game — how 
many refugees can be settled and where — into affective intensities. If the numbers 
game represents one kind of institutional composition of the European demos, then 
the affect-driven image provides a counterpoint to these politics proper. The Twitter 
storm is therefore an affective-performative intrusion into ongoing political delibera-
tions that sought to establish a new relation between rights-bearing European citizens 
and a potentially reconstituted demos. This intrusion suggests that social media users 
passing on the image dissented from institutional counts and quotas, agreements and 
stalemates. They entered the fray as uninvited partakers, amplifying a composition 
that overtly eschewed calculative rationality in favor of affective intensities. I char-
acterize such intrusions as an improper politics, a kind of politics that is all-too-visible 
on social media. Nothing good seems to come of affective-performative gestures. Too 
politically thin, too superficial; too transient and too compromised; too deluded and 
clearly anxiety provoking. Whatever the diagnoses — and there are plenty of them — it 
is unclear what exactly is social about social media. In this context, one may argue that 
habitual retweets constitutive of Twitter storms are often just that: knee-jerk respons-
es that cannot be plotted along an ideological spectrum. Thus it would be disingenu-
ous to argue that the circulating image indexed a particular worldview of the refugee 
crisis; that to share or like the image implies anything beyond a habitual empathy for 
an injured child. Conversely, it is equally disingenuous to argue that a Twitter storm 
that rendered a seismic shock to previous perceptions of the crisis had no collective 
dimension whatsoever. This essay attempts to ford this contradiction, for therein lies a 
complex affective-performative politics that is now the new normal.
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Taking up the central concerns of this volume, I elaborate moving images in two 
ways. First, in the micro-actions of sharing, liking, or re-tweeting, the image of the 
refugee crossed a perceptual barrier: it moved social media users. The consequent sen-
sible composition put pressure on the externality of the refugee to the body politic. 
Second, the micro-actions of amplifying the distribution of the image exhibit a de-
sire to move others and therein to “structure the possible field of actions of others” as 
Michel Foucault once said of power.8 Such amplifications seek to impact the politics of 
movement, of who can cross borders and how. In all these respects, the moving image 
materializes the affective intensities of a sensible politics.
Visualizing the Creative Event
The image is unforgettable: the two-year old Alan Kurdi in a red shirt and blue jeans 
lying face down upon a beach in Bodrum, an upscale resort in Turkey. One of twelve 
refugees trying to reach the Greek island of Kos, Alan drowned alongside his moth-
er and brother. For reasons banal and profound, Alan Kurdi made major headlines 
within a day of Nilüfer Demir’s photographic capture for Turkish news agency, the 
Doğan Haber Ajansi. At 5:30 a.m. on September 2, 2015, Demir snapped the now-iconic 
photograph, originally one among fifty pictures. When the news agency released the 
photograph, it began to be tweeted with the accompanying caption, “Drowned Syrian 
Boy.” Within 12 hours, 30,000 tweets later, 20 million had shared the photograph. It 
had become the recursive graphic that we understand as an iconic image. Like iconic 
images, it endures as one of the 100 most shared images in contemporary Europe — a 
powerful figural trace of a protracted refugee crisis in which 4 million (in 2015) among 
the 11 million Syrians displaced by war sought asylum.
I am less concerned with the signifying power of the trace than I am with its circula-
tion in social media, and specifically on Twitter. For it is on Twitter that a photographic 
event became a media phenomenon that changed perceptions of the crisis at hand. The 
findings of the VSML show that the image played a constitutive role in shifting percep-
tions of the “migrant crisis” to a “refugee crisis” within days. VSML conducted a rapid 
response search for the 12-day period between September 2 and September 14, 2015. If 
for the previous nine months in 2015, the terms “migrant” and “refugee” as qualifiers 
to crisis were pretty much head-to-head — 5.2 to 5.3 million tweets in the same volume 
of conversations — af ter September 2, “refugee” spiked at 6.5 million to “migrant” at 2.9 
million. The data visualizations document the speed and scale of signal amplification. 
Read together, they make legible something like a seismic shock. That is, the peak-
ing quantifications amount to a qualitative change in perceptions of the kind of crisis. 
The appearance of the “refugee” instantly invoked questions of social vulnerability and 
historical responsibility. As we shall see, key activists, journalists, and leaders had a 
hand in shaping such perception. In many instances, they rode the wave, grabbed an 
opportunity. But they could ride the wave because there was a new baseline for the crisis: 
something new had entered the sensible, something infectious; something that was 
perhaps not entirely legible.
8   Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 790.
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Francesco D’Orazio tracks the Twitter storm that followed the first tweet at 
10:23 a.m. In that first hour, the 33 retweets were mostly in Turkish; but in the next two 
hours, Turkish journalist and activist Michelle Demisherich’s retweet with the hashtag 
#refugeeswelcome went viral through Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. The color-coded data 
visualizations available in the online VSML dossier represent the growing storm in 
vivid bursts and intensities. One burst comes when the Free Syria Hub got in on the 
action, spearheading the Twitter wildfire in the Middle East. Another comes when Pe-
ter Bouckaert, the Emergency Director at Human Rights Watch in Geneva urged the 
European community to develop a plan for refugee admission and rehabilitation. His 
call prompted 664 retweets. When at 12:49 p.m., Liz Sly of The Washington Post based 
in Beirut tweeted the photograph, her tweet was shared 7,421 times in 30 minutes. By 
1:10 p.m., The Daily Mail carried the first story with the title: “Terrible fate of a tiny boy 
who symbolizes the desperation of thousands.” At the end of the day, 500 articles on 
Alan Kurdi’s journey had entered the twitterverse. In this essay, I’ll focus on the Twit-
ter storm that passed on the image and its attendant artisanal compositions before the 
image entered the news and entertainment ecosystems.9 By the end of the day, news 
platforms owned the “Alan Kurdi story” and used it to carry their own content, and 
web-based companies such as Buzzfeed invited artistic recompositions of the image. 
These later stages together constitute the public culture around this iconic image. As 
Sam Gregory notes in the VSML dossier, these recompositions were further amplifica-
tions of “counter-speech” already evident in the hashtag punctuations of the first Twit-
ter storm10— roughly occurring between 10:23 a.m. to 1:10 p.m. before the first story 
broke in The Daily Mail.
I focus on this short window because it draws attention to the upsurge of affects 
before their organization into cultural sentiment or considered ref lection. The Twitter 
storm before the capture of the image in memes, caricatures, and cartoons highlights 
not only accumulated intensive forces triggered by the image, but also the extension 
of those forces through social networks constitutive of Web 2.0. The latter movement 
is the heart of social media: in other words, the possibility of affective connectivity 
is what makes social media tick. The Twitter storm that amplified the Kurdi image 
disclosed the desire of social media users to transmit whatever affected them across a 
vast social-technological field. The data visualizations provide distant readings of this 
desire — thickening, expanding, assuming new directionalities. The particular affects 
driving the spread are far more difficult to pin down: they would include everything 
from anger and grief to horror and repugnance, as well as admixtures of these af-
fects. Not yet composed into recognizable emotions, such affects are best described 
as forces that register at their peaking intensities, rising and dissipating, accelerating 
and slowing. Such intensities are now commonplace in political life, and therefore the 
brief temporality of the Kurdi image makes it an exemplary object of study.
There is much to say about why this image caught fire. But I’ll be brief in these ex-
planations, since my focus is on the amplification of the image on social media. Cer-
tainly, it was chosen with care. In the VSML dossier, Claire Wardle notes that, just 
a couple of days before Alan Kurdi’s death, a photograph of dead babies on a Libyan 
9   The VSML dossier distinguishes the visualized Twitter storm from the counter-speech that followed 
the circulation of the images as two dif ferent moments in the life of the iconic image.
10   For more on the histories of digital punctuation, see Scheible, The Digital Shif t.
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Beach had surfaced, but it was quickly reported and removed from Facebook. Drawing 
on her experience as senior Social Media Officer at the UNHCR, Wardle’s point is that 
platform protocols often regulate what can circulate; they constrain the amplification 
of counter-speech and restrain the agency of social media users. To these soft con-
trols, one might add the aesthetic histories that shape viewing photographs of dead 
or injured children.11 News agencies routinely regulate tragic photographs of injured 
children; in this sense, these media are akin to fine art, with its historical norms and 
conventions. An analysis of the photograph’s aesthetic composition would fully unpack 
the representational truth-effects (mimesis), expressivity (poiesis), and affective capaci-
ties (aisthesis) that constitute, Rancière argues, political mediation. I focus primarily 
on the last category, aisthesis or affect; yet it is worth noting that the Kurdi image had 
a substantial poetic and mimetic charge. A few news platforms such as Vox and Slate 
initially refused to carry “gruesome images” of “dead children,” but those refusals re-
ceded after the Doğan News Agency’s tailored image went viral — an image centering 
the red-shirt clad vivid form against the intense gray dissolve of sea and sky. Further, 
despite the overly poetic capture, the indexical truths of the boy’s death haunted the 
photograph. In part, the photograph had high institutional credentials: it was well 
“brokered” before Demir’s first tweet, in all the ways that Zeynep Gursel tracks in her 
ethnography of news photos.12 Then, it was filtered through distributive chokepoints. 
Social media users put their trust in reputable reporters such as Michelle Demisherich 
and in media hubs such as Free Syria and Human Rights Watch. So despite the explicit 
poiesis, strong reciprocal ties enabled the photograph to generate mimetic truth ef-
fects.
No doubt the sentimental portraiture of a fully clad, middle-class boy individu-
ated against the universal eschatological space between life and death had much to do 
with its becoming instantly iconic. Indeed, the Human Rights Watch director Peter 
Bouckaert pitched his own response through his own experience as a father, as did 
Sam Gregory of WITNESS (a video testimony platform). These are clear class-based 
affinities that made the image so powerful. Yet the individuated isolation of social 
media users makes it difficult to claim there was but one reason for the photograph’s 
infectious proliferation. For it is also the case that many remained unsympathetic to 
the image of the dead child. Mike Thelwell notes in the VSML dossier that one strain 
of censure saw Alan Kurdi’s death as just dessert for the boy’s father, who was reput-
edly a smuggler. Still others protested the indignity of circulating an image of a dead 
child; Alan Kurdi’s aunt, for one, offered pictures of Alan, lively against a blue slide 
in a playground, in order to combat the tragic image. Several others saw the circula-
tion of the image as pornographic consumption, an unethical sharing of violence that 




on the child but had been  instructed not  to  touch the children.  In  the  fallout over  the controversy, 
Carter committed suicide within a year of snapping the photograph. The extreme instance tells us 
something about the interrogation of regulated objectivity in the face of horror.
12  In Image Brokers,  Zeynep Deyrim Gursel  traces  the multiple  agencies  “broker”  a  news  photo  goes 
through before it makes the news.
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re-victimizes. The undecidability of reactions challenge attempts to extract a political 
position from the social media event.
For despite all brokerage, it was clear there was no agreement on the refugee cri-
sis. Nor was it intelligible who should carry the burden of responsibility. The hashtag 
“#refugeeswelcome” was most popular in the UK, US, Canada, Australia, India, Ger-
many, Turkey, France, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, but not in others 
(where the hashtag was just #refugeecrisis). In many countries, Google search terms in 
the week following the photograph’s publication were “What happened to Alan Kurdi?” 
or “Why do Syrians leave Turkey?” In Germany, a dominant query was “How to volun-
teer to help migrants?”; in Hungary, “How should Christians respond to the migrant 
crisis?”; in Italy, “How to adopt a Syrian orphan child?” And so on. The heterogeneous 
Google searches indicate that in fact there was no consensus over what was at stake 
or what was to be done. And yet, the photograph circulated, making the image of the 
coming refugee sensible. Instantaneously iconic of the Syrian refugee crisis, the asyn-
chronous temporality of Web 2.0 ensured Alan Kurdi would keep washing up on that 
beach in Bodrum each time to different effect.
Affect Machines
Social media platforms are affect machines. To put it this way brings to the fore self-
organizing organisms articulated with technological and social environments. On 
the one hand, social media users inhabit a technological environment that is deeply 
integrated into their cognitive systems; on the other, their species socialities remain 
irrevocably salient to their cognitive makeup. Affect illuminates the biotechnical and 
the biosocial articulation of carbon-based life-forms and their machinic integration. 
Media theorists variously model the distributed cognition constitutive of the social-
technological subject of Web 2.0 social media.13 Their insights suggest knee-jerk tweets 
are both biotechnical, a media habit, and biosocial, communicative sendings to the 
multiplicity of YOUs. Approaching social media in the context of biological, technolog-
ical, and social wirings suggests habits are once-conscious actions that have settled as 
embodied responses. Both Wendy Chun and Kris Cohen privilege this part-conscious 
impersonal nature of social media actions, even when social media users entertain il-
lusions of personal agency or empowerment.14
Chun explores the singular subject, the YOU in social media, who confronts con-
stant crises in habitual new media.15 As more than one critic has noted, crises are eve-
ryday occurrences in neoliberal times.16 On social media, the demand for real-time re-
sponsibility can prove exhausting. Turning points or thresholds, crises send the YOUs 
running for cover. Like all living organisms responding to change, argues Chun, they 
attempt to reinforce the pattern that they recognize as the “self.” This is simply protec-
13   See, for instance Hayles, Unthought.
14   Chun, Updating to Remain the Same; Cohen, Never Alone, Except for Now.
15  Updating to Remain the Same  is  the  last  in Chun’s  trilogy  that  includes Control and Freedom on how a 
technology of control was managed and sold as freedom and Programmed Visions on computer as the 
tools for negotiating an increasingly complex world.
16   The point is made forcefully in Berlant’s Cruel Optimism and Povinelli’s Economies of Abandonment.
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tion against change, against coming uncertainties. Habit is the conditioned response 
that maintains the self-organizing system (the singular YOU). The return to a struc-
ture is a socially learned and deeply embodied response to the change. Chun under-
scores the creativity of the habitual in a memorable formula: Habit + Crisis = Update. 
One updates the self-organizing structure in confronting crisis with habit; in other 
words, the constant update “deprives habit of its ability to habituate.”17 In context of 
this formulation, one might ask: where does affect fit into the picture? Generally, af-
fects are understood as pre-personal intensities that accumulate and gather force in 
the embodied mind; they are pre-personal because they respond to external stimuli 
before conscious recognition of that stimuli as particular object. One’s lungs throw a 
spasm when a shadow looms in the alley, a visceral biosocial response. One implicitly 
perceives the stimuli one has encountered before; the perception is socially habitual, 
distributed through sensory and motor systems. Chun makes a similar claim about 
media habits that emerge from the integration of sensory and motor system with ma-
chines. She locates social media habit in implicit memory which is distinct from ex-
plicit memory. The latter is what we consciously recall, Chun maintains, following Eric 
R. Kandel’s In Search of Memory; it is long-term memory housed in the brain. By con-
trast, habits arise from implicit memory: they are a form of knowing without know-
ing. We are not conscious of inherent conditioning through habituation; there aren’t 
any memories stored that can be retrieved. Rather, habitual responses reconfigure and 
reinforce past goals / selves / experiences in acts of constant care that look not to the 
past (what must be preserved) but to the future (what enables survival). Affects are 
accumulated forces that drive this constant care. The human perceptual apparatuses 
process external stimuli, and especially noxious signals, in micro-actions such as liking, 
sharing, and retweeting. In this sense, mediation is an act of survival; it is constitutive 
of species socialities. Clicking an anger icon as response to a mass shootings in the U.S. 
or a sad icon for f loods and fires may appear desensitized, since we mostly understand 
sensitization to be enhanced alertness. But if we think about distributed perceptions 
at the interface of sensory, motor, and technological systems, then habitual responses 
are active engagements with stimuli that arrive from the social-technological environ-
ment that one inhabits.
In the case of iconic images, both explicit and implicit memories are in play. The 
icon is a cultural mnemonic: an artifactual graphic sign, it appears natural because of 
its habituation in implicit memory. As such icons call forth habitual responses, ranging 
from disgust to devotion. But because they are a shared cultural mnemonic, iconic im-
ages always belong to collective memory. One might say Alan Kurdi’s image triggered 
responses internal to social media users because of a collective habituation to images 
of injured children. Historically, distress, alarm, and horror at photographs of injured 
children as the exemplary victims of wars, famines, and genocides have provoked con-
troversy. Many such as the “Napalm girl” are a part of a global cultural repertoire. At 
one level, the strength of response to the Alan Kurdi image must be understood in this 
context. If, as I suggest, the Twitter storm is evidence of accumulated affects, then 
those affects arise from embodied cultural knowledge — so embedded that it does 
not appear as knowledge at all. Further, visceral responses to an injured child recall 
17   Chun, Updating to Remain the Same, 85.
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past experiences (“scars” and “remnants”)18 as points of reference for coming harm to 
self-organizing biological systems. Hence, the images of injured children arouse pro-
tective drives, ranging from deep anxiety to horror. Whichever direction one pursues, 
it is clear that complex affects — fear, anxiety, sadness — drive habitual responses to 
the mediatic traces of hurt or dead children. Often this complexity registers as messy, 
even unruly. Affects that have not congealed as discernible emotion are illegible, and 
therein manifest as the unreason of crowds and mobs. Over time, as iconic images 
circulate, they settle as expressive cultural sentiment in public cultures. In blogs and 
forums, the adult subject assumes an ethical and / or parental relation to the injured 
child. A deep sense of collective culpability begins to haunt the iconic image, a cul-
pability sometimes repressed and sometimes acknowledged as we see in the public 
culture around the Kurdi image.
If we follow VSML’s spatialization of the f lows, it is evident that the volume of 
retweets amplify through specific distributive chokepoints such as the Free Syria Hub 
or Human Rights Watch. Put differently, these institutions banked on particular 
forms of liberal subjectivity and on the proverbial iconicity of the injured child to en-
gineer a massive collective response to the refugee crisis. The presupposition of liberal 
YOUs (as Chun puts it) which is then algorithmically fed back to the individuated YOU 
of Web 2.0 marks the kind of controlled enclosure that make social media’s mythic 
sense of user empowerment just that — mythic! A range of theorists have been at pains 
to make the point about the freedom of the internet.19 These analyses of the privatized 
internet have repeatedly shown the “personal” to be algorithmically routed, a mon-
etized commodity. Such scholarship includes platform studies of business models 
that underlie Facebook’s and Twitter’s protocols. Hence, the participatory paradigm 
of unfettered reciprocities and of democratic playing fields of the “free internet” had 
been put to bed well before Cambridge Analytica became a catchphrase for its demise. 
Following these insights, one might say transnational organizations such as Free Syria 
Hub and Human Rights Watch banked on the populational aggregate, on the liberal 
YOUs’ value (pace Chun) that yielded dividends. In engineered viral spreads, not only 
are social media users expected to spread content through their social networks but 
each point of contact makes possible the exponential quantification of content. Corpo-
rate governance of Web 2.0 calculates this quantification. But social media users act 
without the predictive advantage of big data. They court uncertainty. The one surety is 
the desire to pass on the intensities that had them in their grip, a desire that drives the 
social distribution of the sensible. This desire already moves us beyond the algorithmic 
capture of the YOUs.
Even as she underscores the algorithmic production of population aggregates that 
shape the social networks of social media users, Kris Cohen argues that social media 
users inhabit a contorted form of group life: they live partly as populations and partly 
as affective publics.20 It is within the market enclosures of the controlled machinic 
18   Chun, Updating to Remain the Same, 95.
19   Most notably Terranova, Network Culture and Galloway and Thacker, The Exploit.
20   For an account of the dynamics of this group life in relation to the slogan “We Refugees,” see Suzana 
Milevska’s chapter  in  this volume; see as well Farah Atoui’s account of  the relation of public af fect 
to preemption and preemptive modes of power vis-à-vis discourses of migration-as-crisis, also this 
volume.
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environment that the singular YOUs entertain illusions of freedom. Cohen’s “affective 
publics” picks up on this sense of agency: on the singular drive to inhabit a plural YOU 
or the lonely drive to never be alone, to inhabit the social network. In this sense, the so-
cial media user is always a singular-plural subject living a distributed life on Web 2.0. 
Pushing beyond the market dimension to consider how social media users inhabit their 
group form, Chun initially paints a stark picture. If the YOUs in aggregated form show 
up in each other’s feed, does this not imply that social media is deeply segregated? Is 
the group form simply “poorly gated virtual communities”? The YOUs friend, like, fol-
low, recommend, and share with others like them. Chun names these social enclosures 
a prevalent homophily, a concept that rose from urban segregation in the 1950s. The 
homophilic group form strengthens already existing ties.21 Engineered viral spreads 
emerge from the anticipation and management of homophilic responses. These are all 
the reasons why, contra empowerment, social media is widely regarded as politically 
defunct: anti-social, socially risky, and manipulative.
What, then, can be made of political subjectivities that anticipate connectivity, if 
not reciprocity, with other YOUs? Is the desire to participate in political life entirely 
circumscribed? As both theorists argue, these controlled environments are leaky. Un-
expected things happen on social media. One cannot put down all viral events to regu-
lated homophily or to mechanized bot activity. Chun gestures toward such leakiness 
in positioning heterophily as the monstrous chimera of YOUs based on non-reciprocal 
relations. What if social media users inhabit their networked vulnerabilities as iso-
lated YOUs uncertain of outcomes? What if they count not on their social network but 
the originary multiplicity implicit in the very conception of the network? Granted, the 
network they reach is technologically controlled, but their actions disclose a desire for 
undecidable quantification. Such inhabitation of the network made of reciprocal and 
potentially non-reciprocal ties courts risk; the outcomes are undecidable. This unde-
cidability raises allegations of the “thin politics” of social media. The collective “we” is 
too transient, too wavering — it tends towards an inoperative collectivity. And yet, in 
such intensities of social media actions we catch a glimpse of a group form other than 
the algorithmically-governed population.
After Cohen, I call these group forms affective publics. The YOUs do not constitute 
a positive collectivity bearing the markers of racial, national, or other filiations; there 
is no self-ref lexive habitation of a particular medium that marks classic public such as 
a newspaper reading constituency. Rather, the binding glue for the unconnected YOUs 
is affective intensity and the desire to transmit affects through mediation. At mo-
ments when we glimpse unanticipated affective surges, as in the Twitter storm around 
the Kurdi image, the YOUs become a cumulative affective public even as their micro-
actions remain deeply individuated. It is a public without common features, without 
shared agendas, but it is equally a group form that embraces publicness. This ambigu-
ous and weak nature of the YOUs acting “alone together,” to invoke Cohen’s evocative 
phrase, is what renders their politics suspect. If they do not have a common agenda, do 
their micro-politics amount to anything at all? If these affective-performative media-





One way to approach these questions is to look beyond politics proper — be that the 
institutional compositions of the demos or civil society re-compositions of same. De-
mographic data on refugees constitute one major political composition of the Euro-
pean demos to come, with quotas and dispensations policing the implications behind 
incorporating new populations. Large-scale anti-border movements, supranational 
organizations, even local grassroots movements offer recompositions that parlay 
the politics of incorporation. They show how boats capsize from willed neglect, how 
the real issue is a lack of political will and not of material resource, and how states of 
exception operate to racially segregate disposable populations. We are familiar with 
such deliberations that manifest across media platforms. The affective publics I have 
elaborated above, however, are disruptive in that they dissent from the calculative ra-
tionality of these arbitrations. The unconnected YOUs puncture calculative rationality 
in favor of sensible relations to the coming wave. To call their politics “improper” draws 
on the long postcolonial engagement with uncivil mobilization, which is a mode of po-
litical participation for those with little access to the modern associational forms of 
civil society.22 Obviously social media users have clear access to media platforms and 
technologies; and yet, as affective partakers disinvested from deliberative democracy, 
they resemble uncivil congeries whose political participation is affective-performative. 
Thus the micro-actions of such social media users appear unruly and sometimes un-
civil; often artisanal, their mediations are often considered far too banal to elicit criti-
cal attention and far too transitory for political analysis.
In Rancière’s terms, such micro-actions are eminently democratic political activi-
ties when they mediate an uncounted surplus that exceeds political representation. 
Arriving with hashtags, not making any authoritative claims, as in the case of the 
Kurdi image, artisanal compositions of the demos are antithetical to quantification 
and therein to the police function of states. That police function attempts to enact de-
mographic capture by numbers: it counts the rich, the poor, the women, the illegal 
immigrants. It even counts the disposable and relegates them to camps and detention 
















two inspirations are Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed and Gaonkar, “After the Fictions.” 
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mains anonymous. The sensible image does not count but makes visible the space of the 
unknowable demos. In this regard, sensible images are instances of political mediation 
at its most democratic: “The essential work of politics is the configuration of its own 
space. It is to make the world of its subjects and its operations seen. The essence of 
politics is the manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one.”23 The 
figure of Alan Kurdi brings into view a world of deadly crossings, camps and borders, 
roiling waters and grave injury. It is a world whose visibility the police function strug-
gles to keep at bay. In dissenting from the police function, social media users enact an 
improper politics: they amplify artisanal compositions, makeshift and cursory, some-
times transitory, and often inaccurate. The sloppiness evident in the slippage between 
the singular child and the refugee / migrant horde lends such sensible images their po-
litical efficacy.
More importantly, impropriety lies in the uninvited participation of those who are 
not central actors in large political projects. In Rancière’s Sentiments, Davide Panagia 
characterizes such actors as “part-takers” who participate in activities that might not 
belong to them, regardless of whether that activity is persuasive to others.24 They are 
less invested in reasoned political judgement; they just want to partake (partager or 
share). These are exactly the social media users who enter and leave the political fray 
at will. Unruly or unreliable as political actors, their sudden eruptions occasionally jolt 
existing compositions of the demos. In social media, such partaking is highly regu-
lated through algorithmic controls of reciprocal ties. Yet there are occasions when the 
partaking is excessive, leaking beyond established reciprocities. On such occasions, 
media users retweet without a clear sense of how their activity will be received. This is 
a drive to feel rather than count the number of likes and shares. The temporal intensity 
of unprecedented viral spreads suggest the micro-actions that constitute the spread 
are not merely calculative. Something else had happened, something unpredictable. 
We are reminded that what appears unprecedented is often well-engineered: Cohen 
reminds us that there are companies in the business of designing viral memes, for 
there is money to be made in the YOUs value of viral campaigns. But such attention 
to algorithmic architectures does not fully explain the virality of the Kurdi image. Put 
differently, why would this image of the Syrian refugee crisis galvanize the quantifi-
cation drive at exponentially higher scales? After all, the VSML dossier presents evi-
dence of several other photographs of the same crisis that did not elicit a huge response. 
But the Kurdi image caught fire.25 It was the viral spread that was widely considered a 
“wakeup call,” “a lightbulb moment,” and an image that “shook the world.”26 Following 
the discussion of affects, one might argue that the force of accumulated affects reach 
a tipping point — they spill over in frantic sharing, liking, and tweeting — at particu-
23   Rancière, Dissensus, 37.
24  Panagia, Rancière’s Sentiments, xi.
25   There  is  substantial  evidence  in  the VSML dossier  about  the dif ference of  this  image.  The Twitter 
storm reverberated through already existing citizen-led ef forts  to mitigate  the plight of  refugees. 
The Facebook group #RTWN (#refugeeswelcometonorway) that led ef forts to collect provisions for 





lar conjunctures that cannot be predicted. They can only be understood in retrospect. 
In this case, the unanticipated spread suggests that unconnected YOUs were already 
aware, affectively if not consciously, of the refugee wave. They had felt the numbers al-
ready in Europe. In the Twitter storm, the YOUs entered the fray as uninvited partakers 
banking on the connectivity of Web 2.0.
That their entrance could not be anticipated is what frustrates political prediction. 
But it is a suddenness that is now the political norm, and especially in times when 
many social movements explode as admixtures of Twitter and tear gas.27 Such erup-
tions make it crucial to attend to affective publics who habitually exceed algorithmic 
capture. We see this most often in the many showdowns around violent viral images. 
In these cases, strong affective publics bound by filiation, racial or nationalist origins, 
attack democratic projects. They are on the rise all over the world; all the protocols and 
shutdowns in the world can’t seem to hold them at bay. Often antagonistic to liberal 
democracies, they are enamored of the police function: they want the count, if only to 
prove their invisible historical injury. That injury is the basis for closing borders and 
imposing limits on the demos; they, too, generate artisanal composition. In contrast, 
there are the weak inoperative YOUs that loosely establish relations with the anony-
mous demos; this demotic structure emerges again and again in the “springs” and “oc-
cupys” of our times that keep coming. Against an aggressive populism, this inarticulate 
popular surfaces in the time-honored spaces of streets and parks and the newly du-
rable spaces of social media. It may coalesce around avowedly local matters, but its 




Twitter and Tear Gas have spoken to the af fordances and constraints of this interface.
Controlling the Crisis1
Ian Alan Paul
If it were possible to ventriloquize power today it would only talk over itself, anxiously 
announcing that “the whole of our world is in crisis” while austerely assuring that “eve-
rything is entirely under control.” This contradiction suffuses our present, a historical 
moment in which elaborate reports on the disintegration of this or that structure or in-
stitution double as advertisements for security programs that promise to ever more in-
tensely, impenetrably, and intimately safeguard a seemingly threatened world. These 
twin voices of crisis and control mutually constitute the principal rationality of con-
temporary governmentality and power more generally, a logic within which crisis does 
not follow from the absence or failure of control, but rather is dependent upon — and 
is the condition of possibility for — control’s instantiation. This text seeks to elucidate 
how the emergent centrality of crisis in contemporary life, rather than being the con-
sequence of crises beyond control, is instead an output of societies organized by the de-
sire to control crises. Resonating through technical, discursive, aesthetic, and juridical 
strategies, the crisis-control conjuncture operates as a planetary force that is trans-
formatively re-orchestrating the operations and organizations of power in the present.
The first section of this text will draw upon Donna Haraway’s charting of the “in-
formatics of domination,”2 Gilles Deleuze’s prognosis of the coming “societies of 
control,”3 and the “autonomous world of apparatuses” described in Tiqqun’s Cybernetic 
Hypothesis in order to theorize the operations of control as well as chart how they’ve 
been mobilized by Frontex, the agency tasked with policing Europe’s internal and ex-
ternal borders and a truly paradigmatic expression of the dynamics described above. 
After analyzing Frontex’s networked surveillance and policing of migrants — as well 
as the regulation and circulation of data resulting from those measures — in the sec-
ond section of this text I outline how the control and crisis of Europe’s borders have 
emerged sympoietically, diagramming the crisis-control conjuncture within the his-









text, I conclude by looking to emergent practices that aim to counteract, sabotage, and 
undermine the conjunctive logic of crisis and control that now governs our present.
Crucially, I intend to detail the complementary structure of crisis and control 
throughout this text only in the hopes of also helping to clarify the ways in which these 
forms of power are presently being resisted, and speculatively could be resisted in 
times to come. While detailing and charting the operations of power is unquestion-
ably a necessary task, such an endeavour risks deepening a sense of helplessness and 
subjugation if it fails to also suggest ways in which power can be, if not entirely undone, 
at the very least resisted, warded off, or evaded. In this sense, the first gesture of this 
text should be read as an effort to draw a diagram of power, while the second should 
be read as an attempt to contribute, however minorly, to the interminable collective 
project of destituting power wherever it persists.
The Informatics, Cybernetics, and Control of Domination
In The Cybernetic Hypothesis, the authors writing within the anonymous and collec-
tive framework of the journal Tiqqun argue that liberalism has been superceded by the 
logic of cybernetics, within which “biological, physical, and social behaviors” come to 
be approached as “something integrally programmed and re-programmable.”4 Both 
liberalism and cybernetics are fantasies of power, but while the fantasy of liberalism is 
principally instantiated as a series of institutions, the fantasy of cybernetics is mani-
fest instead as “a diffuse constellation of agents, all driven, possessed, and blinded by 
the same fable […] (a fable) that hides behind the names ‘internet,’ ‘new information 
and communications technology,’ (and) the ‘new economy.’”5 In contrast to the isolat-
ed, individualized, and highly supervised forms of subjectivity that are cultivated by 
liberalism, cybernetics is instead a project concerned with vacating subjectivity as a 
means of producing emptied out subjects, blank envelopes that can serve as “the best 
possible conductor of social communication.”6 According to Tiqqun, the cybernetic 
project ultimately aims to produce a “new politics of subjects, resting on communi-
cation and transparency” that conceives of the individual as “something ‘piloted,’ in 
the last analysis, by the need for the survival of a ‘system’ that makes it possible, and 
which it must contribute to.”7 Subjects are each made to act as the “locus of an infinite 
feedback loop which is made to have no nodes,” situated within and dominated by in-
teroperable systems of communication and control.8
The conceptual delineation between cause and effect breaks down in cybernetic 
systems, as inputs and outputs mutually affect one another in regulatory feedback 
loops that push complex systems towards calibrated metastabilities. As subjects en-
ter into feedback processes, they communicate with cybernetic systems which then 
trigger regulatory responses in a corresponding set of control devices. Rather than try 
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implementation of cybernetic feedback at the scale of the subject is intended to ren-
der social uncertainties and indeterminacies eminently manageable, programmable, 
and productive whenever and wherever they emerge. While the logic of sovereignty is 
principally concerned with undertaking forms of action that are intended to produce 
a particular set of planned effects, cybernetics instead seeks to recursively regulate 
what strays or drifts away from calibrated states. These processual corrections are a 
cybernetic technique of governmentality enacted through regulation, a form of pilot-
ing that doesn’t attempt to avoid particular events or crises but instead only means 
to technically steer their effects in favorable directions.9 Like an automated surveil-
lance drone that dynamically adjusts the speed of its propeller in order to compensate 
for the surrounding turbulence, remaining serenely suspended above its target area, 
cybernetic systems enact controls to produce metastabilities between the inputs and 
outputs of a system in an interminable process of regulation that means to minimize 
the distance between a calibrated ideal and a digitally sensed world, materially instan-
tiating capitalism’s ideological structure as a network of technical devices.10
For Haraway, the cybernetic organization of power is expressed principally as “the 
translation of the world into a problem of coding” where “all resistance to instrumental 
control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, 
investment, and exchange.”11 Following the mass production, distribution, and instal-
lation of networked computers, it became possible for social behavior to be sensed, 
stored, and analyzed en masse as data, as abstracted sets of numerical values that 
could be circulated through and processed within the automated computation of ma-
chines. Like the abstracting power of price, which establishes an abstract equivalency 
between all commodities in markets, data establishes an abstract equivalency between 
anything that can be digitally sensed by or manually inputted into computers.12 This 
vast numerical abstraction of the world “transcends the universal translation effected 
by capitalist markets that Marx analysed so well,” emerging as a totalizing cybernetic 
system which aims to regulate all of the world’s activity.13 For Haraway, “information 
is just that kind of quantifiable element (unit, basis of unity) which allows universal 
translation, and so unhindered instrumental power” that permits more and more of 
the world to be subjected to the “informatics of domination” that characterizes the 

















Within the historical movement of cybernetics, Deleuze argues that the central 
technique of power is control. Conceived of as a means of computationally acting on 
the actions of others, control is best understood not as a replacement for but rather 
as an elaboration of the forms of domination that characterized disciplinary power. 
While in disciplinary societies a life was imagined as traveling through a series of 
discontinuous enclosures which often looked something like: Hospital (Maternity 
Ward) => School => Factory (or Prison, or Barracks) => Hospital (Morgue), in control 
societies a life comes to be differentially suffused by all of these structures simul-
taneously as a consequence of their translation into code.15 For Deleuze, the fixed 
molds of disciplinary societies are transformed into “self-deforming cast(s) that will 
continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will 
transmute from point to point” that can be deployed at a plurality of scales and be 
precisely calibrated in relation to each subject in particular based upon the data as-
sociated with them.16 While in disciplinary societies a border could be imagined as a 
fortress-like wall that cuts a landscape cleanly into two distinct territories, in control 
societies a border instead is envisaged as a dispersed series of networked gates and 
checkpoints that each open and close dynamically in response to a shifting multiplic-
ity of passwords and codes.
In the contemporary European context, Frontex acts as the central authority re-
sponsible for controlling migration on the continent and mobilizes the cybernetic 
techniques of power outlined above to do so. Founded in 2005, Frontex organizes and 
oversees a diverse array of programs and technologies that are intended to monitor 
and police the internal and external borders of the EU, but in practice these measures 
far exceed the strict spatial boundaries of the political and economic union. Central to 
Frontex’s approach is the use of planetary-scale networks of interoperable surveillance 
and control technologies, including but not limited to data centers, fiber-optic cables, 
ground sensors, cell phone towers, and communications and surveillance satellites, 
that together serve as the cybernetic infrastructure for dynamic zones of control that 
extend across and beyond the territorial limits of the Schengen area.17
As a core part of its operations, Frontex extensively surveils, studies, and aggre-
gates information about migration as a means of more effectively policing and con-
trolling it. Profuse amounts of data are routinely captured, aggregated, and analyzed, 
all of which are then repackaged and published by Frontex in media-rich “Risk Analy-
sis Reports” that advertise new border control technologies and initiatives, present 
colorful data visualizations and schematic migratory pattern maps, and detail various 
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of the migrant crisis as an object of cultural concern, security planning, political dis-
course, and legislative response in the EU.18
Frontex’s approach to the policing of migration does not involve the deployment 
of large numbers of security forces, an ineffective gesture given the vast kilometers 
of borders that encompass the EU, but rather mobilizes cybernetic techniques of pow-
er that rely upon the capture, circulation, and analysis of data that is collected from 
member states and then transmitted back to them in transnational feedback loops. As 
national security programs deploy technologies and forces at their own borders, the 
information produced by those operations become inputs that Frontex can then use to 
recalibrate the EU-wide distribution and deployment of security funding and resourc-
es. Facilitated by the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and Schengen 
Information System (SIS) information-exchange frameworks, Frontex collects data 
from individual member states’ National Coordination Centres and then produces a 
“European situational picture and the common pre-frontier intelligence picture (fo-
cused on areas beyond the Schengen Area and EU borders)” that is then shared back 
with each member state.19 An associated Frontex program titled Copernicus addition-
ally “increase(s) situational awareness by providing Europe with accurate, reliable and 
up-to-date data collected from satellites and on-site sensors” that contribute another 
degree of detail of the “situational picture” that is circulated across the EU.20 These 
information sharing programs constitute Frontex’s core function, which concerns 
the production of “a constantly updated picture, as near to real time as possible, of 
Europe’s external borders and migration situation” that acts as a “vital part of Fron-
tex’s rapid-response mechanism.”21 The production of a “constantly updated picture” 
of migration is in the end only rendered possible within a cybernetic system organ-
ized to facilitate maximal communication between heterogeneous national security 
forces, technologies, and infrastructures that are made to be transparent to and for 
one another.
Cybernetic systems ultimately rely upon communication in order to determine 
control responses, and in control societies the drive for more communication is made 
to be maximal. The confessional dynamics that animated disciplinary societies, within 
which subjects were coerced into articulating their interior lives for the exterior world 
(in the hospital examination room, the courtroom, the psychiatrists office, the class-
room, etc.), pale in comparison to the ways in which subjects can be made to invol-
untarily confess to machines in control societies. Microfacial expressions, pulse rates, 
body temperatures, perspiration, respiration, eye dilations, and odors are all now the 
targets of automated machine sensing and analysis, each of which are translated into 
data and uploaded into security systems at airports and other border crossings that 








algorithmically determine if alerts should be sent to security officers.22 Attention itself 
has become a central form of confession in this context, where the amount of time 
spent looking at various content online is measured to the millisecond in order to build 
data profiles, determine preferences, predict desires, calibrate the delivery of future 
content, and / or trigger a corresponding series of control responses. All that is sensible 
by machines is approached as constituting part of a planetary polyphonous confession, 
within which subjects engage in an endless autobiographical monologue in the form 
of the communications and signals they send to a heterogeneous multiplicity of cyber-
netically driven apparatuses and feedback systems.23 
Epistemologically, cybernetic systems do not comprehend subjects as individuals 
(as the indivisible, coherent entities of liberalism and disciplinary societies), but rather 
as bundles of dividual characteristics that can be unique to particular bodies but are 
more often shared in common by many. Datasets of dividual characteristics can be 
composed of biometric data such as height, weight, eye, skin, and hair color, genomic 
markers, fingerprints, and gait, but also can incorporate any information that can be 
digitally stored in a database, such as citizenship, sexuality, criminal records, or loca-
tion histories.24 While the discourses that surround crisis tend to focus on individual 
bodies as loci of potential violence, for example the “single male refugee” in the migrant 
crisis that comes to be understood as a parasite or terrorist, these discourses function 
to produce a political justification for the enactment of power that simultaneously obscures 
the way in which power is dividually enacted.25 The kinds of dividual characteristics that 
are collected and analyzed uninterruptibly grows more expansive and diverse as states, 
social media companies, academic researchers, and data brokers compete to invent 
techniques of sensing and storing novel forms of data based upon the tautological un-
derstanding that all data is good, and all that is good is data.
Data is obsessively collected everywhere and anywhere it is found, f lowing in in-
creasingly large volumes and amassing in a multiplicity of informatic reservoirs whose 
depths only grow. In one instance, a video stream from a public webcam installed in a 

















25   For more  on  the  figure  of  the  single male  refugee,  see  Veronika  Zabotsky’s  essay  “Unsanctioned 
Agency” in this volume.
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recognition programs.26 In another case, Microsoft released a dataset that contains 
the names and images of 100,000 “celebrities” that it aggregated from various online 
sources that (unironically) includes the artists Hito Steyerl, Ai Weiwei, and Trevor Pa-
glen and which was used as material for research projects across several continents.27 
While the production and analysis of images remains a central part of cybernetic 
control, whether expressed as data visualizations or in the images captured by sur-
veillance satellites, the luminosity of the pulses that stream through fiber optic lines 
and the electrical charges of individual bits within databases far exceeds the limits 
of visual culture and constitutes a formally broader and more ontologically diverse 
regime of mediation. By translating the world into the most elementary form of digi-
tal difference, the switch between one and zero (presence and absence), anything can 
potentially be “interfaced with any other” by digitally abstracting them, allowing for 
the “processing (of) signals in a common language.”28 The complex arrangement of for-
mal elements that make up every different kind of visual composition (maps, graphs, 
schematics, photographs, etc.) appears excessive and wasteful in comparison to the 
minimalism and austerity of binary encoding.29
The cybernetic organization and expression of power takes shape in banal and eve-
ryday forms, just as it is manifest in punctuated moments of extreme violence. It can 
be expressed as the serving of particular kinds of advertising content to people who 
have become associated with a particular dividual characteristic, just as it can take 
shape as drone strikes that are executed based solely upon the analysis of dividual data, 
such as the suspicious movement of a cell phone over time, without being aware of the 
identity of the person being bombed.30 At the level of governmentality, the state may 
select only those who share a particular grouping of dividual characteristics for the 
enactment of certain controls, such as those subjects who are associated with the data 
identifiers “Muslim,” “Man,” “Under 40,” and “Travelled Abroad.” Once behavioral, bio-
graphical, and / or biometric data is communicated to a cybernetic system, that data 
can then be acted upon and modulated in order to generate new data that is closer to 
the socially, politically, and economically desired ideal of the larger system.
Frontex’s strategy of producing a constantly updated situational picture of migra-
tion might better be described as the production of an operational image that is struc-

















reducing them to a “visual image” would be to miss the ways in which the image also 
acts as a site of analysis, computation, and data that exceeds visuality in its modes of 
abstraction. Like a border surveillance camera that captures a photo of the landscape, 
algorithmically tries to match the various compositional relations of the captured im-
age with coded sets of stored spatial patterns such as buildings, rivers, bridges, trees, 
bodies, animals, and / or roads, and then makes a calculated set of adjustments to its 
aperture and zoom as well as possibly activating the f loodlights and alarm sirens 
mounted on nearby security fences before capturing another image and repeating the 
process, the operational images of Frontex are only produced in order to make various 
adjustments to a corresponding system of controls that will recursively affect the im-
age in a modulatory feedback loop.31 In this way, Frontex only produces, analyzes, and 
circulates an image of migration, a moving image of movement, in order to facilitate the 
operational and cybernetic domination of that movement. As Tiqqun notes, “Empire, 
armed with cybernetics, insists on autonomy for it alone,” and in the context of the 
politics of movement Frontex should be understood as making a totalizing claim on 
the autonomy of its own internal movement (the circulation of data, of commodities, 
of “situational pictures,” of security forces, etc.) while simultaneously refusing that 
same autonomy of movement for all others.32
One of the central contradictions that defines the power of contemporary borders 
is that they both facilitate and hinder movement, allowing for some f lows to proceed 
largely unregulated while forcefully halting others. In the context of the EU, f lows of 
those with proper passports, of commodities, and of financial assets circulate unim-
peded, while vast populations are subjected to policing and control measures intended 
to extinguish even the possibility of their movement. In this way, the cyberneticization 
of the European border regime can be understood as a rearticulation of historical rela-
tions of subjugation and domination which have come to be technically expressed as 
“an autonomous world of apparatuses so blended with the capitalist project that it has 
become a political project.”33 While social media posts are subjected to intense moni-
toring and analysis in relation to border controls, encrypted wire transfers to offshore 
accounts remain shrouded in privileged cloaks of opacity. While Frontex worries about 
“individuals posing a security threat and economic migrants attempting to abuse the 
system by claiming a false nationality” in its annual risk reports, in practice they are 
only concerned by “security threat(s)” and “abuse(s) of the system” of targeted dividual 
characteristics that are algorithmically determined to be out of alignment with Euro-
pean power.34
In this way, cybernetic control can be conceived as both totalizing and dif ferential 
in its processual enactment. Control is totalizing in the sense that everything and 
everyone in the world is targeted by the expansive digital sensing of interconnected 
surveillance apparatuses, and so all subjects are subjected to the systems of communica-
tion and computation that compose cybernetic systems. And yet, crucially, the control 
measures that are activated in response to that sensed data are fundamentally differ-
ential as they are dif ferently enacted in relation to politically dif ferentiated subjects. While 
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society itself can be understood as being totally regulated by the logic of cybernetics, 
the intensity of that regulation is nonetheless distributed unevenly, mobilized differ-
entially against particular groupings of subjects based upon how distant their dividual 
characteristics are from the calibrated settings and norms of the larger social system. 
In this way, subjects become caught between the two extreme and counterposed pro-
cesses of de- and reconstitution, in which bodies come to be understood as being pure 
expressions of particular kinds of social dif ference within a liberal society (along the lines 
of race, class, gender, sexuality, etc.) just as they are disaggregated and disintegrated 
into atomized streams of dividual characteristics within the analytic apparatuses of 
cybernetics.
Ultimately, both liberalism and cybernetics should principally be understood as 
fantasies, as political and technical imaginations of a society’s structure that are mobi-
lized to restructure society in those imagined forms. The subjects of liberalism and cyber-
netics never entirely exist in ways that liberal and cybernetic societies imagine them, 
but nonetheless liberal and cybernetic imaginations act upon bodies as real forces of 
subjectification that effectively capture them within their respective fantastical struc-
tures.35 As fantasies of power and domination, the infinite number of differences that 
constitute the gulf between the liberal and cybernetic fantasies of the world and the 
world itself are not comprehended as being a problem of fantasies but rather simply as 
a problem for fantasies to correct. As a consequence, the historical instantiation of the 
liberal and cybernetic fantasies is inconsistent and often contradictory, allowing for 
societies to dream of frictionless global f lows of information, bodies, and capital on 
one night, and of border detention camps in need of ever more police, tear gas, motion 
sensors, and concertina wire on the next.
However, just as the cybernetic organization of power hasn’t replaced disciplinary 
power but rather has substantially transformed its material instantiation and formal 
enactment, cybernetics should equally be understood not as liberalism’s replacement 
but as a complementary elaboration of its logic.36 In other words, while the modula-
tory feedback of cybernetics now constitutes the principal technical mechanism of power, 
governmentality, and control that acts upon dividual characteristics, nonetheless lib-
eral sovereignty remains deeply involved in the dif ferential enactment and distribution 
of cybernetic power across individualized bodies. In this way, contemporary subjec-
tivity itself is increasingly an expression of the formal contradiction that exists be-
tween liberal and cybernetic imaginaries, persistently decomposed into a multiplicity 
of dividual bits and bytes within the machines of cybernetic systems and ceaselessly 












reconstituted into legible individuals within the discourses, regimes of representation, 
and legal / juridical structures of liberal society.
This apparent contradiction between liberalism and cybernetics ultimately re-
solves itself conjunctively, within which the crisis of liberalism and the control of cyber-
netics come to constitute, sustain, and intensify one another. As a society denounces 
migrants as being an existential threat to the supposed equalities, rights, and forms of 
welfare afforded to subjects within a liberal social order, migrants appear as a crisis for 
liberal society and thus in need of cybernetic control and regulation. The ban on wom-
en’s veiling in various nation states within the EU could similarly be figured as a crisis 
for liberalism, where the niqab is seen as a foreign cultural imposition that islamopho-
bic liberal societies cannot tolerate. Of course, the unveiled face is precisely also the 
face that is available for facial recognition systems to capture and analyze, subjecting 
muslim women to increasing degrees of cybernetic control (it is not coincidental that 
“veil” and “surveillance” share etymologies, after all).37 In response to crises, bodies 
come to be subjectively parsed by and subsumed within historically demarcated forms 
of liberal difference (as liberalism’s constitutive “other”) just as they are permeated by 
concatenated processes of communication and control, conjunctively dominating life 
ever more intimately and totally.
Simultaneously produced as individual subjects and disintegrated into dividual com-
ponents, particularly targeted pieces or patterns of data (“Sends Money Electronically 
to Nigeria,” “Types in Arabic,” “Detectable South Asian Ethnic Facial Geometry and 
Skin Tone,” “Wears a Hijab,” etc.) can be acted upon by cybernetic systems as a means 
of dominating a differentiated subject or group of subjects within the enforced hier-
archies of a liberal social order. In other words, the totalizing structure of cybernetic 
control appears alongside liberal crises as part of a conjunctive historical movement, 
within which a perceived threat to the universality of liberalism must be persistently 
defended by the differential enactment of cybernetic power. In this sense, subjectivity 
itself becomes unthinkable absent either the individualizing force of liberalism or the 
corresponding set of apparatuses, devices, and mechanisms that materially constitute 
the cybernetic systems responsible for both producing and dominating individual 
subjects dividually.38
Brief ly pausing to trace an outline of the shared histories of data collection, com-
putation, and state violence can help to make clear the conditions within which these 
dynamics took shape. In Europe in particular, the history of these practices echoes 
and reverberates through colonial projects, the repression of popular revolts, the or-
ganization of genocide, through to the contemporary control of migration at the EU’s 
borders, each constituting part of a continuous elaboration, development, transfor-






fully  coincide with one another  […]  the search  for new political  subjects  that have  the potential  to 
paralyze, one that still paralyzes the tradition of the left, becomes unthinkable. Theory of the subject 
and theory of mechanisms are one,” cited in Anarchist without Content, “Tiqqun Apocrypha Repost.” 
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lesce into a complex inheritance constituted by the documentation, numeration, and 
eventual computation of bodies undertaken as forms of mass abstracting violence. As 
long ago as the Spanish Inquisition, record keeping, accounting, and data collection 
had already become integral into the processual enactment of state repression.39 A set 
of procedures codified in documents such as the Orden de Processar (Prosecutorial Or-
der) in the late 16th century involved not only the production of a written record of 
those present at trial as well as their testimony, verdict, and sentencing, but also of 
their property, biography, religion, race, and extended familial relations. The episte-
mological structure of the Spanish Inquisition also is what gave it duration as a politi-
cal and historical force: the documentation of property allowed for its seizure which 
was the primary source of funding for the trials, while the documentation of familial 
ties allowed for expanded inquiries to be opened in a cascading series of subsequent 
trials. The establishment of bureaucratic data collection and processing transformed 
the event of state violence into a recursive process of state violence that could unfold over 
many years — or in the case of the Inquisition(s), centuries — and could be carried out 
by many different dispersed actors who could simply follow officially documented in-
structions and procedures.
By the late 19th century, biometric techniques had begun to be developed, prac-
ticed within, and integrated into the bureaucratic organization of state power. In co-
lonial India, the British officers William Herschel and Richard Henry adopted finger-
printing as a method to allow illiterate colonized subjects to sign contracts and later 
was used to identify criminals in Bengal, techniques which were later brought back 
from the colonies to Britain where they became integrated into the standard practic-
es of London’s Metropolitan Police Service.40 In roughly the same period, biometric 
photography was implemented in France in the decades following the defeat of the 
Paris Commune, where mass volumes of city records had been destroyed by fires and 
thus Parisians could attempt to assume whatever identity they desired.41 The stand-
ardization of portraiture in the form of police mugshots in particular was intended 
to “reregister a social field that had exploded into multiplicity.”42 The numeration of 
bodies most infamously took form in the tattooing of numbers onto the skin of Jews, 
Roma, homosexuals, the disabled, and others in Auschwitz during the Holocaust. By 
the mid 20th century, the Nazi regime was already using computers in order to process 
targeted populations and manage their transportation to various concentration and 
extermination camps across Europe with greater degrees of efficiency.43 IBM supplied 
machines and punch cards to the Nazis and also provided routine maintenance, which 
in combination with the vast census operations that accompanied Germany’s expand-
39   The only reason we know so much about the Spanish Inquisition, af ter all, is because of the elaborate 
archives it produced about its own activities.
40   Colonial  territories  continue  to be  laboratories  for  state power.  In  contemporary Palestine,  for ex-
ample, experimental technologies are deployed by the Israeli state against Palestinians before being 
packaged, marketed, and sold to a range of other states. See Puar’s The Right to Maim and Esmeir’s 
“Colonial Experiments in Gaza” for theoretical explorations of this practice.
41   For other  relevant histories of biometrics and surveillance,  see Simone Browne’s Dark Matters and 
James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State.
42   Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” 34.
43   See Edwin Black’s IBM and the Holocaust for a comprehensive look at this history.
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ing occupation of Europe allowed for the dividual sorting of the targeted populations, 
the literal counting of and counting upon bodies, creating the necessary conditions for 
the subsequent extermination of millions.44
In each of the aforementioned histories, the creation of an abstract index in which 
complex and nuanced living bodies came to be counted and numbered was the pri-
mary epistemological and political mechanism through which these forms of violence 
were rendered possible. While the particularities and specificities of each of these his-
tories are not to be disregarded, nonetheless it is important that they be read together 
as contributing to the larger historical elaboration of state power in Europe which con-
tinues to take place today. Over the course of these diverse yet interconnected histories, 
an important transformation coincided with the emergence of cybernetics and control 
that is worth highlighting: while early biometric practices such as the mugshot and fin-
gerprinting were conceived of principally as retroactive measures through which those 
who were arrested could be documented in order to be able to recognize them in case 
they should be arrested again, in control societies biometric data is preemptively col-
lected about the entire population based upon the assumption that although not every 
person is a criminal, every person has the ineradicable potential to become one.45
In response to this imminent criminal potentiality that exists in every subject, data 
is collected in as high of volumes as possible at all times by a dispersed network of 
facial recognition systems, license plate readers, digital payment systems, cell phone 
towers, and myriad other technologies not because of any documented fact but because 
of a social probability that must endlessly predicted and regulated by cybernetic sys-
tems. As shorthand, the shift from disciplinary societies to control societies can be 
mapped onto a corresponding shift from understanding society deterministically, 
which characterized modernist practices of statecraft and sovereignty that aimed to 
produce particular futures, to understanding society as a set of probabilities and po-
tentialities that must be modulated and controlled.46 As a consequence of the above, 
the structure of cybernetics and control incorporates and makes productive a degree 
of indeterminacy by transforming noise into data which can then be used to apply cor-
rective regulatory measures.47 In actuality, without indeterminacy cybernetics and 
control would have no relevant object to act upon and instead would simply operate as 
deterministic machines. Social behavior and arguably life itself are only social and liv-
ing to the degree that they escape, elude, or exceed being entirely determined, and as 
such society and life, as forms of indeterminacy, operate as the material substrate for 
44   On a sobering and (I feel necessary) note, it  is  important to make clear that the forms of computa-
tion and data collection that were practiced by the Nazi regime were extremely meager and unso-
phisticated when compared to standard data collection and analysis practices today. Should a state 
equipped with  contemporary  computational  and  cybernetic  power  decide  to  undertake  a  similar 
project of extermination and genocide now, it would be unthinkably more efficient, expansive, and 
horrific.





47   For more on the relationship between “information” and “data,”  see  the collection  “Raw Data” Is an 
Oxymoron, edited by Lisa Gitelman.
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cybernetic regulation. The central innovation of the cybernetic organization of power, 
of the informatics of domination, and of control societies is that they do not treat in-
determinacy as a problem to be prevented, eradicated, or overcome but as the proper 
territory of governmentality itself.
Following from this insight, it is unsurprising that the rise of cybernetics has been 
accompanied by the emergent centrality of crises.48 It has become entirely banal to 
pick up a newspaper today and read separate stories about how the climate, economy, 
state, youth, universities, masculinities, immigration controls, church, family, and 
civilization itself are all in crisis. Whether ecological, economic, military, social, or 
political, crises aren’t exceptional or ruptural and instead simply processually and in-
cessantly act as the context for new corrective control measures. As Giorgio Agamben 
notes, in crises “the capability to decide once and for all disappears and the continuous 
decision-making process decides nothing” as they become approached simply as op-
portunities for governmentality to enact power in “the form of a perpetual coup d’état” 
that isn’t interested in maintaining order but only perpetually managing disorder.49
The Control of Crisis, and The Crisis of Control
As much as the European migrant crisis was a crisis of control, in which border con-
trols seemingly failed to prevent migrants from entering Europe, it was just as much 
a crisis for control, a historical object for the enactment of control operations. In this 
sense, both control and crisis acted as part of a larger calculus of cybernetic power that 
has come to be profusely and diversely expressed at planetary scales. For cybernetics 
to assume its place as the principal rationality of governmentality, society itself must 
also come to understand itself not as on a path towards a planned idealization but in a 
perpetual fall into new depths of crisis. This understanding of the world as being fun-
damentally in crisis is a consequence of the technical and epistemological structure of 
cybernetics, in which the world is approached as being in need of interminable correc-
tion because it is literally sensed as being increasingly out of control as more and more 
control mechanisms are implemented.
As more communication is established within cybernetic systems, greater amounts 
of indeterminacy are sensed, and as greater amounts of indeterminacy are sensed, a 
greater need for communication and control emerges. This corresponding relationship 
between the production of knowledge in cybernetic systems and the need to implement 
controls in relation to that knowledge acts as a conjunctive synergy between control 
and crisis more generally, an epistemological and political feedback loop within which 










and crisis operate together as a singular structure of power that is just as interested 
in managing crises as it is invested in maintaining them, synchronously emerging as 
an assemblage of technologies, infrastructures, and policies that reinforce, reproduce, 
and sustain one another.
Central to any meaningful understanding of the migrant crisis is an analysis of the 
ways that crisis has emerged sympoietically with the ways it has been controlled, just 
as control has emerged from within the wakes of its own crisis.50 The collection and 
aestheticized circulation of data emerging from the 2015–16 European migrant crisis 
in particular proved to be immensely productive for Frontex, and enabled a substantial 
expansion of its infrastructures and operations.51 In 2015, at the supposed height of the 
migrant crisis, Frontex reported that an “unprecedented inf low of people” (numbering 
710,000) had entered the EU without proper documentation, an increase of 428,000 
from the same period in the previous year.52 While it is unquestionably true that mi-
gration numbers increased in this period due to the revolutionary activity and subse-
quent armed conf licts that were unfolding in the Middle East over the same period, 
what is significant about this report in particular is that the number of migrant detec-
tions was used by Frontex to describe the number of migrants who had entered the EU 
without permission, a subtle but crucially important distinction with consequential 
political effects.
Due to the proliferation of controls at the EU’s borders, it is unsurprising that a 
single migrant can come to be detected multiple times by the dispersed organization 
of various surveillance systems and security forces. After the reporter Nando Sigona 




person several  times  in dif ferent  locations at  the external border. This means  that a 
large number of the people who were counted when they arrived in Greece were again 
counted when entering the EU for the second time through Hungary or Croatia.”53
Even with the clarification that seemed to call into question the “unprecedented in-
f low,” the report nonetheless achieved the same ends by exaggerating the appearance 
of a crisis, an exceptional circumstance which necessitates a correspondingly excep-
tional increase in control measures. As Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri 
states about halfway through the document:
50   For a theorization of the liberatory (as opposed to oppressive) potential of sympoietics, see Donna 
Haraway’s “Tentacular Thinking” and Staying with the Trouble.
51   I’ve used the word “crisis”  throughout without any qualification because  I’m  interested  in thinking 












The “unprecedented” nature of the f lows here of course is suspect, especially consider-
ing that 20th-century Europe was reshaped by much larger mass migrations spurred 
on by two world wars as well as by the migrations involved in European colonial pro-
jects. Nonetheless, the “unprecedented” framing isn’t intended to function descrip-
tively but rather to help constitute a present without precedent, a situation that cannot be 
planned for but certainly can be controlled.
Leggeri’s call for “European solidarity” was later formalized and expanded upon in 
Frontex’s 2016 Risk Analysis Report (produced in 2015), which proposed the establish-
ment of a Frontex Risk Analysis Centre, an information sharing network within the EU, 
and an increase in personnel and funding in order to properly respond to the unprec-
edented crisis. In response, by the end of 2015 the EU Commission adopted new regu-
lations that established the “European Border and Coast Guard Agency,” a replacement 
for Frontex’s previous instantiation as the “European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders.”54 Accompanying the name change 
was a vast expansion of Frontex’s powers which came to include the “right to intervene,” 
allowing for the deployment of Frontex security forces alongside various national au-
thorities, the establishment of a “Risk Analysis Centre” that would facilitate the circu-
lation and aggregation of data concerning migration between EU member states, and 
the formation of “European Return Intervention Teams” that would assist EU member 
states with the deportation of undocumented migrants.55 In the end, the migrant cri-
sis didn’t operate as a crisis of control at all, but rather as a dramatic multiplication of it, 
indefinitely increasing the intensity and scope of Frontex’s operations in almost every 
domain of operations.
After the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was established, several more 
measures were adopted to further regulate, police, and control migration as part of the 
larger cybernetic organization of power. Following the 2015–16 crisis, Frontex went on 
to extend its territorial reach through the establishment of “risk analysis cells” across 
Africa as part of a broader strategy to externalize its borders, extending its control 
and sensing capabilities well beyond the European continent.56 These risk analysis 
cells “analyze strategic data on cross-border crime in various African nation states 
and support relevant authorities involved in border management,” imposing the cy-
bernetic logic of Frontex border control in a deterritorialized and neocolonial fashion 
across Africa. Following Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, these risk analysis cells can 
be understood as being a militarized offensive against the surround, an establishing 






of Europe’s hostile exterior.57 Following from Achille Mbembe, the risk analysis cells 
could equally be understood as necropolitically constituting part of a European war 
machine, a form of state power decoupled from territorial constraints and made to be 
“polymorphous and diffuse,” a militarized and mobile cybernetic force that is para-
doxically captured by sovereignty in order for sovereignty to be able exceed its own 
formal limits.58 These measures, along with other complementary border externaliza-
tion programs in the Mediterranean, Turkey, and elsewhere, displace the borders of 
the EU from being located somewhere in particular to being spectrally expressed across 
many dynamic zones of control at once. As an unbroken extension of Europe’s colonial 
history, the exertion of European power on the territories that it has made exterior has 
come to be materially reinstantiated cybernetically. 
As a formal culmination of all of these transformations, an experimental border 
technology named iBorderCtrl that automates some of the migration controls at of-
ficial points of crossing is now being implemented as a pilot program in Hungary, 
Greece, and Latvia. Mobilizing affect recognition technologies and machine learning 
algorithms, migrants subjected to the program “use an online application to upload 
pictures of their passport, visa and proof of funds, then use a webcam to answer ques-
tions from a computer-animated border guard, personalised to the traveller’s gender, 
ethnicity and language.”59 The system then analyzes “micro gestures” to determine if 
the migrant should be allowed to cross using regular security procedures, or if they 
require additional levels scrutiny from human border guards at points of entry.60
The instantiation of cybernetics occurs across diverse scales, with many distinct 
interoperable layers of communication and control coexisting with one another in 
nested regulatory hierarchies. While Frontex can be understood as having a particu-
lar cybernetic relation with member states expressed in the communication of data 
and subsequent reorganization of security resources, iBorderCtrl is an example of a 
cybernetic process enacted on the scale of the subject. As a migrant interacts with the 
application, their dividual inputs (gender, ethnicity, language, etc.) shape the system’s 
output (questions, computer animations, etc.), which in turn generates a new affective 
response in the subject which is communicated back to and analyzed by the machine, 
triggering further algorithmically-driven adjustments to Frontex’s communication 
and control systems. Here, the cybernetic expression of power is horrifically intimate. 
There is no singular architecture of power imposing itself uniformly upon a popula-
tion here, but rather an algorithmic multiplicity of uniquely calibrated modulations 
executed uniquely and differentially in relation to each subject.
As cybernetic systems come to be technically integrated into more and more of 
society, crisis equally comes to assume its place not as an event but as the persistent 
condition of the present. As crisis becomes discursively, technically, and politically mo-
bilized as a means of enacting more and more controls, and as more and more controls 
epistemologically exacerbate the appearance of various crises, the intensities of both 
crisis and control heighten. As Haraway notes, “the only way to characterize the infor-
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simply becomes another f luctuating input for a larger system that in the end is only 
oriented towards its own duration.61 In control societies, crises operate principally as 
the context for techniques of governmentality and forms of power that are defined by 
the intensifying control of insecurity, and the intensifying insecurity of control.
In the end, Frontex’s cybernetic project can perhaps be best understood by analyz-
ing a word that Frontex itself enjoys using quite frequently: risk. Risk is an epistemo-
logical but also a political concept that is oriented by a probabilistic worldview that un-
derstands everything in terms of its possibility. Risk allows for a form of thinking that 
embraces uncertainty in order to be able to speculate in relation to it, anticipating dif-
ferent futures in an attempt to better control them in advance of their possible arrival. 
Risk becomes an object of analysis, from which algorithmic processes can simulate, 
project, predict, and prognose future trends based upon previously-collected data, 
producing virtualized futures that can be cybernetically acted upon in the present. 
Communication is the central means that cybernetics deploys to tame uncertainty, 
and the more communication that exists the more responsive feedback can become. 
In this sense, risk is not something to be minimized but rather becomes a productive 
element within cybernetic communication and control.
And what is crisis, after all, if not the perpetual amplification of risk? Like a micro-
phone pointed towards its own speaker that multiplies ambient noise into ear splitting 
screeches, the instantiation of control in the world ontologically involves a correspond-
ing amplification of risk. In this way, control doesn’t only operate to minimize the dis-
tance between inputs and outputs in a negative regulatory feedback loop that aims to 
stabilize European projects of securitization and governance, but can also function 
to magnify and strengthen particular signals in order to expand the terrain of what 
is in need of control. Strategically spatialized and differentially enacted across the 
social field, positive feedback — long regarded as antithetical to cybernetic modes of 
control — thus becomes central to the production of risk and, in turn, the extension 
and intensification of both liberal and cybernetic techniques of power.62 In the EU, as 
Frontex organizes to produce higher and higher volumes of data about migrants, and 
as that data is circulated across more and more communication nodes, crisis will pro-
liferate and persist as crucially constitutive of the present, creating the conditions for 
ever expanding and intensifying control. From here, the only question of importance 




cal  homeostasis, which would become a major discursive  and  conceptual  support  for  later  cyber-
netic theories of feedback and control, “The theory […] can also serve as a vade mecum  for imperial-
ism — namely, if you want to hold on to your empire, keep it of f balance in such a way that only the 
motherland  can maintain  it  in a  steady  state. When  the outlying possessions are able  to  regulate 




What is uncontrollable today? What is the remainder of control, what escapes and 
eludes control, and what threatens to undo it entirely? In other words, what is out of 
control, both emerging from control as well as mobilized against its totalizing instantia-
tion? Haraway, Deleuze, and Tiqqun each suggest possible ways forward which inter-
estingly and productively resonate with one another, and help to frame practices that 
have emerged in opposition to control in the EU. The subsequent pages are oriented by 
the understanding that resistance is a fundamentally speculative endeavour, for if we 
already knew what would undo control, control would have already come to be undone. 
Consequently, what follows should not be understood as prescriptive or exhaustive but 
rather as a means of probing the boundaries of possible resistance and revolt. Relat-
edly, the majority of the cases I’ll be mobilizing in this section concern the practices 
of migrants themselves, not because I intend to fetishize or romanticize migrants but 
because, drawing upon an insight from Baruch Spinoza, those who are most affected 
by power are also those who most closely and deeply have knowledge of power’s op-
erations and forces. As such, the choice to emphasize migrant resistance and revolt is 
meant to help proliferate new opportunities for the adoption of those practices as well 
as acts of solidarity with them.
In her writing, Haraway embraces the figure of the cyborg, a particular hybridiza-
tion of the biological and technical that she understands as having the potential to dis-
rupt and undermine the informatics of domination. As she describes, cyborg politics 
are concerned with the “struggle against perfect communication, against the one code 
that translates all meaning perfectly […] cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate 
pollution.”63 This position, oriented against the communication of cybernetic systems, 
against the transparency and emptiness of cybernetic subjectivity, and against the to-
talizing code of computation figures resistance against cybernetics as emerging both 
within and against its structure. This is not an understanding of resistance as consti-
tuting an outside or escape, but rather about an engagement with the cybernetic form 
as a terrain of political struggle that is structured by its imminence. Haraway later 
elaborates that “the main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegiti-
mate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state social-
ism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their 
fathers, after all, are inessential.”64 Here, the crisis of cybernetics that has come to be 
expressed everywhere, in the family, in the economy, in the military, is also the condi-
tion of possibility for the emergence of unfaithful subjects that can come to be incom-
mensurable with the logic of cybernetic feedback that produced them.
Building upon these insights, in the final section of The Cybernetic Hypothesis 
Tiqqun also articulates a series of measures they think can contribute to the abolition 
of cybernetic power. Towards the breaking down of communication, they write that 
“interference is the prime vector of revolt” and that “fog makes revolt possible,” seem-
ingly echoing Haraway’s invocation of noise and pollution.65 They later go on to elabo-
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first imprint of imperial power on bodies” and then quote Deleuze’s insight that “the 
important thing is maybe to create vacuoles of non-communication, interrupters who 





Both Tiqqun and Deleuze locate the possibility of resistance against cybernetics and 
control in forms of opacity and non-communication that both amplify noise and in-
terfere or interrupt f lows of information. Only from this does another kind of life, an-
other kind of experience, become available that perhaps might come to smother and 
silence the cybernetic organization of power.
In the European context, there are a multiplicity of practices already underway that 
adopt similar orientations against cybernetic control, and which can serve as models 
for future resistance and revolt. However, before outlining some of these approaches 
it is worth brief ly outlining why a particular approach has not worked, and what this 
might tell us about other practices of resistance. The passage of the European General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016 (implemented in 2018) established a series 
of rights related to how individuals’ personal data could be collected and processed. 
The law grants “data subjects” within the EU the right to request copies of the data 
collected about them, the right to have their data anonymized, and the right to have 
their data removed from an organization’s servers should they withdraw their consent 
which is also known as the right to be forgotten.68 The GDPR is best understood as a 
liberal response to cybernetic power, a form of legal action which is intended to shelter the 
liberal individual from the excesses of cybernetic power.
While the GDPR established the legal context for several lawsuits to be filed against 
large tech companies related to their mishandling of data, nonetheless the supposed 
protections promised by the GDPR are entirely compromised by the juridical power 
granted to Frontex and other security agencies which allow for those rights’ arbitrary 
suspension. As part of the logic of the state of exception which defines security and 
sovereignty more generally, Frontex is allowed to collect and circulate the data of 
subjects that are considered to be involved in the “facilitation of illegal immigration, 
human trafficking, or other cross-border criminal activities” that includes but is not 
limited to the “name(s) of subject, nickname, gender, nationality / ies, names of known 
accomplices, organised crime group, registered business, personal address, safe house 
address, means of communications (telephone number, social media handles  […]), 
means of transportation (vehicle registration, boat name […]), weapon, photograph(s), 
non-offence event, offence event, ethnicity, sexual orientation.”69 As explored in the 
first section of this paper, the liminality between refugee / asylum-seeker / migrant and 






such exceptions, doing essentially nothing to shield them from Frontex’s cybernetic 
data-sharing programs. In other words, the crisis of liberalism emerges as complemen-
tary to the instantiation of more intense controls in the European context.
In light of all of the above, migrants now knowingly undertake their movement 
cognizant of their potential computation within and at the frontiers of the EU. While 
bodies were conditioned by the felt potential of a prison guard’s surveillance in the 
panoptic structures of disciplinary societies, being coerced into internalizing the 
gaze of authority and instituting forms of self-discipline, today bodies are increas-
ingly conditioned by the felt potential of becoming the subject of computation, being 
coerced into internalizing the logic of algorithmic capture in f lexible forms of self-
regulation and control. In this way, the logic of panopticism has been extended by the 
corresponding logic of pancomputation, in which life has come to be lived in relation 
to its potential computation.70 In this context, the potentiality of computation is at 
least twofold, both expressed as the potential that something will come to be computed 
within cybernetic control systems as well as the ways in which potentiality itself becomes 
the object of computation in cybernetic risk analysis. In the first sense, actions, practices, 
gestures, behaviors, and relations all come to be enacted in relation to their potential 
computation, or in other words, the ways in which they may come to be subjected to 
the diverse algorithmic scrutiny and analysis of corporations, states, and other actors. 
Consequently, migrants come to move always in relation to and informed by the poten-
tial of that movement being tracked and analyzed by cybernetic systems. In the second 
sense, the movement of migrants becomes shaped in advance by the expectation that 
their movements have effectively already been predicted by machines based on pre-
vious data capture and computational analysis. As a consequence of this conjunctive 
operation, migrants always move autonomously in opposition to the control of migra-
tion, mobilizing a form of risk-taking that knowingly opposes and subverts the com-
putational analysis and predictions of Frontex. Technically entangled together, power 
and resistance formally structure one another in a cascading series of control meas-
ures and escape maneuvers. In other words, the autonomy of movement is expressed 
as a series of subjective wagers that, through their risking everything, reaffirm the 
ineradicability of the autonomy that Frontex’s algorithmic capture means to eradicate.
In response to all of the ways that contemporary migration is now controlled cy-
bernetically, migrants have adopted strategies that aim to cultivate zone(s) of opacity 
and participate in the collective struggle against perfect communication. Emerging 
as what Deleuze called “vacuoles of noncommunication,” communities adopt sets of 
practices and relations that constitute spaces opposed to the circuits and apparatuses 
of cybernetic power that at times act as refuges and at others as platforms from which 
to stage revolts.71 The first and most popular of these strategies is the use of encrypted 
communication technologies by migrant communities that allow for forms of coordi-
nation and information exchange that are effectively opaque to cybernetic systems. 
Smartphones are used to establish secure communication channels with smugglers 
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that help to facilitate migration into the EU, a process that often involves some degree 
of exploitation but also at times is undeniably liberatory. Schematic maps of migration 
paths into the EU that graphically diagram the various steps and phases involved in the 
crossing of many different borders (and the evasion of many different security forces 
and architectures) are circulated between various encrypted group chats. Once mi-
grants arrive in the EU, those encrypted communication channels subsequently pro-
vide a means to connect with other migrants and establish novel migrant communities 
that don’t expose them to the scrutiny or violence of national authorities. The wide-
spread use of encryption by migrants is an asymmetric response to the “black box” al-
gorithms of machine learning and artificial intelligence that are used to control migra-
tion and is a means of becoming opaque to their computational scrutiny and analysis.
Beyond the encryption of communications, migrants also engage in the destruc-
tion and / or forgery of various identity documents in order to either refuse “clarity, 
transparency, which is the first imprint of imperial power on bodies” in the case of 
the former or add pollution to the “one code that translates all meaning perfectly” in 
the case of the latter. Frontex organizes to counteract these practices that it claims 
“can ultimately undermine its internal security” by deploying specialized document 
experts at the EU’s borders in order to “tackle the phenomenon in the comprehensive 
way by police, border and coast guard, and customs experts.”72 In a survey conduct-
ed by the EU-Funded European Migration Network on the challenges of identifying 
migrants, member states were asked “Are there good practices or challenges in your 
Member State regarding detecting ID-fraud?”73 In response, Luxembourg wrote that 
“The main challenge is the amount of doubtful documents which make a huge backlog 
seen that there is not sufficient personnel in the special unit of the police to control all 
of them,” Belgium replied that it had trouble processing the “submission of forged or 
falsified breeder documents (e.g. birth certificate) that can serve as a basis to obtain 
other (genuine) identification documents. Obviously these type of falsifications are 
more challenging to detect,” while Estonia simply stated that “There are no specific 
good practices to outline.” The overloading of communication systems with the noise 
of false document submissions as well as the simulation and multiplication of identity 
that subvert the process of coded translation that are rendered possible through docu-
ment destruction and forgery are strategies presently being deployed by migrants to 
undermine the logic of control and cybernetic power.
In addition to the practices described above, migrants have participated in the pro-
duction of opaque spaces at the fringes of the EU that help to facilitate their migration 
across the EU’s borders. On the Northern coast of Morocco near the Spanish enclaves 
(colonies) of Ceuta and Melilla, migrants from across Africa have established informal 
communities in forests where they are able to avoid the repression of Spanish-funded 
Moroccan security forces as well as make preparations to attempt to cross over the lay-
ers of fortified barriers that are erected between the two territories.74 These spaces also 
make it possible for migrants to share information and strategies concerning how best 
to evade the ever-shifting controls of the EU, acting as sites of resistant knowledge 





movement can persist even as communities of migrants circulate in and out of the ar-
ea.75 This spatial otherwise to the zones of control established by Frontex allows for the 
practices of individuals to accumulate and contribute not only to particular acts of mi-
gration, but also to the larger historical movement of migrants that is oriented against 
the instantiation of cybernetic power, a form of communication that isn’t captured by 
or reducible to the communicative structures of control.
Yet another approach involves organizing against the material infrastructures of 
cybernetics. In response to Google’s plan to build a new campus in Berlin’s Kreuzberg, 
a neighborhood with a rich antifascist and anticapitalist history, a network of peo-
ple that unsubtly go by the name “Fuck Off Google” organized against the plan and 
launched a series of actions opposed to the campus’ construction that have included 
noise demonstrations, neighborhood discussions, and other events.76 Citing Google’s 
participation in mass surveillance and cooperation with authoritarian states, among 
other objections, the “Fuck Off Google” network advocates for the decentralization 
of communication as a means of counteracting the cybernetic organization of power. 
Shortly after the Google campus construction site was occupied by activists, Google 
formally withdrew from the plan to build in the neighborhood.77 While surely a sym-
bolic victory given the planetary scale of Google’s data infrastructure, nonetheless this 
opposition to the infrastructure of control societies should be studied as a model for 
future approaches.
Most recently, a new migrant revolt has emerged as an outgrowth and elaboration 
of the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement which, at the time of writing this, has 
been unfolding for several months as the weekly emergence of road blockades, protest 
marches, and riots across France.78 Going under the name Gilets Noirs (Black Vests), 
a network of hundreds of people organizing across dozens of migrant centers across 
France have staged a series of actions targeting the architectures and infrastructures 
of migrant surveillance, detention, and deportation. In May of 2019, the movement 
occupied a terminal at the Charles de Gaulle airport on the edge of Paris in opposi-
tion to Air France’s cooperation with the French State in deporting migrants. In a 
statement released during the occupation, the Gilets Noirs claimed that: “We are the 
freedom to move,” going on to write that the airport they were occupying was “above 
all else, a border. A border without walls or barbed wire. Nevertheless it marks some 
bodies […] Those for whom migration comes easy are a minority coming from the bour-
geois and / or white worlds. It’s this world that colonizes and wages war. The entrance 
to their fortress is the airport. It is well guarded by the military, police, and cameras 
75   For an artistic exploration of these communities, see Abdessamad El Montassir’s artwork in this an-
thology as well as  the accompanying  text  “The Adouaba Project”  co-authored by Krista Lynes and 
Abdessamad El Montassir.
76   See www.fuckoffgoogle.de/. It may also be worthwhile looking at the chapter “Fuck of f, Google” in the 
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[…] This place embodies racism on a planetary scale.”79 The occupation lasted for a only 
a few hours before the Gilets Noirs left voluntarily, but nonetheless this action should 
be read as an experimental disruption of the planetary logistics of migrant expulsion. 
The airport is, after all, not only a nexus of many different expressions and circulations 
of power but is also one of the central laboratories for the deployment of cybernetic 
control, and the occupation of the airport terminal is a model for a collective practice 
of revolt that can disrupt the logistics of cybernetic power. Just as factory workers were 
understood as having the potential to undo the industrial capitalist system that pro-
duced them as proletarian subjects, so too should migrants be understood as having 
the potential to undo the cybernetic systems that produce them as illegal, and thus 
disposable / detainable / deportable subjects. What could collective revolts look like 
against the other architectures and infrastructures of cybernetics?
The present is defined by the accelerated instantiation and intensification of cy-
bernetics, within which control and crisis conjunctively express themselves as an 
expansive form of power. As social support systems crumble beneath the weight of 
austerity, experimental cybernetic programs have funding rained down upon them by 
states and venture capitalists, and even the most dystopian science fiction has trouble 
keeping up with the latest innovations and technical developments of control societies. 
But power is never impermeable or invincible, and always imminently contains forces 
directed towards its eventual abolition. As control bends so as not to break, remaining 
endlessly f lexible and responsive to whatever resistance emerges against it, undoing 
control entails not chipping away at it but breaking it entirely once and for all. Struc-
tured as totalities, control and crisis ultimately offer no way out other than through 
their total imminent negation, the process of which is surely imperceptibly underway 
but the outcome of which is unanticipatable. In this sense, all of the former analyses 
and critiques offered in this text should not be understood as gestures towards the 
reform of our society, but only towards the perpetually renewed possibility of its de-




Tracing Violence Within and Against  
the Mediterranean Frontier’s Aesthetic Regime1
Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani
While the emergence of the Mediterranean’s unequal mobility regime can be traced 
back to European imperial expansion towards the sea’s southern shores in the nine-
teenth century, illegalized migration across the Mediterranean and fatalities at sea 
became structural and highly politicized phenomena only as of the end of the 1980s, in 
conjunction with the consolidation of the freedom of movement within the EU. With 
the Europeanization of migration policies, a truly European “color line” was institu-
tionalized, as the populations who were excluded from accessing the European ter-
ritory were marked out within a matrix of race and class. However, as a result of the 
perpetuation of the systemic conditions underpinning migrants’ movements towards 
Europe — in particular the need for migrant labor, global inequalities, and existing mi-
grant networks — the illegalization of certain categories of migrants only resulted in 
their movement operating in an increasingly clandestine form, in particular by cross-
ing the sea on overcrowded vessels.2 In the attempt to control the Mediterranean, now 
corresponding to the extremities of European space and transformed into a vast fron-
tier zone, European states have deployed a vast array of bordering practices and tech-
niques to contain and channel migrants’ movements. Crucially, since the early 2000s, 
the EU has increasingly outsourced border control to authoritarian regimes in North 
Africa to contain migrants on their shores.
These policies have never more than temporarily succeeded in stemming migrants’ 
crossings, and for every route that was sealed off, several new ones — often longer and 
more dangerous — were opened. This dialectic between control and escape which re-
sults from this mobility conf lict has had a harrowing human cost: more than 30,000 
migrants have perished at sea since the end of 1980.3 Most migrants’ deaths across 
1   This article draws on conversations that have taken place in many dif ferent contexts, and we are in-
debted to the friends and colleagues who have shared their thoughts with us in each one of them. In 
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the Mediterranean frontier have not only occurred at sea, but through the sea, which 
has been turned into a deadly liquid as a result of the EU’s exclusionary policies which 
precaritize their crossings. The sea’s “geopower”4 has become embedded in a form of 
killing operating without state actors directly touching migrants’ bodies, in which vio-
lence is rather inf licted in a mediated way, through water: it is the liquid element that 
transmits the violence of state policies to the bodies and lives of migrants.5 The precari-
ous travelers whose lives are taken during their attempt to cross the Mediterranean 
frontier are thus the victims of what we call “liquid violence,” the specific modalities of 
which are, as we will see, ever changing.6
To contest the EU’s liquid violence, we initiated the Forensic Oceanography project 
in 2011.7 In that period, with the toppling of the authoritarian regimes in North Africa 
that had served as the EU’s outsourced border guards, migrants were able to ‘re-open’ 
maritime routes to the European continent. In so doing, they ushered in a phase of 
increased turbulence in the Euro-Mediterranean border regime. Since then, we have 
sought to understand and document the shifting modalities of the liquid violence op-
erating across the maritime space between Libya and Italy (the central Mediterranean) 
with the aim of contesting them in legal forums and beyond. In this article, we chart 
some of these momentous shifts, and ref lect upon the way we sought to respond to 
them, focusing in particular on three moments of change: The first is the moment of 
rupture in the border regime marked by the Arab uprisings, which led European states 
to adopt recurrent practices of non-assistance exemplified by the left-to-die boat. The 
second corresponds to the lethal policies of non-assistance implemented by European 
states in terminating the Italian Mare Nostrum “humanitarian and security” operation 
in the aim of deterring migrants from crossing. Finally, the third charts the combined 
process of criminalizing civilian rescue initiatives and (re-)outsourcing border control 
to the Libyan coast guard. Distinct forms of violence have emerged within each of the 
phases, which in turn posed new challenges to register their traces and translate them 
into legal violations for which states might be held accountable.
In our attempt to contest the shifting modes of violence operating at the maritime 
frontier, it has been essential for us to understand two dimensions that are central 
to organizing the way the maritime frontier operates. First, the mobility conf lict — of 
4   Grosz, “Geopower.”
















which the sea has become the liquid terrain — opposes migrants’ movements not only 
to the bordering policies and practices of states, but to a multiplicity of other actors. 
It sees international diplomatic disputes between states, conf licts between distinct 
agencies within a single state — such as the coast guard, the police and the mili-
tary — and the confrontation of a multiplicity of non-state actors such as international 
and non-governmental organizations, fishermen, shipping companies, and their trade 
associations, researchers, journalists, artists — all of which contribute, in various ways, 
to enabling or limiting migrants’ movement in a more or less deliberate way.
A crucial axis that organizes this wide spectrum of actors and their relations are 
the logics of security and humanitarianism, both of which have become fundamental 
rationales, discourses and practices that cut across governmental and nongovernmen-
tal actors.8 The coexistence and circulation of these logics within each actor and within 
the border regime as a whole, is always fraught with tensions, and the balance be-
tween them is in constant f lux, with migrants being constituted simultaneously as “a 
life to be protected and a security threat to protect against.”9 While, as Paolo Cuttitta 
reminds us, these f luctuations leave fundamentally unchanged the “restrictive migra-
tion and border regime” imposed by the EU,10 they do have an important impact on the 
conditions of migrants’ crossings and the changing modalities of liquid violence we 
chart below. Each of the shifts we analyze corresponds to a reorganization of the logics 
of security and humanitarianism.
Second, while the violence of the maritime frontier is mediated by water, it is also 
mediated by images and a constantly shifting aesthetic regime. We use the term “aes-
thetic” in the sense underlined by Jacques Rancière as what presents itself to sensory 
experience.11 Distinct conditions of (in)visibility and (in)audibility are imposed onto 
the maritime frontier by states’ restrictive policies, but also shaped, transformed, 
and contested by the multiple other actors mentioned above, including of course mi-
grants themselves, and their various media. Images, surveillance technologies, and 
their use within states’ and migrants’ strategies of (in)visbility shape the modalities 
of liquid violence in decisive ways. In turn, the changing configurations of security 
and humanitarian logics have distinct aesthetic dimensions, with the (in)visibility of 
migrants’ deaths in particular oscillating between concealment within the security 
logic and spectacularization in the humanitarian one. Each of these shifts have forced 
us to reposition our own practice, and seek to exercise anew what we call a “disobedi-
ent gaze”— revealing what state actors have sought to conceal, and not revealing that 
which they seek to shed light upon. In what follows then, we chart the changes at the 
nexus of the modalities of liquid violence, the articulation of humanitarian and secu-
rity logics, and the reconfiguration of the aesthetic regime operating at the maritime 
frontier, and ref lect upon the way each of them has shaped our project. We first discuss 
the aesthetic regime within and against which our project sought to position itself.
8  Fassin, Humanitarian Reason.
9   Vaughan-Williams, Europe’s Border Crisis, 3.
10   Cuttitta, “Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue?”, 649.
11   Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 13.
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The Mediterranean Frontier’s Aesthetic Regime of (in)Visibility
At the EU’s maritime frontier, we find at work a complex and ambivalent aesthetic re-
gime of (in)visibility, inextricably bound to the way the border regime itself operates. 
As a result of their illegalization through the EU’s policies of exclusion, people who 
decide to migrate despite legal denials are forced to resort to an informal infrastruc-
ture of mobility: transnational networks of migrants who exchange information and 
services, the smuggling networks they resort to for a portion of their journey, as well 
as actual means of transport such as overused and overcrowded boats. Migrants are 
illegalized — their illegality is a product of state laws — and therefore they must migrate 
clandestinely, a term with etymological connotations of hiddenness and secrecy, and 
seek to cross borders undetected. The EU’s migration regime thus imposes a particular 
“partition of the sensible” in the terms of Jacques Rancière: it creates particular condi-
tions of (dis)appearance, (in)audibility, (in)visibility.12 As opposed to the logic of clan-
destinity, what all security-oriented agencies aiming to control migration try to do is 
to shed light on migration and in particular on acts of unauthorized border crossing in 
order to make the phenomenon of migration more knowable, predictable and govern-
able. To this effect, a vast dispositif of control has been deployed at the maritime fron-
tier of the EU, one made of mobile patrol vessels but also of an assemblage of multiple 
surveillance technologies, through which border agents seek to achieve the most com-
plete possible “integrated maritime picture” in the aim of detecting and intercepting 
migrants’ vessels. These technologies range from vessel tracking technologies, coastal 
and shipborne radars, to optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery. Together, they 
compose what Karin Knorr Cetina has called a “scopic system”: “an arrangement of 
hardware, software, and human feeds that together function like a scope: like a mech-
anism of observation and projection.”13
However, the partition of the sensible of the EU’s maritime borders is more am-
bivalent than this binary opposition would let us believe. For their part, migrants in 
distress may do everything they can to be seen so as to be saved from drowning. In 
this, they are not only seeking to avert the possibility of their imminent death, but also 
seeking to use the humanitarian logic that has become embedded in the practices of all 
actors at sea — including those whose very aim is preventing illegalized migration — to 
forward their own objective of crossing borders. Conversely, border agents not only 
attempt to deliberately hide the structural violence inherent to practices of policing 
maritime migration — thus allowing these practices to perpetuate themselves in full 
impunity — they may also choose not to see migrants in certain instances, considering 
that rescuing them at sea entails the responsibility for disembarking them and pro-










migrants who have been left abandoned to drift at sea, as in the left-to-die boat case 
we will discuss below. In all these different cases, visibility and invisibility then do not 
designate two discrete and autonomous realms but, rather, an entangled topological 
continuum.
We find the same ambivalence at work in photographic and video imagery of the 
maritime frontier. In addition to the different remote sensing means described above, 
patrol vessels are also equipped with cameras — those of border guards or of “embed-
ded journalists”— which are used to document the moment of encounter between il-
legalized migrants and those seeking to police their movement. This results in a highly 
controlled and ambivalent spectacularization of borders, incisively analyzed by Nicholas 
de Genova.14 In the countless images of intercepted / rescued boats that are circulated 
by state agencies and the press, the threat of illegalized migration and the securitiza-
tion work of border control are simultaneously made visible and naturalized, follow-
ing a circular logic. If migrants are being intercepted through militarized means, it is 
because they are a threat. If they are a threat, then they must be policed by all means. 
The sense of migration as threat is only exacerbated by the profusion of similar images, 
which suggest an invasion of European space by those who have been constructed as 
radically other — racialized and impoverished migrants from the global South.
These racialized representations of migration at Europe’s external maritime borders, 
which produce “a dominant associative notion of irregular migration to non-whites 
bodies,” shape in turn racialized border control within Europe, as “any non-white body 
on the move” is perceived as a potential ‘illegal’ traveller that must be checked.15 What 
emerges then is a fundamental link between the three distinct dimensions of migrants’ 
exposure emphasized by Georges Didi-Huberman:16 the visual exposure of illegalized 
migrants, their being “ex-posed” (rendered outside and excluded from a given com-
munity), and the exposure of their bodies to conditions of precarity and death. The ex-
posure operated by state actors is however highly selective. While focusing on the scene 
of border enforcement, the conditions that lie before and after — the multiple forms of 
violence migrants sought to escape in the first place, the illegalization of their move-
ment through policies of exclusion, the future exploitation of illegalized migrant labor 
in European economies — remain hidden as obscene supplements.
However, as we will see in more detail in the course of this chapter, the regime of 
(in)visibility imposed by the border spectacle is constantly changing, and is in par-
ticular shaped by the unstable equilibrium between the logics of security and humani-
tarianism. If within a logic of security migrants are constituted as a threat to Europe, 
within the humanitarian perspective they are rather victims whose lives are threat-
ened — either in their countries of origin or in the process of crossing borders.17 Illegal-
ized migrants crossing the sea thus operate as an inherently unstable and “f loating” 
signifier,18 and their (in)visibilization is equally f luctuating.
While the deaths of migrants may at times remain hidden, at others they are spec-
tacularized by state actors to cover the violence of borders with a humanitarian var-
14   De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’.” 
15   Keshavarz and Snodgrass, “Orientations of Europe.”
16   Didi-Huberman, Peuples exposés, peuples figurants.
17   Chouliaraki and Stolic, “Rethinking Media Responsibility in the Refugee ‘Crisis’.” 
18   Hall, “Race, the Floating Signifier.” 
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nish: border control becomes framed as an act of saving migrants, occluding the fact 
that state policies endanger their movement in the first place. The spectacularization 
of migrants’ distress and deaths at sea is also mobilized by non-governmental actors 
to contest the lethal effects of borders. As these examples show, the sensing practices 
operating within this aesthetic regime do not simply document the violence of borders, 
but actively participate in it. Whether through the logic of the spectacle or that of state 
secrecy, the very act of exclusion that underpins the EU’s politics of migration takes 
place as well within and through its various visualizations. Struggling for the rights of 
migrants, then, means also intervening in this regime of (in)visibility and challenging 
the very borders of what can be seen and heard. For these reasons, understanding the 
shifting and ambivalent configurations of the aesthetic regime operating at the Medi-
terranean frontier has been fundamental at each stage of Forensic Oceanography’s 
successive projects, which have always needed to navigate and constantly re-negotiate 
a fine and unstable line between complicity, resistance and evasion.
Exercizing a disobedient gaze:  
Reconstructing the Liquid Traces of the Left-to-Die Boat Case
Our project began at a time when the border regime was highly securitized and both 
migrants’ deaths and the violent (in)action of states were largely kept in the shadows. 
As both migrants’ crossings and fatalities at sea increased again in 2011 in the wake of 
the Arab uprisings, and with indications of state actors’ responsibility for this loss of 
lives, we launched the Forensic Oceanography research project within the wider Fo-
rensic Architecture agency.
Historically, forensic science can be understood as “a disciplinary project that af-
firms the power of states.”19 Since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, states 
have relied on experts deploying scientific methods to find traces of events under in-
vestigation so as to reconstruct them to prove or disprove a crime — an (in)action that 
constitutes a violation of legal norms. In doing so, states have often also policed and 
silenced the victims of their own violence, pitting the alleged objectivity of technology 
and science against the fallibility of human testimony. Our aim has been to somehow 
reverse this process and reinvent forensics as a counter-hegemonic practice that could 
be used by non-governmental actors to hold state and other non-state actors account-
able for their crimes, focusing on events that occur in zones outside conventional state 
jurisdiction and beyond established frames of criminal justice.20
However, if the traces considered by the inventors of forensic science since the 
times of Edmond Locard (1877–1966) could be stains, fingerprints, or gunpowder, 
etc., today events are potentially registered by an infinite amount of materials and 
media, from phone communication to payment data, from videos shot with mobile 
phones to satellite images and vehicle tracking data, from sound recordings to rubble 
analysis.21 Despite the limits and even ambivalences of strategic litigation which we 





policies that lead to migrants’ deaths had the potential to block the forms of border 
violence that we were observing at the maritime frontier. We thus began to explore 
the ways in which we might take this approach to the sea. In the process, however, 
we further had to challenge a well-ingrained imaginary of the maritime space as an 
empty expanse without history, where all traces of past events seems to be constantly 
erased by winds and currents.22
Our project was sparked by a 2011 incident that came to be known as the ‘left-to-die 
boat’ case.23 At the height of the NATO-led military intervention in Libya, during which 
more than 38 warships were deployed off the coast, 72 migrants f leeing the warzone 
were left to drift in the central Mediterranean Sea for fourteen days. 63 human lives 
were lost, despite the survivors calling Father Zerai (an Eritrean priest based in Rome) 
via satellite phone, despite distress signals sent out to vessels navigating in this area, 
and despite several encounters with military aircrafts and a warship. As we demon-
strated in our report, this was not an isolated incident, but rather the outcome of re-
current conf licts between Italy and Malta with regard to rescue at sea, as well as the 
aim of the military actors to restrict their activities to military objectives and not be 
seized by humanitarian ones.
This was a time, then, when a security logic dominated the practices of the differ-
ent actors operating in the central Mediterranean, and when the humanitarian prac-
tice of rescue was instead repeatedly avoided despite maritime law imposing on all 
actors the duty to assist passengers in distress at sea. While survivor testimonies in-
dicated increasing instances of non-assistance, during this period the Mediterranean 
appeared as a “black box” for civilian actors in which the capacity to see and document 
the events occurring at sea was nearly entirely in the hands of state actors — with the 
exception of Father Zerai’s unique capacity to listen to the distress of migrants at sea 
and pressure states into complying with their obligations. The challenge we faced as 
we embarked on our investigation in support of the nine survivors and a coalition of 
NGOs, was precisely in wresting the capacity to sense the sea away from state actors, 
so as to make the violence of abandonment visible and breach the impunity in which it 
was being perpetrated.
Images could be of only limited assistance in the process. While several photo-
graphs were taken at different moments during these tragic events by military person-
nel as well as the passengers themselves, only one of them — taken by a French surveil-
lance aircraft during the first day of the migrants’ journey — was released in response 
to a parallel investigation by the Council of Europe24 (Fig. 6). In the absence of rev-
elatory images documenting these events, our investigation had to rely on the “weak 
signals” that underpin truth production practices in the field, which Thomas Keenan 
(after Allan Sekula) has called “counter-forensics.”25
22   We further elaborate on this aspect in Heller and Pezzani, “A Disobedient Gaze.”
23   For our reconstruction of these events, see our report: www.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/
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6.
Reconnaissance picture of the lef t-
to-die-boat taken by a French patrol 
aircraf t on 27 March 2011
By corroborating survivors’ testimonies with information provided by the vast appa-
ratus of remote sensing technologies that have transformed the contemporary ocean 
into a digital archive, we assembled a composite image of the events. The expertise of 
an oceanographer allowed us to model and reconstruct the drifting boat’s trajectory, 
and satellite imagery analysis to detect the presence of a large number of vessels in the 
vicinity of the drifting migrant boat that did not heed their calls for help (Figure 7.1 
and 7.2).
While, as we discussed above, these technologies are often used for the purpose of 
policing and detecting illegalized migration as well as other ‘threats,’ we repurposed 
them to find evidence of the failure to render assistance. Through our work on the 
‘left-to-die’ case, we sought to put into practice a disobedient gaze that used some of the 
same sensing technologies as border controllers, but redirected their ‘spotlight’ from 
unauthorized acts of border-crossing, to state and non-state practices violating mi-
grants’ rights. We conceived of this gaze as “[aiming] not to disclose what the regime of 
migration management attempts to unveil — clandestine migration — but unveil that which 
it attempts to hide, the political violence it is founded on and the human rights violations that 




Envisat satellite image 
showing the modelled 
position of the “lef t-to-die 
boat” and the nearby 
presence of several military 
vessels who did not intervene 
to rescue the migrants
7.2
Chain of events 
in the “lef t-to-die boat”
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In addition to reconstructing the traces of events at sea, crucial to our project was 
the task of spatializing the practices of actors and inscribing them within the politi-
cal geography of the sea. At sea, the moment of border crossing is expanded into a 
process that can last several days and extend across an uneven and heterogeneous ter-
ritory that sits outside the exclusive reach of any single polity. The spatial imaginary 
of the border as a line without thickness dividing isomorphic territorial states is here 
stretched into a deep zone “in which the gaps and discrepancies between legal borders 
become uncertain and contested.”27 The maritime territory constitutes, then, a space 
of “unbundled sovereignty” in Saskia Sassen’s terms,28 one in which sovereign rights 
and obligations are disaggregated from each other and extended across complex and 
variegated jurisdictional spaces.
The multiple jurisdictional regimes that crisscross the Mediterranean have allowed 
states to simultaneously extend their sovereign privileges through forms of mobile 
government and elude the responsibilities that come with them.29 Facing their mobile 
and f leeting practices of bordering and (non-)assistance, we have sought to inscribe as 
precisely as possible the lethal events within specific jurisdictional zones and bounda-
ries (such as SAR zones, but also in the case of the left-to-die boat, NATO’s maritime 
surveillance area) so as to assign responsibility for them. While the fragmentation of 
juridical regimes at sea often allows for the evasion of responsibility, we have sought 
to mobilize this very fragmentation strategically toward the multiplication of poten-
tially liable actors who could be held accountable for not abiding by the duty to rescue 
inscribed in maritime law. Not only did our reconstruction of the migrants’ drift allow 
us to demonstrate that the migrants had remained within NATO’s maritime surveil-
lance area during their 14 days of deadly drift (see Figures 8.1 & 8.2), but by identifying 
many ships in the vicinity of the migrants’ boat our report allowed the NGO coalition 
we collaborated with to file several legal cases against the different states — including 
France, Spain, Italy and Belgium — whose assets had taken part in the NATO-led op-
eration, and who shared a degree of responsibility for the death of the 63 passengers.30 
While these different complaints did have an impact insofar as they put pressure on 
state actors to change their practices, eight years after the events the legal process is 
still ongoing and none of the actors involved has been condemned by a court for their 
practices of non-assistance. Aware of the structural limitations of “international jus-
tice to isolate a few culpable individuals while leaving the social and economic hier-
archies of a society intact,”31 we have also attempted to multiply the forums where the 
violence against migrants at sea could be debated and challenged: not only established 
legal arenas but also emerging social, political and cultural spaces, both institutional 
and informal.32
27   Neilson, “Between Governance and Sovereignty,” 126.
28  Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights.








As the events of the left-to-die case demonstrate, the initiation of the Forensic 
Oceanography project was marked by a context in which a security logic dominat-
ed the maritime frontier, and with it an aesthetic regime of invisibilizing migrants’ 
deaths while spectacularizing their interceptions. In response, Forensic Oceanogra-
phy’s strategy to make up for the near absence of available images documenting the 
lethal events of the left-to-die boat case was to create a composite image of events, 
assembling the traces generated by multiple sensing devices. In so doing, we opened 
a fissure in the partition of the sensible imposed by states, and in the impunity that 
prevailed for migrants’ deaths. While the methods we developed in the process re-
main important to this day, the profound shifts in the modalities of violence and the 
aesthetic regime that emerged as part of rapid processes of humanitarianization and 
de-humanitarianization of the maritime border we observed in the wake of the Octo-
ber 2013 shipwrecks near Lampedusa forced us to reposition ourselves and adapt our 
research and aesthetic strategies accordingly.
A Forensics of the EU’s policies of non-assistance:  
Mare Nostrum and its Demise
On October 3, 2013, a boat carrying more than 500 migrants sank less than one kilom-
eter from the coast of Lampedusa, causing the death of at least 366 people and a public 
outcry.33 Not only did this boat manage to cross the multiple layers of surveillance sur-
rounding Lampedusa undetected, but survivors of this incident also claimed that, a 
few hours before the boat capsized, two or three fishermen’s ships ignored their calls 
for help (this has not been confirmed or disproven to date). On October 11, another boat 
carrying over 400 people sank after rescue deployment was delayed for over 5 hours 
due to the conf licting responsibility of the Italian and Maltese Coast Guards, and more 
than 200 people died.34 Since both of these tragedies involved practices of non-assis-
tance, they initially appeared as a tragic repetition of the left-to-die boat, with an even 
more exorbitant death toll. In hindsight, however, we can see that these shipwrecks 
were indices of much deeper changes.
In the wake of these two tragic shipwrecks, migrants’ deaths suddenly gained 
tremendous public visibility as the haunting underwater images of the Lampedusa 
wreck circulated in the international press, forcing policy-makers to articulate their 
positions. During his visit to Lampedusa, Jose Manuel Barroso’s, then President of the 
European Commission, posed in front of the coffins containing the bodies of the ship-
wrecked in the hangar of Lampedusa airport, which was transformed into something 
in between an improvised media center and a mortuary. In his statement on October 8, 
2013, he declared: ‘We in the European Commission, […] believe that the European Un-
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ion cannot accept that thousands of people die at its borders.’ Despite denouncing the 
deaths of migrants as unacceptable, Barroso’s conclusion was not to take responsibility 
for these deaths or to challenge the EU’s exclusionary border regime which has proven 
so deadly. In the same speech, Barroso announced instead an increase in Frontex’s 
budget and the launch of Eurosur, the European Border Surveillance System — that 
is, the continuation of a predominantly security-based approach to migration. This 
policy, however, was now less framed as a response to the “risk” that the movements of 
illegalized migrants was presumed to constitute for the EU than to the risk they faced 
in attempting the crossing.
Barroso’s speech, and the mise-en-scène of his and other policy makers’ compas-
sion, are exemplary of what we may refer to as the humanitarianization of the border. 
What William Walters refers to as the “humanitarian border” emerges “once it be-
comes established that border crossing has become, for thousands of migrants seek-
ing, for a variety of reasons, to access the territories of the global North, a matter of 
life and death. It crystallizes as a way of governing this novel and disturbing situation, 
and compensates for the social violence embodied in the regime of migration control.”35 
While rescues at sea have long been the humanitarian counterpart of the illegalization 
of migrants, the October 2013 shipwrecks marked a turning point where border con-
trol operations themselves became framed as acts of saving, all while European states 
perpetuated their exclusionary border regime.
Days later, Italian authorities, faced with the impossibility of ignoring the public 
outcry caused by these shipwrecks, single-handedly launched what has been by far the 
largest “humanitarian and security” operation in the Mediterranean: Mare Nostrum.36 
In the framework of this operation, an unprecedented number of Italian Navy ships 
proactively patrolled close to the Libyan shores to rescue migrants and disembark 
them on Italian territory, thus marking a clear shift away from the principled reluc-
tance observed in previous years to initiate rescue operations. Humanitarianism be-
came a central dimension of this mission, both at the discursive and operational level, 
transforming as well the conditions of (in)visibility imposed on migrants’ crossings 
and state activities.
As Martina Tazzioli has importantly highlighted, with Mare Nostrum the border 
spectacle was temporarily transformed and humanitarianized, although always in 
ambiguous ways.37 Now, instead of foregrounding the securitized scene of neutral-
izing the threat of migration through border control, Mare Nostrum activities focused 
public attention on the good “scene of rescue,” recasting the role of the state and the 
military as that of a merciful savior.38 However, the “humanitarian border spectacle”39 
was just as selective in the (in)visibilization of the maritime frontier as the primarily 
security-oriented spectacle that had preceded it: the good scene of rescue ended with 
disembarkation, and the illegalization and future exploitation of migrants onshore 
continued to remain hidden, as did their previous identification and fingerprinting 
that (at times) began on military ships while still at sea. Because the policies that pre-
35   Walters, “Foucault and Frontiers,” 138.
36   “Italy launches Mare Nostrum, 400 more saved.”




caritize migrants’ crossing were perpetuated, the large-scale rescue activities did not 
prevent them from dying in even greater numbers as the scale of crossings increased 
with the exodus of Syrians. In this sense, just like the spectacularization of the Lampe-
dusa deaths, the display of heroic rescue activities occluded political responsibility for 
migrant deaths.
Furthermore, the control of the capacity to know, document and produce imagery 
of the maritime frontier remained firmly in state hands. Even though select cases of 
migrants’ deaths as well as military-led rescue operations were now spectacularized, 
lending a sense of profound change in the aesthetic regime of the maritime frontier, 
there were deeper continuities in what was occluded by the border spectacle in both 
its security and humanitarian variants. Importantly, this phase demonstrated that the 
mourning of migrants’ deaths, which until then the border regime had attempted to 
keep largely hidden, could be rendered hyper-visible and spectacularized, without this 
entailing any increased accountability for their deaths.
This situation posed a challenge to Forensic Oceanography’s strategy of demanding 
accountability by making deaths visible, a challenge that emerged even more acutely 
as the Italian-led humanitarian turn came under attack from its European counter-
parts, leading to a shift in the modality of liquid violence perpetrated by states from 
practices to policies of non-assistance. While the causal relation between policies of clo-
sure and migrant deaths had been undermined by the humanitarian border spectacle, 
re-establishing this connection would become the central task of our “Death by Rescue” 
report.40
The break with practices of non-assistance and the strength of the humanitarian 
logic marked by Mare Nostrum proved short-lived, as the operation was soon criticized 
for allegedly constituting a “pull-factor” for people crossing the Mediterranean. The 
UK Foreign Office Minister, Lady Anelay, exemplified this position when she stated 
“We do not support planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. We 
believe that they create an unintended ‘pull factor,’ encouraging more migrants to at-
tempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary 
deaths.”41 Translated in more frank terms by François Crépeau, United Nations Rap-
porteur on the rights of migrants, this statement amounted to saying “let them die 
because this is a good deterrence.”42 As the balance of the border regime tilted once 
again towards securitization, European member states refused to Europeanize Mare 
Nostrum as Italy requested, and Italy terminated the operation at the end of 2014. As of 
November 1, 2014, the Frontex-led Triton operation was launched instead, deploying 
fewer vessels in an area further from the Libyan coast, and prioritizing border control 
instead of rescue. Through this operational shift, the EU and its member states hoped 
to make migrant crossings more difficult, so as to deter migrants from crossing. Nev-
ertheless, as the UK statement exemplifies, the process of de-humanitarianization of 
the border European policy-makers sought to impose at the operational level was still 
couched in a humanitarian discourse: migrants should not be rescued proactively so 
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But this humanitarian varnish was fissured by the dramatic scale of human suffer-
ing that would unfold in early 2015 as a result of this policy shift. The week commenc-
ing April 12, 2015 saw what is believed to be the largest loss of life at sea in the recent 
history of the Mediterranean. On April 12, 400 people died when an overcrowded boat 
capsized due to its passengers’ excitement at the sight of platform supply vessels ap-
proaching to rescue them. Less than a week later, on April 18, a similar incident took 
an even greater toll in human lives, leading to the deadliest single shipwreck recorded 
by the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Mediterra-
nean.43 Over 800 people are believed to have died when a migrants’ vessel sank after 
a mis-manoeuvre led it to collide with a cargo ship that had approached to rescue its 
passengers (see Fig. 8.1 & 8.2). More than 1,200 lives were thus lost in a single week. As 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) commented at the time, these figures eerily resemble 
those of a war zone.44 Beyond the huge death toll, what was most striking about these 
events — which resulted in few recorded images and which we therefore had to recon-
struct on the basis of survivor testimonies and AIS vessel tracking data — was that they 
were not the result of a reluctance to carry out rescue operations, which were a struc-
tural cause of migrants’ deaths in the past. In these two cases, the actual loss of life has 
occurred during and partly through the rescue operation itself.
While it might appear (as state actors were quick to argue) that only the ruthless 
smugglers who overcrowded the unseaworthy boats to the point of collapse were to 
blame, our report titled “Death by Rescue — The Lethal Effects of the EU’s Policies of 
Non-assistance” argued that the absence of any immediate violation perpetrated by 
vessels in vicinity to the boats in distress hid a form of policy violence operating at a dif-
ferent scale and temporality than that of the migrants’ crossing.45 In order to account 
for this violence, we had to go beyond the reconstruction of specific cases of death at 
sea and resort to what we have called a forensics of policies. In particular, our report 
meticulously reconstructed the policy and operational decisions taken in the forums 
of the European Commission in Brussels or in meeting rooms in Rome through which 
Frontex and EU member-states created what we have called a “rescue gap” in full 
knowledge of its lethal effects.
43   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Mediterranean boat capsizing: deadliest 
incident on record.” 





Automatic Identifi cation 
System (AIS) vessel tracks in 
the Mediterranean following 
a Mediterranean shipwreck 
of April 18, 2015
8.2
Video still of an interview with 
a survivor of the April 18, 2015 
shipwreck, showing his drawing 
of the collision between the 
migrants’ boat and the cargo ship
8.3
Map comparing the operational 
zones of Italian Navy’s Mare 
Nostrum and Frontex’s Triton
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9.1 and 9.2 
Minutes of a technical meeting held in Rome on September 24, 2014 between representatives 
of the European Commission, Frontex, the Italian Ministries of Interior, Defense and Foreign 
Af fairs as well as the Italian Coast Guard Border Police and the Navy. In the meeting, a 
foreseen increase in search and rescue operation as a result of the end of Mare Nostrum is 
discussed
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Through the spatial analysis of operational zones, interviews with state officials 
concerning their operations at sea, and statistical data referring to migrant arrivals, 
deaths and SAR operations, our report reconstructed the reality that began to unfold 
in early 2015: migrants’ crossings continued unabated, but instead of a f leet of state-
operated vessels, a lethal search and rescue gap awaited them. Seeking to fill this gap, 
the Italian Coast Guard increasingly called upon large merchant ships transiting in the 
area to carry out rescue operations. But because the rescue of migrants’ overcrowded 
boats can easily lead to tragedies if not operated with the most adaptive means and 
standards, the large vessels of the shipping industry were unfit for the task.46 In this 
context, the April 2015 tragedies were waiting to happen. On April 29, 2015, the Presi-
dent of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, admitted that “it was a seri-
ous mistake to bring the Mare Nostrum operation to an end. It cost human lives.”47 The 
ending of Mare Nostrum and its (non-)replacement by Frontex’s Triton operation, how-
ever, cannot adequately be described as a “mistake” since it was a carefully planned 
policy implemented with full knowledge of its outcomes. Our report demonstrates 
that EU agencies and policymakers deliberately implemented policies of non-assistance 
that created the conditions that made the April shipwrecks inevitable.
In the wake of the October 2013 shipwrecks, the rapid process of partial humani-
tarianization and de-humanitarianization of the border that we saw at work between 
Mare Nostrum’s launch and termination involved profound shifts both in the regime of 
(in)visibility operating at the maritime frontier and the modalities of liquid violence. 
These changes demanded that we reposition our strategies in the aim of effectively 
contesting the violence of borders. The spectacular display of migrants’ deaths as part 
of the humanitarianization of the border was mobilized to justify border control, but 
also to justify the temporary deployment of a new scale of state-led rescue operations 
to mitigate the structural violence of borders. The conditions in which these lethal 
events unfolded, as well as the responsibilities of policy makers for restrictive policies 
that precaritize migrants’ crossings in the first place, were however still largely kept in 
the shadows.
Contesting the partition of the sensible operating at the maritime frontier by using 
forensic techniques to reconstruct lethal events remained important; it proved insuffi-
cient, however, in relation to the changing modality of liquid violence. Moreover, while 
in the case of the “left-to-die” boat our investigation was mainly concerned with finding 
new ways to shed light on an episode of violence that had been deliberately kept hidden, 
in this case the two shipwrecks of April 2015 received immediate and quite extensive 
media attention. While our reconstructions still proved important, the unfolding of 
the immediate events themselves was never particularly controversial. What was at 
stake was less the “draw[ing] open [of] a theatrical curtain […] behind which violence is 
lurking,”48 and more the attempt to re-establish the link that exists between the policy 
decisions taken in meeting rooms in Rome and Brussels, and their deadly effects at 
sea — thus displacing the scene of violence onto a different scale. In other words, the 






events — in this case the two shipwrecks and the deaths these caused — and their “say-
ability” in terms of violence, the possibility of producing statements that would be able 
to link these deaths with the political decisions that made them inevitable so as to seek 
accountability for them.49 
The shift from practices to policies of non-assistance as a dominant modality of 
liquid violence in the context of the humanitarianization of the border, demanded that 
we supplement a forensics of cases with a forensics of policies, the scale of which could 
no longer limited to a particular incident, or even the central Mediterranean as a whole, 
but had to extend to policy forums and meeting rooms from Rome to Brussels. The 
form of liquid violence we reconstructed, which operates in an even more indirect way 
than in the past, has however proven challenging so far for lawyers to translate into a 
violation that might be accounted for in the language and forums of the law. As a result, 
the impunity which prevailed for the implementation of this lethal policy has allowed 
it to be perpetuated.
Navigating the Architectural-Image Complex and the Ambivalences  
of the Humanitarian Border Spectacle
Like the twin October 2013 shipwrecks, the twin April 2015 shipwrecks signaled an-
other wave of impressive shifts in the assemblage of security and humanitarian logics 
shaping rescue and bordering practices, as well as in the aesthetic regime operating 
at the maritime frontier. Despite Jean-Claude Juncker’s admission of guilt for the in-
crease in migrants’ deaths, the EU has continued to refuse to launch a new proactive 
search and rescue operation. Instead, it strengthened its security-oriented operations. 
On the one hand, it increased Frontex’s budget as well as the scope of its operations; on 
the other, on June 22, 2015, it launched a European anti-smuggling operation named 
EUNAVFOR MED. In opposition to Mare Nostrum’s combined “humanitarian and mili-
tary” dimensions, the EU anti-smuggling operation was entirely “a police operation 
with military means,” as Rear admiral Hervé Bléjean, the Deputy Operation Com-
mander in the Mediterranean, described it,50 and the rescue of migrants was far from 
the mission’s operational priority. However, this security-oriented mission continued 
to be justified in the name of saving migrants from the dangerous crossings they were 












Pastore, The Changing Dynamics of Human Smuggling and Traf ficking in the Mediterranean. Monzini also 
underlines how the actual practices of  the “actors practicing the commerce of  illegalized passage” 
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Times op-ed by Prime Minister of Italy Matteo Renzi as the “slave traders of the 21st 
century.”52 This discursive humanitarian spin to this security mission was clearly il-
lustrated when, in September 2015, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, suggested the operation be re-named “Sophia” 
in honor of a Somali baby born on one of its warships following a rescue operation.53 
In adopting this name, Mogherini declared, she wanted “to pass the message to the 
world that fighting the smugglers and the criminal networks is a way of protecting hu-
man life.”54 While the operation, in its initial phases, has come to rescue a substantial 
number of migrants — 54,000 between 2015 and 2016 — it has also consistently sought 
to refrain from initiating rescue operations in order to prioritize its anti-smuggling 
activities, and has almost entirely pulled back from its rescue activities as of 2017.
Faced with the continued refusal of states either to fundamentally change their 
exclusionary policies or to redeploy a proactive rescue mission, a growing number of 
NGOs courageously stepped in with their own vessels to fill the lethal gap in rescue 
capabilities left by the ending of Mare Nostrum, progressively constituting a veritable 
civilian rescue f leet. As the work of Stierl and Cuttitta have shown, rescue NGOs are 
far from homogenous, and can be positioned on a wide spectrum in terms of their 
(de)politicization. While organizations such as MOAS have framed their activities as 
putting themselves at the service of states, and others such as SOS Méditerranée have 
tended to restrict their activities and discourse to the urgency of saving lives at sea, 
critical humanitarian organizations such as MSF, and much smaller NGOs such as Sea 
Watch, have adopted a far more politicized stance, denouncing the retreat and inac-
tion of states, and calling on them to redeploy a large-scale SAR operation.55 These lat-
ter organizations have further underlined that, as Mare Nostrum had already demon-
strated, as essential and urgent as saving migrants in distress at sea might be, it could 
not put an end to deaths as long as the exclusionary EU migration policy remained in 
place. As a result, these organizations have called for a fundamental reorientation of 
the EU’s policies to enable “safe passage.”56 With their sudden presence at sea, rescue 
NGOs have both denied states the monopoly over intervention in — and the monitoring 
of — the seas. Rescue NGOs quickly demonstrated a fundamental impact at the opera-
tional level, as they came to rescue a greater number and share of people — reaching a 
peak of 35 % in 2017.
As EU states emphasized the security dimension of their operations, and NGOs 
deployed their own rescue missions, a new and surprising situation began to emerge 
as of the spring of 2015. It was as if the Janus face of Mare Nostrum, humanitarian and 












tinct actors. Would they be better reconciled in this new configuration? By spring 2015, 
it could seem so: after the transgressive arrival of NGOs, a relative complementarity 
settled in in which NGOs ran rescue operations, allowing state agencies to focus on 
destroying migrant boats in their wake. In this sense, even if security and humanitar-
ian logics were operated primarily by distinct actors, they remained bound together 
in a “secret solidarity,” to borrow Michel Agier’s term.57 This surprising division of la-
bor in fact pointed to a recurrent ambivalence in humanitarian practice, which, again 
in Agier’s words, is always at risk of becoming the “left hand of Empire,” healing the 
wounds wrought by the violence of the right hand.58 While unable to end migrants’ 
deaths at sea, and proving more effective in replacing state-led rescue at sea than in 
forcing states to reinstate their operations, NGOs nevertheless rescued 75,000 people 
between 2014 and 2018 — many of whom might have died without their presence. They 
further profoundly transformed the aesthetic regime of the maritime frontier in ways 
that have yet to be fully accounted for.59 
Through the presence of NGO vessels, non-governmental actors suddenly had an 
unprecedented capacity to claim a right to look at the EU’s maritime frontier, wresting 
from states the monopoly over the knowledge and imaging of migration and border-
ing across the sea.60 The outcome has been as impressive as it has been ambivalent.61 In 
some ways, rescue NGOs have clearly reproduced and even heightened the humani-
tarian border spectacle that had taken form during the Mare Nostrum operation. Just 
like the Italian operation, they substituted the securitized scene of border interception 
with the good scene of rescue. Taking on board journalist teams who f locked in droves 
to the Mediterranean frontier as the “migration crisis” intensified in 2015, but also de-
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images produced by rescue NGOs (or through them) brought distant viewers into an 
unprecedented proximity with the extreme situation of life and death that each rescue 
operation constitutes.
Making visible their rescue activities may have been necessary to convey the 
continuing urgent reality of migrants’ distress at sea, and more prosaically to allow 
NGOs to justify their activities to their funders. In the process however, as had been 
noted by numerous observers,62 rescue NGOs reproduced the intertwined tropes of 
the white savior and the racialized, precarious subject fighting for survival.63 While 
many members of rescue NGOs we have spoken to are well aware of these problems, 
and have sought to address them as best they can — for example by alternating the 
type of imagery they have circulated between images of distress and empowerment, 
or conducting interviews with rescued migrants on the deck of their vessels to allow 
them to unfold their life stories64 — there is no easy way out of the radically unequal 
positions our postcolonial world generates, which permeate humanitarian practices in 
general.65 In fact, moments of radical precarity in the open sea bring these inequalities 
into even sharper relief.66 Furthermore, NGOs’ radicalized version of the humanitar-
ian border spectacle also reproduced some of the configurations of the partition of the 
sensible imposed by the spectacle of border security: by spectacularizing the maritime 
crossing, the imagery produced by NGOs continued to echo the iconography of the Eu-
ropean imaginary of invasion, as well as this imaginary’s occlusion of the conditions 
lying before and after the sea crossing. No matter how hard different rescue NGOs 
have tried to frame their images differently — and a more careful study than what we 
can offer here would be necessary — in effect many of the images they have produced 
have been nearly identical, and practically interchangeable, from one rescue organiza-
tion to another.
Despite these ambivalent outcomes, which should not be taken lightly, rescue 
NGOs have also re-organized the Mediterranean frontier’s partition of the sensible in 
other highly oppositional and decisive ways. By wresting the monopoly over the capac-
ity to document events at sea away from states, they were also able to redirect part of 
the “light” shed by the humanitarian border spectacle towards the violent (in)actions 
of state actors. Without the civilian oversight at sea that NGOs have permitted, much 
of this violence would have remained in the shadows. This role would become even 
more crucial when, after an initial phase of relative complementarity between the se-
curity-oriented operations of states and the rescue activities of NGOS discussed above, 
European states deployed drastic measures to seal off the Mediterranean frontier by 
criminalizing solidarity and (re-)outsourcing border control as of the summer of 2016.
As migrants’ capacity to overcome the EU’s borders peaked in summer 2015, when 
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ing, plunging the EU into a deep crisis, European states sought to impose a violent 
roll-back of the border regime. Unable to manage migrants’ transgressive movements 
once they arrived on European territory, in the aim of re-imposing order on the bor-
der regime, European states found only one solution: (re)outsourcing border control 
to whatever partner they could find along migrants’ entire trajectories. After success-
fully sealing off the Aegean thanks to the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016,67 the atten-
tion of policy makers returned to the central Mediterranean, where the only available 
partner facing Italian shores was the shattered Libyan state, and particularly its un-
savory coast guard units. Outsourcing border control once again to these Libyan part-
ners — as had been the case already in 2009 — demanded that NGOs be sidelined. After 
all, if the newly-equipped Libyan units were to intercept migrants leaving their shores 
effectively, the same migrants could not be rescued by NGOs which would bring them 
to European soil. Furthermore, to allow the Libyan coast guard to intercept migrants 
at gunpoint with impunity, the monopoly of states over the maritime frontier’s aes-
thetic regime had to be restored. For all purposes then — inextricably operational and 
aesthetic — the Mediterranean had to be de-humanitarianized.
Since the summer of 2016, then, Italy, with the full support of the EU, has stepped 
up its collaboration with the Libyan coast guard, and at the same time led a virulent 
campaign of delegitimization and criminalization of NGOs — a two-pronged policy we 
have called Mare Clausum.68 These two dimensions have been the focus of our work 
since 2016. Knowing the looming catastrophe that the attacks against rescue NGOs 
signaled, we first attempted to intervene in this debate through our report, “Blaming 
the Rescuers,” which demonstrated the fallacy of the “pull-factor” attributed to SAR 
NGOs, an argument that had already been mobilized against Mare Nostrum. In collabo-
ration with Forensic Architecture, we have further offered a counter-reconstruction of 
events of alleged collusion with smugglers by the NGO Jugend Rettet, whose vessel was 
seized on August 2, 2017.69 Thanks to the documentation produced by this NGO — in 
particular through GoPro cameras mounted on its crew’s helmets and the images pro-
duced by journalists on board its own and other NGO vessels — we have demonstrated 
that the accusations against NGOs have been spurious and amounted to “factual lies” 
(the use of factual elements to weave a narrative that is intentionally false).70
Our efforts — as that of many other actors — have however proven insufficient, and 
since the summer of 2017 the NGO f lotilla has been reduced to only a few remaining as-
sets, leading as in the past to a greater risk for migrants of dying at sea.71 Furthermore, 
as the share of migrants rescued by NGOs fell, the share of interceptions operated by 
the Libyan coast guard increased in parallel. Between 2016 and 2018, 55,000 migrants 
were pulled-back to Libya, where they have faced detention, forced labor, torture, and 
rape.72 In this shift then, we can sea a repetition of the EU’s policy of non-assistance, 
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Video still from The Crime of Rescue — The Iuventa Case (2018)
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exercised at and through the sea with the all too direct forms of violence perpetrated 
by proxy on firm land.
Just as the presence of rescue NGOs was being drastically reduced over the sum-
mer of 2017, and with it the rift NGOs had opened in the state-imposed partition of the 
sensible, the German NGO Sea Watch radicalized its visual politics. In the face of the 
accusations of collusion with smugglers and mounting Libyan coast guard attacks on 
rescuers and migrants alike, Sea Watch supplemented the GoPro cameras of its already 
well-equipped crew by mounting six cameras on the deck and mast of its ship, as well 
as devices to record its radio communications with state actors. The Sea Watch ship be-
came a kind of moving audio-visual recording apparatus, continuously documenting 
everything that occurred on the horizon 360 degrees around it. The footage Sea Watch 
would gather in early November through these unprecedented means would prove 
central to our attempt to counter Italy and the EU’s outsourcing of border control to 
the Libyan coast guard.73
On the morning of November 6, 2017, a conf lictual rescue / interception event oc-
curred, after both Sea Watch and the Libyan coast guard were directed by the Italian 
coast guard to the position of a boat in distress carrying more than 130 migrants. With 
its recently repaired vessel (that had been handed to Libyan authorities by Italy in May 
of that year), the Libyans were able to arrive on scene first, where many of the pas-
sengers had already fallen into the water after one of the boat’s tubes def lated. The 
Libyans captured those who were still clinging to the boat using very dangerous ma-
noeuvres — despite 8 of the 13 crew members onboard having been trained by the EU’s 
anti-smuggling operation “Sophia.” As the Sea Watch vessel approached minutes later, 
its crew deployed small fast boats to rescue the passengers set adrift. Soon, the an-
tagonistic logics of interception and rescue came to a head. As Sea Watch’s crew ap-
proached the migrants’ boat to rescue the passengers struggling in the water around 
it and not assisted by the Libyans, the Libyan Coast Guard threatened them and threw 
hard objects at them to keep them away. For the migrants caught between the Libyan 
coast guard and the rescue NGO, the few meters between their vessels is what sepa-
rated the prospect of a new life in Europe and the certainty of violence at the hand 
of Libyan captors, which many of the migrants had already experienced. Some of the 
migrants the Libyan coast guard had managed to bring on board — and were beat-
ing — managed to jump overboard and reach the NGO boat instead. Losing control, the 
Libyan coast guard set off at high speed with one passenger still hanging on the boat’s 
side ladder. In total, at least twenty people died before or during these events and as 
consequence of the conf lictual and chaotic operation. Sea Watch was able to rescue 58 
migrants and bring them to safety in Italy, while 47 were captured by the Libyan coast 
guard and brought back to Libya where, as several survivors later recounted, they suf-
fered grave human rights violations — including arbitrary detention, brutal beatings, 
rape, and starvation.
In some ways, this incident was far from exceptional: the Libyan coast guard inter-
cepted and returned to Libya more that 20,000 people in 2017 alone. What was excep-
tional was that this pull-back event was only partly successful, so that several survivors 
could be retrieved and interviewed in Italy, allowing in turn that contact be estab-
73   See our “Mare Clausum” report and associated video investigation: www.forensic-architecture.org/
case/sea-watch/.
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lished with those brought back to Libya. Moreover, by turning its vessel and crew into 
a complex apparatus of audio-visual recording, Sea Watch was able to record the entire 
violent event with unprecedented precision. To measure the change in the aesthetic 
regime of the Mediterranean frontier that had occured, we need only compare the sin-
gle photograph we could access for the left-to-die boat case in 2011 with the hours and 
hours of video recordings of the events from multiple angles that Sea Watch handed 
over to us in order to reconstruct these events. To respond to this overabundance of 
images, which was novel for events occurring at sea, we had to call upon the unique 
method the Forensic Architecture agency has developed in a number of contexts on 
firm land — what it calls “the architectural-image complex.”74 By locating each cam-
era within a dynamic three-dimensional model of the scene, Forensic Architecture’s 
method enabled us to navigate within an image-space and offer a minute-by-minute 
reconstruction of the facts from multiple perspectives.
The audiovisual material produced by Sea Watch, and the way we have been able to 
assemble it with Forensic Architecture, provided fundamental evidence of the violence 
of the Libyan coast guard and its collaboration with its EU counterparts. To recon-
struct this collaboration at a policy level, we resorted to the method of policy forensics 
developed in our previous reports.75 Finally, the testimonies of several of the survivors 
who were brought back to Libya give account of the brutal violence to which they were 
subjected, which lies far beyond the frame of Sea Watch’s cameras, and beyond the sea 
itself. Together, these testimonies, the video reconstruction, and our written report 
served as the factual basis for a legal case before the European Court of Human Rights 
filed by seventeen survivors in May 2018 against Italy. The argument put forward by 
the legal team constituted by Global Legal Action Network and the Association for Juridi-
cal Studies on Immigration is that — because of the multiform collaboration between It-
aly, the EU and the Libyan coast guard — Italy was engaging in “refoulement by proxy,” 
and was responsible for the passengers’ fate at sea and in Libya.76 
As important as the audiovisual material produced by Sea Watch has been for our re-
construction and the ongoing demands for accountability that aim, through litigation, 
to force Italy and the EU to interrupt their policy of outsourced border control, it has 
also confronted us with new difficulties and questions that we still ponder. Beyond the 
abundance of available images of this violent incident — an outcome of the profound 
reorganization of the partition of the sensible at sea operated by rescue NGOs — there 
is another striking difference in relation to our previous investigations that were char-
acterized by a paucity of accessible imagery: while the lack of images in the report on 
the left-to die boat and on the April 2015 shipwrecks forced us to assemble a composite 
image of events by combining survivor testimonies with georeferenced data and re-
mote sensing technologies so as to map the unfolding of events with a certain distance, 
here the images produced by Sea Watch bring us to the heart of events, in an intimate 
and disturbing proximity with bodies struggling for their lives and their cries of dis-
tress. We are faced with scenes of radical precarity, and even death (the video includes 
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camera fixed on Sea Watch’s mast, we see a man’s body slowly swallowed by the sea’s 
liquid mass after Sea Watch’s crew has been prevented from rescuing him by the Lib-
yan coast guard. These are horrific images of a horrific event, and their presentation 
as documents to a court entails that this violence must remain in the brutal form in 
which it was captured. Even if the survivors we have worked with wanted these im-
ages to be seen as part of their demand for justice, and even if this footage constitutes 
essential evidence to incriminate both the Libyan coast guard and European states, 
working with and displaying such imagery conjures difficult — and perhaps unresolv-
able — questions: How to contest the violence of the EU’s outsourced policies of border 
control without reproducing other forms of symbolic violence in the process?
Our use of these images is first of all haunted by the ghost of the dead from whom 
we will never be able to request consent to use this footage, whose lives were only made 
visible to us “in the moment of their disappearance.”77 While the initial use of these 
images within our video has been geared to a judicial context, as a consequence of 
their further circulation in different cultural, institutional and political forums, no ge-
neric public can be assumed as viewer of those images. As such, echoing other debates 
on the consumption and circulation of images of Black suffering we must ask: who is 
meant to see those images and what do those images mean to her/him? Can they be 
effectively mobilized to counter the fungibility of Black life? If yes, by whom and un-
der what conditions? Might their circulation in certain contexts undermine that aim?78 
Clearly we see a risk that, in recirculating these images of Black subjects in conditions 
of radical precarity, struggling for survival and being rescued by European activists, 
we reproduce racialized tropes of the rescued / rescuer. Our own work of reconstruc-
tion is affected by the inherent ambivalence of the images produced by NGOs as part of 
the humanitarian border spectacle we have discussed above. Furthermore, as George 
Didi-Huberman has recently reminded us in a scathing critique of Ai WeiWei’s Human 
Flow (2018), if for Walter Benjamin criticism is “a matter of correct distancing,” we may 
ask if the images of NGOs haven’t brought us too close? How to re-introduce distance 
from within this extreme proximity? Moreover, in a context of over-abundance of im-
ages, could the subtraction of visual imagery become an additional — and in certain 
situations not only more ethically sustainable but also more effective — tool in our rep-
ertoire? These are among the questions and tensions that continue to inhabit us, and 
which, as Saidiya Hartman underlines, are “unavoidable in narrating the lives of the 
subaltern, the dispossessed, and the enslaved.”79
After having submitted our factual video reconstruction based on Sea Watch’s foot-
age to the European court, one of the ways we have sought to respond to these ques-
tions is by accompanying the display of our own reconstruction in artistic contexts 
with a video interview in which a survivor looks back at and re-subjectivizes these im-
ages. This is, however, far from exhausting them, and risks to continue reproducing 
the unequal relationship that the trope of “giving voice to” a under-represented group 
always institutes. What these difficulties point to is that relying on some of the tools 
77   Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” 12.





mobilized and images produced as part of the border spectacle, whether in their se-
curitized or humanitarian variants, demands careful positioning, and charting one’s 
course through a field fraught with ambivalences in which there is at times no unprob-
lematic position. This, we would argue, is the risk that comes from intervening within 
and against the aesthetic regime of the maritime frontier.
Conclusion
The trajectory we have charted of the changing modalities of liquid violence, constant 
rearticulations of humanitarian and security logics, and reconfigurations of the aes-
thetic regime operating at the maritime frontier, have all shaped the twists and turns 
of our own practice as researchers, aesthetic practitioners and activists striving to 
contest the violence of borders. The complex and ambivalent shifts at the maritime 
frontier we have described trace a sequence of openings and closures in relations to 
migrants’ movements, the presence of non-governmental actors and the aesthetic re-
gime. While in 2011, migrants had pried open the Mediterranean frontier in the wake 
of and as an integral part of the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, with 
each group of illegalized migrants intercepted and pulled-back to Libya, or left strand-
ed at sea for days, the sea is once again being closed down. The sea is also closing down 
on activists, who, in response to the demands for freedom and equality that emerged 
out of the so-called Arab uprisings, have in the last few years transformed the sea into 
a central space of political struggle, inventing new strategies and tactics to contest 
the violence of borders and support migrants’ movements. Contesting the partition 
of the sensible imposed by states on the liquid frontier has been a central dimension of 
each of these initiatives — even if their intervention conjured new problems in the pro-
cess — and the attempt to criminalize them and expel them from the maritime frontier 
has also been an attempt by states to re-impose their own regime of (in)visibility.
The closing down of the sea in these different respects has continued apace since 
the autumn 2017 Sea Watch vs Libyan Coast Guard incident described above. While 
our reconstruction was the basis for a legal challenge against Italy in front of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights filed on May 8, 2018, the deterrent effect we hoped our 
complaint might have on state practices even as the court examined the complaint, did 
not materialize. After far-right politician Matteo Salvini became Interior Minister on 
June 1, 2018, the de-humanitarianization of the border pursued through the Mare Clau-
sum policy was only further radicalized: more NGOs have been prevented from operat-
ing, rescued migrants have been prevented from disembarking, and more migrants 
have been pulled back to Libya.80 The rift in the monopoly of states over imagining and 
documenting the maritime frontier (which rescue NGOs had widened) has been nar-
rowed. While we continue to consider strategic litigation as an essential political tool 
against the lowering of the threshold of acceptable violence (particularly in regards to 
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Despite the tendency of closure, the sealing off of the Mediterranean frontier 
remains an unstable, contested and open-ended process. The recent shifts in the 
Mediterranean frontier’s partition of the sensible have demanded new responses by 
non-governmental actors seeking to contest the violence of borders. With the vessels 
of rescue NGOs prevented from operating, the role of an activist hotline supporting 
migrants in distress in the Mediterranean we have contributed to forge, the Watch-
TheMed Alarm Phone, has proven more important than ever over the last months.81 
Launched in October 2014 by a coalition of freedom of movement, human rights, and 
migrant activist groups, the Alarm Phone connects more than 150 activists located in 
about 12 countries, who take shifts to respond to distress calls from migrants cross-
ing the sea. The Alarm Phone activists enact what we might call a topological solidarity: 
while the activists that respond to calls are dispersed throughout Europe and North 
Africa, through the phone line, they can hear the precarious passengers as if they were 
beside them. The Alarm Phone has intervened in a crucial way in the Mediterranean 
frontier’s aesthetic regime. By providing support to and amplifying the voices of mi-
grants to denounce state violence,82 the Alarm Phone has exercised a form of disobedi-
ent listening, which is all the more crucial today when the visual means of monitoring 
the maritime frontier are challenged.
The moment of closure we are facing is thus far from being the end of the story. 
Illegalized migrants from the Global South will continue to refuse their banishment 
from spaces of (relative) opulence, and non-governmental actors will strive to find new 
ways to contest the violence of borders, which, as we have shown, also involve contest-
ing the boundaries of what can be seen and heard. But this open-ended sequence also 
underlines the limits of the hand-to-hand struggle of migrants and those who sup-
port them with the border regime, since we have collectively proven unable to durably 
end border violence. Migrants’ claims to freedom of movement — which they express 
through their voices and practices of unauthorized mobility — have not been heeded. 
While they have pushed the European border regime into a phase of turbulence, lead-
ing to the rapid changes we have outlined in this chapter, the fundamentals of the EU’s 
policy of migrant illegalization have remained unchanged. In this context, strategic 
litigation may have blocked certain violent practices temporarily, but it has not chal-
lenged the foundational violence of the EU’s policies of exclusion. Likewise, state and 
NGO vessels deployed to rescue migrants have succeeded in mitigating the lethal ef-
fects of the violence of the liquid frontier, but proven unable to put an end to the very 
necessity of rescue, and with it to the “asymmetry between rescuer and rescued,”83 that 
is intrinsic to this practice and that haunts the images produced by state and non-state 
actors alike. As important as these practices have been, they have proven to be “not 
enough.”84 These limitations are certainly not the ground to refrain from any form of 
intervention, but acknowledging them is necessary to navigate a fine and unstable line 







While activist energies, and much of our own research, focus on countering the 
shifting modes of violence at the border, this risks leaving the systemic conditions 
within which borders are embedded, and which reproduce the mobility conf lict of 
which the Mediterranean is a major frontline, unaddressed. The problems arising 
from an excessive focus on the border as the site of political contestation is also partly 
an aesthetic question. As we have shown in relation to the humanitarian border spec-
tacle, there is a risk that, even as we contest the securitized border spectacle and its 
lethal policies, one partly reproduces its selective (in)visibilisation — for example by 
contributing to the over-representation of racialized migration across the Mediterra-
nean frontier that fuels Europe’s imaginary of invasion, or by occluding the forms of 
systemic violence that extend far beyond the sea’s coastline to shape the social, politi-
cal and economic conditions that migrants escape in the first place. Our ongoing inter-
est in migrants’ trajectories as an epistemic device85 stems precisely from the way they 
connect multiple locations and struggles, bringing into view an expansive field of rela-
tions.86 While this may be part of a response to the challenges of contesting the border 
spectacle, we are well aware that each practice and perspective reveals as much as it 
conceals. That partiality cannot be undone, but it demands to be constantly ref lected 
upon and the configuration of the (in)visible it produces questioned anew. At best, its 
recognition can produce a sense of humility, and the acknowledgement of the need for 
practices and perspectives other than one’s own.
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As cultural producers from Europe, we experience the continent where we live as an 
ambiguous terrain; we cannot simply identify with it without accepting the conse-
quences of such a positioning. Europe has a long tradition of dealing for itself. When 
the terms of the treaties of Westphalia were negotiated in the 17th century, it was Eu-
ropeans sitting around the table and agreeing that the world would be made up of sov-
ereign states. They were the ones who decided — for themselves and for all those who 
were not invited to the table — what was lawful and what was outside the law, who had 
the right to control territories and markets, and who had no rights whatsoever. Its sys-
tems are as regional as any other regional configuration of knowledge, but Europe has 
always understood them as universal and turned them into global designs.1
1   Nimako and Willemsen, “Transatlantic Slavery and the Rise of the European World Order”; Mignolo, 
“Geopolitics of sensing and knowing.”
Lonnie van Brummelen and Siebren de Haan128
Being artists from the Netherlands presents a specific ambivalence for us because, 
in our nation’s history, the eminence of art is inextricably tied to colonialism. Colonial 
profits enabled the Dutch Golden Age with its “masters” who painted not for monar-
chies, aristocracies, or the church, but for the new art market. Such profits also fi-
nanced our nation’s war of independence against the Spanish Empire. It was the newly 
founded Dutch Republic that initiated and facilitated the emergence of the United 
East India Company, followed later by the West India Company. These forerunners of 
corporate-led globalization were involved in international trade and the overseas pro-
duction of high value commodities such as sugar, tobacco, nutmeg, and cloves. They 
issued bonds and stock shares for individual buyers, thus recruiting citizens to the 
role of shareholder. The financial resources this generated enabled the further con-
quest of overseas territories and the construction of infrastructures to commercially 
exploit them. Meanwhile, savvy Dutch lawyers developed legal tools that granted the 
companies the right to operate as agents of the state. Such government letters pro-
vided legislative cover to loot ships, wage war, and install administrations in the con-
quered territories.2 Many cities in the Netherlands still honor the officers who worked 
for these companies with statues and placards that celebrate the contribution of these 
naval heroes to our nation’s struggle for independence and greatness. What is often 
left out of the story is how they participated in enslavement, slaughter and ecocide to 
achieve this.3
How, as two white Dutch artists, can we grapple with our inherited complicity in 
this tangle of colonial and postcolonial projects? How can we build upon our conti-
nent’s aesthetic and cultural legacies without reproducing the mechanisms of exploi-
tation on which these are founded? How can we — privileged with European citizen-
ship — problematize its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion? Such questions have 
shaped our artistic practice. We embrace the notion that making images in and of the 
world entails our participation in shared events, as actors amongst other actors, both 
human and other-than-human. Art-making thus becomes for us an involvement in a 
world that is not there for us to fully grasp, but that we get to know a little better by 
interacting with it. Although we often work in a documentary style, we learned that 
there is no such thing as mere observation. As image-makers, we are always already 
part of the events that we record. We frame, we focus, we shape, we choose a point of 
view. Unwittingly, our presence may provoke certain voices to speak up and silence 
others. As a consequence, we came to understand our artistic practice as a form of 
participatory intervention.
2   Of these two companies, only the VOC had the right to deploy military troops. Minto-Coy and Berman, 
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13.1 and 13.2
Stills from Grossraum (Borders of Europe) (2004 / 2005, 35 mm film), 
depicting smugglers throwing contraband over the border fence at the 
market in Ceuta
 © Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan (both)
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Borders of Europe
Working from Europe today means being situated in the dynamics of cultural and 
economic crises, shifting borders, growing divides, and red tape. Around 2003, we 
started to investigate this transforming Europe. At the time, the EU was on the verge 
of extending itself with ten new member states. It was not yet clear how the European 
project would develop. Would an expanded EU be able to confront transnational chal-
lenges such as migration or climate change? Or would it rather become a fortress, a 
privileged area where goods and people could move freely protected by fortified bor-
ders and tariff walls? Were the dismantling of national borders and the introduction 
of a single currency first steps leading to a federation? Or would Europe remain a 
patchwork of jurisdictions, a league of sovereign states? Perhaps the outside boundary 
would turn out to be a new Frontier: a wave of territorial expansion that would soon 
incorporate sizable countries such as Turkey and Ukraine. Such questions incited us 
to make Grossraum (Borders of Europe) (2004 / 2005): an installation consisting of a silent 
35 mm film juxtaposed with a publication, documenting border crossings at the Polish-
Ukrainian border, the Spanish-Moroccan border, and the Greek / Turkish Cypriot di-
vide. We stationed our camera on hillsides and rooftops and filmed across Europe’s 
border to its outside. Our camera-eye didn’t adhere to the borderlines that were drawn 
on the map. Instead, we explored alternative trajectories. We followed a smuggler 
throwing contraband over a border fence, or descended through a forest — divided by 
a border, but nonetheless inseparably part of the same ecosystem.
Europe’s borders were heavily guarded and photography was forbidden without 
the permission of proper authorities. A long trajectory of permission-seeking preced-
ed our poetic border transgressions. The publication entitled The Formal Trajectory con-
tained a selection of correspondence with local contacts and authorities, and a logbook 
of our experiences on location. In revealing these negotiations and the circumstances 
surrounding the recordings, the publication makes evident that our artistic freedom 
to optically trespass was regulated by an invisible juridical structure.
The making of Grossraum taught us that bilateral ties shape Europe’s relation to its 
outside. For example, when we asked Polish authorities for permission to film their bor-
der with Ukraine, they requested that we also contact the Ukrainian authorities for their 
approval. And although the Polish request confused the Ukrainian authorities — how 
could they give us a Ukrainian press card, if we would not set foot on Ukrainian soil?—
they displayed a similar prudence with regards to their Polish colleagues. Only 60 
years ago, the western part of what is now Ukraine used to be Polish territory. The bor-
der between the two countries still divides many families. This was one of the reasons 
that the Polish government had been reluctant to comply with Europe’s visa require-
ments and strongly advocated for more favorable conditions for its eastern neighbor. 
It resulted first in cheaper and simplified access to European visas for Ukrainians, and 
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That not all countries enjoy such good relations with their neighbors became clear to us 
when Moroccan authorities refused to give us permission to film its border with Spain 
at Ceuta. Morocco considered the Spanish enclave on the Northern point of Africa as 
occupied by Spain, and therefore did not recognize the border as legitimate. Reading 
between the lines, however, we understood that we could film the boundary if we had 
permission from Spanish authorities.
The Guardia Civil — whose headquarters were located in the Spanish capital Ma-
drid — guarded the frontier itself. But there were also port authorities, customs, and 
the local police of the autonomous district of Ceuta. It required a considerable amount 
of asking around to find out which authority was responsible for what, and in what or-
der we had to approach them. We spoke to many officers who all gave us their consent, 
but never received a single document. When we asked the final officer how we could 
prove without papers that we had permission to film the borderland, he advised us to 
memorize the names of everyone we had encountered, and to list them orally in case 
we were held up; a directive that surprisingly turned out to work.
Though the border fences at Ceuta had not yet been stormed, irregular migration 
was already leaving traces in the landscape. We found rubber ammunition and im-
provised wooden ladders: remnants of nocturnal encounters between Spanish border 
patrols and African migrants climbing the fence in an attempt to reach Europe.
The Cyprus divide turned out to be an even more contested boundary. In 1974, 
Greek Cypriot nationalists supported by elements of the Greek military junta staged 
a coup d’état in an attempt to incorporate Cyprus into Greece. To protect the Turkish 
Cypriot minority that lived on the island, the Turkish army invaded Cyprus, occupied 
its northern part, and never left. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared 
itself independent in 1983 with Turkey alone recognizing the new state. For decades, 
a UN buffer zone has separated the two parts of the island. As a result, only half of 
Cyprus was able to enter the European Union in 2004.
After considerable negotiation, the government of Cyprus gave us permission to 
film the divide on the condition that we always be accompanied by Greek Cypriot sol-
diers.5 But a dilemma arose when we wanted to film inside the buffer zone. According 
to UN regulations, the Greek Cypriot soldiers were not allowed to enter. The recruits 
nonetheless had orders from their superiors to escort us. After calling back and forth, 
the Greek Cypriot soldiers were told that they could accompany us provided that they 
exchanged their uniforms for plain clothes. Filming in the presence of two groups of 
soldiers was by no means easy. They watched continuously over our shoulders to make 
sure that nothing came into our picture frame that could give the impression of parti-
ality in the conf lict. Since the landscape was fraught with f lags and monuments, this 
made it almost impossible to compose a shot. Only around noon, as imams started to 
bellow from the minarets, and a UN soldier began to talk about his recent employment 
in Baghdad, did the monitoring ease. By nightfall, the soldiers were chatting animat-
edly about the latest news, and the boring and expensive nightlife in Nicosia, allowing 
us to explore the landscape a bit more freely.
5   Another condition for their collaboration was that the title of the film would not be Borders of Europe, 
since the government of Cyprus did not recognize the divide as a legitimate border.
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15.1 and 15.2
Stills from Grossraum (Borders of Europe) (2004 / 2005, 35 mm film),  
depicting the UN buf fer zone in Cyprus
 © Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan (both)
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In retrospect, the whole process of seeking permission and negotiating with border 
patrols and state officials took place in a remarkably friendly atmosphere. It may have 
been indicative of positive expectations of the newly expanded Europe. But it soon 
became clear that the shifting border also caused political turmoil. When the presi-
dential elections in Ukraine turned out to be manipulated in favor of the pro-Russian 
candidate, tensions surfaced between pro-European and pro-Russian parts of the 
population.6 The struggle over direction eventually led to several armed conf licts, in 
which separatists supported by the Russian army attempted to divide Ukraine into 
pro-Russian and pro-European parts.7
Also within the European territory, ruptures revealed that support for the Euro-
pean project was waning. Only a year after the expansion, French and Dutch citizens 
voted against the European Constitution. Romania and Bulgaria were admitted into 
the EU in 2007, but several member-states applied limitations with regard to the free 
movement of these countries’ workers.8 A year later, the financial crisis laid bare that 
the EU was no longer able to deliver on its promise to increase prosperity. Euroscep-
tic political movements from the far-right surged and Europe found itself struggling 
to stay united. Would authorities have been open to an artistic project that aimed to 
frame Europe’s borders had we sought their permission a few years later? 
Eluding trade barriers
On May 4, 2004 — the day that the EU extended its borders with ten new member 
states — we stationed our camera on a hillside along the Polish-Ukrainian border. 
Our aim was to document how this national border would transform into an external 
border of a refigured Europe. While we observed the growing queue of cars, a farmer 
greeted us with sausages and coffee. When he handed us the sugar, he told us that the 
Polish cukier had become twice as sweet since Poland entered the European Union: the 
price had multiplied from one day to the next. As a result, Polish sugar was now even 
cheaper in the Ukraine than in Poland itself.
The farmer’s remark incited us to investigate Europe’s sugar market. We discov-
ered that Europe’s beet sugar industry had relied on political protection from the start. 
Beet sugar had not been able to compete with cane sugar imported from the colonies, 
where it was produced through the slavery system. A beet sugar industry came into 
existence in Europe only when, at the beginning of the 19th century, the English and the 
French set up trade blockades in their struggle for colonial hegemony. With Napoleon’s 
financial support, sugar refineries were built all over Europe.
At the time we investigated Europe’s sugar politics, the EU still provided financial 
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16.1 and 16.2
Still from Monument of Sugar — how to use artistic means  
to elude trade barriers (2007, 16 mm film), depicting the pro-
duction of a sugar block from European beet sugar respectively …
… depicting a ship unloading raw sugar bulk in the port of Lagos, 
filmed from the Dangote sugar refinery
 © Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan (both)
Lonnie van Brummelen and Siebren de Haan136
so-called intervention price: a minimum selling price, which was substantially higher 
than what was offered on the world market. A financial instrument called export res-
titution made the expensive beet sugar competitive and allowed European sugar pro-
ducers to dump their surplus sugar outside Europe. Meanwhile sugar imports were 
taxed heavily, to keep out foreign competitors. This elaborate system caused the price 
difference that the Polish farmer had observed.9
Trade statistics suggested that the majority of Europe’s sugar exports were sold 
to Nigeria. With the aim of reversing Europe’s sugar f low, we travelled to Lagos. We 
planned to purchase Europe’s sugar cheaply on Nigeria’s market, to transform the 
sweet crystals in situ into sculptural blocks, and to ship these back to Europe. Trans-
forming the sugar into an artwork would allow us to submit our import application in 
Europe under the commodity code 9703, which applies to all monuments and original 
artworks regardless of the material in which they are produced.
The silent 16 mm film Monument of Sugar - how to use artistic means to elude trade bar-
riers evaluates the project in scrolling titles alternated with documentary sequences 
showing the production of sugar and the making of the monument. The film essay 
also chronicles how our conceptual framework crumbled. We could find no trace on 
Nigeria’s market of the large f lows of European beet sugar that the data had suggested, 
but only found cane sugar imported from Brazil. Much to our surprise, sugar was by 
no means cheap. The high earnings generated from the export of oil had led to the 
overvaluation of the Nigerian naira, making it cheaper to import commodities than 
to produce them. To stimulate local production, the Nigerian government imposed 
levies on all foreign goods, including sugar. We had also not foreseen that exporting 
our sugar monument out of Nigeria would make it subject to a Nigerian regulation cre-
ated to stop the exodus of antiques and other art treasures. After import levies, profit 
margins, and export permit, the Nigerian sugar blocks turned out to be even more 
expensive than sugar blocks made in Europe.
Tokens of Friendship
The Lomé Convention regulates the trade of sugar and other commodities between Eu-
rope and so-called ACP countries (formerly colonized countries in Africa, the Carib-
bean and the Pacific). When this convention came up for revision in 2000, the EU de-
manded the insertion of a clause that required ACP countries to “accept the return and 
readmission of any of its nationals illegally present in EU territory.” The new agree-
ment — now called the Cotonou Agreement after the city in Benin where the treaty was 
signed — also obligated the ACP countries to discourage undocumented migration, as 
well as to facilitate the work of European administrators tasked with evaluating asy-
lum and immigration claims before would-be migrants departed for Europe.10 Thus, 
while the treaty was nominally conceived to stimulate sustainable development, it 
ultimately only provided this support on the condition that the beneficiary countries 
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17.
Installation view of Monument of Sugar as exhibited at Argos, Brussels (2007)
 © Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan
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More treaties followed that hid in their terms that they were instruments in the forti-
fication of Europe’s outside borders. In August 2008, the Italian Prime Minister Ber-
lusconi and the Libyan Colonel Gaddafi signed the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation to settle long-running disputes between the two countries, such as Libya’s 
demands for reparations for the damages caused by colonialism, and claims from Ital-
ian companies that work carried out in Libya had never been paid for. The disputes 
were resolved with the agreement that Italy would reimburse five billion euros to Libya 
over a period of twenty years. The sum would be recuperated from tax revenues, which 
Italy would collect on profits made by Italian companies operating in Libya. At the oc-
casion of the treaty’s signing, Italy also returned the Venus of Cyrene, a statue that 
had been looted from Libya during the colonial period.11 According to Berlusconi, the 
sculpture’s restitution and the Friendship Treaty were “a complete and moral acknowl-
edgement of the damage inf licted on Libya by Italy during the colonial era.”12
The treaty, however, not only mended old wounds with the help of an ancient art-
work and future business opportunities, it also made provisions for bilateral efforts to 
tighten the control of Libya’s coast, its waters, and its terrestrial borders. Both coun-
tries agreed in the treaty to combat undocumented migration with the help of patrol 
boats and a satellite detection system. Libya also consented to the disembarkation on 
its soil of migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea by Italian vessels.13
To most Europeans, these first signs that Europe was outsourcing its border pro-
tection by means of treaty-making went largely unnoticed. We, too, were absorbed by 
other issues, such as the sudden rise of conservative nationalism, the growing resist-
ance against migrants, and increased Islamophobia. In the same year that Italy signed 
the Friendship Treaty with Libya and restituted the Venus of Cyrene, we started the art 
project Monument to Another Man’s Fatherland, which delved into Europe’s roots of im-
perial cultural politics. Its point of departure was the Pergamon Altar — a monument 
that is nowadays the property of Berlin’s State Museums, but was in ancient times 
constructed in what is present-day Turkey to celebrate a victory of Greek colonizers 
over migrating Celts. Our plan was to make a film installation that would address the 
expatriation of the monument and its appropriation for nation-building.14 Since Berlin 
hosts a large community of Turkish migrants, we wanted to do this by layering the 
monument’s 19th century relocation on contemporary migration.
At the time, many European countries had launched compulsory integration pro-
grams in response to reports of migrant integration “lagging behind” expectations. 
Such programs not only included language classes but also civic courses aimed at fa-
miliarizing immigrants with the receiving country’s norms, history, values and cul-




13   Bialasiewicz,  “Off-shoring  and  Out-sourcing  the  Borders  of  EUrope”  and  Ronzitti,  “The  Treaty  on 
Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between  Italy and Libya: New Prospects  for Cooperation 
in the Mediterranean?” 
14   The State Museums in Berlin had been one of the signatories of the Declaration on the Importance and 
Value of Universal Museums (2002) which defended western museums policy to not restitute foreign 
artifacts to the countries of origin, even if the items were obtained under dubious circumstances.
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tural traditions.15 For our restaged version of the monument, we invited young Turkish 
men and women who were participating in an integration program at the Goethe In-
stitute in Istanbul to describe before the camera in their f ledgling German the myth-
ical battle between Greek gods and giants that is depicted on the Pergamon Altar’s 
frieze. The film was countered by a second film, which silently scanned the sculpted 
battle scene.
Because the Berlin State Museums repudiated our request to make film record-
ings in the museum with the comment that “the project might stir the debate about 
repatriation, something we are not interested in,” we reconstructed the altar’s frieze 
from images that we found in books, and instead of the sculpted relief, filmed the 
photomontage. The process of tracing images for the collage revealed that the altar 
had been used over and again both as a means of political bond-making and as a 
locus of cultural appropriation and exchange. For instance, we found one study that 
analyzed Pergamon’s building style and appropriation of Greek mythology as propa-
ganda to present the colony as genuinely Greek. Other books disclosed how the altar’s 
frieze had been confiscated by Stalin’s Red Army and brought to Leningrad as war 
booty, to be returned to Berlin in 1958 as “a token of friendship between the GDR and 
the USSR.”
We were reminded once more of the entanglement of colonialism, migration, and 
art when in January 2019 a massive migration was announced, not of people trave-
ling to Europe, but of art treasures crossing Europe’s borders in the opposite direc-
tion: a massive relocation of things. French president Macron issued a statement that 
France was willing to return all art treasures ill-gotten during the colonial period to 
their countries of origin. He based his statement on a report — which he had commis-
sioned himself — on the status of African objects in French museums. The report called 
for the prompt restitution of objects taken by force or acquired under unfair condi-
tions, including items recovered during scientific missions prior to 1960, and “forgot-
ten” objects — objects which had been lent by African institutions to French museums 
for the purpose of exhibition or restoration and never returned.16 Because the French 
law of inalienability forbids the ceding of cultural heritage from public collections, the 
report proposed to amend the law. In line with these recommendations, the French 
president decided that, without further delay, twenty-six sculptures in the collection 
of the Musée du Quai Branly would be returned to Benin. The artefacts were spoils of 
war, pilfered by the French army after a historical battle at the end of the 19th century 
against the Kingdom of Dahomey. That these objects still sparked the African imagina-
tion became evident when, in 2006, some of them were exhibited in Cotonou, attract-
ing hundreds of thousands of visitors — the same Cotonou where six years earlier the 
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18.1 and 18.2 
Stills from Monument to Another Man’s Fatherland:  
Revolt of the Giants — recited by prospective Germans (2009, 16 mm film)
 © Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan (both)
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18.3 
Still from Monument to Another Man’s Fatherland:  
Revolt of the Giants — reconstructed from reproductions (2009, 35 mm film)
 © Commissioned by Project Art Center, Dublin, Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan
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Will the French restitution of art treasures again be merely an instrument for Euro-
pean politics? A diversion to def lect anger over French immigration policy and the 
presence of French troops in West Africa? A form of leverage in ongoing negotiations 
over halting migration and securing access to resources?18 Or could the shipping back 
of old artworks be a sign that Europe is finally prepared to reinvent its relation to what 
imagines as its outside?
New deal
How would we frame Europe’s outline today? Although migration is often discussed as 
a European “crisis,” countries in the Middle East and Africa host the most displaced per-
sons. What most distinguishes Europe from these countries is its struggle to reconcile 
irregular migration with its self-image of being a neatly bounded, well-governed poli-
ty.19 This image of regulatory competence seems to pivot on Europe’s perceived effec-
tiveness in controlling the f lows of goods, property, ideas, and artworks into and out of 
its markets. We encountered Europe’s complex regime of trade regulations during our 
research for Monument of Sugar.20 But it is not only import levies that regulate Europe’s 
market. Any company that makes or sells products within the European Union must 
comply with regulatory standards that pertain to food hygiene, traceability, environ-
mental impact, competitiveness, and consumer privacy. The European Union applies, 
for example, a zero-tolerance policy to the presence of unauthorized biotech products 
in food and feed; it has strict directives with regard to the use of recyclable packaging; 
and it does not allow the testing of cosmetics on animals. Europe’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (regulating the use of personal data by companies operating in the 
EU) and its Competition Law (restraining the anti-competitive conduct of companies) 
were able to restrain technology giants.21 Market directives, regulations and other acts 
have thus enabled Europe to distribute its values and norms far beyond its territory.22
Regulating f lows of services and things is however quite different from regulating 
f lows of people. Persistent conf licts and atrocities in (among other nations) Syria, Af-
ghanistan, and Eritrea caused large numbers of people to leave their country and seek 
refuge elsewhere. This resulted in a steep increase in the number of refugees trave-
ling to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. The term “migrant crisis” came into use in 
April 2015, when five boats sank with a combined death toll estimated at more than 
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responsible for the task of managing irregular migration became overloaded. To curb 
such ‘un-European’ disorder, the European Union concluded a whole range of treaties 
designed for the sole purpose of externalizing the control of its border. In 2016, a first 
deal to tackle the migrant crisis was brokered with Turkey. In exchange for six billion 
euros to support refugee shelters on its territory, Turkey committed to better guard-
ing its borders and coastlines and to stop migrants sailing to Greece. In return, Turkey 
demanded that discussions on its membership in the European Union be sped up, and 
that visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering the EU be waived. The deal caused 
great division within the Union. Cyprus refused to talk about Turkish membership un-
til the Turkish occupation of half its territory had been resolved. But also, How could 
Europe stand up for values such as democracy, equality, freedom of expression, or 
human rights, if it outsourced its border security to a state that increasingly violated 
these values? What values did Europe actually represent? 
In 2013, Morocco became the first country in the Mediterranean area to sign a Mo-
bility Agreement with the European Union that includes an objective to “combat illegal 
immigration.” It also endorsed deals on immigration with individual EU countries, 
particularly with Spain. To comply with the task of halting undocumented migration 
to Europe, Moroccan authorities often arbitrarily arrest migrants during raids, and 
deport them to remote areas.24 But like Turkey, Morocco also uses its contribution to 
Europe’s border protection as leverage in other negotiations, such as its claim to the 
Western Sahara. After colonial Spain left North Africa, the Polisario Front and Mo-
rocco battled to get control of Western Sahara until a ceasefire was agreed upon in 
1991. The area has been disputed territory ever since. In 2016, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that trade agreements between the European Union and Morocco could 
therefore not include products from this region. Since the ruling, Morocco seems less 
motivated to guard Europe’s border. With growing f lows of migrants, it tries to pres-
sure the EU to support its claim to the Western Sahara, or at least turn a blind eye to 
products coming from this region.25
Although outsourcing borderwork has turned out to be a sticky wicket for Europe, 
more treaties have followed. Italy, for instance, has reactivated its Friendship Treaty with 
Libya after suspending it during the Arab Spring. Libya also received substantial fund-
ing from Europe for “managing mixed migration f lows”— EU jargon for distinguishing 
refugees from other migrants — and for “improving migration management”— which 
includes the repatriation of migrants, border surveillance, and improving the condi-
tions in immigration detention centers.26 Because it was not easy to do business with a 
fragmented Libya ravaged by years of civil war, Europe also began making agreements 
with countries deeper into the African continent.27 Niger, for example, is one of the coun-
tries through which migrants from Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, 








Lonnie van Brummelen and Siebren de Haan144
19.
Still from Grossraum (Borders of Europe), (2004 / 2005, 35 mm film),  
depicting the f lag of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in painted pebbles
 © Lonnie Van Brummelen & Siebren de Haan
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surveillance regime was tightened, human traffickers were put behind bars, pick-up 
trucks (used to transport migrants through the desert) were confiscated, and new leg-
islation was adopted prohibiting the transportation of undocumented migrants. Eu-
rope even started a re-employment project for the more than 6,000 Nigerians who had 
been working in the migrant industry and had become jobless due to the measures.
Sudan is also a transit country for migrants on their way to Libya. Eritreans, Ethi-
opians, Chadians, Somalis and even Syrians travel through it. Sudan’s President al-
Bashir was the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal 
Court in The Hague for masterminding and implementing a plan during the war in 
Darfur to destroy the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa populations.28 Nevertheless, many 
European countries strengthened their diplomatic ties with Sudan during al-Bashir’s 
dictatorship and the European Union released more than 150,000,000 euros for the 
training and gearing up of the Sudanese border police.29
Such partnerships brought Europe into troubled waters with regards to human 
rights and international law.30 Media frequently report of migrants being either abused 
by the law enforcement officers of contracted governments or stranded in overrun 
processing camps under the remit of the partner countries, where they are vulnerable 
to robbery, rape or even to being sold off as enslaved laborers.
Europe’s new “migration deals,” “friendship treaties,” and “mobility agreements” 
do not seem so different from the treaties of Westphalia, which for centuries have 
shaped the identity of Europe and secured its hegemony. In the process, the new trea-
ties distribute European priorities such as strong borders to Niger, Turkey, and else-
where.
Where would we have stationed our camera if we wanted to document Europe’s 
boundaries today? Would we have filmed in a refugee camp in Turkey, funded by the 
EU? Would we place the camera at the border between Nigeria and Niger, where road 
signs adorned with EU logos inform travelers that “Illegal transportation of migrants 
exposes you to a fine of 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 CFA Franc?”31 Would we try to retrieve 
images from the European satellite detection system that scours the Saharan dust 
road between Sudan and Libya? Or would we seek permission to film at Charles de 
Gaulle airport in Paris where once-looted artworks are loaded into airplanes to be re-
turned to their countries of origin? One thing seems certain: Europe is no longer the 
only party sitting at the negotiation table, and its mandate is no longer the bedrock 















The twenty-first century is an age of mobility. Enormous numbers of people are on 
the move today in increasingly unequal ways. More images, too, are on the move. The 
migrant has become the political figure of our time just as the mobile digital image 
has become the aesthetic figure of our time. The migrant and the image are part of the 
same historical primacy of motion and mobility that defines life in the early twenty-
first century. This chapter argues that we need to re-theorize the migrant and the im-
age from the perspective of motion.
This is an important conceptual move because, on the one hand, the migrant has 
been predominantly understood as a secondary political figure derived from the static 
basis of states. The migrant is typically defined as the one who moves between pre-
established states. Opposed to this, this chapter argues that the migrant is in fact a 
constitutive figure of social life itself. On the other hand, the image has been predomi-
nantly understood as something static, either as a representation of an object or as an 
imagination by the subject.
Both of these static conceptions, I argue, should be replaced with a kinetic theory 
of the “migrant image.” However, by the term “migrant image” I do not necessarily 
mean visual or art images of migrants, art by migrants, or the migration of art images 
across borders, although these are all important aspects of migrant images. I mean 
something much more general about the material structure of images and migrants 
themselves. The image does not become mobile just because it represents migrants, 
and the mobility of migrants is not derived merely from our images of them. Rather, 
the argument I would like to make in this chapter is that the social primacy of the mi-
grant and the aesthetic primacy of the mobile image are two dimensions of the same 
historical zeitgeist at the turn of the twenty-first century in which everything appears 
to be characterized by the primacy of motion.
Therefore, instead of trying to derive the mobility of one from the other, I would 
like to show the common conceptual redefinition occurring in both with respect to the 
primacy of mobility in the twenty-first century. In order to do this, I begin first with 
the social primacy of the figure of the migrant and then move on to consider the kines-
thetics of the mobile image. The aim is to demonstrate the sense in which the migrant 
has become a dominant social image for us today, as well the sense in which the image 
has become aesthetically migratory and mobile at the same time.
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The Figure of the Migrant
We live in the age of the migrant. At the turn of the twenty-first century, there were 
more regional and international migrants than ever before in recorded history.1 Today, 
there are over 1 billion migrants.2 Each decade, the percentage of migrants as a share 
of the total population continues to rise. In the next 25 years, the rate of migration 
is predicted to be higher than over the last 25 years.3 More than ever, it has become a 
necessity for people to migrate due to environmental, economic, and political instabil-
ity. Climate change, in particular, may even double international migration over the 
next 40 years.4 Even more, the percentage of total migrants who are non-status or un-
documented is further increasing, which poses a serious challenge to democracy and 
political representation.5 
In other ways, despite the gulf that separates different forms of movement, we are 
all becoming migrants.6 People today relocate greater distances more frequently than 
ever before in human history. While many people may not cross a regional or interna-
tional border in their movement, they tend to change jobs more often, commute longer 
and further to work,7 change their residence repeatedly, and tour internationally more 
than ever before.8 Some of these phenomena are directly related to recent events, such 
as the impoverishment of middle classes in certain rich countries after the financial 
crisis of 2008, which include subsequent austerity cuts to social welfare programs, ris-
ing unemployment, the subprime mortgage crisis, which led to the expulsion of mil-
lions of people from their homes around the world (9 million in the United States alone 
since 2008), the eviction of millions of small farmers in poor countries owing to the 540 
million acres acquired by foreign investors and governments since 2006, and increas-
ingly destructive mining practices around the world, including hydraulic fracturing 
and tar sands. This general increase in human mobility and expulsion that affects us 
all is now widely recognized as a defining feature of our epoch.9
1   In total number (1 billion: 1 in 7) and as percentage of total population (about 14 %) according to the 
International Organization on Migration.
2   United Nations Population Fund, State of World Population 2015. As of 2015, there were 244 million inter-
national migrants and 740 million internal migrants according to the United Nations Population Fund.
3   On the theoretical implications of this phenomenon for liberalism, see Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion.













9  Sassen, Expulsions, 1–2. I use the word expulsion here in the same sense in which Saskia Sassen uses it 
to indicate a general dispossession or deprivation of social status. Many scholars have noted a similar 
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However, not all migrants are alike in their movement, and neither are the reasons 
for their movement consistent, shared, or uniform across space and time.10 For some, 
movement offers opportunity, recreation, and profit with only a temporary expulsion 
from or deprivation of their territorial, political, juridical, or economic status. For oth-
ers, movement is dangerous, constrained, and their social expulsions are much more 
severe and permanent. Today, most people fall somewhere on this migratory spec-
trum between the two poles of “inconvenience” and “incapacitation.” But at some point, 
everyone on this spectrum shares the minimal experience that their movement results 
in a certain degree of expulsion from their territorial, political, juridical, or economic 
status. Even if the end result of migration is a relative increase in money, power, or 
enjoyment, the process of migration itself almost always involves a “sacrifice” or “cost” of 
some kind and duration: the removal of territorial ownership or access, the loss of the 
political right to vote or to receive social welfare, the loss of legal status to work or drive, 
or the financial loss associated with transportation or change in residence.
The gains of migration are always a risk, while the process itself is always some 
kind of loss. This is precisely the sense in which Zygmunt Bauman writes that “tourism 
and vagrancy are two faces of the same coin” of global migration.11 Both the “tour-
ist” (the traveling academic, business professional, or vacationer) and the “vagabond” 
(migrant worker or refugee), as Bauman calls them, are “bound to move” by the same 
social conditions, but result in different kinds and degrees of expulsion from the social 
order.12 Business people are compelled to travel around the world in the “global chase 
of profit,” “consumers must never be allowed to rest” in the chase of new commodities 
and desires, and the global poor must move from job to job wherever capital calls.13 For 
the “tourist,” this social “compulsion, [this] ‘must,’ [this] internalized pressure, [this] 
impossibility of living one’s life in any other way,” according to Bauman, “reveals itself 
to them in the disguise of a free exercise of will.”14
The “vagabond” sees it more clearly. The social “compulsion” to move produces cer-
tain expulsions for all migrants. Some migrants may ‘decide’ to move, but they may 
not decide the social conditions of their movement or the degree to which they may be 
expelled from certain social orders as a consequence. Migration in this sense is neither 
entirely free nor forced; the two are part of the same internally differentiated regime 
of social motion. ‘Expulsion’ simply means the degree to which a migrant is deprived or 
dispossessed of a certain status in this regime.
The “tourist” and “vagabond” are always crossing over into one another. “None of 
the insurance policies of the tourists’ life-style protects against slipping into vaga-
bondage […] most jobs are temporary, shares may go down as well as up, skills, the as-
sets one is proud of and cherishes now become obsolete in no time.”15 Migration is the 










on this spectrum. In this way, migratory figures often change their status as mobile 
social positions and not fixed identities.
Accordingly, there is no theory of the migrant “as such.” There is no general on-
tology of the migrant. There are only figures of the migrant that emerge and coexist 
throughout history relative to specific sites of expulsion and mobility. A figure is not 
a fixed identity or specific person but a mobile social position. One becomes a figure 
when one occupies this position. One may occupy this position to different degrees, at 
different times, and in different circumstances. But there is nothing essential about a 
person that makes the person this figure.
A figure is not an unchanging essence lying beyond the concrete, but neither is 
it merely a specific individual or a group of individuals. A figure is a social vector or 
tendency. Insofar as specific individuals take up a trajectory, they are figured by it. 
But it is also possible for individuals to leave this vector and take up a different social 
position, since it does not define their essence. In other words, the figure of the migrant 
has a “vague essence” in the etymological sense of the word: a vagabond or migratory 
essence that lies between the ideal and the empirical.
For example, in geometry, a circle is an exact ideal essence. This is in contrast to 
inexact empirical objects that are round (such as bowls, planets, or balls). However, 
figuration is like “roundness”: it is more than an empirical object but less than an ide-
al exact essence. Roundness can refer equally to bowls and to ideal circles: both are 
round. Thus, as a figure, the migrant refers both to empirical migrants in the world and 
a more abstract social relation. It is irreducible to either.
One is not born a migrant but becomes one. However, there are two central prob-
lems to overcome in order to develop a movement-oriented theory of the migrant.
Two Problems
The first problem is that the migrant has been predominantly understood from the 
perspective of stasis. The result is that the migrant has been perceived as a secondary 
or derivative figure with respect to place-bound membership. Place-bound member-
ship in a society is posited first. Then the migrant is defined as the movement back 
and forth between social points. The emigrant is the name given to the migrant as the 
former member or citizen, and the immigrant as the would-be member or citizen. In 
both cases, a static place and membership is conceived first, and the migrant is the one 
who lacks both. This is the case because more than any other political figure (citizen, 
foreigner, sovereign, etc.), the migrant is the one who is least defined by their being 
and place, but rather by their becoming and displacement: by their movement.
Therefore, if we want to develop a political theory that begins with the migrant, 
we need to reinterpret the migrant first and foremost according to its own defining 
feature: its movement. Thus, we should develop a theoretical framework that begins 
with movement instead of stasis, following in the tradition of those thinkers who have 
granted theoretical primacy to movement and f low: Lucretius, Marx, Henri Bergson, 
and others.16 However, beginning from the theoretical primacy of movement does not 
mean that one should uncritically celebrate it. Movement is not always good, nor is 
16   For a full literature review of the history and thinkers of the ontology of motion, see Nail, Being and 
Motion.
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movement always the same or uniform.17 Movement is always distributed in differ-
ent social formations or circulations.18 Thus, the migrant turn is neither a valorization 
of movement nor an ontology of movement in general. Rather, it is a philosophical or 
what I call a “historical ontology” of the subject of our time: the migrant.19 It seeks to 
understand the historical conditions under which something like contemporary mi-
gration has come to exist for us today.
In this way, we need not only a theory of the migrant, but also a theory of the so-
cial motions by which migration takes place. Society is always in motion. From border 
security and city traffic controls to personal technologies and work schedules, human 
movement is socially directed. Societies are not static places with fixed characteris-
tics and persons.20 Societies are dynamic processes engaged in continuously directing 
and circulating social life. In a movement-oriented framework there is no social stasis, 
only regimes of social circulation pockmarked by temporary and contingent sites of 
concrescence. Thus, if we want to understand the figure of the migrant, whose defin-
ing social feature is its movement, we must also understand society itself according to 
movement.21
The second problem that needs to be overcome is that the migrant has been pre-
dominantly understood from the perspective of states. And since history is all-too-
often written by the state, the result is that the migrant has often been understood as 
a figure without its own history and social force. “In world history,” as Hegel says, “we 
are concerned only with those peoples that have formed states [because] all the value 
that human beings possess, all of their spiritual reality, they have through the State 
alone.”22 This is not to say that migrants are always stateless, but that the history of 
migrant social organizations has tended to be subsumed or eradicated by state histo-
ries. Often, it is the most dispossessed migrants who have created some of the most 
interesting non-state social organizations.
In response to this problem, we need a counter-history of several important mi-
grant social organizations that have been marginalized by states. The migrant is not 
only the figure whose movement results in a certain degree of social expulsion; the 
migrant also has its own type of movement that is quite different from the types that 
define its expulsion. Accordingly, migrants have created very different forms of social 
organization, as can clearly be seen in the ʻminor historyʼ of the raids, revolts, rebel-
lions, and resistances of some of the most socially marginalized migrants.23 This is a 
challenging history to write because many of these social organizations were not writ-
ten down, or if they were, they were systematically destroyed by those in power. It is 
17  Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays.
18   For a review of the criticisms against the philosophy of movement, see Merriman, Mobility, Space and 
Culture, 1–20.
19   Nail, Being and Motion.
20   Urry, Sociology Beyond Societies.
21   In this sense, this chapter can also be placed in the context of what is now being called the “new mo-
bilities paradigm” or “mobility turn” in the social sciences. See Hannam et al., “Editorial: Mobilities, 
Immobilities and Moorings,” 1–22; Cresswell, On the Move; Kaufmann, Re-thinking Mobility; Urry, Mobili-
ties; Thrif t, Spatial Formations.
22  Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 41–42.
23   Notes from Nowhere, We Are Everywhere.
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not a natural fact that the history of migrants has become ahistorical, as Hegel argues; 
it is the violence of states that has rendered the migrant ahistorical.
The Consequences
There are three important consequences of developing a political theory of the migrant 
in this way. First, it will allow us to conceptualize the emergence of the historical condi-
tions that gave rise to the types of social expulsion that define the figure of the mi-
grant. These forms of social expulsion linked to migrant motion did not emerge out of 
nowhere in the twentieth-first century; they emerged historically. At different points 
in history, migratory movement resulted in different types and degrees of social ex-
pulsion (territorial, political, juridical, and economic) due in part to the presupposed 
ontological primacy of stasis. Once a new form of social organization becomes histori-
cally dominant (i.e. villages, states, feudal lands, markets, etc.), we begin to see an ex-
plosion in new techniques for expelling migrants from their territorial, political, legal, 
or economic status. Once these techniques emerge historically, they are differentially 
repeated again later on. Today, we find the contemporary migrant at the intersection 
of all four forms of social expulsion, albeit to varying degrees.
The aim of such a project should also be historical: to provide an analysis of the 
major techniques for expelling migrants during their period of historical dominance 
and to provide a conceptual, movement-based, definition of the migratory figures as-
sociated with these expulsions.24
The second consequence of the theory of the migrant is that it will allow us to an-
alyze contemporary migration. This is possible because the history of migration is not 
a linear or progressive history of distinct ‘ages.’ Rather, it is a history of co-existing 
and overlapping social forces of expulsion. The same techniques of territorial, politi-
cal, juridical, and economic expulsion of the migrants that have emerged and repeated 
themselves in history are still at work today. For example, territorial expulsion (the 
dispossession of land)25 does not only occur once against the nomadic peoples in the 
Neolithic period. Once this technique of expulsion emerges in the Neolithic period, it 
is taken up again and mobilized in various ways throughout history up to the present.
The first territorial expulsions created historical nomadic peoples, but they also 
defined a conceptual type of migrant subjectivity characterized by territorial expul-
sion that also defines other territorially displaced peoples. This is the sense in which 
migrants may be ‘nomadic’ without being the same as historical nomads. As an ex-
ample, in the ancient world, migrants were expelled from their territories by war and 
kidnapping; in the medieval world, they were expelled by enclosure and the removal 
of customary laws that bound them to the land; and in the modern world, they were 





strictly historical way since, as Stuart Elden argues in The Birth of Territory, the usage of the word terri-
tory varies significantly throughout history and cannot be used in a univocal way.
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like a festival, paradoxically repeat an “unrepeatable.” “They do not add a second and a 
third time to the first, but carry the first time to the ‘nth’ power.”26
Contemporary migration is part of this legacy.27 Migrant farm workers expelled 
by industrial agriculture, Indigenous peoples28 expelled from their lands by war and 
forced into the mountains, forests, or waste lands, and island peoples expelled from 
their territories whether by militarized relocation, nuclear detonation, or the rising 
tides of climate change are all often popularly described as “nomads.”29 In a certain 
sense, this is true. All these migrants share those similar social conditions of territorial 
expulsion that first produced historical nomads.
The analysis of contemporary migration I am arguing for here is not one of total 
causal explanation of push-pull factors, psychological volunteerism, neoclassical or 
structural economism, and so on. Rather, it offers a descriptive kinetic analysis. The 
aim is not to explain the causes of all migration, but to offer better descriptions of the 
conditions, forces, and trajectories of its historical emergence and co-existence in the 
present from the perspective of motion.
The third consequence of a theory of the migrant is that it will allow us to diagnose 
the capacity of the migrant to create an alternative to the social expulsion of the migrant. 
The figure of the migrant is not merely an effect of different regimes of social expul-
sion. The migrant also has its own forms of social motion in the form of riots, revolts, 
rebellions, and resistance. Even occupation and “staying put” has its own pattern of 
motion.30 Just as the analysis of the historical techniques for the expulsion of the mi-
grant can be used to understand contemporary migration, so too can the historical 
techniques of migrant social organizations be used to diagnose the capacity of con-
temporary migrants to pose an alternative to the present social logic of expulsion that 
continues to dominate our world.
Today, the figure of the migrant exposes an important truth: that social expan-
sion has always been predicated on the social expulsion of migrants. The twenty-first 
century will be the century of the migrant not only because of the record number of 
migrants today, but because this is the century in which all the previous forms of so-
cial expulsion and migratory resistance have re-emerged and become more active than 
ever before. These two events also reveal, however, a certain historical and conceptual 
continuity of migratory struggles for an alternative to social expulsion.
If we think of the recent “migrant crisis” as if it were an unexpected and contin-
gent outbreak that can simply be “solved,” we will continue make the same historical 
mistakes and misunderstand what migration is as a broader historical social struc-
ture. Thus any theory of the migrant today requires a much deeper historical account 
to properly see that it is not migration that is the problematic historical anomaly, but 
nation-states.
26   Deleuze, Dif ference and Repetition, 1.
27   As Tim Cresswell writes, “We cannot understand new mobilities, without understanding old mobili-
ties.” Cresswell, “Towards a Politics of Mobility,” 25.
28   Nail, Theory of the Border; Nail, The Figure of the Migrant.
29   Cresswell, “Towards a Politics of Mobility.”
30   Nail, The Figure of the Migrant, 156–178.
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The same historical conditions at the beginning of the twenty-first century that 
give rise to the primacy of the figure of the migrant also give rise to the primacy of the 
mobile image.
The Mobile Image
We also live in an age of the image. Just before the turn of the twenty-first century 
a host of digital media technologies (computers, the Internet, video games, mobile 
devices, and many others) unleashed the largest f low of digitally reproduced words, 
images, and sounds the world has ever witnessed. No other aesthetic medium can pos-
sibly compete with what digital media have done to human sensation in the last twenty 
years. The digital image has mobilized sensory and aesthetic experience in more ways 
than ever before in history.
While the effect of television and radio on sensation was significant, they still 
restricted sensation to relatively centralized, homogenized, and unidirectional pro-
gramming. The interactive and multi-directional nature of contemporary digital me-
dia has expanded the mobility and mutability of the image in a way that analog media 
never could. With the popularization of the Internet and mobile devices at the turn of 
the twenty-first century — cell phones, smartphones, tablets, and laptops — digitized 
images have become not only dominant but increasingly portable.31 As of 2014, there 
were more active mobile devices than there are people on the planet. The mobile phone 
is probably the single fastest-growing human sensory technology ever developed, 
growing from zero to 7.2 billion in a mere three decades.
The mobility of the digital image has incited a revolution in publishing, journalism, 
entertainment, education, commerce and politics. It has both overthrown and wholly 
integrated analog media, giving rise to whole new digitized industries in the process. 
Industrial factories and workers are increasingly supplemented by internet servers 
and automated checkout software. It is plainly obvious to everyone that we have now 
entered a new aesthetic regime; we are now in the age of the digital image.
Today, it is possible for huge numbers of people to communicate by voice or text 
with anyone else; to listen to almost every sound ever recorded; to view almost any im-
age ever made; and to read almost any text ever written from a single device and from 
almost any location on Earth. All of this is now available on the move and is itself in 
movement in the form of electrical f lows. The image will never be the same. Yet, at the 
same time, unequal access to digital media and information is also a growing problem 
directly related to the unequal distribution of mobility and migration.
The contemporary mobility of the image and its sensation, made possible by the ad-
vent and now dominance of digital media, is not just a quantitative increase in repro-
duced images. Digital media and digital images have transformed the very conditions 
of sensation itself. Anything can now be potentially digitized, mobilized, and browsed 
non-linearly through a single portable device. The whole of aesthetic reality can now be 




 Migrant Images 155
and a continuous f low of electrical current — which is also key in the shaping of citi-
zenship. None of the senses have remained unchanged by digital media; even taste and 
smell can now be synthesized using computer software.32 Something is always lost in 
transit as the continuous is converted into the digitally discrete, but the affect moves 
on regardless, sweeping us all along with it.
More than ever before, the fact that the image is up in the air and on the move 
requires a serious rethinking of the nature of art, media, and affect from the perspec-
tive of the present, from the age of the mobile image. Something fundamental about 
our world changed around the turn of the twenty-first century; not just an empirical 
change introduced by new technologies, but a new and fundamentally kinetic set of 
relations in media and aesthetics have begun to appear.
The exceptions to the rules of the previous historical paradigms have now them-
selves become the rules in a whole new game. Mobile digital devices are no longer lux-
ury items for the privileged few but have transformed every aspect of daily life around 
the world, including the very structure of human experience, thought, and sensation. 
If everything looks like a crisis today — the migration crisis and the digital media crisis 
(big data, privacy infringement, the privatization and censorship of the Internet)33—it 
is because we are still looking at our present through the eyes of the past. As long as 
these kinds of critical events continue to appear as secondary or derivative, as long as 
motion and mobility appear to be deviations from stasis, we have no hope of under-
standing some of the greatest events of our time.
Migrant Media
The mobile image and the centrality of the migrant mark a new period in aesthetics 
and media culture.34 The digital image is not only mobile by virtue of its form but by 
the mobility of its content, material infrastructure, and author. Some of most shared 
and viewed images of the last few years have been digital images of migrants, refugees, 
and the conditions of their travels, and even their death. The image of Alan Kurdi, the 
dead Syrian three-year old, is now one of the most inf luential images of all time.35 An 
iconic photo of migrants on a beach holding their mobile phones up in the air to try 
and get a signal to call home won the 2014 World Press Photo Award. We think of im-
age viewing as a passive activity separate from the legal system, but the circulation 
of migrant images should be taken seriously as a political act with real consequences.
On the other hand anti-immigrant media representations and rhetoric have also 
proliferated. In particular, the spread of images and rhetoric of the migrant caravan as 
a military “invasion” of the United States have had disastrous consequences. President 
Trump called the caravan an “invasion” and “an assault on our country;” the Associated 
Press called it an “army of migrants” and tweeted about “a ragtag army of the poor;” 
32   Turin, The Secret of Scent.
33   Chun, Updating to Remain the Same.
34   This turn perhaps had its early origins at the turn of the last century. See Benjamin, “The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”
35   See Vis and Goriunova, The Iconic Image on Social Media, as well as Bishnupriya Ghosh’s “A Sensible Poli-
tics” in this anthology.
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and Robert Bowen murdered eleven people in a Synagogue because a Jewish refugee 
group supported caravan refugees.36 Trump even told the border patrol to shoot mi-
grants if they throw rocks.37 This aesthetic criminalization of migrants and the rise 
of cyber-racism helped mobilize anti-immigrant militia groups and popular support 
against refugees.38 Now refugees are being deported from the US and detained in 
cages in Mexico as if they were criminals. The explicit media framing of migrants as 
a violent, criminal, military invasion is an old historical tactic with a huge popular 
resurgence in the US and Europe.39
Because these images circulated across digital and social media so quickly, people 
formed opinions and judgements before the real details of the caravan were known 
or could be disseminated by more accurate sources. In this way so much of migration 
politics happens before the confrontation at the border or transversally across borders. 
Thus the circulation of media images has its own kind of migration and has its own 
kinds of borders that are not necessarily spatially or temporally congruent with the 
migrant bodies at the border or in detention. There is simply no way to fully under-
stand migration politics without understanding migrant images as part of the pro-
cess — confronting their own barriers and waging their confrontations as they affect 
everyone.
However, the widespread access to cell phones with digital cameras has also made 
it possible for migrants and refugees themselves to generate more images of their 
own movement and experience than ever before. The itinerant, grainy, handheld, and 
“poor” images of migrant cell phone cameras have become their own film genre: the 
“wretched of the screen.”40 In these videos migrants are not silent victims but creators 
of new aesthetic forms, “an imperfect cinema”41 as demonstrated in Elke Sasse’s 2016 
film #MyEscape.
Cell phones have also become literal lifelines for migrants to obtain travel informa-
tion in isolated areas, to share videos, sounds and images with friends, family, and 
authorities (but, as well, as Heller & Pazzani, in this volume, tell us, they are also part 
of a perilous politics of visibility that render migrants detectable, identifiable, pros-
ecutable by migrant-exclusionary states). Images of all kinds (sonic, visual, haptic, 
etc.)42 produced by migrants have become the material basis of the aesthetic threads 
that hold together numerous committees across borders, not just refugees. Although 
it is most obvious in the case of refugees, these are the same aesthetic lifelines that 
make possible sustained social and informational communities around the world. The 
migrancy of the digital image is what allows for community in a world of global migra-
tion, continuous mobility, and displacement. What would global migration look like 
without the migrancy of the image and the images of the migrant?
The migrant image thus marks the limits of the previous century and the outline 





40   Steyerl, The Wretched of the Screen.
41   Espisona, “For an Imperfect Cinema.” 
42   Nail, Theory of the Image.
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approach both to the politics of migration and the media image. However, the advent 
of the present is never limited to the present alone. Now that our present has emerged, 
it has become possible in a way it was not before to inquire into the conditions of its 
emergence and discover something new about the nature and history of mediation. 
In other words, the present reveals something new about the nature of sensation and 
what it must at least be like so as to be capable of being defined by the primacy of mo-
tion and mobility as it is.
So, what does this say about the nature of the image such that it is capable of this 
mobility? If the image is defined by the primacy of mobility today yet existing theories 
of it are not, then we need a new conceptual framework. We need to produce such 
a new conceptual framework based on the primacy of motion to better understand 
contemporary sensation and aesthetics, as well as the historical events from which it 
emerges. In short, the rise of the mobile digital image draws our attention not so much 
to its radical novelty,43 but to the inappropriate understanding of historical ‘crisis’ itself.
The research program proposed by this chapter is therefore neither a theory of the 
migrant image that applies strictly to the novelty of the digital image nor an ahistorical 
theory of the image that applies forever and all time to all images and media. I am not 
proposing a naive realism in which the discovery of the contemporary primacy of mo-
tion gives us pure access to unchanging essence of the image. Instead, I am proposing 
a realism of the minimal af fective conditions of the emergence of the present itself. That 
is, a critical or minimal realism in the sense in which the image is interpreted only with 
respect to that aspect of the image that must at least be the case for our present ‘to have 
been possible,’ i.e., actual.
Therefore, the method proposed here is neither realist or constructivist in their tra-
ditional senses, but rather minimally or critically realist. The question is not what the 
conditions of the human mind must be for the image to be what it is, but rather what 
the image itself must at least be like such that the present has come to be defined by the 
primacy of a mobile or migratory aesthetics.
Without a doubt, contemporary reality is shaped by multiple human structures, 
but these structures are in turn conditioned by other real, non-anthropic, affective, 
and aesthetic structures. This chapter proposes that we locate the real conditions nec-
essary for the emergence of the contemporary mobility of the image and of global mi-
gration. The type of global migration we are witnessing today would not be possible 
without the unique material and media structure of the digital image.
The Migrant Image
The migrant image is not a copy. It is not even a copy of a copy without an original.44 
There is no mimesis whatsoever. If we are looking for a new and more fruitful defini-
tion of the migrant image, we need look no further than within the same Latin root of 
the word itself. The word image, from the Latin word imago, means “ref lection, dupli-
43  Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media; Hansen, Bodies in Code; Manning,  Relationscapes; Massumi, 
Parables for the Virtual; Naukkarinen, “Aesthetics and Mobility”; O’Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect”; 
Gregg et al., The Af fect Theory Reader.
44   Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation.
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cation, or echo.”45 These definitions imply precisely the opposite of what we typically 
think of as a copy. A copy must be something other than its model or, by definition, it 
cannot be a copy of a model.
Ref lection, however, from the Latin word f lex, means to bend or curve. A ref lec-
tion is a re-curving or re-bending that folds something back over itself. Duplication, 
from the Latin word pli, meaning fold, and the example of an echo, given in the Oxford 
Latin Dictionary, make this meaning quite apparent. The image is not a distinct or 
separate copy but the process by which matter curves, bends, folds, and bounces back 
and forth.46 The image is therefore the mobile process by which matter twists, folds, 
and ref lects itself into various structures of sensation. The migrant too is defined by its 
f lows, folds, and circulations — always in transit and caught between worlds.
There are not first static objects, subjects, and states and then second a movement 
or transfer of images or migrants between them. Rather, there is first matter in mo-
tion and then a folding, composition, and duplication that generates larger sensuous 
matters like objects and subjects that then further ref lect and duplicate the f lows of 
matter between them.47 A folded image is not a copy because a fold is not something 
separate from the matter that is folded. The fold is a completely continuous kinetic 
and topological structure. There is not one part of the fold which would be an original 
and another that would be a copy. This is the sense in which Henri Bergson writes that 
the image is “more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that 
which the realist calls a thing — an existence placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and 
the ‘representation.’”48 It is more than a representation because it is not a copy of some-
thing else, and it is less than a thing because it is already the material of which things 
are composed and as such is irreducible to our empirical sensations of them. Images, 
in our view, are an aggregate of “matters.”49
However, there are two central problems to overcome in order to develop such a 
migrant theory of the image.
Two problems
The kinetic theory of the image encounters two problems related directly to the prob-
lems encountered by the figure of the migrant. Both have been treated as static and 
ahistorical. The fate of the image and the fate of the migrant are thus related to the 
problem of stasis. One of the biggest dangers in migrant media politics is that im-
ages are seen to be representations of an objective situation and not, as they really are, 
themselves migrant bodies with their own affective and material power to move or not.
45   Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary.
46   Nail, Being and Motion, 29–41.
47   For related attempts to think about the materiality of the moving image see Munster, Materializing 
New Media; Marks, Enfoldment and Infinity.
48  Bergson, Matter and Memory.
49   An inversion of Bergson’s claim that “matter, in our view, is an aggregate of images.” (Matter and Mem-
ory).
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First problem: stasis
The first problem to be overcome is that the image has been traditionally subordinated 
to something static. This subordination has taken two complementary formulations: 
an objective one and a subjective one.
Objective stasis. On the one hand, the image has been subordinated to a static 
object or unchanging essence. The image, in other words, has been treated as a copy 
or representation of an original, just as the migrant has been treated as a failed citi-
zen (a failed copy of the original). The difference between the object and the image of 
the object becomes the degree of movement or change in the image itself with respect 
to its unchanging original. This is the classical model / copy relation famously drama-
tized by Plato in the Timaeus. The original or model object remains static and unmoved 
while subsequent images aim to work like mobile snapshots to accurately represent the 
original object in all its immobile perfection and essential form.
As Plato writes, “Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow 
this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to 
have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this 
image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity.50” 
There can be no higher exhalation of eternity and denigration of the image than this. 
For Plato, the image is nothing but illusion, appearance, and likeness organized ac-
cording to discrete numerical quantities. The object is thus fixed in its essence and 
the image is fixed by its discrete number. These discrete numerical images fail to rep-
resent the object precisely because of the mobility of the image. Motion and mobility 
thus become the conceptual names for the failure of the image to represent the object. 
Similarly, the mobility of the migrant challenges the political distinction between the 
inside of the constitutional nation-state (model) and its outside (failed claimants).
All definitions of media as representation are defined by some version or degree 
of this static model / copy / resemblance relation. Not only is the object immobilized in 
the model to be copied but the image of the model itself remains nothing more than 
a failed numerical attempt to reproduce this same static condition. Between the two 
stands a gulf of movement and turbulence that ensures their incommensurability. In 
this way the only real or true sensation occurs in the object itself — all images of the 
object are mere appearances or modified snapshots of the original. It is also no coinci-
dence that images of migrants and refugees tend to be treated as victim-images, as if 
the process of their suffering was not still ongoing and many others were not suffering 
the same.
Subjective stasis. On the other hand, the image has also been subordinated to the 
relatively static mental states of the subject. In this theory perceptual images are only 
given conceptual and aesthetic coherence and reality in the faculties of the perceiver. Ver-
sions of this theory are closer to the more modern aesthetics developed by Kant in his 
Critique of Judgment. In this theory what remains static, fixed, and universal is not the 
object being represented but the concept of beauty itself found in the mental structure 
of the subject. Fluctuating images occur in the body of perceiver but it is only in the 
concept of beauty that they are given fixed and universal form. It is thus human mental 
50   Plato, Timaeus, 37 c-e.
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and perceptual structures and not sensual images themselves that lie at the firm foun-
dations of truth and beauty.
Again, for Kant, it is the movement of the image in the mobile and affected body 
that marks the inferiority and subordination of the image. The nature of the object in 
itself remains unknown because the body and its perceptual images are moved and mobile. 
The senses are thus led to misrepresent reality to the mind. The senses of the body can-
not be trusted in knowledge or in beauty. Our experience of beauty, therefore, is not 
the beauty of nature or even of the beauty of the images, but rather the beauty of our 
own idea, experience, or faculty of representing these images to ourselves. Nature is 
only the prompt for us to discover the beauty of our own aesthetic and phenomeno-
logical faculties.51 This is the inverse of the classical idea of the model / copy relation. 
Instead of defining the image by its subordination to the static essence of the object, 
it is defined by its subordination to the static aesthetic structures of judgment in the 
mind of the experiencing or intentional subject.
This subjective form is most dramatic in Kant and post-Kantian aesthetics, but a 
similar model is also at work in other anthropic constructivisms as well, including so-
cial, anthropological, linguistic, economic, and other non-psychological versions. All 
these different constructivisms share the reduction of the image not to the Kantian 
ego, but to other anthropic structures. In contrast to Kant, some of these anthropic 
constructivisms can even be transformed to some extent by moving images. However, 
even in those cases the movement of the image still remains tied to the relatively static 
anthropic structures that produce and consume those images. Since numerous full-
length works have recently been devoted to making this argument, including my own, 
and since this is not the primary focus of this chapter, I must simply refer the interest-
ed reader to those works at this point.52 My worry with respect to the migrant image is 
that this constructivist approach does not take seriously the materiality, borders, and 
circulation of the “image operations” that constitute the social field in the first place.53
Both the objective and subjective / constructivist theories of the image thus subor-
dinate it to something relatively static. Furthermore, they both treat the movement of 
images as something discrete, either in number (Plato) or in the body (Kant). In both 
cases movement is what makes the image inferior but also what secures the differ-
ence between the object and subject in the first place. For Plato, the object remains 
different from the inferior images of it precisely because the object does not move. 
For Kant, the same is true of the transcendental subject. For constructivists, images 
remain extensions, projections, or ref lections of more primary human structures. In 
both cases the object and subject are separated by a kinetic gulf of f luctuating material 
images. The political connection here is that it is the figure of the migrant that relies 
most deeply on this subordinated aspect of the image’s mobility. The use of images is 
not just a luxury of fixed citizens but a defining feature of survival for migrants. Their 
51   We can see a later expression of a similar idea in Aby Warburg’s interesting, but also socially and an-
thropocentrically limited, idea of the “pathos of images” and in Bredekamp’s Theory of the Image-Act, in 
which images have agency, but only for human reaction, will, desire, and perception. “The ‘I’ becomes 
stronger when it relativizes itself against the activity of the image.” 
52  See Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology; Barad, Meeting the Universe; Hodder, Entangled; DeLanda, As-
semblage Theory; Coole and Frost, New Materialisms; and Nail, Being and Motion.
53  Eder and Klonk, Image Operations.
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own mobility is thus tied to the mobility, and often hybrid and shaky mobility, of the 
image in a way that it is not for others. When images cross borders or do not this is not 
merely a subjective question, it is a material one of how images are (or are not) allowed 
to circulate, and with what consequences. There is thus a migrant politics of the im-
age that takes place and should be studied as part of the migration process. Treating 
images as having purely constructible meanings (we choose what to think about them) 
ignores the role of the real material and kinetic structures that put them in front of us 
in the first place.
There are two kinetic paradoxes here. The first is that the movement of the image is 
both necessary to ensure the division between subject and object but also necessary to 
ensure the region of transport that connects them as distinct. The model transports its 
image to the senses. The subject then receives these images on the surface of its sensi-
tive mobile body. Without this zone of transport between the object and subject, noth-
ing transpires — sensation fails. And yet, precisely because of this mobility represen-
tation is undermined. The mobility of the image, just like the mobility of the migrant, 
is thus both the condition of possibility for the object and subject and the condition of 
their impossible convergence in perfect media and political representation. Therefore, 
the study of migrant images is the study of aberrant affects not of representations.
Hence the related second paradox, that the image is treated as necessarily mobile 
in its transport but fixed and limited by number and body. The image, in the subjec-
tive and objective accounts, must move but only as a frozen mobility, a snapshot, or 
particle of sensation. The mobility of the image is thus described as secondary to the 
fixed object or subject when it is in fact the mobile substratum within which regions 
of relative immobility emerge. The citizen and the snapshot are thus crystallizations of 
the mobile migrant image.
Therefore, if we want to develop a theory of the migrant image that does not fall 
into these paradoxes we need to begin from its most primary and defining feature, its 
mobility, and not try and deduce this mobility from something static or statist. This 
requires, however, a theory based on the motion of the image. The division between the 
object and subject of sensation is not a primary ontological determination but rather 
the effect of a more primary kinetic process of kinetic images themselves.
This is the novelty of the kinetic approach: it reinterprets the structure and history 
of media from the perspective of the primacy of the migrant and mobile image.
Second Problem: History
The second problem the kinetic theory of the migrant image aims to overcome is the 
supposedly ahistorical nature of the image, just like the ahistorical treatment of the 
migrant. There are three formulations of this ahistorical thesis: an objective, a subjec-
tive, and an ontological one.
Objective. On the one hand, if the image is subordinated to a static model object 
then it can have no history, or its history is a mere illusion. History presupposes the real 
movement and transformation of matter, but if objective essences do not move, then 
they can have no history, and their images can have no real history either. The state 
treats the migrant in the same manner.
Subjective. Second, if the image is subordinated to the static conceptual or con-
structivist structure of human subjects then a similar problem occurs. If subjective 
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structures are universal, as Kant and much of post-Kantian phenomenology argues,54 
then they do not change (or change only within a fixed domain) over time, and if sub-
jective structures themselves (not just their contents) do not change over time then 
they have no real history. Perceptual images may change within this structure, but the 
aesthetic conditions of making sense of these images and ordering them have always 
been the same — and thus the image too, as subordinate to the structure, remains 
ahistorical. A notable exception to this post-Kantian ahistoricism is the tradition of 
Marxist aesthetics, including the Frankfurt School.55
Ontological. The third formulation of this problem is ontological. In order for the 
object to be copied by an image, the object must appear in sensuous reality and thus 
must be, in some sense, affected by the conditions of its appearance. Similarly, in or-
der for the subject to schematize and conceptualize its perceptions, it must in some 
sense be affected or receptive to the sensory images of its body. The affective nature 
of the image is therefore continuous with the whole process of becoming in which the 
object and subject both transform and are transformed through their appearance as 
images. In this way, the ontology of the affective image liberates the image from its 
twin subordination.
It does so, however, only at the risk of reintroducing its own form of ahistoric-
ity. If the affective image comes to be understood as ontologically ‘autonomous’ with 
respect to the objects and subjects it produces or distributes then its constant change 
becomes something relatively changeless: pure becoming.56 If all images are reduced 
to their lowest common denominator, affect, becoming and ontological change, then 
the particularity of historical and regional images risks being submerged entirely into 
a pure ontological f lux. Pure change becomes pure stasis. The ontology of becoming 
is ahistorical. The ontological rejection of history in favor of becoming has been put 
forward by a number of recent process ontologists.57
The process ontology of the affective image treats the image as if it were possible 
to describe its structure for ever and all time and from no position in particular. The 
ontological image, in this way, risks becoming something like its own kind of ‘autono-
mous’ substance or pure ‘force’ — adding nothing to the historical description of the 
image but a generic ontological language applied to new phenomena.58
In response to the problem of ahistoricity, this chapter proposes not only a theory 
of the image and media grounded in the migrant present, but also offers a history of 
this present and the material conditions of its emergence. In short, it does not offer an 
54   Merleau-Ponty and Edie, The Primacy of Perception. Merleau-Ponty’s late essay “Eye and Mind,” for ex-
ample, makes great strides toward overcoming the anthropocentrism and constructivism of earlier 






56   Massumi, Parables for the Virtual.
57   Massumi, Parables for the Virtual; Manning, Relationscapes; Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Connolly, A World of 
Becoming; Whitehead, Process and Reality, 73.
58   Nail, Theory of the Image. For a critique of this ontological position see Hayles, Unthought, 80–83.
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ontology of the image. It is precisely because the image is mobile that it has a history 
and therefore that media must be theorized historically, and not ontologically. Fur-
thermore, because the image has a history it also has a whole typology of distributions 
that organize the world of subjective and objective structures. All these structures 
have to be accounted for, starting from the historical mobility of the migrant image.
It is precisely because of the dual historical migrancy of the image and media ki-
naesthetics of the migrant that this type of inquiry is now possible and crucial. Just 
as it is impossible to understand our contemporary world without understanding the 
primacy of the migrant, so it is impossible to understand it without the migrancy of 
the image itself and its global network of affective lifelines, which socially and aes-
thetically support a world-in-migration.
Conclusion
The migratory turn in media studies is not just a turn toward the prevalence of images 
of migrants, the emergence and importance of migrant art works, but also the mobile 
and migratory nature of the image itself. There is thus a becoming migrant of the im-
age and a becoming image of the migrant at the same time. Because of the current his-
torical conjuncture, it is impossible to untie them from each other. Therefore, the two 
must be thought together as migrant images. This chapter, however, has only laid out 
the problem conceptually and suggested some possible methods and trajectories for a 
much larger research project that would look more closely at the images of migrants, 
by migrants, and the mobility of images themselves as migrant.59
59   See Nail, Theory of the Image for a full development of this research program.

Listing
Thomas Keenan and Sohrab Mohebbi
“The List traces information related to the death of more than 35,597 refugees, asylum 
seekers, and migrants who have lost their lives within or on the borders of Europe since 





What is it to “list?” Etymologically, the word points in three apparently unrelated di-
rections. Ships and other vessels list: they tilt or sway to one side or another, when pas-
sengers or cargo shift abruptly and when winds and waves overtake them. And when 
they list, they run the risk of capsizing. An announcement of listing, then, is an alarm 
or warning. Beware! To list also means, in an older English, to hear or hearken, to lis-
ten. List! I am calling for your attention, asking you to notice and respond, to acknowl-
edge what is being said. Finally, to list is to bring things together in a column or row. 
This meaning of the word is derived from the Middle English liste, meaning “border, 
edging, stripe,” and from Old French and Old Italian words meaning “strip of paper.” 
Listing brings things together in a line or a strip, treats separate items as related to one 
another, assembles them into a territory of their own.2
Boats list and sink, and their passengers and crew drown, all the time. The forces 
of nature are often to blame. The phenomenon charted by The List is anything but natu-
ral. It results from the deliberate choice of European governments and electorates to 
restrict legal entry into the EU by those seeking refuge, asylum, or a better life. Fleeing 
people are forced to undertake dangerous journeys across inhospitable deserts, seas, 
beaches, and cities, often ending in detention centers and refugee camps. The engine 
that drives The List is the weaponization of the sea, land, and weather in the name of 
what is cynically called “deterrence.” And the events it documents are not limited to 
Europe: The List could certainly be expanded to include North America as well, where 
more or less the same thing happens at and on the way to the southern border of the 
United States.
1  The List website: www.list-e.info.
2  Oxford English Dictionary online, “list.”
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The List features the names of the dead when they are known and placeholders 
when they are not. Many names are yet to be learned and entered. The entries are 
counted and enumerated, so the names become numbers as well. The qualitative and 
the quantitative meet — The List says two things at the same time, joining them in a 
dynamic rhythm. All the dead deserve to be known and recorded individually, to have 
their identities preserved as the markers of the lives they alone lived. The entries speak 
of singularity. But the names are gathered together in this list because the individuals 
died, in effect, together. The enumeration brings them into relation, it equalizes and 
generalizes them. And it reminds us of how many lives have been lost to policies of 
cruelty and indifference. The ever-growing number is another sort of marker, an index 
of the scale and scope of the catastrophe that has taken place, and still is taking place, 
within Europe and at its borders.
Banu Cennetoğlu calls herself the caretaker of a graveyard. There is no proper rest-
ing place for many of the lost on The List — some bodies are never found, others are 
found but not identified before being buried in unmarked graves across Europe. What 
kind of cemetery is a list, and how does one take care of it? The name, gender, and age 
of each victim is added to a spreadsheet, along with the date, location, and cause of 
their death. Note is made of where they came from, if known, and the source of the 
information about their death. The logic of the entries’ organization must be consist-
ent, so the caretaker edits the document, checking the spelling, grammar, and syntax. 
Because the data is recorded in different languages, the task often involves transla-
tion. It’s an administrative process. The presentation is bureaucratically austere, neu-
tral, factual, banal: six columns are filled in along the new rows added each time the 
document is updated.
The List has been growing for more than a decade. When Cennetoğlu first present-
ed it publicly in March 2007 in Amsterdam, it contained 7,128 confirmed entries. When 
she facilitated its publication in The Guardian as a special supplement in June 2018, the 
headline read: “It’s 34,361 and rising: how The List tallies Europe’s migrant bodycount.”3 
Its most recent presentation in Barcelona in September 2018 showed 35,597 dead. The 
creation and maintenance of The List is a private, voluntary, civic effort initiated by the 
Dutch NGO UNITED for Intercultural Action. Cennetoğlu’s projects aim to publicize 
it: “It needs to be visible. Governments don’t keep these records for the public; they 
don’t want the public to see these records because it exposes their policies. So you have 
NGOs trying to put the data together, and that data is incomplete and fragile, but there 
again someone has to do it.”4
The List is a public document that aspires to readability and visibility. The names 
it bears should be known, seen, heard, beyond the realm of those who have already 
noticed. They appear in print and on walls and billboards, not just spoken to a friend 
or whispered to a neighbor. Because, as Cennetoğlu notes, “a surprise encounter is 
important,” we are confronted by The List when we look out the windshield or open 
the newspaper at the breakfast table or a café.5 Far from the border, or the sea or the 
desert, the names of the dead confront the living. The List demands attention, it insists 





and despite that they are caught up in their daily lives; the fact they have to go to work, 
come back from work, get on the subway, walk on the street, etc. I wanted to put it out 
there without any announcement, without any direct negotiation with the audience 
but somehow in a negotiated space.”6
Monuments are often erected in the name of nation, race, faith, or clan to remind 
those who survive of those who did not. Like any memorial, The List seeks to restore the 
dead, as Thomas Laqueur writes, “into a remade world of the living.”7 It alerts us — re-
gardless of whether or not we want to know — that we are both living without the de-
ceased and existing alongside them, creating a new community of the living and the 
dead. In this way The List challenges the monopoly that organized powers have sought 
to exercise over the memories and disposition of the dead. Beyond or despite the bor-
ders customarily erected around institutions and their memories, The List aspires to 
what another activist has called the “more egalitarian citizenry of the dead.”8 
The List is ephemeral and unfixed. It keeps changing, when people die, when the 
formerly nameless are identified, and when factual errors are corrected. The List ’s size 
and shape shift, as do the sites of its public presentation. It is a sort of counter-monu-
ment in constant formation.
A nation is similarly composed of a list of people, one that is restricted to those 
whom the state recognizes and counts as its own. The List challenges the distinction 
with its stark rewriting of the borders of contemporary Europe and the nation-state 
form it has bequeathed to the globe. Any list creates a border, as it distinguishes those 
who are on it from those who are not. The List negatively defines Europe as the place of 
those who are not on it — those who walk by the document in Liverpool, London, Basel, 
Athens, or Budapest. In a sense, Los Angeles and Istanbul are also part of this place. 
The List does not belong to any single nation-state, and it is presented not in the place 
where the deceased originated but rather where they ended up — “within, or on the 
borders of Europe.”9 As such, it designates a new geographic concept: the frontiers of 
the European continent, its reach, are defined by people who are now dead. The border 
is no longer an arbitrary political marker, but the track of lives lost along the way. The 
people who are named no longer belonged to any place at the time that they died; they 
will not be returned to a homeland and are seldom ceremonially buried or memorial-
ized. The List is their distinctive itinerant resting place.
Cennetoğlu observes: “This document carries the weight of all these people who 
cannot really speak for themselves. And while we’re talking about all of this, people 
are dying.” There is urgency in recording the names and making them public, yet this 
objective, technical, administrative undertaking carries ethical risks. It is unilateral: 
no one can ask the dead for their consent, or even their opinion. “The attempt to talk on 
behalf of someone else comes with a burden. In general, one will never know if you are 
doing something good, or if you are taking advantage, or if you are really talking about 
yourself when you are talking about them. These are blurry borders. How to not fully 
occupy the agency or space of someone who is silenced?”10
6   Higgins, “Banu Cennetoğlu.”
7   Laqueur, The Work of the Dead.
8   Fullard, “Missing Persons Task Team (South Africa)” in Cassidy Parker, “The Missing Persons Task Team.”
9  The List website: www.list-e.info.
10   Higgins, “Banu Cennetoğlu.” 
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The List distributes this burden among all of us who were previously unburdened. 
There is no way to stay clear of these “blurry borders,” between speaking and silence, 
generosity and exploitation, knowledge and ignorance. But to take a moment to listen 
and to mourn at the site of this migratory mass grave can contribute, in the words of 
Allan Sekula, to “laying the groundwork for a collective memory of suffering.”11 How to 
grieve for the dead of others, the dead to whom one is not related, the dead who come 
from elsewhere? How to mourn those who wanted to live among us? In the words of 
Laqueur, The List asks the question, “How do we come to feel that we should care?”12 
And, if we do, how do we become caretakers?
Cennetoğlu insists that The List is not a work of art. This is not only an effort to fore-
close an aesthetic judgment: does the list look good or bad, is it beautiful or sublime? 
It is also an attempt to deprive us of the recourse to some alleged indeterminacy of 
artistic interpretation. The List makes a claim on us, an ethical one, yes, but also a fact-
based one. The names are facts. The List lists “refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants 
who have lost their lives.” What we do with this fact is up to us.
11   Sekula, “Photography and the Limits of National Identity.” 
12   Laqueur, The Work of the Dead, 45.




The List as published in The Guardian UK (June 2018) 
List of 34,361 documented deaths of refugees and migrants due to the restrictive policies of 
Fortress Europe. Documentation as of May 5, 2018 by UNITED for Intercultural Action. 
Co-produced by Chisenhale Gallery, London and Liverpool Biennial, the updated version 
of The List was printed and distributed by The Guardian in a print run of 210,000 on 
World Refugee Day, June 20, 2018. Free of charge copies of the newspaper with the 64-page 
supplement were available at Chisenhale Gallery (28 June–26 August, 2018)  
and Liverpool Biennial (14 July–28 October, 2018). Copy edited by Lizzie Homersham, 




The List as displayed in Barcelona (2018) 
Documentation as of September 30, 2018 by UNITED for Intercultural Action From September 30, 
2018 to February 6, 2019 as part of UMBRA project, in collaboration with Barcelona City Coun-
cil, Imma Prieto and Associació La Llista Oblidada. The List translated into Spanish and Catalan 
was on view in Barcelona inside the Passeig de Gràcia metro station. Translation from English to 
Spanish and Catalan: Associació La Llista Oblidada; Ferran Macià Bros, Carme Ferrer Vilardell, 
Julie García McCusker, Dídac Macià Bros. Copy editing: Maike Moncayo.
 © Banu Cennetoğlu
 The List 17 1
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The List as displayed in Amsterdam (2007) 
List of 7128 documented deaths of refugees and migrants due to the restrictive policies of 
Fortress Europe. Documentation as of May 3, 2006 by UNITED for Intercultural Action.
Between March 14 and March 28, 2007, The List was displayed as a poster campaign in 110 
outdoor advertising signs throughout the city of Amsterdam in close collaboration with 




The List as displayed in West Hollywood, Los Angeles (2017) 
List of 29,586 documented deaths of refugees and migrants due to the restrictive policies of 
Fortress Europe, Documentation as of March 21, 2017 by UNITED for Intercultural Action 
in collaboration with Nihan Somay. This iteration of The List was commissioned by Roy 
and Edna Disney / CalArts Theater (REDCAT) in conjunction with an exhibit curated by 
Thomas Keenan and Sohrab Mohebbi, it is obvious from the map (March 25–June 4, 2017) 
and installed with the support of the City of West Hollywood through WeHo Arts (www.
weho.org/arts). The entire document was installed in two sections. One section was located 
on a concrete wall near the West Hollywood Park Auditorium (647 N. San Vicente Blvd.), 
while the other was on a busy section of Robertson Boulevard just south of The Abbey (692 
N. Robertson) taking advantage of a temporary wooden construction fence in a high traf fic 
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“The Adouaba Project”
Tranquilos, Adwaba and Moving Spaces









In 1955, Aimé Césaire crafted a poem to the Haitian poet, René Depestre, coining the 










Césaire’s neologism activates a verb-form of the noun marronage — a word that derives 
from the old Spanish word cima (mountaintop or place of escape), which slipped into 
cimarrón (wild or runaway), and then marronage. Originally, the cimmarón were the 
1   “Marronner means to take the crossroads of thought, to follow the traces, to furrow in all the detours.”
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renegade or escaped cattle, sheep or pigs who f led Spanish colonial farms on newly 
conquered lands, and ran to the mountains. This f light into the wilds then came to 
indicate the fugitive movement of Indigenous or enslaved peoples from conditions of 
subjugation toward a partial and tentative freedom,3 from the space of the plantation 
to that of the mountain, the forest, or the swamp, colonial non-sites where new socie-
ties were forged in and through the collective cultural experience and creativity of run-
aways who had to, in Winks’s words, “make themselves natives of their surroundings.”4 
Marronage indicates this speculative struggle for a distinct and differential concept of 
freedom, a struggle to institute another form of social life, and a retooling of the very 
instruments of cultural expression and practice.
“The Adouaba Project” sheds light on these “transformatory forces, which operate 
in complex and invisibilized social situations in the postcolonial moment.”5 The project 
focuses on two specific contexts: maroons in Mauritania who self-organize and find 
refuge in villages named adwaba,6 and people in migratory movement in the north of 
Morocco who create sites of survival in the forests called tranquilos. It finds in these 
movements an alter-migration, a set of paths of intra- and inter-African movement 
orbiting around Europe’s “migrant crisis,” affected by its pull, but not centered in it.
Mauritania was the last country in the world to officially abolish slavery in 1981, 
and it only passed a law enforcing abolition in 2007. Even since, the failure to properly 
acknowledge contemporary slavery has meant that “there are not remnants but only 
‘sequels’ of slavery to be witnessed in Mauritania.”7 The definitional f lux is informed by 
the large variety of forms of slavery: men and women who are bound to a slave estate, 
manumitted slaves, enslaved persons who gained autonomy by leaving their masters, 
and haratin (those who claim to never have been bound to the slave estate).8 Haratin 
identity is forged in a shared experience of social and economic deprivation, and forms 
a distinct group solidarity of the oppressed. The haratin speak the hassaniyya Arab dia-
lect, but are distinct insofar as they learned this dialect through their assimilation to 
bizan society, a consequence of their slave pasts. The spaces of contemporary marron-
nage organize themselves in adwaba, remote villages or camps constituted by maroons 
f leeing extreme political and economic situations, and by enslaved people who culti-
vate date palm and millet according to the rhythms of seasonal harvests.
In these quarters, enslaved people perform popular performances of meddh, con-
sisting of unofficial groupings of haratin who create stories of emancipation through 
song and dance. In former times, enslaved women used to perform a particular kind 
of folk song which mocked their masters, syncopated to the monotonous rhythm of 
millet-pounding. Another genre of distinct enslaved culture consisted of a variety of 
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arranged sessions, and a veritable art of meddh” which “became integrated into the po-
litical agitation for the haratin cause. New texts, inspired by the little red book of Mao, 
and calling for haratin freedom, were superimposed on the classical songs.”9
Adwaba became the means by which enslaved people (known as sudan) distin-
guished themselves from their masters (bizan), an encampment in which one stayed 
for extended periods of time, or returned to seasonally. Even though the adwaba are 
impermanent, they are imagined as permanent, and hence figure as the origin of the 
sudan. They become, in Urs Peter Ruf’s analysis, “transcendent localities, independ-
ent of their actual state.” When they are taken down, the adwaba are maintained as 
“virtual entities, serving as a means of identification to both bizan and sudan, and thus 
providing the sudan with what they so fundamentally lack: a location of origin.”10 The 
adabay is thus both a geographical refuge and a cultural resource, a space of trans-local 
identity formation and a tool of decolonial expression. “The Adouaba Project” locates 
in these songs an “itinerary of freedom-making, one that gestures towards other non-
spaces where new forms of sociality and resistance are forged.”11
The project thus threads together the adwaba and meddh with the migratory trajec-
tories where people create parallel societies or villages in the forests in the north or Mo-
rocco to survive. Named tranquilos, these spaces are mobile, taking shape in relation to 
a changing social context and its attendant dangers. The tranquilos are: 
“spaces  of  inter-African  regrouping  and marronnage,  cosmopolitan  spaces  that  gath-
er  people  from  all  over  the  continent.  These  sites  seek  to  melt  into  and  confound 
the  forest  in order  to survive.  In  these contexts, new forms of emancipation emerge, 
languages  and  cultures  creolize  themselves,  in  a  necessary  effort  to  construct 
identities-in-becoming.”12
They constitute — like the adwaba — sites for a specifically contemporary form of mar-
ronner.
Marronner moves beyond an archeological paradigm, beyond an excavation of past 
possibility, toward an attempt at understanding the logics of late capitalism, the ex-
ternalization of European borders, the economies of labor exploitation, and the inter-
national division of labor from an other place-in-transition. The forests outside Ceuta 
are spaces of waiting, trajectories of movement that act on quiet — tranquilo — even as 
Spain’s partnership with Morocco leads to police raids of homes, to the expulsion of 
peoples, loaded on buses, and driven to the country’s southern border. Morocco, work-
ing in tandem with the Spanish civil guard, builds new encampments for officers pa-
trolling its borders with Ceuta. They monitor the fence’s cameras and motion sensors 
to detect potential border crossers. The archbishop of Tangier, Santiago Agrelo Mar-
tinez, notes that the Moroccan police treat migrants “like they are their owners, like 
they are sheep. They can put them and take them wherever they want.”13 In the forest, 
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deport people to the south. Returning to the forest, back under the canopy of the trees, 
such communities wait for opportunities to move on.
Marronner enacts a different trajectory of movement, one that undoes the relation 
between slavery and freedom, that undoes the narrative of movement into freedom, 
if by freedom one understands moving into the European zone. Marronner cuts the 
arrogance that collapses freedom and Europe, that reconfirms the metropole as the 
site of arrival. As Lisa Lowe suggests, “liberal forms of political economy, culture, gov-
ernment and history propose a narrative of freedom overcoming enslavement that at 
once denies colonial slavery, erases the seizure of lands from native peoples, displaces 
migrations and connections across continents, and internalizes these processes in a 
national [or, in this case, continental] struggle of history and consciousness.”14 The ma-
roon is not at all outside the expansive jurisprudential and discursive reach of the Eu-
ropean project, and is often resigned to its various vanishing points; and yet marronner 
persists in wrecking the guiding narratives of the European project, abandons them in 
order to eke out modes and sites of survival not easily emplotted on a smooth gradient 
between unfreedom and its overcoming.
Through the figure of the maroon, one might follow differently the subjective and 
social transformations generated in and through global movement (more generally) 
and intra-African movement (more particularly), and the new forms of citizenship 
such movement proposes. Césaire’s marronner is movement and poetics beyond the 
image of the shipwreck but nevertheless in its wake.15 It initiates and rearticulates a 
pedagogy of crossing,16 a political imaginary not governed by the colonial structuring 
of the hemisphere. For Moten and Harney, marronner invokes a “contrapuntal island,” 
where “we linger in stateless emer-gency.” It works to refigure the cartographies of 
movement, to rethink the relation between such territories, dislocated embodiments, 
and the poetics of transit.17
“The Adouaba Project” seeks to ref lect on “contemporary situations of political and 
cultural domination, where new models of societies constitute themselves as spaces of 
transformation and emancipation, reinvented time and again.”18 These sites are pos-
ited in the project as new spaces of marronage, constituted in order to f lee an unbear-
able context and elaborate modes of resistance. In this respect, walking, dancing, and 
chanting become acts of struggle and resistance, subverting the imposed order to cre-
ate intervals for restaking rights claims, identities and confiscated histories.
While, James Clifford notes, the verb to maroon in English conjures images of ship-
wreck and abandonment, Césaire’s French verb marronner has no exact English equiv-
alent, and remains without translation. Marroner, offered by Césaire as a specifically 
aesthetic strategy, signals a f light toward new forms of expressive agency, the forging 
of a vital and oppositional cultural practice, and creative innovations — a way of sing-
ing, dancing, and languaging — that gives voice to fugitive experience.
The untranslatability of marronner resonates in, disturbs, blurs or scrambles the 
worn conceptual pathways for thinking migratory movement — the necropolitical em-
14   Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents, 3.
15   Sharpe, In the Wake.
16   Jacqui Alexander, Pedagogies of Crossing.
17   Moten and Harney, The Undercommons, 94.
18   Camuset.
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phases on overturned boats or vessels cast to sea. For if the maroon is not merely the 
shipwrecked victim, what other forms of withdrawal-in-transit might be imagined? 
Marronner signifies not a simple f light — there are no boarding tickets for this pas-
sage — but a social, psychological, political and metaphysical struggle to exit condi-
tions of slavery, maintain a liminal freedom and assert a “lived social space.” Roberts 
argues that in marronage, “there is agency within potentiality. Actuality is merely the 
manifestation of a heightened form of activity in the action of f light.”19
Marronner is then about “ref lexive possibility and poesis,”20 about the possibili-
ties of forging a fugitive demos across a multiplicity of existing territories and zones 
of occupation. Marronner is a “multidimensional act of f light” that involves distance, 
movement, property and purpose.21 Flight can be both real and imagined; “freedom 
is not a place; it is a state of being.”22 Quilombos, palenques, mocambos, cumbes, mam-
bises, rancherias, ladeiras, magotes, manieles … James Scott notes that marronnage cre-
ates “zones of refuge” that resist or momentarily escape surveillance, expropriation, 
and exploitation.23 
Far from the imaginary of the shipwreck but too close to its manifestation, mar-
ronner involves navigating the European project’s suspensions, hiatuses, and contin-
gencies. The forest where migrants wait — the tranquilo — and the village or camp that 
frames the sudan experience — the adabay — are not non-zones but sites where the pos-
sibility of freedom shades into and huddles closely around abiding conditions of un-
freedom. Marronner points up dramatically what the vast archive of racial slavery and 
global colonialism has to tell about freedom as such: that in the liberal dispensation, 
it shares ground with its alleged opposite, that freedom and unfreedom are not tidily 
seriated, but are rather wound into one another, intercalated, a zone of indistinction. 
Marronner, knowing this, abandons the ruse of overcoming — of arrival — as the condi-
tion of poetic and more broadly cultural possibility. It crafts instead a multiplicity of 
escape routes, a capillary system of transit, a new set of subjective wagers, new mo-
dalities of social life.
“The Adouaba Project” mines forms of agency buried by the iconography of the mi-
grant crisis — an iconography which reinvests in the figure of Europe as the seat of 
right action and just governance, which is to say liberal freedom. Glissant and Cham-
oiseau write: “The ‘temptation of the wall’ is proper to those civilizations that haven’t 
succeeded in thinking the other, in thinking with the other, in thinking the other in-
side: the barbed wire of these caged ideologies, which lifted themselves up, crumbled, 
and return again with a new shrillness, faced with the new processes of creolization 
and métissage.”24
Marronner instead calls for a political theory deriving from the underside of a mo-
dernity thoroughly racial and colonial in its formation; it points to the capacity for 
cultural innovation, for the “rebellious slave’s insane song or cry of defiance.”25 The 
19   Roberts, Freedom as Marronnage, 10.
20   Clif ford, The Predicament of Culture, 181.
21   Roberts, Freedom as Marronnage, 9–10.
22   Roberts, Freedom as Marronnage, 11.
23   Scott, The Art of not being Governed.
24   Glissant and Chamoiseau, Quand les murs tombent.
25   Clif ford, The Predicament of Culture, 181.
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tranquilo and the adabay indicate not only the sites of f light — the forests of Tangier, 
the haratine communities of Mauritania — but the contrapuntal poetics of such modes 
of survival, persistence and resistance. The songs that accompany the images included 
here are emancipatory chants, activated in secret evening rituals, sung in groups of 
men and women, in the haratines of Mauritania. These adabay constitute territories 
through the fabrication of a space in which “sensations may emerge, from which a 
rhythm, a tone, coloring, weight, texture may be extracted and moved else-where, may 
function for its own sake, may resonate for the sake of intensity alone.”26 The vacilla-
tion of silence and song, of tranquilo and meddh, expose in their contrapuntal harmony 
the minor keys of marronner ’s fugitive actions.
26   Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art, 12.
Unsanctioned Agency
Risk Profiling, Racialized Masculinity,  
and the Making of Europe’s “Refugee Crisis”
Veronika Zablotsky
When unprecedented numbers of displaced persons began to arrive in Greece by boat 
in late 2014, f leeing from escalating violence in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and else-
where, via Turkey and the Aegean Sea, images of washed up rubber boats and dis-
carded life jackets proliferated in the European press. Camera teams and bystanders 
captured young and old, exhausted but relieved to be alive, disembarking by day and 
by night. Before continuing on their journey, some reportedly took a moment to docu-
ment their survival with a digital photograph for relatives and friends. Either alone 
or in groups, they were captured by onlookers as some posed to snap a “selfie” with 
smartphones, mounted on handheld monopods, also known as “selfie sticks,” that al-
low one to adjust the angle of the self-portrait.
Amid ongoing debates about the proper response to unsanctioned border cross-
ings, these images did not generally elicit sympathy from online commentators. In-
stead, they seemed to surprise and incense their critics on social media. Why did a 
seemingly vernacular sight prompt such outrage? Taking the negative reception of so-
called “refugee selfies” as an analytical point of departure, this chapter interrogates 
the implicit assumptions that were challenged by these images in order to critique the 
constitutive exclusions of humanitarian discourse. By asking why some refugees ap-
peared in excess of the passive roles that were assigned to them in public and inter-
national discourse, I illustrate how the incessant repetition and circulation of visual 
media depicting their alleged transgressions produced a new kind of subject.1
Based on an analysis of relevant policy documents, international advocacy, and 
international media reporting between 2015 and 2018, I unpack the gendered and 
racialized scripts that govern the construction of unaccompanied men, in particular 
young men and minors, as suspiciously agential and therefore less likely vulnerable. 
This chapter brings transnational feminist thought and postcolonial studies to bear 







on activist and academic discussions of humanitarianism, whiteness, and neoliberal-
ism in Europe to problematize the production of the “single male refugee” as a racial 
profile that facilitated the consolidation of more restrictive and increasingly deadly 
European border regimes.2
It begins with a discussion of the debate surrounding “refugee selfies” to illustrate 
how racist tropes about sexual and religious excess were projected onto mobile tech-
nology in the hands of displaced persons, particularly young, able-bodied men from 
the Middle East, often assumed to be heterosexual and Muslim. During the so-called 
“European refugee crisis” of 2015, the smartphone became a signifier of unsanctioned 
mobility through media reports that portrayed groups of refugees as “crowds” which 
coordinated their cross-border movement through social media, geo-positioning, and 
mobile messaging applications. Giving a brief overview of asylum law in Europe, I un-
pack why the use of technology by refugees was perceived to stand in contradiction to 
claims about vulnerability.
In order to demonstrate how the racial profile of “the refugee,” as an “unconscious 
prototypical figure” in the Western imagination, was informed by this emergent im-
age regime, I analyze how its framing operations were canonized in Ai Weiwei’s Hu-
man Flow (2017), a documentary film in wide digital release, and Brandon Bannon’s “Ifo 
2, Dadaab Refugee Camp,” a photo taken at the border of Somalia and Kenya in 2011. 
The latter was selected as a frontispiece for Insecurities: Tracing Displacement and Shelter, 
an exhibition that entered the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York City in 2017, which aligned images of displacement around the world to con-
struct the idea of “the refugee” in a global frame. Amplified by high-powered institu-
tional platforms, both works conjure a paradigmatic global aesthetic of displacement 
through technologies such as airborne drones, handheld devices, and the internet. 
Despite the explicit intent to raise awareness about the refugee condition, dominant 
modes of narration in humanitarian discourse — the bird’s-eye view of the refugee 
camp, crowds photographed in extreme wide angle, representations of unnamed indi-
viduals in extreme close up, and the frog-perspective, a voyeuristic angle that does not 
allow to return the gaze — erase the agency of the displaced in the popular imagination 
of forced displacement.
In order to think through the “refugee selfie” as a genre that restores the possibility 
of political action, I draw on Hannah Arendt’s critique of human rights in The Origins 
of Totalitarianism and her conception of freedom in The Human Condition. As Arendt 
observed in her remarks on the effects of mass displacement after World War II, de 
facto stateless persons lose a world to act upon in which they are regarded as particular 
individuals. Since “selfies” are by definition photographs that are taken by the subject 
of an image, they inevitably ref lect how the photographer intended to be seen and en-
countered. After revisiting the genre’s potential for self-representation, I complicate 
2   Insofar as  the  racial profile  is an  “imago”  that  “orientates  [a]  subject’s way of apprehending others” 







its emancipatory promise through a closer look at the alienating effects of the materi-
ality of mobile technology.
Secondly, I examine the discursive strategies through which sympathetic advo-
cates and consultants have attempted to reframe the digital literacy of refugees as an 
economic resource for host societies. I draw on Michel Foucault’s late lectures on neo-
liberalism to critique representations of refugees as enterprising subjects that make 
rational choices in uncertain circumstances. Since legal title to protection is predi-
cated on proof of vulnerability, the discursive generalization of human capital theory 
in the humanitarian field undermines the space of asylum. Through an analysis of the 
German debate about “lane switching” (Spurwechsel) between parallel asylum and im-
migration “tracks,” I argue that the application of economic logic in the humanitarian 
field obliterates the key legal distinction between asylum and immigration.
Lastly, I draw on Banu Bargu’s framework of “biosovereignty” and Achille Mbem-
be’s articulation of “necropolitics” to reconsider the European Union’s “war on human 
trafficking” as a calculated exposure to death at Europe’s external and “liquid” borders. 
Drawing on a report by Frontex, the private border agency of the European Union,3 I 
chart how border policies are reduced to a technical matter through calculations of 
risk that represent young, unaccompanied men as a security threat. When refugees 
are reframed as economic agents, however, this projected risk is effectively trans-
ferred onto the individual.
Beyond declarations of good will, the structural denial of human freedom and dig-
nity faced by de facto stateless and racialized peoples calls for an abolitionist response. 
Over six decades ago, Hannah Arendt argued that humanitarianism was funda-
mentally f lawed from its inception in a world of nation-states. Its constitutive exclu-
sions are missed by neoliberal advocates that seek to improve “refugee management” 
through “better” design. I revisit the emancipatory demands of refugee activists in 
Germany during the “refugee strike” of 2013 to ref lect on the ways in which the anti-
racist politics of transnational solidarity are threatened to be eclipsed by the exclusive 
















The Figure of the “Single Male Refugee”
In 2015, overwhelmed Greek authorities left the displaced to fend for themselves in 
improvised shelters and makeshift encampments that sprung up at transit stations, in 
city centers, as well as near border crossings. Instead of remaining in Greece, hundreds 
of thousands of asylum seekers embarked on a long journey by foot to reach Germany 
by crossing Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria. The spatial 
imaginary of a “Balkan route” across the European continent dominated the German 
news for months on end after Hungary closed its southern border in October 2015. As 
refugees traveled in groups, images of so-called “caravans” soon became ubiquitous in 
print, television, and social media. Media reported that “crowds” were coordinating 
their movement through mobile devices.4 Animated graphics of maps with arrows of-
fered a daily reminder of the “progression” of a f luid, shifting, and destabilizing force 
imagined to “sweep” across Europe. Military metaphors entered the mainstream to 
describe Europe as a “fortress” and refugees as an “army.”5
In this political climate, images of refugees posing on the beaches of Lesbos, Samos, 
and other Greek islands to take selfies shortly after landing sparked outrage on social 
media. To some, these self-portraits seemed to cast doubt on the merit of their asylum 
claims. They questioned how forced the migration of someone could be who thought 
ahead to bring a “selfie stick.” Countering these negative perceptions, the newspaper 
The New York Times declared that the smartphone was an essential of the “21st-Century 
Migrant.”6 TIME magazine invited readers to “See How Refugees Use Selfies to Docu-
ment Their Journey.”7
In times of global communication technology, internet-enabled mobile phones, 
closed-messaging applications, and social media have become features of everyday life 
across the dividing line of the Global North and the Global South. Yet, Western pub-
lics continue to be steeped in imageries that position racial others as outside of time 
(and thus outside the present’s technological affordances).8 The sight of refugees with 
smartphones, taking “selfies” no less, raised eyebrows because it unsettled implicit 
assumptions about the imagined other of Europe. The millennial subjectivity identi-
fied with the quotidian aesthetics of the “selfie” disrupted the phantasy of Western 
superiority vis-à-vis refugees. Its casual display broke with narrative conventions that 
construct refugees as objects of humanitarian relief.
Despite associations with self-absorption and vanity, the digital literacy encoded 
in the “selfie” seemed to represent agency, the capacity to act on an environment rather 
than being determined by it. It inserted refugees as narrators at the center of a story 
that Western audiences believed they should be able to control. Through mobile tech-
nology, these selfies symbolically repeated the material assertion of self in relation to a 







8  Fabian, Time and the Other.
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ticular identity, at the center of a terrain that had only become available as backdrop 
after the unsanctioned crossing of a territorial border. This self-assertion / insertion, 
represented by the “refugee selfie,” cancelled out rightful claims to protection in the 
eyes of some observers because it contradicted ingrained assumptions about the pre-
sumed passivity and victimhood of refugees. The capacity to act under conditions of 
uncertainty seemed to cast doubt on the vulnerability of unaccompanied young men 
in particular.
Through the lens of televised, printed, and online news, pre-existing racist tropes 
about sexual and religious excess associated with Middle Eastern men layered onto the 
smartphone as a sign of excessive mobility and agency. Some wondered why able-bod-
ied men would leave behind their dependents, scorning unaccompanied men for “de-
serting” women and children in conf lict zones. Instead of protecting vulnerable oth-
ers, they appeared to seek protection only for themselves. Race, gender, age, presumed 
ability, and ascribed religious identity as Muslim, rather than Christian, mediated 
whose unsanctioned mobility appeared suspect. The enabling uses of mobile technol-
ogy were collapsed with the agential excess projected onto racialized masculinity. This 
image regime stoked fears about “single male refugees” as potential “terrorists” that 
might infiltrate the European Union in disguise. At the intersections of race, sexuality, 
and geopolitics, the masculinity of racialized men was questioned because they sought 
asylum instead of engaging in combat. At the same time, their racialized masculin-
ity was interrogated as a potential threat to public order in Germany and elsewhere.9 
Racialized as a “hyper-masculine” suspect, the “single male refugee” was profiled as 
a security risk. He emerged as a racialized and sexualized figure that confronted the 
constitutive exclusions of humanitarian discourse.
Modern humanitarianism first emerged in the aftermath of the genocidal vio-
lence inf licted upon the Ottoman Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian communities of 
Anatolia.10 After World War I, newly formed international organizations such as the 
League of Nations and development agencies such as Near East Relief mobilized new 
technologies and visual media, first and foremost film and photography, to shore up 
public support for their relief operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.11 Raising the 
specter of a world-historical confrontation between Christianity and Islam, this cul-
tural production operated through tropes of gender and sexuality to represent Arme-
nian women and orphans, in particular, as innocent, devoid of agency, and therefore in 
need of international protection. At its inception, the sexual economy of humanitarian 
representation secured the phallic status of Western sovereignty in the international 
arena by positioning European and North American audiences as saviors.12 The cul-
9   See Abdelmonem, Bavelaar, Wynne-Hughes, and Galán, “The ‘Taharrush’ Connection.” 
10   Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones.
11   Torchin, Ravished Armenia.








tural repertoire of humanitarianism generated stereotypical attributes of femininity 
such as helplessness and passivity as standards of legitimacy that persist in the popu-
lar imagination of displaced persons. Films such as Ravished Armenia (1918), a silent 
film that was lauded for its documentary realism, inscribed Orientalist or racial phan-
tasies about Muslim men as predators.13 
Dominant representations of refugees often center women and conf late them 
with children (and elders) to produce “womenanchildren”14 as a victim unit that is pre-
sumed to be essentially vulnerable.15 Refugees who are unaccompanied men, by con-
trast, are constructed as self-possessed and willful agents. During the media produc-
tion of the so-called “European refugee crisis,” the “single male refugee” emerged as 
a figure whose capacity to be vulnerable or exposed to violence was denied. In order 
to humanize “single male refugees,” advocates emphasized that unaccompanied men 
could also be care-givers.16 By pointing out that mobile technology connected “single 
male refugees” to elderly parents and dependents too weak and vulnerable to under-
take the dangerous journey themselves, the smartphone was represented as a life line. 
Contesting the idea that smartphones were symbolic of excessive agency, advocates 
resignified mobile phones as a means of caring for others left behind in a self less at-
tempt to reach Europe on their behalf.
Yet, as images of young men holding children proliferated, the European Union’s 
private border police Frontex declared that “managing” groups of refugees required 
strategically separating the vulnerable from the suspect. In its report “Risk Analysis 
for 2016,” Frontex maintained that “young single men [mixed] with more vulnerable 
families, including women and children […] to facilitate their progression.”17 By sug-
gesting that “young single men” strategically infiltrated “crowds” to use the vulner-
ability of others as a shield, the vulnerability of young single men was denied and their 
mere presence profiled as “high-risk.”18 The United States have altogether barred unac-
13   See Zablotsky, “Governing Armenia.” 
14  Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases, 25.
15   Gendered constructions of the essential victimhood of women obscure that men can be victimized as 
well, and obfuscate the ways in which women may become perpetrators of violence, including sexual-
ized violence (see Moser & Clark, Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?).














18   Frontex Risk Analysis Unit,  “Risk Analysis  for 2016,” 61. The heightened visibility of unaccompanied 
men arriving at Europe’s external borders in 2015 also provoked a sex panic that continues to play out 
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companied men from resettlement schemes for Syrian citizens while Canada exempts 
only “single male refugees” that position themselves as members of the LGBTQ com-
munity.19 Neither legally entitled to asylum, nor declared regular enemies in combat, 
displaced persons suspected of terrorist intentions on the basis of race and gender are 
made, once over, “outlaws by definition.”20
Vulnerability, Mobility, and Detention
Asylum cases in Europe are determined on the basis of calculations about the vulner-
ability of petitioners. Only individuals that can prove they are at risk of torture and 
persecution by their country of citizenship on the basis of political, ethnic, religious, 
or sexual attributes will be considered eligible for asylum. Economic insecurity or ci-
vilian threats of violence are not recognized as valid grounds for asylum claims. By 
strategically designating this risk as low, and labelling states such as Afghanistan as 
“safe countries of origin,” EU officials exploit loopholes in international law to carry out 
blanket deportations of groups statistically considered “unlikely to obtain asylum.”21
In violation of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights,22 petitioners from 
countries other than Syria currently live in fear of deportation because their right to 
due process and individual case review is not guaranteed. Instead of ensuring that 
persons are not deported to places where they will be at risk of death, torture, inhu-
man or degrading treatment, a running roster of countries of origin are declared “safe” 
by the stroke of a pen. Individuals seeking asylum within the European Union are re-
quired to register with local authorities upon first entry to the Schengen zone.23 As the 
review process runs its course, which can take several years, the mobility of petitioners 
is restricted to the administrative districts in which their cases are first filed. After 




















an Union is prohibited.24 This is primarily to ensure that asylum claimants can swiftly 
be deported if their petition is denied. 
For those who cannot afford a visa or plane ticket to their desired destination with-
in the European Union, few alternatives exist to risking their lives at sea and crossing 
the Mediterranean or Aegean Sea without prior authorization. On the other side, those 
who survive the perilous passage are registered and, depending on their nationality, 
either immediately deported or detained in EU-funded camps. These so-called “recep-
tion centers” or “hotspots” reportedly fail to provide even basic shelter due to “unsani-
tary” and “unsafe” conditions.25 Overcrowded and managed by police, an archipelago 
of detention centers has spawned across Greece to hold hundreds of thousands of dis-
placed persons until their asylum cases are processed.26 
In March 2016, the European Union signed a “return” agreement with Turkey 
that stipulates all new arrivals from Syria are to be immediately deported to offshore 
detention centers set up on the Turkish side of the Syrian border. Here, in these EU-
subsidized zones of de facto lawlessness, petitioners are to wait until case workers de-
termine the merit of their asylum cases. Only petitioners that were present in Greece 
before the agreement went into effect were permitted to remain. The agreement fur-
ther envisioned that in exchange for each Syrian refugee that is deported after reach-
ing Greece without authorization, one would be approved and relocated from a deten-
tion center in Turkey to a member state of the EU. The so-called “one-for-one scheme,” 
however, failed to deliver on its promise of providing “vulnerable people” with a “safe 
and legal way […] to reach the EU.”27 With “return missions” stalled by the refusal of 
Greek Appeal Boards to authorize deportations to Turkey, and several member states 
of the EU blocking the scheme, more and more refugees are funneled into administra-
tive detention in Greece and forced to wait without the prospect of a speedy resolution.
Regimes of Representation
Daily reporting about informal tent settlements “in the middle of Europe” generat-
ed anxieties about states losing control of national borders in light of the seemingly 
unruly “f lows and streams” of the displaced. Images of “caravans,” filmed and pho-
tographed from above, at an angle, or at a distance, became a staple of televised news. 
Drawing on the visual canon of humanitarianism, the constant repetition of these im-
ages constituted a referential regime of crisis that proved portable.28 
Over the course of the twentieth century, Western publics have become accus-











centers of cities throughout Europe provoked a strong response. Associated with mud 
and tarps, the informal quality of these sites is often presented as evidence of their 
transient character. Despite their “purposely deteriorating building material,”29 many 
of these temporary settlements have become permanent fixtures, housing millions of 
displaced persons and refugees worldwide. The destabilizing effects of forced migra-
tion, further, threaten the appearance of order, fixity, and durability through which 
modern statecraft is enacted. This imaginary of states as fortified compounds is con-
trasted by metaphors of liquefaction and dissolution that are often deployed to alle-
gorize forced migration. Refugee camps therefore function as sites of detention that 
are designed to contain and regularize movement in spaces of enclosure. The effect 
is boredom, the phenomenological experience of “abandonment in emptiness,”30 as a 
calculated outcome of human life forced into the invariable repetition of administra-
tive time. 
From above, the order imposed by the humanitarian agency is accentuated. Unlike 
the angled perspective characteristic of the “selfie,” the bird’s-eyes view constructs a 
central point of view from which all life in the camp can be overseen or surveilled as a 
governable substrate for state-imposed order. This aerial view also dominated report-
ing on ground-level migrations and “crowds” of refugees in Europe in 2015 and 2016. 
Soon after, in late 2016, the Museum of Modern Art in New York City opened the exhi-
bition Insecurities: Tracing Displacement and Shelter, an interactive installation of imag-
es, immersive objects, and artifacts engaging with architectures and infrastructures 
of forced migration around the world. Between a wall of images and an installation of 
illuminated boxes, arranged on the f loor, hung a photograph taken by photojournalist 
Brandon Bannon in 2011, enlarged to show an aerial view of Ifo 2, one of four settle-
ments that make up the Dadaab refugee complex in Kenya.31 It was selected as the cov-
er image of the exhibition. Stretching in neat rows across a clay-colored plain, plastic 
covered shelters line an arid landscape, leaving room for unpaved thoroughfares and 
several large, rectangular areas. Instead of the ground-level realities lived by the resi-
dents, the angle of “Ifo 2, Dadaab Refugee Camp” recalls “the diplomatic, bureaucratic, 
and capitalistic work of governments, institutions, and entities elsewhere.”32 This cu-
ratorial choice illustrates how the visual discourse of humanitarianism reproduces the 
aesthetic of the state while responding to the expediencies of refugee management.
29   Herscher & Siddiqi, “Spatial Violence,” 276.
30   Agamben, The Open, 63.
31   According  to  the United Nations High Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHRC),  the Dadaab  refugee 
complex was housing 235,269 registered refugees and asylum seekers  in January 2018. Dagahaley, 












Over the course of 2016, Ai Weiwei, a mixed-media artist exiled from China in 2015, 
directed the film Human Flow over the course of 2016. The feature-length documentary 
takes its audience on a visual tour de force across twenty-three countries on four conti-
nents to illustrate that forced displacement is a global phenomenon. In this indexical 
sense, it expands on the project of the Insecurities exhibition. Its aesthetic engagement 
with spaces of humanitarianism serves as another high-profile example which illus-
trates the symbolic force of violence which seems to permeate even sympathetic repre-
sentations of displacement. Through footage recorded by drones and smartphones, the 
film accomplishes a monumental scale while offering an intimate look at the human-
ity of refugees worldwide. Opening with a bird’s-eye view of an unidentified refugee 
camp in Iraq, set in an arid desert plain, the film cuts to a sequence of shots from a very 
low angle, the so-called frog-perspective near the horizon line. Shrubbery, covering 
most of the screen while appearing out of focus, frames children in the distance. The 
audience is then teleported into a beige canvas tent where its gaze is directed toward 
the silhouette of a girl with two braids. Unnamed, she appears as a figure that looks 
out through the opening of the tent into the glaring sunlight, holding onto a strap and 
facing her uncertain future.33 Following this sequence, Ai cuts to a group of women 
appearing to bake bread in a clay oven lowered into the ground, before moving on to a 
group of men crouching around a security guard who holds a stack of paperwork. The 
film thus establishes the gendered division of labor in the camp by depicting women as 
caregivers of children and men as agents that interact with the state.
Within its first ten minutes, Human Flow not only reproduces the visual canon of 
humanitarianism through the camera perspectives it deploys but also narratively rein-
forces gendered stereotypes about the Middle East. While bird’s-eye views invoke the 
central authority of the state, the frog perspective positions the spectator as a voyeur 
that can learn about life in the camp as a seemingly impartial observer whose gaze 
cannot be returned. Some of the footage filmed at eye-level closely resembles the mug-
shot, though many interlocutors remain unnamed.34 Some images captured by drones 
reproduce the trope of moving “caravans” as if to visualize the metaphor of “human 
f low” that gives the film its title.
While the title plays with the imagery of “f lows” that is often mobilized to describe 
forced migration, it humanizes its protagonists by inserting Ai Weiwei in the frame, 
for example when he swaps passports with a Syrian citizen in Idomeni, the site of an 
infamous tent encampment in Greece. Shaky footage from hand-held devices creates a 
documentary aesthetic that invites a false sense of identification with the experiences 
of refugees. Yet, Ai presents this appropriation as a form of “respect.” By suggesting 
that the subject positions of the film maker and the subjects of his documentary are ul-
timately interchangeable, Ai asserts the shared humanity of displaced persons. How-
ever, by obscuring the operations of power that position him as a standard bearer of 




34  If Human Flow is streamed on Amazon Prime, some of the names become available as metadata in a 
sidebar.
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figures that stand in for humanity in general, rather than the particular identities of 
which they have been stripped due to their forced displacement.
Overall, both Brandon Bannon’s photography and Ai Weiwei’s cinematography rely 
on techniques of documentary realism to generate empathy with refugees but fail to 
make room for solidarity by framing displacement as a universal condition aff licting 
humanity in general.35 In contrast, the genre of the “refugee selfie” inherently resists 
homogenization because it is constituted by an irreducible plurality. Despite the visual 
conventions that govern its form,36 it offers a unique mode of self-representation that 
destabilizes the aesthetic regimes that produce the reality effects of central author-
ity. By attesting to the specific identity of those confined to the “huge and nameless 
crowd,”37 the “selfie” restores the possibility of political action on the part of displaced 
and de facto stateless persons. 
Politics of Representation
Hannah Arendt critiqued the post-war human rights frameworks for failing to remedy 
the zone of lawlessness in which refugees find themselves when neither their state of 
citizenship nor any other given state is willing to guarantee and enforce their human 
rights. She argued that this loss of legality not only stripped individuals of their civil 
rights but also erased their particularity as specific, rather than generic, human be-
ings. Once reduced to “mere existence,” seekers of asylum are stripped of the right 
to “act in and change and build a common world.”38 According to Arendt, the “right to 
have rights” derived not from the “abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but 
human”39 but from belonging to a “social texture” in which one “established for them-
selves a distinct place in the world,”40 in which one’s actions mattered, and in which 
one’s opinions were significant. Rightlessness was therefore a function of displace-
ment as “the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever.”41 














37   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 287.
38   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 301.
39   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.
40   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 293.
41   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 298.
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Instead of being “judged by one’s actions and opinions,”42 for which one is held respon-
sible before the law and by peers, humanitarian discourse frames displaced persons as 
“nothing but human beings”43 whose “treatment by others does not depend on what he 
[or she] does or does not do.”44 In Arendt’s conception of the human condition, freedom 
of action is possible when the outcome of an action is not determined by necessity and 
words and deeds are remembered by free and equal peers. By emphasizing empathy 
over solidarity, humanitarian representations of refugees as “thrown back […] on their 
natural givenness”45 exclude displaced persons from the “category of people”46 that are 
entitled to state-sanctioned agency.
In contrast to the post-war context described by Arendt, realms for the appear-
ance of words and deeds, which she theorized as a condition of political action, have 
proliferated through mobile communication. Though still confined to a course of ac-
tion determined by force, displaced persons use smartphones to carve out spaces of 
freedom from necessity and thereby create political possibilities. Instead of food and 
shelter, which are basic human needs, access to social media allows displaced persons 
to “feel human” in connection with peers to whom the individual’s actions and words 
appear and matter. Friends and family remember and engage the displaced person as 
a particular individual that is acting upon a shared world beyond the purview of any 
single nation state. It is possible to use the smartphone to assert one’s “full” rather than 
“mere” humanity precisely because battery life and data are not “essential” to physical 
survival. Enabled by data roaming, geo-positioning software allows for virtual forms 
of emplacement. “Selfies” communicate physical survival to family and friends while 
anchoring a particular individual at the center of a given landscape. As a form of self-
representation, “selfies” undermine humanitarian constructions of refugees as help-
less victims while challenging the exclusionary logic of territorial borders.
Despite this emancipatory promise of mobile technology,47 the mediation of smart-
phones is inherently alienating because the hardware itself is a material product of 
42   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297.
43   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 295.
44   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.
45   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 302.




energy (praktische Energie d[es] Menschen), or  labor-power, was alienated (entfremdet) or captured by 
another in the commodity form of private property (Marx Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, 94). 










exploitation and extraction elsewhere.48 If freedom, to Arendt, is action that appears 
unencumbered by necessity, the commodity form of mobile technology and the binary 
logic of its operating software, as well as the material mediation of telecommunica-
tions infrastructure,49 threatens to place human freedom — the ability to act anew and 
in unexpected ways — under erasure. The use of mobile technology introduces layers 
of alienation and necessity that mediate the subjective will to act insofar as the words 
and deeds of displaced persons and their allies are processed as information and data. 
Still, refugees constitute themselves as political subjects, despite the forced nature of 
displacement, which propels movement by necessity, by acting through digital media 
that, at any rate, allows for the “experience of being free.”50 
Calculations of risk at Europe’s biometric borders51 negate the agency and human-
ity of asylum claimants because they interpret the actions of refugees, in particular 
those cast as “high-risk” individuals, as if they were determined by immutable traits. 
Racial profiling, in particular, reduces “new and spontaneous processes”52 to a form of 
“excess” to be captured by apparatuses of security.53 Despite its administrative veneer, 
risk profiling is a form of political violence that hinges on racist tropes about sexual 
and religious excess which, in the Western tradition, are attributed to the East in gen-
eral, and Islam in particular.54 I argue that these tropes form the core of social media 
debates about the role of mobile technology in the unauthorized mobility of refugees.
Some humanitarian advocates have attempted to reframe the actions of “single 
male refugees” by explaining that mobile devices were primarily used to maintain 
ongoing relationships with vulnerable dependents, thereby containing the agential 
excess projected onto racialized masculinity within the humanitarian script. In 2016, 
Brian Reich, then managing director at The Hive, a US-based data strategy firm con-











50   Arendt, The Human Condition, 24 [emphasis added].
51   Amoore, “Biometric Borders.” 
52   Arendt, The Human Condition, 231.
53   Following Michel Foucault, liberal governmentality confronts the problem of security as the princi-
ple through which it calculates the “precise extent to which and up to what point individual interest, 
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54  Said, Orientalism.
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In this statement, Reich confirmed not only that displaced persons use mobile tech-
nology to connect to family members, but also that some of them use the internet in 
strategic ways that allow them to navigate the territorial fault-lines of European bor-
der regimes. He asserted that unauthorized mobility was a legitimate choice made by 
technologically savvy individuals in dire circumstances. While capturing the human-
izing potential of connectivity, he signaled that digital skills represent an economic 
asset. As bearers of valuable capacities, so the argument goes, refugees in the twenty-
first century should be reimagined as an educated workforce waiting to be deployed 
by host societies. Instead of emphasizing the moral obligation to protect vulnerable 
populations, against which right-wing governments seem to have immunized them-
selves, international advocates and consultants are increasingly countering calcula-
tions of risk with calculations of value.56 
Melissa Flemming, a spokesperson of the UNHCR, for example, argued, “The sim-
ple truth is that refugees would not risk their lives on a journey so dangerous if they 
could thrive where they are.”57 This ref lection on a “simple truth” of forced displace-
ment locates a peculiar “choice” at the level of the individual. Once forced displace-
ment is reimagined in terms of a preference for life, refugees appear to act as economic 
agents who allocate scarce resources while bearing the risk of death. In this scenario, 
exposure to death becomes the responsibility of the individual, rather than that of the 
state which decides on the exception.58
As Michel Foucault predicted in his 1979 lectures on neoliberalism, all human be-
havior that “responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environ-
ment” may become “susceptible to economic analysis.”59 This is the case insofar as life 
and death are understood as “competing ends […] which cannot be superimposed on 
55   See Fitch, “Smartphone Use on the Refugee Trail.” The partial transcription of the video above is my 
own.











58   Agamben, State of Exception.
59   Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 269.
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each other” and “between which we must choose.”60 Deciding to act despite uncertain 
outcomes, refugees are cast as economic agents that accept the risk of death in order 
to “thrive” elsewhere. Instead of remaining in a war zone, seeking to “obtain some kind 
of improvement”61 is presented as a rational choice. From this perspective, the figure 
of the “single male refugee” becomes intelligible as an entrepreneur that “invests in an 
action, expects a profit from it, and […] accepts the risk of a loss.”62
When neoliberal theories of the subject are introduced in the humanitarian field, 
the apparent technological savvy of refugees translates into evidence of an “abilities-
machine” formed through “investments […] made at the level of man himself.”63 As 
argued by Theodore W. Schultz, one of the founders of the Chicago School of Eco-
nomics, “people can enlarge the range of choice available to them […] by investing in 
themselves.”64 Rather than a security risk, the unsanctioned mobility of “single male 
refugees” may now appear as a form of entrepreneurial risk-taking. The application of 
economic analysis to forced displacement, however, blurs the distinction between ref-
ugees and economic migrants. By suggesting that persons in both categories “decide” 
to “improve” their lives, the normative core of asylum law is hollowed out by economic 
logic which anchors shared humanity in the capacity to invest in oneself as human 
capital.
From the standpoint of cognitive capitalism and the so-called “sharing economy,”65 
time is a scarce resource and a valuable asset that could be remotely matched with the 
needs of distant consumers. Considering the deadly boredom that permeates every-
day life in administrative detention, some humanitarian aid experts have problema-
tized enforced inactivity as a waste of time and skill of those condemned to perpetual 
waiting. Neoliberal logic supplies a new framework that humanizes refugees, albeit as 
human capital.
If displaced persons currently residing in Germany can demonstrate employment 
and language skills, they might soon be able to opt out of the asylum process and 
“switch” into a newly created immigration track. The German debate about so-called 
“lane switching” (Spurwechsel) represents a concession to employers that demand the 
right to profit from the investment they already made in refugees as extremely moti-
vated employees. However, critics of a possible bifurcation in the asylum process fear 
that “rewarding” skill might incentivize further unsanctioned migration to Germany. 
The subtext of the public controversy, not so thinly veiled, was that offering a way out 
of the asylum process, regardless of eligibility, might lead to an increase in Germany’s 
racialized population. In this context, a new quota system has been recently intro-
duced to minimize family reunifications (Familiennachzug) for recognized asylees that 
are currently residing in Germany. Low quotas and administrative backlog effectively 
deny displaced persons the right to ensure that their children and spouses are also in 
60   Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 222.
61   Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 230.
62   Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 252–253.





safety. This measure is intended to put pressure on refugees to return to their coun-
tries of origin even if they are formally entitled to stay.
By suggesting that refugees are entrepreneurial subjects, this neoliberal turn in 
humanitarian discourse merely supplements the biosovereign formation of a Euro-
pean power intent on policing the symbolic borders of whiteness.66 By representing 
forced displacement as a choice at the level of the individual, the profiling of racialized 
masculinity as always already suspect is not only left intact but reinforced.67 Instead 
of embracing neoliberal logic, advocates must interrogate the gendered and racialized 
scripts that govern the recognition of vulnerability in order to push back against dehu-
manizing calculations of risk that will only respond to economic calculation.
Calculated Exposure
Europe’s external borders and their expanding buffer zones — geographical, ideologi-
cal, and in relation to the bodies of racialized others68—have become sites at which 
“migratory circuits” are regulated, and “irregular f lows”69 “disallow[ed] to the point of 
death.”70 Banu Bargu argues that biopower has not supplanted sovereignty but that 
it has imbricated it as a power “concerned with efficient regulation [of f lows] and the 
optimization of circulation.”71 In a like manner, the language of risk management de-
ployed by Frontex justifies exposure to death as a technical matter which “ensure[s] 
that interventions are focused on high-risk movements of people, while low-risk move-
ments are facilitated smoothly.”72 Biosovereignty, as Bargu calls this hybrid power, 
links up the “politics of life (and death) and a politics over life itself ”73 in an “ongoing 
process in formation.”74 While biopower invests in subjects to construct “the very agent 
who will act,”75 its sovereign core exposes racialized others to death through divest-
ment.
Achille Mbembe describes this “division of space into compartments for the 
purpose of control” as a necropolitical “terror formation”76 that rules “in absolute 
lawlessness”77 over those who it defines as “disposable.”78 In tandem with states that 
66   Eggers, Kilomba, Piesche & Arndt, Mythen, Masken und Subjekte.
67   El-Tayeb, European Others; Haritaworn, Queer Lovers and Hateful Others.
68   Amoore, “Biometric Borders.”
69   Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, “Risk Analysis for 2016.”
70   Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 138.
71   Bargu, Starve and Immolate, 47.
72   Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, “Risk Analysis for 2016,” 61.
73   Bargu, Starve and Immolate, 50.
74   Bargu, Starve and Immolate, 52.








displace their own citizens, member states of the European Union are complicit in the 
“creation of death-worlds” in which “vast populations are subjected to conditions of 
life conferring upon them the status of living dead.”79 The funneling of asylum seekers 
into border territories that are not conducive to human life, such as the Sonoran Desert 
at the southern U.S. border, or the Mediterranean and Aegean seas that separate the 
European Union from its southern and eastern neighbors, functions as a “Prevention 
Through Deterrence (PTD) strategy.”80
The management of “risk” has taken precedence over any morally founded duty 
to protect. Since 2014, thousands of refugees who attempted to reach safety by boat 
have effectively been left to drown just a few miles off the European coastline after 
the patrolling grounds of coastal guards were reduced from 150 kilometers to only five 
kilometers.81 Meanwhile, civilian search and rescue missions are criminalized for pro-
viding emergency assistance at sea.82 This constitutes a calculated exposure to death 
that leaves refugees to attempt the journey at their own risk.
Biopower effectively marks the racialized masculinity of the “single male refugee” 
as a limit that cancels out vulnerability and international title to protection. Going by 
the pseudonym Abu Jana, or “father of Jana,” a Syrian refugee in Egypt told a reporter 
for the British newspaper The Guardian that his decision to cross by boat was neither a 
choice nor an investment. To him, it was the only way to escape the “bureaucratic no-






Another young Syrian man identified as Ahmed Abu Zeid confirmed that he was “past 
the point of caring.” He explained, “I’ll go whether or not a boat rescues me. If I have 
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no more fear in our hearts.” Both men described the experience of “civil death”84 as 
equally if not more unbearable than the risk of physical death.
Indeed, the European Union’s 2015 declaration of a “fight against smugglers and 
traffickers”85 is a “powerful demonstration of the EU’s determination to act.”86 While 
targeting the unsanctioned mobility of asylum seekers, the EU’s “war on human traf-
ficking” has in effect failed to quash “criminal networks which exploit vulnerable 
migrants.”87 Instead of the vulnerability of persons, border police focus on the “vulner-
ability” of states, which is defined as the “capacity and readiness of Member States to 
face upcoming challenges, including present and future threats and challenges at the 
external borders.”88 A new regulation, passed in 2016, vested Frontex, renamed “Euro-
pean Border and Coast Guard Agency,” with a legal personality, a stand-alone budget, 
and an expanded mandate to act.
The actions of this new agency, essentially, aim to disallow the decentralized and 
unsanctioned agency of the displaced. The requirement, for instance, that a funda-
mental rights officer internally review all complaints is grounded in the so-called 
“right to good administration,”89 rather than any notion of “freedom and justice” as 
guaranteed to EU citizens, residents, and legally-sanctioned visitors.90 Despite lip 
serve to international conventions and fundamental rights, risk profiling not only fails 
to guarantee due process and individual case review (non-refoulement) but it subjects 
displaced persons to administrative violence.
While Frontex conducts limited search and rescue missions during border sur-
veillance operations at sea,91 it is only expected to “protect and save lives whenever and 
wherever so required.” This chilling pronouncement minimizes the horror of the deaths 
of displaced persons at high sea and depoliticizes the question of freedom and jus-
tice for all. Although Frontex ’s 2016 charge takes care to spell out that the power to de-
cide on protected status remains with sovereign member states, it vests border police 
with unprecedented executive powers to not only assist and coordinate border control 
measures, but also to deploy its own personnel and equipment to launch “rapid bor-
der interventions.” (article 8.1e). Frontex may now also initiate “return interventions” 
and manage “return-related tasks” (article 36.4), including the “acquisition of travel 
documents for returnees” (preamble 32), traditionally a prerogative of sovereign states. 
Since its creation in 2004, Frontex ’ role has significantly shifted from a coordinating 
institution to an EU body that not only implements but also makes operative decisions. 
States delegate sovereign license to EU bodies that exist to exclude racialized and dis-
placed populations from access to common infrastructure space.92 As the power to act 
devolves to Frontex, its status as a quasi-sovereign body is formalized.











After declaring a war on human trafficking in 2015, the European Commission laid 
out a detailed action plan to “transform migrant smuggling into a high-risk and low-
profit operation.”93 By confiscating and destroying vessels that are suspected to facili-
tate the unauthorized passage of refugees, multiple agencies are engaged in a coordi-
nated assault designed to diminish the returns of brokers. However, the discourse of 
“prevention through deterrence” fails to acknowledge that the “high risk” is ultimately 
borne by vulnerable persons whose forced mobility is disallowed to the point of death.
By using roaming data, geo-positioning software, end-to-end encryption, and 
social media platforms to facilitate their own mobility and connect to legal counsel 
and adequate shelter, unsanctioned border crossers act with and through infrastruc-
tures of the state such as roads, satellites, and glass fiber cables. This unauthorized 
use destabilizes the sovereign logic of the exception.94 Since mobile technology enables 
persons to make informed decisions about their movement, the European Commis-
sion also seeks to establish “closer coordination”95 with private internet service provid-
ers and social media companies.
In addition to the consolidation of the Common European Asylum System, the 
European Union’s “fight against migrant smuggling” also set the stage for ongoing 
negotiations about a Common Defense and Security Policy that would enhance “op-
erational coordination” and “capabilities”96 across existing and planned EU agencies 
and information technology (IT) systems.97 The implementation of this plan would en-
tail even greater executive powers for Frontex, the European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Coordination (Europol), and other security, surveillance, and intelligence 
providers engaged in joint-military operations. In light of the projected goal of “inter-
operability,” the European Union is no longer limiting itself to economic and legal co-
operation. Its continental-scale alignment of agencies and supporting infrastructures 
heralds the constitution of Europe as a bio-geo-sovereign power that seeks to regulate 
and manage life within a territory designated as its “area of freedom, security and 
justice.”98
Insofar as neoliberal theories of the subject presuppose that economic man, as a 
particular figuration of the human, necessarily follow the principle of a preference for 
pleasure over pain,99 they reduce all observable actions to the pursuit of “private” in-
terest in bodily integrity rather than the political interest to actualize the freedom to 
act in a shared world. By positing refugee’s capacity to labor as a source of human 
dignity, neoliberal advocates generalize the market mechanism of exchange to valor-
ize and thereby depoliticize the agency of refugees as a form of capital. By integrating 
humanitarian discourse with human capital theory, they fail to account for the racial 
93   “A European Agenda on Migration,” 1.
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profile of the “single male refugee” as a limit of biopolitical investment at which vul-
nerability is denied and protection withheld. Although a comparatively small number 
of displaced persons arrived in Greece since 2014, the term “refugee crisis” centers Eu-
rope, yet again. Instead of the fundamental right to human dignity, Frontex is defend-
ing the borders of whiteness. Instead of globalizing the Western gaze, humanitarian 
discourse must be decolonized, first and foremost by attending to the coloniality of 
militarized border regimes and contemporary crises of displacement around the world.
Abolition Democracy
In contrast to neoliberal constructions of the subject as a self-possessed agent, grass-
roots solidarity groups leverage private property or possession of physical assets to 
assist refugees with shelter, safe passage, and data connectivity. An active squatting 
movement continues to mobilize legal frameworks that bestow relative inviolability 
on EU citizens to not only aid and host but also accompany and shield undocumented 
claimants of asylum from state violence. Over the past decade, autonomous refugee 
movements have staged collective actions that ranged from organized caravans, oc-
cupations of public squares and empty buildings, and frequent hunger strikes100 to 
demand freedom of movement, freedom of residency, community control, and legal 
status for all.
During a solidarity visit in Berlin in 2015, Angela Y. Davis characterized the refu-
gee movement as “the movement of the 21st century.”101 After being denied access to an 
occupied school by district authorities, she walked with organizers and allies of the 
occupation before coming to a halt at the closed gates of the school. Filmed with a 
hand-held camera, she listened attentively to the refugee activists, asked questions, 
and witnessed the gathering of supporters in the street that opposed the pending evic-
tion of the school. One young man explained, “Even German animals are living better 
than we refugees, I’m telling you.” Another emphatically agreed, “Yes.” She identified 
herself as one of the activists that set up the “International Women’s Space,” a wing of 
the occupied school reserved for refugee women.102 “They evicted us very badly, on a 
rainy day,” she shared. After losing access to the school, several refugee activists were 
forced to seek refuge at a nearby church. Scandalizing the dehumanizing treatment of 




Anyone could be a  refugee. Today  I am a  refugee. But  I don’t know about  tomorrow, 
somebody else has to be a refugee. […] Before we became refugees, there were thou-
100   See Vrasti & Dayal, “Cityzenship;” Mudu & Chattopadhyaya, Migration, Squatting and Radical Autono-
my; Bargu, Starve and Immolate; Mitchell & Sparke, “Hotspot Geopolitics versus Geosocial Solidarity;” 
Stierl, Migrant Resistance in Contemporary Europe.
101   Tosco, “Angela Davis.”




Unlike the assimilationist “We Refugees” Hannah Arendt described in her 1943 essay of 
the same title,104 the “we” pronounced by autonomous refugees and their allies in Ber-
lin, Calais, Athens, and elsewhere describes a political collectivity forged through con-
scious resistance to racism and state violence through media activism. As the above 
statement illustrates, refugee activists act out of a sense of historical responsibility 
for others. Despite a lack of individual choice, they find ways to engage in “purposeful, 
politically motivated act[s] of protest”105 and hail a “new relation of self to self (and to 
others).”106
Gabriela, identified as a queer woman from Chile and one of the organizers of the 
“International Women’s Space,” explained to an interviewer that she needed collabora-
tors, not help. “In my opinion, people should get together when they empathize with 
others, when they share the reasons to fight together, when they think the struggle is 
also for them.”107 She emphasized, “they should fight not because they feel guilty or 
have pity.”108 Insofar as people claiming asylum in Europe struggle to “create bonds of 
solidarity, friendship, [and] autonomy”109 by opposing the Lager system of administra-
tive detention,110 refugee activists “invent novel practices of common life and subjec-
tivities, from the ground up, insisting on a new imaginary that is independent from 
the politics of life and death signified by sovereignty itself.”111 By opposing border re-
gimes with a practical “will to live together,”112 they model an ethics of resistance to 
death-worlds that threaten to engulf most of us, eventually.
No longer aligned with the dominant rationality of self-interest, practices such as 
lip-sewing and hunger striking function as “embodied truth-acts”113 that forge a “re-
lational mode of subjectivation.”114 By “doubly” withdrawing from speech and nour-
ishment, argues Bargu, refugees reconstitute themselves as political agents in an 
extremely constricted field of action.115 Their unsanctioned acts of protest negate the 
negation of shared humanity — dehumanization, that is — in border zones and deten-
tion centers across EUrope. The demands and actions of refugees call for practical 
forms of solidarity that exceed the compassionate stance of humanitarian advocacy. 
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ses of activists facing down the dehumanizing forces of security and surveillance, not 
least through the quotidian act of snapping a “selfie,” require those of us who are no 
longer, or not yet, refugees to listen closely. In the cracks and crevices of racist border 
regimes, abolitionist imaginaries are f lourishing.
The Calais Crisis
Real Refugees Welcome, Migrants “Do Not Come” 1
Farah Atoui
In times of “crisis” […] we must ask anew: Who has 
become a migrant? Which forms of human mobility 
are classified, or recognized, or disavowed as mani-
festations of “migration”? Moreover,  it  is  crucial  to 
ask: Who does, and who does not, come to be governed 
as a “migrant”?
—The New Keywords Collective, “Europe / Crisis”
Fear  is  the  anticipatory  reality  in  the  present  of  a 
threatening future.
—Brian Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Af fective Fact”
Thomas Nail opens The Figure of the Migrant with the affirmation that “the twenty-first 
century will be the century of the migrant.”2 In the context of this defining histori-
cal instance, I take the New Keywords Collective’s invitation to ponder questions of 
definition and classification as a starting point to engage with the discursive me-
diation of the so-called migrant / refugee crisis in Europe. I focus on the British con-
text — which intensively mediated the migrant camps of Calais, France as a focal point 
of threat — critically scrutinizing the key terms that have been deployed in the British 
political establishment and mainstream news media to shape popular perceptions of 
migration and refugeeism. My analysis centers on the keyword “crisis,” as well as on 
the bifurcated keywords “migrant / refugee,” as these terms constitute key political op-
erators around which political and media discourses proliferate within the discursive 
field of migration. I focus on Calais as a site of entry to shed light on the specific politi-
cal and governmental responses these keywords generated, as well as on the ways in 
which they constituted a series of bordering practices and immigration and asylum 
regimes.
The intellectual and political orientation of this research takes its inspiration from 
the work of the New Keywords collective, which is concerned with destabilizing exist-
1   This phrase is taken from a public address by the president of the EU Council Donald Tusk at a press 
conference in Athens, March 3, 2016.
2   Nail, The Figure of the Migrant, 1.
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ing objects and categories of migration, providing a new critical theorization of mi-
gration and borders, and producing a counter-discourse in the field of migration. I 
share the Collective’s conviction that migration keywords are more than mere words. 
Rather, they frame in essential ways the stakes of contemporary migration research, 
and related debates, policies, and matters of governance. These keywords are key 
sites of struggle where competing and conf licting political aspirations, projects and 
practices collide. On the one hand, as suggested elsewhere in the current volume, the 
“hegemonic discursive formations of crisis”3 shore up European governmental policies 
and practices, from intensified border enforcement and militarized police violence to 
the sweeping illegalization of human mobility as a management strategy. On the other 
hand, the autonomous movements,4 practices and mobilizations of migrants and refu-
gees who “appropriate movement and claim space”5 as they seek safe and promising 
places to stay in Europe defy borders and contest normative categories of citizenship, 
national identity, and belonging.
The term “crisis,”6 which by 2015 had become a more or less standard frame of 
reference through which to understand the “unauthorized” migratory movements of 
people across and within the borders of European states, was mobilized to particu-
lar effect by British politicians and media to describe the migrant camps of Calais. I 
take then-Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2015 denunciation of the Calais migrant 
camps as evidence of a widespread migrant crisis as a starting point to examine the 
epistemic and political work performed by that particular term. Drawing on the work 
of Brian Massumi, I examine how the keyword “crisis” conjures various temporalities, 
and how, through their interplay, these temporalities operate on an affective level to 
simultaneously produce migration as a future threat and erase its past, its historicity.7 
In so doing, they legitimize governmental measures that seek to securitize Europe and 
Britain against migration and to discipline migrants. While my analysis begins in 2015, 
I am particularly concerned with how this specific moment of crisis was preceded by a 
longer series of crises that established the affective and symbolic reserve that rendered 
the 2015 crisis legible as such. I claim that this recursive operation — which in many 
ways contravenes the very sense of political and historical singularity that crisis as a 
keyword attempts to impute to migration — works through a logic of preemption (of 
the threat of migration)8 to consolidate a new form of governmental power. This logic, 
through which the vision of migration as an impending crisis recursively constitutes 
itself, is nowhere more pronounced than in the operations of another of the British 
media and state’s preferred migration keywords: ‘illegal.’ I argue that the refugee / eco-
3   De Genova, Garelli and Tazzioli, “Autonomy of Asylum?”, 240.
4   De Genova, Garelli and Tazzioli explain that from an autonomist perspective, migration is conceived 
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nomic migrant distinction is mobilized by various formations of sovereign power,9 
from the British government to the EU, to “illegalize”10 migrants as a preemptive meas-
ure, and to thus justify their exclusion from the international regime of refugee rights 
and protection. In other words, I show how the representation of all Calais migrants 
as potential “illegal” economic migrants by British politicians — a representation cir-
culated and amplified by mainstream newspapers — is the mechanism by which these 
migrants are discursively and politically excluded from the category of refugee and 
produced in turn as always already illegal. I also show how this illegality gets attached 
not only to certain types of mobility, but to specifically (non-white) bodies according 
to a neocolonialist logic of racial and class hierarchy and differentiation, and produces 
them as vulnerable and exploitable subjects.
Solve the Crisis! Stop the “Swarm”!11
The year 2015 marks a decisive turning point in the development of contemporary dis-
courses of migration. Due to the increased pace and scale of migratory movements to 
Europe during the second half of that year, the EU declared that a vast “migrant / refu-
gee crisis” was underway, and that it threatened Europe’s control over its borders, as 
well as its security, its identity, and its values. As De Genova, Garelli and Tazzioli af-
firm, “what has been designated unanimously by European authorities as a migration 
or refugee crisis […] signals an impasse for the effective and efficient government of 
multiple cross-border mobilities that is figured as ‘crisis’ only inasmuch as it signifies 
a crisis of control — a crisis of the sovereign power of the European border regime.”12 
This potent framework was expanded to include the northern French city of Calais fol-
lowing an incident in which a few hundred migrants charged the UK-France border 
barriers during the summer of 2015.13 Speaking to ITV news in July 2015, David Cam-
eron, then Prime Minister of the UK, expressed that he was “totally focused” on the 
“Calais crisis,” and vowed to address it through various measures, including intensi-
fied securitization of Britain’s maritime and submarine borders with France, offshore 
preemption — what Cameron described as “deal[ing] with the problem at the source, 
that is stopping so many people from travelling across the Mediterranean in search 
of a better life”— and finally increased domestic immigration enforcement designed 













A crisis is defined as “an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a deci-
sive change is impending,”15 and as such, it seems to demand urgent intervention and 
immediate action. A crisis thus conjures a particular temporality: even as it demands 
action in the present moment, it anxiously looks toward and attempts to preempt a 
potential future catastrophe, some shift that is impending. In “The Future Birth of 
the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat,”16 Brian Massumi insightfully 
theorizes how this temporality operates and, more importantly, how it gets politically 
instrumentalized. Massumi argues that while “threat is from the future,” it has “an 
impeding reality in the present.”17 This is because whether the potential danger that 
the threat anticipates for the future exists or not, a threat is real because it is felt to be 
real, in the form of fear. Massumi ties the affective ontology of threat to a new and 
dominant form of political power: preemptive power. Preemptive power takes threat 
as its object and preemption as its “operative logic,”18 justifying defensive actions that 
are designed to prevent the felt potential (of) threat from actualizing, and to protect 
public security. Through the production and sustenance of threat, preemptive power 
creates the conditions that justify its own exercise, and thus, is able to perpetuate it-
self recursively. The keyword crisis, as mobilized in the discursive field of migration, 
works in a similar manner. It temporally oscillates between future (the future threat of 
further or increased migration) and present (the current atmosphere of fear that this 
threat produces). So situated, crisis becomes affectively operative, galvanizing a sense 
of collective fear which in turn legitimizes anti-migrant actions that promise collective 
security. In other words, the discourse of crisis justifies preemptive measures that ex-
pand the ambit of state sovereignty, and increase the state’s power to govern migrants 
and mobility. For instance, Cameron, during his interview with ITV, vowed to respond 
to the crisis by increasing police presence at the border, by further investing in border 
security, and by erecting border fences at the port of Calais and at Coquelles (site of 
the French entrance to the Eurochannel). He also promised to pursue illegal gangs that 
help migrants get to Britain, and pledged to intervene domestically by “throwing out 
more illegal migrants,” passed new legislation that made it more difficult for them to 
stay in Britain. These mechanisms, dedicated to what Massumi refers to as the “modu-
lation” of the “felt qualities” of the environment, are precisely what give preemptive 
power an edge over other forms or regimes of power.19 Put differently, these preemp-
tive defensive measures enable Cameron to modulate the public fear around migra-
tion, by reaffirming Britain’s power over its borders and over cross-border human 
mobilities.
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The discursive operation of crisis relies on various metaphors of pathology and 
disease. These are used as governmental tactics to demonize migrants, and to thus 
manufacture the collective sense of fear that needs to be modulated. The epistemic 
move of associating the term crisis — defined as “the turning point for better or worse 
in an acute disease or fever; a paroxysmal attack of pain, distress, or disordered 
function”20—to the term migration pathologizes migration by representing it as a 
disease, fever, or pain attacking the European body, and causing its dysfunction. As 
the New Keywords collective argues, “the very terms ‘migrant crisis’ and ‘refugee crisis’ 
tend to personalize ‘crisis’ and relocate ‘crisis’ in the body and person of the figurative 
migrant / refugee, as if s / he is the carrier of a disease called ‘crisis,’ and thus carries 
the contagion of ‘crisis’ wherever s / he may go. Most importantly, the figure of the mi-
grant / refugee hereby threatens ‘Europe’ with its incurable and contagious malady.”21 
The camps in Calais and their residents were openly represented as a pathogenic threat 
in some British newspapers. For instance, The Daily Mail, the second biggest-selling 
British daily tabloid newspaper, denounced the Calais camp’s “squalid” condition, as-
serting that it is “rife with disease, violence and prostitution.”22 According to this re-
port, published in August 2016, “Calais jungle [was] at ‘breaking point’ as number of 
migrants passes 9000 and camp becomes a ‘major health and security risk’.” The Daily 
Mail was thus claiming that disease, violence and prostitution were at the very door of 
Britain, waiting to infiltrate the nation with and through the contagious bodies of the 
migrants who were seeking to cross the channel from Calais. The Daily Express used 
the same wording to warn that the 9000 migrants in Calais were so dangerous that the 
camps were a “police no-go zone.”23 The Daily Express was thus alleging that the “dan-
ger” characterizing the Calais migrant camp was threatening to spread through entire 
British nation if migrants were to be allowed in. In yet another article, The Daily Mail 
actually claimed that the migrants jumping into lorries going from Calais into Britain 
were contaminating the food products that these lorries were transporting.24
These metaphors of pathology and disease are some of the various strategies that 
proliferate under the discursive regime of crisis, and keep it potent by affectively satu-
rating the environment with a sense of fear. Another effective and pernicious meta-
phor that Cameron draws on to depict migrants is that of the “swarm.” Conjuring the 
visual image of a large and dense body of insects, Cameron compounds the repellent 
image of a contagious disease with the equally revolting image of a swarm of insects, 
thus producing an image of migrants that is intended to invoke visceral and instinc-
tive feelings of disgust and fear. The term swarm was circulated by the mainstream 
media, intensifying the sense of a crisis in Calais, one that threatened the very body 
of the nation. The July 31, 2015 edition of the Daily Mail displayed on its front page 
a collection of photographs of “illegal” migrants being arrested by the police across 
southern Britain under the all-uppercase headline “THE ‘SWARM’ ON OUR STREETS.” 
Cameron’s metaphor, dutifully repeated in the press, is not incidental. Swarm was 







novel “Le Camp des Saints” to describe the “attack” of France by migrants from the In-
dian continent. This racist and violent book, which laments the fall of the native French 
population and of the Western civilization following the migrants’ “invasion” popular-
ized racist and xenophobic terminologies — such “tidal wave” and “swarm”— which are 
today used in some mainstream media to represent migration. These terms have also 
gained currency in far-right American and French political circles. The book, for in-
stance, has been cited by far-right politicians such as Marine Le Pen and Steve Bannon 
to advocate for anti-immigrant measures in Europe.25
The discourse of a Calais migrant crisis, bolstered by the various metaphors that 
have been used by British politicians and by news outlets from the BBC to The Times to 
The Daily Mail to represent migration and migrants to Europe — from contagious dis-
ease and “swarm” to “tidal wave,” “f lood,” “invaders,” and “marauders”26—performs, 
to draw on Massumi again, “an operative logic […] that combines an ontology with an 
epistemology in such a way as to endow itself with powers of self-causation.”27 That is, 
these terms epistemologically constitute migration and migrants as a potential threat 
which is affectively and collectively felt in the form of fear of what migrants “would do” 
if “they could” access Europe — what Massumi calls “the double conditional”— which 
in turn, legitimizes preemptive actions that deny migrants access to Europe under the 
pretext of safeguarding European security. Put differently, these metaphors are mo-
bilized by politicians and mainstream media as techniques to make up crisis as a par-
ticular kind of discursive regime which assembles all the migrants in Calais into one 
nameless, faceless, pathological and threatening mass, producing the figure migrant 
as “the generic identity of a potential threat,”28 and rendering migrants themselves 
subject to a mode of preemptive power that is invested in governing migration and 
securitizing borders.
The discursive regime of crisis not only implicates the future to act on the present, 
but it also restructures the past by disappearing the historicity of migration. The narra-
tive of crisis indeed invokes a nostalgic account of a mythical past that was supposedly 
absent of migration, and that was disrupted by the threat of the migration crisis. The 
language of crisis therefore forecloses the structural nature of exclusion and exploita-
tion that produces the migrant “camp” as an ongoing phenomenon. As Miriam Ticktin 
argues, the attachment of crisis to a sense and language of emergency “makes [the 
situation] seem as if it is an exception to an otherwise peaceful order. There is no space 
to understand causes or histories that might have led to or shaped this moment.”29 Put 
differently, through an alarmist representation of a momentary border control emer-
25   Alduy, “What a French novel tells us.”
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gency, the discourse of a migrant crisis obscures the structural forces and historic con-
ditions that have shaped migratory movements, and that drive thousands of people to 
risk their lives as they attempt to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe. Through its 
evocation of a mythical past that erases the history of migration, crisis conceals coloni-
al histories, their legacies and enduring effects. For Britain, this means that the Calais 
crisis belies the reality that Britain is the final destination for many migrants precisely 
because of the colonial histories that have shaped their language, culture, education, 
and imagination, and that thus have bound particular countries to the metropole. Cri-
sis also conceals the role of such economic policies as liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization — all enforced by Western powers, including Britain, through powerful 
international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank — in contribut-
ing to those forms of mass dispossession and forced displacement that drive people 
to Europe in the first place. Crisis moreover conceals the historical responsibility of 
industrialized nations, such as Britain, for climate change and its environmental ef-
fects (such as crop failure and rising sea-levels) that are driving migratory movements 
to Europe, especially out of Africa.30 And finally, crisis conceals the wars — in Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Yemen to name a few —in which Western powers are em-
broiled and that are displacing large populations to Europe.
Crisis thus essentially severs the connections between the history of European 
imperialism and neo-colonialism and contemporary migratory f lows. In the specific 
context of migration to Britain, crisis conceals the role played by Britain in shaping the 
colonial histories, and the economic, environmental and political forces that drive peo-
ple to be on the move and to transit through Calais, as they attempt to reach Britain. In 
other words, crisis conceals the longer history of the Calais camps as an ongoing crisis, 
and displaces Europe’s and Britain’s responsibility for migratory movements and ac-
countability to migrants by producing migration and migrants “as the de facto human 
refuse of ‘crises’ constructed to be strictly ‘external’ to the presumed safety and stabil-
ity of ‘Europe,’ erupting always ‘elsewhere’.”31 Crisis replaces Europe’s and Britain’s im-
plication, accountability and responsibility with a sense of imminent threat, and with 
an environment of fear that affectively galvanizes populist anti-migrant sentiments 
and legitimizes various measures taken by European governments to stem migration 
to Europe, under the pretext of re-instating safety and stability, and restoring a “lost” 
mythical past, imagined as devoid of migration and migrants.
Further, by concentrating attention on the present moment, crisis not only disre-
gards the past, but it also excludes the future. In times of crisis, there is “no time to 
think of the past or plan for the future,” Ticktin tells us.32 The preemptive actions that 
are called for by the crisis — such as the ones promised by Cameron as solutions to the 
Calais crisis — whether in the form of more borders, more fences, more security, more 
surveillance, more policing, and more militarization, or in the form of migrant illegal-
ization, incarceration, deportation, or resettlement, do not interrogate or address the 
structural conditions and forces that underlie contemporary migratory movements. 






These solutions, devised as responses to an event framed as an emergency, “demand 
a response that moves us beyond politics and into the realm of exception,” confirms 
Polly Pallister-Wilkins.33 
The Becoming of a Crisis:  
From the Sangatte Refugee Center to the Calais Migrant Camps
Contravening the very sense of urgency and singularity that the discursive regime of 
crisis seeks to create, the crisis in Calais has been intensively recursive. While Calais 
only became a focal point of the so-called European migrant / refugee crisis in 2015, it 
has been a place of migration and a transit point for migrants for decades — a disap-
peared history that intersects with that of another site, Sangatte, that although less 
known to the public, is equally important in shaping the current “migrant / refugee 
crisis.” Beginning in the 1990s, Calais, a port-town in northern France, emerged as a 
major hub for migrants attempting to cross from France to the UK where they would 
seek asylum.34 In 1999, the French Red Cross opened a refugee center in the Sangatte 
commune to offer shelter to migrants sleeping on the streets in and around Calais. 
Pierre Kremer, editor in chief of the French Red Cross magazine Croix Rouge, reports 
that “the presence of the center has elicited the wrath of local residents, who regularly 
claim that the constant comings and goings of foreigners has led to a permanent in-
security in this region. In fact, no rise in the crime rate has been registered since the 
center opened.”35 The xenophobic anti-immigrant sentiments expressed by the local 
population were exacerbated by news media and the political establishment’s repre-
sentation of the presence of migrants in Calais as a problem that required the urgent 
intervention of the state and the police. The discursive recursivity of an impending 
crisis was starting to accrete to the Calais site, and a preemptive logic mobilized to 
govern migration and migrants.
Liza Schuster traces how the Sangatte center and its residents were produced as 
a public issue in ways that ultimately drove the British government both to close the 
center and to increase security at the British-French border.36 Her analysis shows that 
Sangatte constitutes a complex conjunction of state, corporate, and civil society inter-
ests which together manufactured the “problem” of migrant crossing and simultane-
ously militated against it. Schuster explains that in 2001, the closure of the Sangatte 
refugee center became an imperative for Eurotunnel at the moment when the UK La-
bour government announced that both Eurotunnel and cross-channel carriers would 
be penalized for undocumented migrants stowing away, effectively shifting the re-
sponsibility of controlling the borders and preventing the crossing of undocumented 
migrants to these private companies.37 Eurotunnel consequently undertook to lobby 
British opposition parties to fight the Labour government’s legislation, and simultane-
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the Sangatte center, which continued to attract blame for drawing “illegal” migrants 
to the area.
“Illegal” is an operative term in the discursive representation of migrants in Calais. 
The rhetoric of “illegality” draws on the Dublin regulation, an agreement within the EU 
that forces asylum seekers to apply for asylum in whatever EU country they reach first. 
Since few migrants arrive in Britain as their first point of entry to the EU, the Dublin 
Agreement therefore acts as a powerful instrument of illegalization. In other words, 
seeking asylum in Britain renders Calais migrants de facto “illegal.” The rhetoric that 
was mobilized in British political and mediatic speeches to represent and to govern 
migrants in Calais coded Sangatte as a “migrant attraction”— obscuring its raison-
d’être as a center providing basic humanitarian assistance to refugees — and coded 
all migrants as always already illegal because they were not refugees, thus justifying 
measures to deny them entry to the UK, and to force them out of Calais. The legislative 
and discursive construction of Calais migrants’ illegality was compounded by main-
stream media spectacles: journalists were allowed into the channel terminal so they 
could document and publicize migrants’ attempts to “illegally” enter the UK. Schuster 
reports that during the summer of 2001, Sangatte was prominently featured in British 
news media: all newspapers, tabloids and broadsheets, supplemented by TV coverage, 
reported on Sangatte. The Daily Express deployed the terminology of war, describing 
migratory movements to Europe as an “invasion” to support of Eurotunnel’s demand 
for strengthening the border with France; the Mail backed a Tory MP’s request for a 
militarized intervention in the form of British troops patrolling the French coast.38 A 
sense of threat, produced by this discursive formation, was coalescing, in the form of 
collective fear, around Sangatte’s migrants and around migration more generally.
Not only was Sangatte instrumentalized to advance the economic interests of Eu-
rotunnel and the carriers, but it also became an opportunity to further political agen-
das. Conservative officials used Sangatte as an example of the Labour government’s 
incompetence in the handling of a migrant crisis during the 2001 elections, promising 
the British people to make migration and asylum a priority in their political agendas. 
With the support of all tabloids and some of the broadsheets, various Conservative 
spokespersons fed the perception that Britain had become the most attractive destina-
tion for migrants and asylum seekers because of the Labour government’s lax immi-
gration policies.39 From a refugee center, Sangatte was thus transformed by the British 
press and political establishment into a symbol of migration and border control poli-
tics in Britain, while the migrants it housed were construed as “illegal” subjects caus-
ing damage to British businesses,40 threatening the security and safety of Britain, and 
abusing its welfare system. “Illegality” was painted onto migrants because they were 
being figured as economic beings in pursuit of wealth while at the same time siphon-
ing public resources. In other words, “illegality” designated not only a strictly legal 
category, as defined under the Dublin Agreement, but also an improperly governed 
38   Schuster, “Asylum Seekers: Sangatte and the Tunnel,” 510–511.
39   Schuster, “Asylum Seekers: Sangatte and the Tunnel,” 513.





form of capitalist aspiration that was threatening to the dominant social and political 
order, and that thus needed to be controlled through preemptive action.
Massumi incisively asks: “How can a preemptive politics maintain its political le-
gitimacy given that it grounds itself in the actual ungroundedness of affective fact? 
Would not pointing out the actual facts be enough to make it crumble?”41 The response 
seems to be no. As Schuster’s study highlights, the number of asylum applications 
to the UK had actually decreased in 2001, contradicting the discourse of emergency 
and threat that was entrenched in the migration debate. And yet, following mount-
ing pressure — from Eurotunnel, the Conservative Party and the media — the British 
Home Secretary David Blunkett pressed the then-French Interior Minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy to close the Sangatte Red Cross center, describing it as “a magnet for illegal 
immigration into Britain.”42 The center was shut down in 2002, and while Britain took 
in a portion of the center’s residents under a “burden-sharing agreement” and France 
took in another portion,43 the British government introduced a new bill aimed at tight-
ening the nationality, immigration and asylum system. In defence of this bill, Blunkett 
stated that the government’s aim is not to create “Fortress Britain” but to break the 
image of Britain as “soft touch.”44 The bill’s aim was thus to restore the British people’s 
confidence in Britain’s territorial sovereignty, its border enforcement system, and its 
immigration and asylum regime. Put differently, the bill’s aim was to reinforce the 
mechanisms that modulate the collective atmosphere of fear around migration. The 
manufacturing of the “threat” of migration in Sangatte legitimized the intensifica-
tion of border control in the Calais region. The agreement between France and Britain 
indeed entailed an increase in the number of French border police across the channel’s 
ports, and the extension of Britain’s immigration control across the border to France.45 
What took place around Sangatte prefigured, and uncannily anticipated, the next mo-
ments of crisis in 2009 and 2015, thus marking the recursive nature of the Calais Crisis. 
The structure of this crisis, far from being singular and totalizing, is highly repetitive, 
and it is precisely its recursivity that acts as the enabling condition for an ongoing but 
constantly mutating politics of preemption, and a self-sustaining preemptive power.
The rhetoric of migrant illegality (and its association to threat) which had shaped 
the representation of Sangatte in the early 2000s resurfaced in 2009 to mediate the 
representation of migrant camps in Calais, and quickly came to dominate the debate 
around the politics of migration, border and asylum control policies in Britain. The clo-
sure of Sangatte’s refugee reception center in 2002 did little to slow the arrival of mi-
grants to and the passage of migrants through Calais. The center’s residents relocated 
to the surrounding area, and new migrants continued to arrive, with the hope of cross-
ing the border to Britain. Smaller, temporary camps started emerging around Calais, 
one of which expanded dramatically despite French authorities’ sporadic attempts to 
demolish the shelters and disperse their inhabitants. This site came to be known as the 
Calais “jungle.” Like the Sangatte refugee center, the Calais migrant camps became a 
41   Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact,” 55.
42   Travis, “Britain to accept 1200 migrants in Sangatte deal.”
43  UNHCR News and Stories, “Last Groups to Leave for Britain As Sangatte Closure Looms.” 
44   “Blunkett Closes Asylum ‘Loopholes’.”
45   Travis, “Britain to accept 1200 migrants in Sangatte deal.”
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f lash point of political interests and a signifier of a larger politics of mobility control.46 
When in 2009, French riot police bulldozed the informal settlements and rounded up 
their dwellers, sending adults to detention centers and minors to shelters in Eastern 
France, French Immigration Minister Eric Besson justified this operation by declaring 
that Calais was not a humanitarian camp, but a base for human trafficking and illegal 
migration.47 His claim was supported by the British, who this time refused to take in 
any migrants yet did not hesitate to instrumentalize this event, emphasizing Britain’s 
commitment to the prevention of illegal migration and human-trafficking. Home Sec-
retary Alan Johnson expressed his “delight” about the camp’s closure, and stated that 
Britain would not be forced to take any “illegal” migrants: “genuine” refugees would 
have to apply for asylum in the country from which they accessed the EU, while non-
genuine refugees would be returned home.48 
The distinction between a refugee and other types of migrants is rooted in the defi-
nition set forth by a United Nations treaty, the 1951 Refugee Convention, which today 
constitutes the key legal document forming the basis of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) work.49 This document codifies the rights of a refu-
gee at the international level, who is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion.”50 The asylum seeker is described as a person waiting to be recognized as 
a refugee (but will not necessarily be recognized as such), while the economic migrant 
is defined as a person who “normally leaves a country voluntarily to seek a better life. 
Should she or he elect to return home they would continue to receive the protection of 
their government.”51
At the outset, the UNHCR terminology defining the distinction between a refugee, 
an asylum seeker, and an economic migrant elicits questions that shed light on the 
problematic assumptions and implications of such normative categories of differen-
tiation and classification. For instance, given the complexity and entanglement of mi-
gratory patterns and motivations, is it even possible to categorize migrants into tidy, 
mutually exclusive groups? Can a migrant not be simultaneously displaced by unrest 
in their home of origin and have economic motivations as well as desires to ameliorate 
their situation? How are the conditions in the home country determined to be “safe” or 
not for someone’s life or freedom? Does not economic disaster and catastrophic cli-
mate change constitute a threat to one’s life? Does not war, internal strife, or conf lict 
undermine one’s economic well-being? Is war not an economic phenomenon? Nicholas 
De Genova, Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli shed light on the role of the fault lines 
between the category of “migrant” and that of the “refugee” in constituting the crisis in 
Europe, particularly the manner in which migrant management policies and humani-
tarian responses are premised precisely on the exclusion of economic migrants from 








De Genova et al. problematize this “customary governmental partition” and its “exclu-
sionary juridical reification and rarefication of the status of refugee” by affirming that 
“every act of migration, to some extent — and in a world wracked by wars, civil wars, 
and other more diffuse forms of societal violence, as well as the structural violence of 
deprivation and marginalization, perhaps more and more — may be apprehensible as a 
quest for refuge, and migrants come increasingly to resemble “refugees,” while, simi-
larly, refugees never cease to have aspirations and projects for recomposing their lives 
and thus never cease to resemble “migrants.”52
The distinction between refugee and asylum seeker performs the same work, since 
the very term “asylum seeker,” argues the New Keywords collective, “is always already 
suggestive of a basic suspicion of all people who petition for asylum within a European 
asylum system.”53 In other words, migrants are all guilty, until they prove their worthi-
ness and deservingness of European protection, which is a rare occurrence, because 
as the New Keywords collective further adds, “the European asylum system routinely 
and systematically disqualifies and rejects the great majority of applicants, and there-
by ratifies anew the processes by which their mobilities have been illegalized.”54
The indeterminacy of these definitional exclusions, bound by the framework of in-
ternational law which reduces the complex and multi-causal contexts in which people 
move, operates as a form of power that is crucial to the virtual politics of crisis and to 
the manufacturing of fear. This indeterminacy is both discursively and politically lev-
eraged in anti-migration debates and actions, as it enables states to govern migrants 
through the “illegalization” of undesirable forms of mobility. In Calais, the discursive 
distinction between “genuine” refugees and “non-genuine” refugees creates on the one 
hand, a category of tolerable / legal migrants who would be given access to Europe, and 
on the other hand a category of undesirable / “illegal” migrants who can and should 
be turned back. This, of course, is mere justificatory discourse, since according to the 
Dublin regulation, there are no instances where migrants could be treated as refugees 
or asylum seekers in the whole of the zone for crossing between Britain and France. 
The UNHCR’s institutional and juridical framework thus leaves power in the hands of 
nation-states to categorize migrants and to draw the line between “genuine” refugees 
who are deemed worthy and deserving of protection, and other migrants who are not. 
As Daniel Trilling affirms, “international law aims to protect refugees while allowing 
states to retain control of their borders — but the definition of ‘refugee’ status is po-
litical, and subject to a constant struggle over who is deserving and who is not.”55 By 
leveraging the exclusion of migrants from the UNHCR’s structures of protection and 
rights, the British government is able to bypass the principles of non-refoulement56 
and non-penalization for illegal entry that underpin the 1951 Geneva Convention (a 
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with basic rights. Daniel Trilling elaborates on the various technologies deployed by 









The 2009 destruction of the migrant camps in Calais — a culmination of the escalat-
ing tensions around migration politics — received significant media attention. John-
son’s statement was reproduced by mainstream British media, including the BBC, The 
Daily Mail, The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, and media images of the camps’ 
demolition and of the arrested migrants were widely circulated,59 reinforcing the nar-
rative of migration as illegal and threatening in British public opinion. Echoing rep-
resentations of the Sangatte refugee center and its residents of the early 2000s, the 
2009 migrant camps in Calais became the object of the exercise of preemptive power. 
And yet, similarly to 2002, the dismantling of the migrant camps did not alter the pat-
tern and intensity of migration. Migrants started gathering again, and migrant camps 
sprang up, eventually resurrecting the Calais “jungle” into the “new jungle.”60
At the height of the so-called “European migrant / refugee crisis” in 2015, Calais 
once again occupied a significant place in British mainstream news outlets and in the 
discourse of the British political establishment. The language of crisis, extended from 
the broader European migrant crisis to the specific site of Calais, helped justify an-
other spectacular destructive intervention by the French government.61 The operations 
began in 2016, when French police forces and demolition workers — “cleaners,”62 ac-
cording to French officials — descended onto the camp site to destroy migrants’ make-
shift homes and to dispose of their meagre possessions, supposedly bringing migrants’ 
















what Nicholas de Genova calls a “border spectacle:” that is, the use of the border as a 
theatre for the spectacle of law enforcement that renders migrants’ “illegality” both 
visible and natural.64 Images of the evicted migrants, of the camps’ destruction and 
its before and after, and of the French policemen in action were widely, and generally 
uncritically, circulated by global news media — from CNN, BBC, and the New York Times 
to Euronews and AlJazeera. These were the representations of a “global” migration crisis 
being effectively managed by the French and British governments.
Calais (and Sangatte before it) has thus been the center of political and media at-
tention for sustained periods of time. Its repeated feature in political discourses and 
in ominous headlines amplified the affective performance of threat, effectively trans-
forming the threat into an “ambient thickness:”65 the crisis. That is to say that the Calais 
crisis was already well underway by the time it coalesced in 2015 as a so-called politi-
cal or sociological crisis. 2015 was in effect a re-animation of previous crises-in-the-
making that built off each other, and affectively charged a repository of images and 
sites that culminated into a deliberately manufactured migrant / refugee crisis. The 
anticipation of the crisis as an affective state, then, provided “ungrounded” grounds 
for border securitization projects and migration / asylum control regimes, and enabled 
Britain (and the EU more generally) to extend its sovereignty over territory and people.
Economic Migrants: The (Not So) Generic Identity Of A Potential Threat
Returning to David Cameron’s interview on Calais, his strategic use of the term “illegal 
migrants” to represent all Calais’ migrants — a term circulated by mainstream media 
who also speak of the “bogus,” “fake,” and “non-genuine” refugees of Calais — operates 
through a preemptive logic. His speech stigmatizes migrants in the social imagination 
by asserting that all migrants in Calais are frauds66 and passing for refugees to reach 
Britain, and take advantage of its economy, take jobs away from British citizens, and 
abuse its welfare services, which is why they should not be let into Britain, or should 
be kicked out of Britain if they are already there. Cameron thus discursively and politi-
cally produces migrants as “illegal” in order to preempt the potential effects of their 
presence in Britain and to justify their exclusion. This exclusion mechanism is part of a 
larger European discourse that serves to justify increased governmental interventions 
in the management of cross-border mobilities, and to solidify the European border 
regime. During a press conference held in Athens in March 2016, the European Coun-
cil President Donald Tusk warned “all potential illegal economic migrants”: “Do not 
come to Europe. Do not believe the smugglers. Do not risk your lives and your money. 
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is rendered fraught, and is used as a discursive mechanism of illegalization. As the 
New Keywords collective explains, “in the discourse of the ‘migrant crisis,’ it would 
seem that the term ‘migrant’ in fact refers exclusively to ‘illegal’ migrants, and there-
fore is profoundly implicated in the rendering of ‘migration’ as inextricable from a 
global / postcolonial politics of class and race.”68
The “economic migrant” (or “migrant”) is thus far from a neutral category. The nar-
rative of threat — to Europe’s safety, economy, security — that this category mediates 
is attached not only to certain types of (undesired) mobilities, but also, and especially, 
to Black and Brown bodies. In 2015, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond plainly 
revealed the association of a European migration crisis with Black bodies when he said, 







According to Hammond, if Europe were to “absorb millions of migrants from Africa,” 
it would not be able to “protect itself” and preserve “its standard of living and social 
infrastructure.” Hammond’s discourse represents all economic migrants to Europe as 
poor Africans, and all Africans as a potential threat to the European Body. Black bodies 
are “always already weaponized,” affirms Christina Sharpe, as the narratives of Black 
bodies as carriers of danger, disease and disaster that were entrenched during slavery 
persist to this day and are manifest in the ongoing criminalization of Black bodies.70 
Another carrier of threat to the European Body is the Muslim male body (see Za-
blotsky, this volume). Associated to the threat of terror, Muslim male bodies, in the 
post-9 / 11 geopolitical world order, are also always already weaponized, and framed 
as the object of the War on Terror. The association of migration to the threat of terror, 
and thus to the Muslim body, is nowhere clearer that in the 2016 Ukip Brexit refer-
endum campaign poster “Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all.” This anti-migrant 
poster was a call to action for the British people to reclaim the UK’s borders by voting 
Brexit: “We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders” read its 
sub-headline. The poster comprises an image of a queue of mainly non-white migrants 
crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border in 2015, where the only prominent white person 
is hidden by a text box, as pointed out in The Guardian.71 Challenged about the poster, 
UKIP leader Nigel Farage asserted that the photograph used was “undoctored,” and 
















By discursively conf lating migrants with “jihadi terrorists,” Farage’s discourse con-
strues all migrants to Europe as potential “terrorists,” and thus as a potential terror 
threat that should preemptively be dealt with, through anti-migration policies and 
measures that are justified as anti-terrorist ones. While Farage’s discourse aims to 
stoke a reactionary populist backlash to migration and to enlist the support of na-
tivists for the Brexit campaign, this discourse is indicative of the broader European 
migrant crisis’ preemption logic which entangles anti-Blackness and Anti-Muslim 
rhetorics with Anti-Migrant views and policies to produce a collective sense of threat 
embedded in the legacies of slavery, and saturated with the lingering fear of post-9 / 11. 
Refugees and migrants are refigured as suspects, as part of a “security crisis,”73 and 
represented as potential terrorists that are seeking to infiltrate the space of Europe.74 
Within the political formation of preemptive power, Migrant, as the “generic identity of 
potential threat” thus takes on specific qualities: Migrant is illegal. Migrant is poor. Mi-
grant is Black. Migrant is brown. Migrant is male. Migrant is Muslim. Migrant is terror-
ist. Migrant, is produced as an illegalized, racialized, classed, and gendered identity, 
attached to Black bodies and Muslim Brown bodies who are always already figured 
as threat, who are represented as a danger to the European body politic — its secu-
rity, standards of living, and social infrastructure — and who are imagined as Europe’s 
“breaking point,” and must thus be preemptively apprehended, detained, rejected, ex-
pelled.
And yet, the migration and border control regime is not one of exclusion only. As 
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson argue, this regime is one of dif ferential inclusion, 
which selects and filters migrants according to a capitalist logic to include their labor 
power as a commodity in global labor markets under new conditions of accumulation, 
exploitation and domination.75 Their argument echoes Nicholas de Genova’s assertion 
that “some [migrants] are deported in order that most may remain (un-deported)—as 
workers, whose particular migrant status may thus be rendered ‘illegal’.”76 The intent 
of illegalization is not solely deportation; it is the creation of a condition of deport-
ability that renders undocumented migrants more vulnerable, and thus more exploit-
able as cheap and disposable labor.77 In other words, the deliberate attachment of the 




75   Mezzadra and Neilson, Border as Method.
76   De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” 439.
77   De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” 439.
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states to rearrange (or rather cement) labor relations under conditions of late capital-
ism, according to a neocolonial logic of racial and class differentiation and a neoliberal 
logic of market forces. Through various technologies of migration governance, Euro-
pean states transform migrants into a vulnerable, exploitable and expandable source 
of labor, thus creating a transnational f lexible (and non-white) labor commodity at the 
disposal of market forces. Migrant is thus not only a socio-political identity, it is also an 
economic one. Migrant becomes cheap disposable labor.
Calais constitutes an ideal case study in the ways in which the figure of the migrant 
is discursively, politically and affectively manufactured as a threat, as well as illegal-
ized, and rendered vulnerable, deportable and exploitable. Calais, as a site, thus holds 
potential for subsequent research on how Calais migrants, as unruly economic figures 
that are undisciplined by the global division of labor and the transnational circulation 
of capital, are subjected to economic regularization, and transformed into a pool of 
cheap labor and made available to European labor markets, to help redress the Eu-
rozone economic crisis. Calais also constitutes a site of crisis of the European project 
itself, as it was not only produced as a symbol of the larger European migrant / refugee 
“crisis,” but, as a “crisis within a crisis.” (Im)migration is indeed a pillar of the Brexit 
campaign, and the securitization of borders is meant to protect Britain against the 
“threat” of not only migrants, but the threat of Europe as well.
The affective reality of threat, felt in the form of fear, and its transformation into 
an ambient thickness, is enabled by the discursive regime of crisis, and its intense-
ly recursive structure. The regime of crisis is sustained through the discursive and 
political forces of mediatic and political speeches which mobilize keywords such as 
“crisis,” “refugee / migrant,” and “illegal” that produce migrant as the new identity of 
potential threat, and justify new preemptive anti-migrant governmental measures. 
These new enactments of sovereignty point to the emergence of new political forma-
tions — preemptive power key among them—that seek to control cross-border human 
mobilities through various strategies and technologies. And yet, the material impli-
cations (on the lives and subjectivities of migrants) of the recursive nature of crisis, 
and the political and discursive forces of this new power formation, are countered by 
the autonomous force of migration, and the recursive persistence of migrant encamp-
ments. As journalist and asylum researcher Alex Fusco asserts, “It hardly needs to be 
said that sending in police to forcibly expel inhabitants and backhoes to demolish the 
structures will have no effect on patterns of migration. Desperate people wanting to 
get to the UK will continue to f lock to Calais. And if not Calais, Dunkirk. And if not 
Dunkirk, then the next patch of French coastline that offers a viable launching point 
for crossing the channel.”78 Since 2016, migrants have indeed been setting up tempo-
rary camps in and around Calais, Dunkirk and elsewhere in Northern France as they 
continue to attempt to cross the channel to the UK.79 Calais, then, is both a border 
spectacle and a site of persistence. It is a site for a challenge at the very heart of the 
language of crisis.
“A social wave is a transportation of social force […] A wave transports a qualitative 
change or social force of solidarity or collective disruption” says Thomas Nail.80 Nail 
78   Fusco, “The Futile Destruction of the Jungle in Calais.” 
79   Bulman, “The Lost Childhoods on Britain’s Doorstep.”
80   Nail, The Figure of the Migrant, 125.
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identifies a form of counter-power, invented and deployed by migrants (historically 
and in the current historical conjuncture), as an alternative to the conditions and tech-
niques of social expulsion to which they are subjected. Deploying an aqueous metaphor, 
Nail poses an alternative to the pejorative use of the term “f lood” in media and political 
discourse, offering instead the image of the “wave” to characterize migration as a uni-
fied (yet heterogeneous), unpredictable, irregular social force of solidarity and disrup-
tion that overf lows dominant territorial, economic, political and juridical orders. This 
turbulent collective social force challenges the hegemonic categories of differentiation 
and classification that frame our conceptions of cross-border mobilities and migrants, 
and limit our imagination of how these could be thought / represented / perceived / act-
ed upon otherwise. By accepting these distinctions and the value / rights they assign 
to migrants’ lives and motivations, we indeed contribute to the production of “eco-
nomic migrants” as “illegal” migrants, and in so doing, we sanction the violence, both 
epistemic and material, that is performed in the name of these categories. The social 
force of migrants brings to light the relations of inequality, violence, and exploitation 
that these categories conceal, and that are embedded in, and constituted by, the global 
system of migration management. The social force of migrants de-reifies these catego-
ries which operate pervasively — and define the dominant discourse on migration — to 
appear to us as natural, normal, common-sensical, ahistorical and necessary, and un-
settles their definitional exclusion which constitutes the very essence of the language 
of crisis. The social force of migrants is in excess of the discursively constrained socio-
political and economic identity of the migrant, and of the regime and techniques of 
cross-border human mobility control. It is also in excess of the humanitarian logic of 
care, and the liberal discourse of human rights. This turbulent collective social force 
demands a radical rethinking of mobility, migrants, territory, and belonging, from the 
perspective of migrants and of migration, which produces the state, and not people on 
the move, as a crisis.
SOPHIA
The Language of “Trafficking” in the Mediation  
of Gendered Migration1
Krista Lynes
On November 5, 2017, the Spanish ship Cantabria, a vessel in the European Union’s Op-
eration SOPHIA “anti-trafficking” program, docked in the port of Salerno in southern 
Italy. Alongside the survivors, the ship carried the bodies of 26 young Nigerian women 
and girls who had perished in two shipwrecks off the coast of Libya. Because the only 
victims of the shipwrecks were women, the Italian authorities opened an inquiry to in-
vestigate whether the women had perhaps been purposely killed — thrown overboard 
by traffickers in the Mediterranean.2 The Communications Officer for the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Marco Rotunno, informed the press that it was highly 
probable that the women were victims of sex trafficking rings. Traditional and social 
media in Europe and North America, which focused on the episode over the space of 
several weeks, circulated multiple images of a body bag suspended in mid-air, unload-
ed from the hold of the Cantabria. Some photographs were tightly cropped, indefinite-
ly suspending the corpse’s landing; others showed the corpse dangling over a series 
of hearses, whose doors stood open for a seemingly infinite number of victims; still 
others revealed alternately the surviving migrants descending from the ship’s deck, 
or ship staff (clothed in white protective gear and blue gloves and face masks) control-
ling the procession off the boat.3 The representation of the female victims vacillated 
between massification and singularity — between the individual coffin suspended 
in mid-air and the row of hearses, between naming the women (the two identified by 
family members) and un-naming them (in their anonymous repetition).
1   This article expands and elaborates a brief commentary piece that appeared  in the  journal Feminist 











These images re-crystallized the figure of migrant death circulating in media im-
ages (not the least among them the press photograph of a drowned boy, Alan Kurdi, 
on a resort shore in Turkey), which in their volume and velocity have created the very 
contours of the “crisis” as such. Never mind that when the autopsies had been com-
pleted it was concluded that the women showed “no signs of abuse” and that they had 
simply drowned, the images nevertheless continue to constitute a repertoire for visu-
alizing trafficking in its trans-Mediterranean dimensions.4 As the facts of their ac-
cidental drowning came to light, the story virtually disappeared from the news, its 
everyday depiction of the mortality of crossing less mediatic than the speculations that 
drove the press attention to the story at the outset.5 Nevertheless, as Radha S. Hegde 
explains, such sites of mediation form a critical site for elaborating the causality of 
the crisis (the distinction of “refugees” from “economic migrants,” for instance, or the 
focus on “rescue” vs. “securitization”), for framing social reality, and for giving shape 
to the figure of the migrant — steeped in thickly gendered, racialized and classed im-
aginaries.6
As a story of gendered migration, one where the risks of the perilous crossing of 
increasingly fortified borders is unevenly borne by women, it both masks more than it 
reveals, and reveals more than it lets on: on the one hand, the focus on trafficking sco-
tomizes a more complex and dilated vision of the conditions, causes and conclusions of 
gendered movement, and thus works to obscure the complexity of gendered migration 
across the Mediterranean; on the other hand, though, the very focus on trafficking, 
its emphasis on the fungibility of migrant life, and the cast of characters that come to 
dramatize the rescue operation crystallize both allegorically and with striking literal-
ity the haunting instrumentalization of Black women’s lives in and through media-
tions of migration as crisis.
It is thus vital, as Ariella Azoulay’s understanding of the “civil contract” of pho-
tography suggests, to pull at the threads of the so-called migrant crisis’ mediation of 
gendered movement and trace the image “in such a way as to reopen it and renegoti-
ate what it shows, possibly even completely overturning what was seen in it before.”7 
This strategy is particularly necessary given the pervasiveness, the insistence, and the 
recursivity of images of death and drowning in the Mediterranean, and the specificity 
of the gendered and racialized imaginaries that frame the outlines of the corporeal 
















on both shores of the Mediterranean. The mediation activates an internal reservoir 
of images that are — in Azoulay’s terms — “planted” very differently in different bod-
ies, sometimes while its subjects are unaware of the violence involved, often in an 
instantaneous fashion (a snap-shot), “ruling out any opportunity for negotiations as 
regards what they show or their genealogy, their ownership or belonging.”9 The im-
ages of death work (as I have previously argued) either to confirm a body hypostatized 
and enshrined as an ideal of transparency, one which effaces the liveliness of social 
life, even in death,10 or to confirm a necropolitical aesthetic, an iconic reminder of the 
power of death and exclusion wielded by state and para-state structures across the 
Mediterranean.11 How might we (differentially located in the West) receive the image 
of a coffin hovering over the port city of Salerno? How might the phenomenon of “traf-
ficking” itself shape the closures contained in the image, the image’s taken-for-granted 
status as a story of gendered migration? What might be reopened through it regarding 
the tangle of gender, sexuality, mediation and migration? 
The setting of the Cantabria rescue focalizes accounts of gender-based migration 
squarely around issues of “trafficking,” occluding in their wake the EU’s increased 
border “securitization” policies, externalized border controls, treaties with third coun-
tries, and denials of family reunification visas, all of which render travel routes more 
perilous and incidences of violence more significant.12 As will be elaborated below, the 
United Nations Security Council, making use of “trafficking” as its justification, has 
put forth a resolution that would authorize Europe to use military force to stop mi-
grant smuggling boats that set off from Libya across the Mediterranean.13 Simultane-
ously, the EU’s externalization of its border operations, and accordingly its support to 
Libya (both on its territory and with its “Coast Guard” and Navy), directly impacts the 
incidences of gender-based and sexual violence faced by people on the move.14 Smug-
gling operations have become more significant as EU border securitization policies 
have rendered routes of travel more perilous and incidences of violence more signifi-
cant. They are accordingly an effect of the consolidation of border securitization re-
gimes rather than their cause. Smugglers have both assisted and threatened refugees 
seeking safe passage, frequently providing the only possible movement towards Eu-
ropean shores under new border security regulations. For women with insufficient 
means to pay their passage, transactional sexual relations frequently constitute the 
only manner in which women and sexual minorities may move through and along 
smuggling routes.15 












Despite the dominant rhetoric’s depiction of women as victims of trafficking, 
women are more frequently deported or penalized for seeking asylum in the EU, this 
despite Italian legislation that grants victims of sexual exploitation a right (at least on 
paper) to remain in Italy in order to protect them from their perpetrators and provide 
for their “rehabilitation.”16 It should also be noted that the focus on trafficking works 
to eclipse the violence and traumas that greet minoritized subjects upon their arrival 
in Europe, exacerbated by the various “hotspots” that the EU has created to respond to 
the waves of refugees in Greece and Italy. Both the Common European Asylum Sys-
tem (CEAS) and Frontex operations have “mainstreamed” gender equality issues into 
their directives, which in principle oblige EU member states to take gender issues into 
consideration in the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, and in refugee status 
determination procedures. In practice, not only is no attention paid to issues of gender, 
but border guards themselves may be the source of (gender-based and sexual) violence 
and human rights abuses against migrants and refugees.17 A focus on sexual exploi-
tation or forced prostitution has thus, rather than fortified international protections, 
instead shifted policy towards “anti-trafficking” border securitization measures.
Thus, while trafficking is a significant site for women’s exploitation and experi-
ences of violence (and indeed gender-based and sexual violence is omnipresent at every 
stage of movement), confounding the categories of “trafficking” and “smuggling” in 
fact eclipses both the various shapes violence takes (by armed forces, police, smugglers 
and traffickers, other refugees and members of one’s own family) and the multiple 
forms of (more or less voluntary) movement across state boundaries that propel gen-
dered movement across state borders. The script of women being ‘trafficked’—which 
is a key trope through which gendered migration is mediated and visualized — serves 
to assign women to the clear category of victim, rendering impossible and unthinkable 
the willfulness and agency of women (much less the shifting constitution of gender) 
in movement. In this mediation, the corpse becomes a key modality of representation, 
binding migrant movement to death, isolating networked actions into singular (or se-
rial) victims, focalizing the transit over the arrival, and literally dangling the figure of 
the migrant in mid-air, suspended in the thick of trajectories of movement and border 
securitization measures.
Trafficking and ‘Containerization’
In the case of the Cantabria ‘rescue,’ trafficking provided the lens through which the 
gendered violence of the Mediterranean crossing came into focus. Most of the press 
coverage in the initial days reiterated a statement by the prefect of Salerno, Salvatore 
Malfi, who noted that sex trafficking frequently employs specific routes and dynamics: 
“Loading women onto a boat is too risky for the traffickers, as they could risk losing all 
of their ‘goods’—as they like to call them — in one fell swoop.”18 Malfi’s statement pro-
vides a coda for critically reading this story of gendered migration against the grain of 





image, namely the eerie resonance between the images from the Cantabria and the 
image repertoire of container shipping in the commercial maritime trade. The vacilla-
tion — in the image and Malfi’s statement — between human subject and commodified 
object, the embeddedness of the female corpse within the commercial logics of trans-
national shipping, binds the “migrant crisis” to the calculus of trafficking and loss that 
instrumentalize life — and black women’s lives particularly — within the economic log-
ics of global trade.
Trafficking is, of course, thoroughly imbricated in these logics. It rides upon the 
structures of globalization, using its circuitous routes and decreased internal border 
controls to support a broader structure of bonded sex-work. Rasheed Olaniyi notes 
that the traffic in women can be traced back to “the ‘engine room’ of western capital-
ism, namely the trans-Atlantic slave trade and slavery, which spanned over 300 years.”19 
In the wake of slavery’s abolition, trafficking took the form of forced abductions, false 
marriages, false adoptions, and forced sex-work. Trafficking is not solely a story of mi-
gration but of displacement engendered by a militarized global economy. Particularly 
in relation to Nigeria, trafficking has been a longstanding concern, with women traf-
ficked through border towns and communities, including Delta, Akwa Ibom, Lagos, 
Imo, Rivers, Ondo, Kano, Ebonyi, Osun, and Enugu, transported across Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast, and then by sea to Italy, or through Morocco and Libya as transit points for 
onward movement to Spain and France.20 Olaniyi emphasizes that traffickers them-
selves may also be women, relying on the capital and connections acquired through 
the sex trade to then organize rather than be organized by its commerce. Rather than 
tell a story of gendered migration that relies on clear gendered distinctions between 
trafficker and trafficked, Olaniyi emphasizes that the driving forces of trafficking are 
“the advance of capital over labor and nation states, economic recession, neo-liberal 
political transition and instability and corruption.”21 She points to Nigeria’s depend-
ence on the petroleum industry, for instance, as a contributing factor in supporting 
trafficking networks.
For Christina Sharpe, cargo containers (what Allan Sekula and Noël Burch call 
“coffins of remote labour-power”) are connected to the journeys of Africans over land 
and across the Mediterranean Sea as “asterisked histories of slavery, of property, of 
thingification, and their afterlives.”22 She calls these processes the “containerization of 
people” or the “asterisked human” (with a play on the term “risk” which presents itself 
in this term) to point to both the “shippability” of life as well as its excess, the manner 
in which the prefix trans- in the Trans-Atlantic points to a range of configurations of 
Black being in movement. Among these trans* processes (and I return to them later in 
this essay), Sharpe points to “transubstantiation,” a process of “making of bodies into 
f lesh and then into fungible commodities while retaining the appearance of f lesh and 
blood.”23
In this respect, the use of the violently anodyne term “pay as you go” to describe 
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violence of present conditions of slavery, indentured labor, and exploitation that are 
constitutive of the passage across the African continent, the Mediterranean, and the 
European Union. Unpacking the term “trafficking” thus becomes an instrument for 
identifying the imaginaries of gendered movement across a broad range of media, 
and the vacillation between voluntary and involuntary forms of movement contained 
therein.
The images of the Cantabria ‘rescue’ rest both on the specter of transnational trade 
(of the free passage of goods over labor, of the trade in human subjects-as-objects) and 
also on the ghostly architectonics of the trans-Atlantic crossing, because of the instru-
mentalization and jurisprudence that underwrote the structures of the slave trade. 
Christina Sharpe attends to the historic calculability of Black life in slavery and its 
afterlives by recounting the story of the Zong, a 1781 slave ship which ran low in provi-
sions and jettisoned some of those enslaved in order to “save the rest of the cargo.”24 
Sharpe reminds us that this act of violence defined modern structures of insurance 
value, risk and loss in the economy of maritime commercial transit, and constituted 
the “mathematics of Black life” still at play in catastrophes such as the Lampedusa 
shipwreck,25 but (in my estimation) in the Cantabria deaths as well. Understanding 
the distribution of risk by traffickers across separate crafts, and the calculus of po-
tential loss entailed, is thus only thinkable within the architectonics of the persistent 
instrumentalization of Black life.
The language of trafficking, or of human cargo, thus reveals something of the re-
figuration of subjection mapped by, among others, Saidiya Hartman. For Hartman, 
the language of rights fails precisely because liberty, sovereignty and equality not only 
coexist with — but also depend on — extant and emergent forms of intensified domi-
nation, subordination, indebtedness, inferiority, encumbered status and subjection.26 
Insofar as liberation freed black subjects into a fungibility in and through which their 
capacities could be quantified, measured, exchanged and alienated, abstract equality 
thus actually bestowed an encroaching and invasive form of social control over Black 
bodies. The language of ‘human cargo’ thus exposes the fungibility of the Black body, 
the exchangeability of subjects, within the violent contemporary social order, marked 
by what Hartman called the “nonevent of emancipation.”27 What the language of ‘traf-
ficking’ exposes (at times as its ghostly unconscious) is the mechanisms in and through 
which movement across the Mediterranean is already marked by a logic of accumula-
tion and the fungibility of the Black body.
What’s in a name?
The mediation of gendered migration is thus caught up in the constraints posed by the 
story of “trafficking,” even in discourses whose aim is humanitarian: a story where the 
representation of women vacillates between subject and object, and where the figure 
of the corpse violently abstracts and anonymizes women on the move. I argued in an 
24   Sharpe, In the Wake, 81.




earlier article that the story of the Cantabria’s rescue is marked by a descriptive f lux 
(describing the women as girls at times, women at others, young women or women 
between the ages of 14 and 20).28 This liminality highlights a kind of unwritten catego-
ry error — of girl-women or women-girls, of humans and ‘goods,’ of Nigerian women 
crossing the Mediterranean from Libya — produced by the very act of migration. Their 
liminality is unassigned in media coverage, which ignores “how this liminality is a 
mark of the border-identities and thresholds through which gender articulates itself 
time and again as it crosses state and geo-political systems and structures.”29
Movement, which Sharpe indicates through the term Trans*— ”translation, trans-
atlantic, transgression, transgender, transformation, transmogrification, transcon-
tinental, transfixed, trans-Mediterranean, transubstantiation”30— forces a critical, 
conceptual, aesthetic and political imaginary that is lateral, that crosses relations in 
movement across land and sea, across bordering regimes, across forms of making and 
unmaking that constituted gendered and racialized bodies-in-motion. But instead of 
the unmooring of gender that transition and transitivity entail, the women’s identities 
in the Cantabria mediation are governed only by loss and erasure, by the verticality of 
maritime and port infrastructures.
What work does the concept of “trafficking” do not only to the understanding 
of gendered migration, but also to its mediation in Euro-American media contexts? 
Azoulay’s invitation cited above to “reopen the image and renegotiate what it shows” 
allows us to f lesh out the named and unnamed figures in gendered migration, to 
examine their echoes, the passage of subject-to-object, of migrant-to-vessel, of anti-
trafficking-to-border security. Instead of asking whether the women were voluntarily 
killed by traffickers, for instance, we might begin by asking how we account for an 
“anti-trafficking” operation embedded in the apparatus of the EU’s border securitiza-
tion measures.
How indeed can we reopen the Cantabria story through Azoulay’s invitation to re-
negotiate what its iconic images show? In the midst of the erasure of Black women’s 
agential possibility (of the impossibility of thinking a will-to-move by Nigerian wom-
en), the “life-saving” EU anti-trafficking operation, Operation SOPHIA, speaks volumes 
about the movement of peoples through juridical frameworks, policing and security 
operations, treaties and pacts with third countries, the externalization of borders, and 
imaginaries of passage that inform and materialize gendered migrant death, beyond 
the media’s framing of gendered migration as instances of “trafficking.”
How to renegotiate a border security operation named after a young Somali child 
born aboard a German frigate, itself named after a figure of German imperial power? 
How can we name the willful forgetting that forces these condensations to remain un-
packed? And how to do so without reconfirming the language of rights or freedom 
curtailed by anti-trafficking discourse from the outset?
First, SOPHIA — the operation: The setting of the ship Cantabria (and the “rescue op-
eration” under the auspices of Operation SOPHIA) focalizes accounts of gender-based 
migration around issues of trafficking, using both the terms “smuggled” and “traf-
28   Lynes, “Drowned at Sea,” 2.
29   Lynes, “Drowned at Sea,” 2.
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Krista Lynes236
ficked” to describe women’s passage across the Mediterranean. As Rigo makes clear, 
borders mirror the “imperialistic genesis of the world order […] and confirm its current 
postcolonial condition.”31 Anti-trafficking operations must accordingly be examined 
for the manner in which they assign migrants to distinct legal, political and symbolic 
spaces, and thus hierarchize movement according to gendered, racial and class cat-
egories. The EU’s anti-trafficking operation might be parsed in both its pre-nominal 
and post-nominal dimensions: as EUNAVFOR MED — a “military crisis management 
operation”32—and as “Operation SOPHIA,” a new name for the operation, coined to 
“honor the lives of the people we are saving, the lives of the people we want to protect, 
and to pass the message to the world that fighting the smugglers and the criminal net-
works is a way of protecting human life.”33
EUNAVFOR MED, which was established on May 18, 2015 following the death of 
800 migrants after the boat in which they travelled sank off the Libyan coast, forms 
part of the EU’s common security and defense policy (CSDP) military response to hu-
man smuggling and trafficking in the Southern Central Mediterranean, and focuses 
particularly on trafficking organized in Libya. It outlines several phases of operation, 
moving from the detection and monitoring of migration networks to the boarding, 
search, seizure and diversion of boats — first on the high seas, and following this, in 
the territory of coastal states.34
Its new designation — EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA — occurred in Septem-
ber 2015, when the Operation Commander, Admiral Enrico Credendino, proposed the 
new name on the occasion of a visit by High Representative and Vice-President of the 
European Commission, Federica Mogherini to the mission headquarters in Rome. Op-
eration “SOPHIA” because a Somali child born on board the German frigate Schleswig-
Holstein on August 24, 2015 was named after the earlier battleship, the Schleswig-Hol-
stein, which in 1905 went by the radio call “Sophie.” This shift in nomination, ratified 
by a Council Decision in October of 2015, accompanies a shift from detection and 
monitoring of the high seas to boarding, search, seizure and diversion of vessels (and 
ultimately, to operations in Libyan territorial waters, with military capacity-building 
for the Libyan “Coast Guard” and Navy offered in return). In this juridical regime, mi-
grant populations are frequently turned back to a country where they will face deten-
tion, brutality and persecution, contributing to what Paul Strauch calls “a concerning 
norm of militarized extraterritorial border control.”35
The Operation’s capacity to move between the high seas and territorial waters 
constitutes what Dal Lago names the “militarization of contiguity,”36 a networked 
coordination with NATO’s Active Endeavour mission, as well as Frontex, Europol, and 
the International Maritime Organization. Further, despite the poetics of Operation 










activities, not on saving lives.37 One might also note that, despite the fact that both 
Operation Sophia and Operation SOPHIA (capitalized) are used in news reportage on 
the operation, the legal documents indicate the name in a capitalized form, “SOPHIA,” 
which pulls the name towards its operational acronym (EUNAVFOR MED) and away 
from the body of the Somalian infant, from which it nevertheless continues to draw 
its humanitarian force. The operation’s framework of “preventing more people from 
dying at sea” is based not on a politics of rescue but on preventing more people from 
boarding boats. While it acknowledges the existence of a “human emergency” in the 
Mediterranean, it does not refer to migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean as po-
tential asylum seekers or refugees, this despite its concern with trafficking. In this 
respect, calling Operation SOPHIA a “life-saving operation” (as news sources did in the 
case of the Cantabria “rescue”) obscures its participation in the very vulnerability from 
which it “rescues” people.38
SOPHIA’s politics of prevention, along with its policing of Libyan waters and its 
support for the Libyan “Coast Guard” and Navy, thus constitute not simply a politics 
of EU exclusion, but, as Saucier and Woods argue, a politics of “preclusion,” a preclu-
sion premised not solely on European governmentality and biopower, but also on the 
insistence on the fungibility of the Black body prior to its capture within the circuits of 
neoliberal exploitation and alienation.39 For Saucier and Woods, anti-Black violence 
in the Mediterranean (importantly, both trafficking and anti-trafficking in this case) 
“has its roots in the earliest racial slave trade in which Italian merchants funded Por-
tuguese raiders across the Mediterranean Sea and down the Atlantic coast of Africa.”40 
The shift from the boarding, search, seizure and diversion of boats in international 
waters to the multiple arrangements with the Libyan State, and the coextensive and 
contiguous bordering operations that constitute the EU’s anti-trafficking operations 
assumes that gendered and sexual violence is a result of movement, and of illicit move-
ment specifically. A politics of preclusion presumes that home spaces may not be the 
source of conditions from which one might wish to f lee, and ultimately that sexual 
violence is a result (and not a cause) of movement. The bordering apparatuses’ anti-
trafficking gesture thus serves to keep women in the protective “care” of patriarchal 
orders all the way down the line. Further, the violence those who are trafficked face 
in the territory of the EU are disavowed by an operation that targets traffickers. Ulti-
mately, a focus on trafficking is a manner of saying that there is no legitimate asylum 














the scene of human rights abuse). Calling the operation “SOPHIA,” after the infant, 
after the ship, masks the violent border securitization the operation entails (one that 
extends European biopolitical power into the lifeworlds of the Mediterranean’s south-
ern shores) behind the face of rescue, of an infant rescued, carried by the craft that 
buoyed her into an Italian port. SOPHIA thus becomes the name for the production of 
a European social cohesion, arrived at through a politics of preclusion, reinterpreted 
as a form of humanitarianism. In this regard (even though their article dates tellingly 








The humanitarianism of anti-trafficking (particularly as it serves as an alibi for mili-
tary operations in the Southern Mediterranean) therefore sustains social life on the 
Mediterranean’s north shores through accessibility to the Black body, in both direc-
tions of trafficking and anti-trafficking operations.
Women in movement, and gendering across borders, are thus figured at once as 
both “a risk” and “at risk” — a risk to be policed by a politics of preclusion, and at risk 
and thus in need of security forces’ protection.42 The specific risk women’s movement 
poses to European identity is steeped in fantasies of race / gender / sexuality, wrapped 
up in the biopolitical regulation of reproduction and sexuality more broadly. This a 
risk / at risk juncture “serves to justify, while rendering inevitable, public sexual vio-
lence against women.”43 Moreover, anti-trafficking operations, which take place to 
“secure” against sexual violence and exploitation in the context of social, economic and 
political upheavals that are the direct result of former colonized states’ integration into 
the global political economy, are more than simply the border spectacles of exclusion. 
Anti-trafficking activism — which identifies human trafficking with a ‘new slavery’–
also positions Europeans as “modern-day abolitionists,”44 and therefore shore up no-
tions of justice, sovereignty, equality on European shores through the name SOPHIA.
The legislative, political and mediatic focus on “trafficking” then both engenders 
and dis-genders the migrant body — engenders because the trade in sex rides on sex-
ual and gender differentiation, and dis-genders because the language of units and 
cargo eclipse the subject, the person or the individual.45 The space of the ship’s hold 









to map the force of the figures of trafficker, savior, child, and ship that animate the 
passage across the Mediterranean and beyond. The fungibility of the female migrant’s 
body for producing value or pleasure and the “shared vulnerabilities of the commodity, 
whether male or female, trouble dominant accounts of gender.”47 Rather than begin 
with the violence against women perpetrated alternately by traffickers, the story of 
the Cantabria demonstrates the primacy of gender and sexual differentiation in the 
making of the worlds of migrant movement.
In this regard, policing is “a central methodology for organizing the social 
globally.”48 Operation SOPHIA thus indicates the impossibility of thinking Black wom-
en’s self-possession in movement, which persists as a site of suspicion (“a risk”) in the 
“non-event of emancipation” today. Trafficking indicates the gendered direction of this 
fungibility, in a bordering regime in which gender, race, sexuality and class are not al-
ways where one thinks, and not always in the same location. The tangle of gender, race, 
class and sexuality are constantly worked on and reconfigured by multiple actors, in 
an ongoing practice of gendering the border.
Second, Sophia — the ship: The “story” of Operation SOPHIA’s name on the agency’s 
website notes that the Somalian child (Sophia) born on board the German frigate was 
herself named after the ship, the Schleswig-Holstein, which was dedicated to the 
Prussian princess Sophia of Schleswig-Holstein, a figure in the courts of Prussian 
imperial power and colonial expansionism in the late nineteenth century. Christina 
Sharpe’s In the Wake teaches us to pay attention to the naming of boats and people, as 
she traces the epistemic violence entailed in naming a young girl, Phillis Wheatly, after 
the slave ship (the Phillis) on which her transatlantic abduction was carried, and the 
slave owners (the Wheatleys) who purchased her on her arrival in Boston, Massachu-
setts. Sophia. Phillis. The particularity of a proper name erases itself as the exchange 
between girl child and ship reverses itself again and again — from ship to child, from 
child to ship — enacting recursively the general law of value in the context of migration 
as crisis, and in the afterlives of the transatlantic passage: What does it mean to be a 
subject, and what does it mean to be an object?49
The German frigate’s operations along the coast of Libya also signals the ubiquity 
of border operations, made up of control technologies that are pixelated rather than 
linear.50 The frigate itself has operated for multiple agencies and in vastly disparate but 
interconnected geo-political contexts. For instance, it was deployed as part of the Mar-
itime Task Force of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 2009, and worked on behalf of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to destroy Syrian chemical 
weapons and complete military exercises in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf in 
2014. More importantly, it deployed with Operation Atalanta, the common security 
and defence policy (CSDP) which preceded Operation SOPHIA, working to counter pi-
racy off the Somali coast. This operation was devoted specifically to transferring per-
sons suspected of having committed acts of piracy and armed robbery. The frigate is 
47   Hartman, “The Belly of the World,” 83.
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thus imbricated in a range of security and defense policies across the Mediterranean, 
crossing agencies and jurisdictions, national actors, international and transnational 
agencies, in patrols relating to commerce, military material and piracy. Its redirection 
to the Libyan coast as a vessel for EUNAVFOR MED thus manifests and allegorizes the 
ties that bind the movement of humans, commodities, cargo, and weapons.
This contemporary militarized oceanic infrastructure, however, is superimposed 
with a mythical structure indexed by the name Sophia, which binds this specific craft 
to EUNAVFOR MED’s Operation. Sophie refers to the radio call sign used by an ear-
lier Schleswig-Holstein destroyer, itself a reference to the early battleship the SMS 
Schleswig-Holstein, which had been dedicated to the Prussian Princess of the same 
name. The name Sophie is thus bound to German naval history. The website of the Ger-
man Navy notes the story of “Sophia” in a news release from November 7, 2015, re-







The eponymous first frigate, dedicated to the Prussian Princess, was laid down in the 
dockyard in Kiel, Germany in 1905, a mere twenty-years after the Berlin Conference 
and in the thick of Germany’s imperial Weltpolitik. As an instrument of imperial vision, 
however, it comes late to sea, after Britain has demonstrated its preeminent control in 
the manufacture of battleships, and when new ship-building technologies had made 
the Schleswig-Holstein too small, too poorly defended and too slow to effectively put 
into motion a Weltpolitik for the twentieth century. Thus, while Sophia conjures an im-
aginary of German imperial power on a global scale, it in fact indexes a moment of 
falling profits, overcapacity, fierce competition, and worldwide shipping crises.52
Third, Sophia — the Prussian princess: An anomaly of history: a brief footnote in the 
annals of the New York Times reveals that Princess Louise Sophie of Schleswig-Hol-
stein-Sonderburg had several near-death experiences, including once in 1896, when 
the Princess and one of her ladies, Baroness Colmar, broke through the ice while skat-
ing near Glienicke Castle in Potsdam. Prince Frederick Leopold of Prussia, her hus-
band, was upbraided by the Emperor William II for the “indifference of his treatment 
of his wife” and consequently placed under arrest for fourteen days, confined in a room 
in his castle.53
Operation SOPHIA thus exposes which names remain in the record, and which 
names do not. The mediatized focus on trafficking covers over the stories of gendered 
movement in a veil of anonymity and indifference, making it impossible to identify, 





cess Louise Sophie’s travails are an object of public record. SOPHIA thus figures (by 
reverse) the irreconcilable gulf between the Prussian Princess, Louise Sophie, and 
the young Somali child, Sophia, born aboard a German frigate in the Mediterranean 
Sea. Read against the grain of its obscure operations, SOPHIA performs the work of 
holding together in a name the afterlives of colonialism, imperialism, and slavery that 
shape the “crisis” of contemporary movement.
Fourth, (philo)Sophia — Knowledge, complicity … SOPHIA is an operation for naming 
what migration-as-crisis doesn’t know that it knows, what it obscures in the name of 
the proper pronoun. In this regard, an Afro-pessimist position calls out “the efforts, 
on the part of [identity-based politics] to produce a coherent subject (and movement), 
and [reduce] antagonisms to a representable position,” calling these a circumscription 
of liberatory potential and an “extinguishment of rage with reform.”54
And hence, Sophia — the child: Saidiya Hartman argues that “gestational language 
has been key to describing the world-making and world-breaking capacities of racial 
slavery.”55 In her view, the ship’s hold carries this world making / breaking capacity. 
Under slavery, the mother could not claim the child, could claim only the transfer of 
dispossession to the child under a systemic process of natal alienation.56 In Spillers’ 
words, “‘kinship’ loses meaning, since it can be invaded at any given and arbitrary mo-
ment by property relations.” This theft and regulation bind themselves to the afterlives 
of slavery. Women in the hold of the ships crossing the Mediterranean remain also in 
the hold of the language of units and cargo, a language that eclipses the subject as an 
individual person. In this context, “f lesh provides the primary narrative rather than 
gendered subject positions.”57
Taken individually, the Sophias that constitute the dramatic scene of “trafficking” 
across the Mediterranean operate according to incommensurable logics: one, an inex-
haustible, militarized, metonymic action that absorbs all objects and subjects into its 
order — system, child, ship, signal, princess — under the name of a failing but persis-
tent imperial order of things; the second, an unnamable refusal of the child who does 
not name herself, who does not consent to the ship’s hold, to the engineer-midwife who 
assists at her birth, who does not wish to bind her body to a radio signal, much less 
a Prussian princess … and yet, who is named and in whose name policing-becomes-
humanitarianism.
Taken together, however, Sophia names a nexus — of migration in its gendered, 
raced, and sexed complexity, returned to the context of the unfinished processes of 
imperialism, slavery, primary accumulation and state violence. As a name that holds 
together these processes, it exposes the name of the operation itself, SOPHIA, as a 
reservoir for imperial thinking. In so doing, it assists in removing the “planted images” 
I referred to at the outset of the body bag as the icon of women-in-movement, those 
“phantom pictures” Ariella Azoulay sees as embedded in bodily memory. This sophia 






of gendered and racialized movement. It labors to attribute images to their creators 
and initiators (not the body bag but the crane, the dock, the coast guard, the hearse, 
the medic), and “allows civic negotiations about the subject they designate and about 
their sense.”58 It indicates, without achieving, a fuller way of knowing migration that 
does not displace this fullness wholly into the epistemic, learning from Afro-pessi-
mism’s emphasis on the ontic status / non-status of blackness in the white supremacist 
colonial world system.59 This alter-sophia names a position that is “neither constituted 
nor circumscribed by the sovereign.”60
The gendered, racialized movement named “trafficking” in the current discourse 
of crisis names this eclipsing of subjectivity in the language of anonymity, and covers 
over a view into another motion, another gesture, another resistance, another refusal: 
“What is the text of her insurgency and the genre of her refusal? What visions of the 
future world encourage her to run, or propel her f light? Or is she, as Spillers observes, a 
subject still awaiting her verb?”61 Rather than a name, then, a verb: not craft but craft-
ing, the vexed, contradictory, perilous poetics of crossing, what Edouard Glissant calls 
a “thinking thought,” a “knowledge becoming.”62 The Cantabria and the Schleswig-
Holstein are ships; the migrants’ boat is a craf ting.
What the erasures and revelations of the Cantabria story suggest — traced through 
the figure of the name Sophia — is that the mediation of migration needs to radically 
re-envision women’s movement beyond the language of “trafficking,” and beyond a 
focus on images of death and drowning. Rather than mediating migrant loss princi-
pally through narratives of “trafficking”— narratives which enforce the view of those 
on the move as involuntary captives of transnational f lows (including f lows of media 
and the circulatory dynamics of images)—we thus need to understand the complexity 
of movement in its entangled voluntary and involuntary dimensions.
Mainstream Western media needs to be confronted with media produced by mi-
grants and activists, which visualize and unpack the complex calculus that instigates 
decisions to move, and migrant experiences. There needs to be space for images of 
both gendered movement (with all its violence, risk and exposure), and the real threats 
of non-movement (of detention and deportation, among other holding patterns).
As scholars also, we need a framework for understanding the shifting and consti-
tutive force of gender, sexuality, race and class in shaping both the character and tra-
jectory of migration. This shifting force attunes us to the transitive character of identi-
ty itself for people on the move, particularly in and across state borders. Over a decade 
ago, Ursula Biemann maintained that — rather than take a human rights approach to 
issues of sex trafficking — she would prioritize a geographical theoretical framework, 
which would allow her to link geopolitics to subject formation.63 The visions of globality 
produced by satellites, the infrastructures of rescue and surveillance, press agencies, 
and migrants themselves visualize and enact a sexual, gendered, and racialized econ-
omy of displacement on a global scale. Biemann observes that “trafficking hinges on 
58   Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 13–14.
59   I thank Tyler Morgenstern for drawing out this insight in reading an earlier draft of this chapter.
60   Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 21.
61   Hartman, “The Belly of the World,” 88–89.
62   Glissant, The Poetics of Relation, 1.
63   Biemann, “Remotely Sensed,” 181–182.
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the displacement of women, their costly transportation across topographies from one 
cultural arrangement to another, from one spatial organization to another, from one 
abandoned economy to a place of greater accumulations. It is the route that counts.”64
Gender and sexuality are more than subjective attributes of (or data points for) 
migrants and refugees; they are forces that organize the trajectories of movement, the 
transactions across boundaries, the economies of exchange, the patterns of reception, 
and the politico-aesthetics of images of crossing — and they do so on and through the 
body. Literature on gender-based migration emphasizes that gender is “a latticework 
of institutionalized social relationships that, by creating and manipulating the catego-
ries of gender, organize and signify power at levels above the individual.”65 The deci-
sion to move, its voluntary and involuntary dynamics, the vast terrain of negotiation in 
which movement advances in fits and starts, en-genders and de-genders migrant sub-
jectivity. Gender operates on multiple and frictional spatial and social scales (the body, 
kinship structures, the state) across transnational territories. Within and across these 
scales, gender ideologies and relations are alternately reaffirmed or reconfigured.66
Enrica Rigo paints instead a picture of women migrants who, by crossing borders, 
resist all at once the “conditions imposed on them by patriarchy, violence, wars, the sex 
industry, smugglers, and borders themselves.”67 She notes that women take advantage 
of the very migratory routes opened by the people from which they are simultaneously 
trying to f lee. In doing so, they use their bodies “in ways that reject their depiction as 
docile victims, willing accomplices or defiant opponents of their tormentors.”68
Such subjective movement is shaped by one’s location within historical, political, 
economic and geographic power hierarchies, that affect the trajectory, force and veloc-
ity of movement. Intersectional hierarchies of class, race, sexuality, ethnicity, nation-
ality and gender frame bodily life in passage, and expose subjects to their differential 
articulation in the multiple formal and informal social orders through which migrant 
subjects pass. The ability to act, to wager one’s possessions or selves depend on gen-
dered geographies of power. Doreen Massey argues that some individuals “initiate 
f lows and movement; others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than oth-
ers; some are effectively imprisoned by it.”69
These dimensions are present in the multiple testimonies, maps and guides, com-
munications, and images by and through which migrants represent their own trajec-
tories and experiences, always already “entrenched within media worlds.”70 Aesthetic 
strategies assist in lifting the lid on the complexities cooking beneath the image of 
a suspended body bag, hovering over the port of Salerno. Ursula Biemann’s Remote 
Sensing, for instance, proposes “a mode of representation that traces the trajectory of 
people in a pancapitalist world order, wherein the space between departure and arrival 






69   Massey, Space, Place and Gender, 149.
70  Hegde, Mediating Migration, 3.
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rules.”71 Similarly, Bouchra Khalili’s The Mapping Journey Project gives voice to migrants’ 
own accounts of their travels, which she records in a single shot and does not edit in 
post-production. For Khalili, the narratives (and the trajectories drawn across maps 
of the world) demonstrate not only how individuals are trapped in “nets of arbitrary 
power”72 but how they might refuse the forms of representation and visibility demand-
ed by surveillance systems, border controls, and press accounts. Such accounts and 
grassroots mediations help to reveal the force of gender-in-the-making in constituting 
the violence and loss — but also the possibilities — in the Mediterranean crossing and 
elsewhere. They also refocus media attention more clearly not only on the dangers of 
crossing, but on the pernicious “border securitization” policies that themselves nega-
tively impact gendered trajectories of movement.
71   Biemann, “Remote Sensing,” 187.
72   Michalarou, “ART-PRESENTATION.”
Solidarity and the Aporia of “We”
Representation and Participation  
of Refugees in Contemporary Art
Suzana Milevska
In all iterations of Olafur Eliasson’s Green Light, asylum seekers and refugees were 
asked to participate by producing crystalline green light lamps, consisting of polyhe-
dral units fitted with small, green-tinted light fixtures. The module was invented by 
Eliasson’s long-time friend and collaborator, Einar Thorsteinn, as part of the numer-
ous geometric studies they undertook at the studio. The small modules were made pre-
dominantly from recycled and sustainable materials (European ash, recycled yogurt 
cups, used plastic bags, and recycled nylon) and green LED lights that could function 
either as single objects or be assembled into a variety of architectural configurations. 
The lamps were ultimately sold for €250 each. Participants in the workshop, for their 
part, could access free language classes, counselling education and other workshops.
Eliasson is one of many artists who have attempted not only to depict or record 
refugees in the context of contemporary art, but also to invite them to participate di-
rectly in projects and events organized by art and cultural institutions.1 In this man-
ner, refugees become represented not only by “proxy”— in images, objects or recorded 
videos that represent their plight — but through their very presence in real time when 
they are invited to become participants, collaborators and co-producers of art projects.














There is nothing wrong with such a statement at first sight. The obvious question, 
however, is whether such “decentralized hospitality” can really occur in the contexts 
in which Olafur Eliasson staged his project, particularly when accounting for how pro-
foundly integrated the art system’s institutions — TBA21 Vienna and the 2017 Venice 
Biennale — are in the capitalist mode of production.
In Venice, the project occupied a huge space in one of the first rooms of the prestig-
ious Central Pavilion. Refugees were invited only for the duration of the professional 
and press opening, where the audience consisted primarily of journalists commis-
sioned to review the Biennial, museum and gallery directors, employed and freelance 
curators, art collectors and dealers. The participants-turned-producers were instruct-
ed on how to make the objects — in other words, there was no creativity involved on 
their side; they were simply present in the installation — and their communication 
with the audience during the exhibition’s events was reduced to a minimum.
The budget and distribution of the initial funds, as well as those raised and ob-
tained through the project, were not made transparent. In addition, thousands of im-
ages of the anonymous refugee participants have circulated ever since the installation. 
Alongside the green lights, then, the participants in Eliasson’s project were eventually 
nevertheless turned into images. One might also inquire about the fees, copyrights, 
and lecture honoraria generated from the project, and ask other difficult questions 
about the circulation and distribution of capital beyond the event itself.
This paper attempts to unravel the hidden contradictions and challenges stemming 
from prevailing expectations of this emerging strategy of participation. At first sight, 
by comparison with other art genres that use representation,3 such a strategy and 
mode of art production seems more appropriate to the current social climate (which 
the media refer as to a “humanitarian crisis” or “refugee crisis”). More traditional 
forms of artistic representation are frequently stereotypical and prejudicial, regard-
less of whether they involve fully documented citizens or refugees of various statuses 
who are kept marginalized and mostly invisible in the common social fabric. The so-
called crisis has also made already existing social tensions more visible, exacerbated by 
the outburst of hatred and racism towards recently arrived refugees (for instance, with 
the anti-Islamist and neo-Nazi Pagida riots in Germany and Austria).4 Participation in 
art projects is, thus, to a large extent imagined as a kind of enacted compensation for 
both faulty artistic representations and the lack of inclusion and participation in socio-
political life. Clearly, there is an ethical debate over whether and how to represent vul-
nerable and suffering subjects in general, but it nevertheless remains pertinent to ask 
whether and how people’s direct involvement in artistic projects substantially changes 






5  In On Productive Shame, Reconciliation, and Agency,  I  argue  that  the  neoliberal  socio-political  context 
turns many  socio-political  engaged projects  into  “infelicitous  speech acts”  that  stem  from  the  con-
tradictions between  the artists,  institutional  limitations and  the neoliberal  socio-political  and eco-
nomical paradigm of production and distribution of art. More recently Abreu’s “We Need to Talk about 
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Between saying and doing
According to various statements by Eliasson, Green Light was conceived as a metaphor-
ical “device” for refugees and migrants (in Austria and beyond) in order to employ the 
“agency of contemporary art and its potential to initiate processes of civic transforma-
tion” by eliciting “various forms of participation and engagement.”6 In an interview, 
Eliasson elaborates similar good-faith, critical intentions:








While international asylum laws differ in the various countries that hosted the pro-
ject, in most European countries (among them Austria and Italy, where Green light was 
installed) refugees do not have the legal right to be engaged in paid activities or to ac-
cess free education if they have not been granted asylum. The political institutions re-
sponsible for either embracing or refusing the requests for refugee status, legalization, 
residential permits, or citizenship rarely contemplate the means for future inclusion 
of refugees or the political frames in operation. Accordingly, participatory art is often 
seen as the only alternative compensation for a situation in which it is not unusual 
that refugees’ entire life is confined to in-betweenness and the non-spaces of refugee 
camps.
The substantial difference between inclusion and belonging (access to state institu-
tions that secure such equal civic rights as rights to education, visas, residential and 
work permits, employment, and citizenship), and the symbolic inclusion and short-
term participation in art projects is one of the main reasons it is urgent to analyze 
the political dynamics of participatory art practices that include refugees. While the 
representation of undocumented subjects in the context of political institutions oper-
ates on a different register, I would nevertheless like to challenge this difference and 
question the source of such assumptions, emphasizing that any political representa-
tion is also symbolic (and vice versa). The main questions, therefore, are twofold: first, 





7   Eliasson and Roepstorf f, “Hosting the Spirit of Green Light.” Eliasson then takes a more personal tone: 
“We know a lot about the refugee crisis from the media and from one another because we talk about 





tion of their (already) difficult position and condition; second, whether, in re-enacting 
their plight and their impeded political status time and again, such projects neces-
sarily have an advantage over figurative and conceptual artistic representation simply 
because such representations are not “mediated” and (if possible) the participation is 
paid. Most importantly, it is important to discuss whether it is possible at all to avoid 
the perpetuation of stereotypical representations and to induce sociopolitical changes 
with participatory strategies that apply the instruments of direct democracy in an art 
context.
The Aporia of “We”
What form does “inclusion” take in participatory art projects? What imagined com-
munity is figured in and through the work? During the recent refugee crisis in Eu-
rope, perhaps the biggest since World War Two, the phrase “we refugees” became a 
slogan of apparent solidarity with exiles, a mode of offering one’s own home to those 
arriving. It involved a form of political overidentification, and proof of compassion and 
empathy for people who have been stripped of their basic human rights in their new 
domiciles. Of course those who mobilize this phrase (for my purposes here, the artists 
or organizations, such as BAK, Utrecht, organizing participatory works) are not refu-
gees themselves and do not belong to the ones f leeing political turmoil in their home 
countries. Although accompanied by calls for equal participation of non-documented 
immigrants and refugees in civil society, claiming democratic rule of law and “equal 
justice for all,” the “we” of “we refugees” often rings f lat, since the slogan is ambigu-
ous and open to charges of self-interest, condescension, and even racism. The “we” can, 
even as it claims solidarity, conceal a suppressed fear of the refugee, of the ‘other’ who 
supposedly crosses the ‘threshold’ of one’s home without legitimate right to do so. It 
can also express the Eurocentric divide between ‘us’ (already settled and privileged 
citizens) and ‘them’ (the newcomers, including those, for example, from the former 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere in eastern Europe, or between Christian and Muslim im-
migrants).
Expressions of solidarity with refugees can thus conceal essentialism and conde-
scension based on citizenship, class and religion. Governments’ f lagrant neglect of re-
sponsibilities entailed by use of the “we” reveals the aporias of a solidarity founded in 
national belonging. Ever since Hannah Arendt’s essay “We Refugees,” the phrase has 
been used to express sympathy with the underprivileged, the precarious and the po-
litically persecuted.8 Fifty years later, Giorgio Agamben borrowed it for the title of an 
essay comparing Nazi concentration camps and the contemporary detention centers.9 
Agamben’s argument in favour of the use of “we,” emphasizing the need for compas-
sion towards all political subjects, was directly inf luenced by Arendt, whom he quotes 




9   Agamben, “We Refugees.” Dif ferent versions have been published under the same or dif ferent titles, 
including “Beyond Human Rights.”
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at the beginning of his essay. The sentiment organizes the politics of “inclusion” pre-
sent in participatory art practice.
Jacques Derrida’s term “hostipitality,” however, points to the complexity of the con-
cept of “belonging” and “hospitality,” unravelling the challenges to the legislation and 
socialization of refugees. Hostipitality derives from the tension between hospitality 
and cosmopolitanism, or more precisely from the conf lict between the privacy of the 
home and an unconditional ethics and openness to the world; the tension proceeds 
from fears for the stability of the home if the problems of the world enter in. Derrida 
has stressed that “If we try to draw a politics of hospitality from the dream of uncondi-
tional hospitality, not only will it be impossible but it will have perverse consequences.”10 
The aporia of absolute hospitality comes from the fact that it “requires that I open my 
home and that I give not only to the foreigner (provided by a family name, with the 
social status of being a foreigner, etc.) but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, 
and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place 
in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a 
pact) or even their names.”11
The paradox of not being able to give a gift and still have it, of not being able to of-
fer your home to the Other if you have already offered it to someone else, is related to 
issues of “power and possession.” Yet the paradox of hospitality, according to Duform-





The story about the Iranian refugee Mahboubeh Tavakoli cooking and feeding other 
refugees in Athens’ Victoria Park only two years after her and her family arrived as 
refugees in Greece defies the logic of hospitality based on sharing wealth, comfort and 
political decisions, and comes as close as possible to this ideal of unconditional hospi-
tality.13
Thus when Derrida and Dufourmantelle coined the oxymoron “hostipitality” they 
wanted to stress that the state becomes the “critic” endowed with the power to distin-
guish friend from foe, guest from parasite, hospitality from hostility, the “we” from an 
“us.”14 In the context of contemporary art, the limitations and contradictions entailed 
in the concept “hostipitality” become more apparent in participatory art. Although not 
the initial aims of the artists, these contradictions cannot be reconciled by addressing 
only the figure of the refugee without taking into account the figure of the legislator 
and the political context in which such projects take place.15





15   Milevska, On Productive Shame, Reconciliation, and Agency.
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For example, two projects by BAK in Utrecht used similar phraseology: One of them, 
We Are Here, was dedicated to refugees, and was publicized as “the first large-scale or-
ganization of refugees” established in collaboration with artists and cultural workers.16 
The other was a publication dedicated to the socio-political conditions of Roma: We, 
Refugees (2014).17 Both projects resonated with the practice of masking the sponsors or 
organization (otherwise known as “astroturfing”) because — although they were made 
to appear as though they originated from grassroots participants — there is little evi-
dence of this. There is an inner split within the “we” itself, caused by its unspecified 
and heterogeneous alignment — as if the right to use the pronoun were allocated on a 
“first come, first served” basis. However, the question of whom it includes and how one 
gains the right to utter it is not only semantic. The origins of the distrust also need to 
be discussed.
Turning words into acts
English, unlike some non-European languages, has no exclusive form of the first per-
son plural pronoun; in other words, no grammatical distinction is made between an 
all-inclusive “we” and a “we” that includes only certain addressees. Despite this fact, 
or perhaps exactly because of it, there are many possibilities for duplicity and hidden 
agendas in the use of the “we.” It is therefore necessary to discuss the difference be-
tween “saying” and “doing” in the use of the first person plural, and how its mecha-
nisms of inclusion and exclusion work in the participatory art context and beyond.
The emphasis on doing is particularly urgent given the responsibility of politicians 
and government representatives, non-governmental agencies or ordinary citizens to 
the “we,” and the f lagrant neglect of those responsibilities in the case of refugees.18 
In some cases, governments use refugees’ tragic destinies in political negotiations. In 
2002, for example, the Macedonian government opened an inquiry into the shoot-
ings of innocent immigrants who were originally portrayed in Macedonia as Al Qaeda 
mujahideen. The alleged terrorism was used to avoid the expected solidarity — the 
“we”— with the refugees. However, autopsies performed on the men (as well as po-
lice photos) suggested that the police were responsible for the shootings and had even 
staged the crime scene. All bodies had multiple bullet wounds, in one case, fifty-three. 
Later it emerged that six Pakistani immigrants and one Indian had been even lured 
onto Macedonian soil with false promises and been ruthlessly killed as a part of Gov-
ernment’s strategy to f lirt with NATO and the US administration.19
16   BAK, We Are Here.
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“We refugees” thus sometimes sounds like a hollow marriage proposal by a notori-
ous philanderer. In this respect, the concept of “infelicitous acts” is a useful way of an-
alyzing the aporias surrounding conf licting normative and legal obligations towards 
refugees.20 According to J.L. Austin, the difference between what one says and what 
one does depends on context and circumstance; context can substantially affect the 
fulfilment of a promise. In speech act theory, an unfulfilled promise is referred to as an 
“infelicitous act.”21 When a certain “we” is invoked, members of communities with dif-
ferent statuses and origins (African-Americans, Roma and travellers, homeless people, 
Syrian refugees or child-refugees of any religion) supposedly become, whether volun-
tarily or not, part of the community — a prime example of an infelicitous act.22
The problem with the “we” of “we refugees” is that it is a no-win game: regardless 
of whether one is using it oneself or disputing the right of others to do so, essential-
ism is inevitable. The right to use the “we” is pre-determined neither by genetic nor by 
ethnic inheritance or simple grammatical appropriation. On the contrary, one has to 
earn the other’s trust in order to secure the preconditions and illocutionary force to 
enable this speech act to count as having been felicitous vis-à-vis invisible hierarchies 
and privileges.
The concept of the nation-state itself does not help, since it is founded on precisely 
the same mistrust and hierarchical differentiations. Étienne Balibar has critiqued 
modern conceptions of the nation-state and examined the uncertain historical reali-
ties of the nation.23 He contends that it is impossible to pinpoint the beginning of a 
nation, or to argue that the people who inhabit a nation-state are the descendants of 
the nation that preceded it. Because no nation-state has an ethnic base, according to 
Balibar, every nation-state creates fictional ethnicities in order to project stability.24
These stable identities are produced because the greatest threat to national identity 
are the different identities that pre-existed and preceded the more recent waves of 
immigration. As Balibar puts it, “the idea of nations without a state, or nations ‘be-
fore’ the state, is thus a contradiction in terms, because a state is always implied in the 
historic framework of a national formation (even if not necessarily within the limits 
of its territory).”25 The “we” is therefore fated to be distrusted and feared, both by the 
included and the excluded, as already pointed out by Arendt in her early criticism of 
Herzlian Zionism, Minority Treaties after World War One, and her warnings about the 
problems she detected with any mode of linking the nation and state predicated on 
turning into stateless some other citizens.26
20   Austin, How to Do Things with Words. See also Felman’s The Scandal of the Speaking Body, on Molière’s Don 
Juan and his character’s double speech.







26   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 269–270.
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“We Refugees” or the impossibility of “being with”
With the arrival of Syrian refugees in 2015 at the height of “refugee crisis,” racism en-
hanced the pre-embedded Islamophobia against different ethnicities and communi-
ties practicing Islam already living in Europe for centuries, including Albanians, Turk-
ish people, or Roma. Some European Roma are Muslim, but they often claim different 
religions in local censuses exactly to avoid the consequences of racism, and yet they are 
mainly perceived as Muslims.
Balibar offered a more profound analysis of the need, but also of the danger of the 
uncritical “we.” He made a clear distinction between the different types of “we,” point-
ing out the responsibility that is lost with the appropriative “we”:
“We,  French  citizens of  all  sexes,  origins and professions,  are greatly  indebted  to  the 
‘sans-papiers’  who,  refusing  the  ‘clandestineness’  ascribed  to  them,  have  forcefully 
posed  the question of  the  right  to stay. We owe them a  triple demonstration, which 
also gives us some responsibilities.”27
Balibar’s skeptical view of the effects of the 1994 Maastricht Treaty are linked to the 
paradox that European citizenship was, from the outset, based on the false equation 
“citizenship equals nationality.” European citizenship is thus defined by restrictions on 
the right to asylum.28 The hypocrisy of the promise behind the “we” is clearly stated in 




legal  immigrants  […]); on  the other  side, nationalist and electoral propaganda  (creat-
ing scapegoats for insecurity, projecting the fear of mass poverty into the phantasmal 
space of identitarian conflicts).”29
Jean-Luc Nancy has argued that while sharing the world is an implication of our exist-
ence, and that the concept of “being” is always already determined by a certain “being 
with,” we cannot truly say “we,” or at least not ethically so. One cannot say “we” even 
about the community to which one undoubtedly belongs. The aporia of the “we” is the 
aporia of intersubjectivity.30 Nancy warns us of the impossibility of pinning down a 
universal “we” whose components always remain the same. He argues that we have 
forgotten the importance of “being-together,” “being-in-common,” and “belonging”; 
that the “we” is not a subject, nor composed of subjects. According to Nancy, we live 
our lives “without relations.”31 There can be no “we” unless the relations are established 





30   Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 75.
31   Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 75.
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This is linked to his concept of “inoperative communities,” communities that refuse 
to be state “accomplices.”32 In this kind of appropriation of the “we,” there might be 
potentials for certain positive impacts of a new “we” not based on belonging as such. 
This is a “we” that wants not to belong but to appropriate belonging, but only if this 
triggers moral responsibilities not necessarily resulting from legal, political or social 
ties.33 Nancy’s notion of “inoperative communities” gestures in important directions 
for modalities of participation not premised on the dynamics of “inclusion” or “belong-
ing” detailed above.
Kalokagathia: The reconciliation of aesthetics and ethics  
in contemporary art and theory
When it comes to general ethical principles, contemporary art remains experimental 
and, with few exceptions, not much has been formally drafted, although standard le-
gal and institutional implications apply to projects in a variety of ways. Therefore, the 
generic and officially circulated and accepted ethical principles for social science re-
search are often applied without necessary corrections.
For example, in March 2015 the British Academy of Social Sciences’ Council for-










However there is no official consent regarding any specific ethical principles to be ap-
plied in the context of participatory art, which often relies on artistic research. Given 
the complexity of different art media and the specificity of crossdisciplinary concepts, 
it is very difficult to conceptualize a uniformed set of rules to be followed by artists, 
particularly for an art form that by default tries so hard to resist rules.35 Neither is it 
clear how to reconcile the long-term tensions between ethical and aesthetic values due 
to the prevailing dilemmas imposed already by modernist theories of art, mainly due 
to the complexity and diversity of artistic practices.36
32   Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 80–81.
33   Agamben, The Coming Community, 86–87.
34   Academy of Social Sciences, “Academy Adopts Five Ethical Principles for Social Science Research.” 
35   Bolt, Alsop, Sierra, Vincs and Kett, Research Ethics and the Creative Arts.
36   Milevska, “Relations, Participations, and Other Dialogical Frameworks.”
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Yet there is also no reason why some (if not all) of these ethical principles could 
not apply to artists’ accountability when artistic research involves live participants (or 
human remains), although additional principles should be drafted specifically in the 
context of participatory and collaborative projects with a focus on the performativity 
and involvement of members of various vulnerable communities. One reason for such 
thoughts is the numerous different understandings of what art is among audiences 
coming from different social and cultural contexts not necessarily informed by the 
rapid reformulations of art and eventual challenges related to what is expected from 
or of them.37
The rigorous formalist division between aesthetic and ethical aspects of art, or 
more precisely the polarized distinction between form and content, or between the 
“beautiful” and the “good,” has in any case yielded some of the most debilitating out-
comes of modernist and formalist theory. The either-or polarity that often results from 
hierarchical positioning of one of these poles still has a key bearing on our understand-
ing of art’s position and its role in different cultural contexts and in contemporary 
society in general. The conf lation of the realm of philosophy — to which the aesthetic 
category of the beautiful belongs — and the realm of art has gradually resulted in a 
contradictory long-term pursuit of an ever more precise (and false) dichotomy be-
tween art and society, as if they could ever be isolated from each other.
Taking the current neoliberal political context as a point of departure, it is neces-
sary to reveal and disentangle the difficulties that still prevent many art theorists from 
completely (or at least partially) abandoning modernist ideals and formalist criteria 
regarding art and the valorization of its production. I find it urgent to discuss why 
and how the sociopolitical factors that enabled the long-term dominance of modern-
ist aesthetics still affect — or more precisely prevent — the embracing of institutional 
critique and participatory art as relevant contributions to art theory and art practice.
The criticism, for example, that participatory art merely caters to societal needs is 
one of many commonplaces stemming from modernist aesthetic principles — the death 
grip of formalist aesthetics’ invigilators — surrounding issues of autonomy and posi-
tioning and other contradictions. For a certain limited period after the World War Two, 
the l’art-pour-l’art position enjoyed widespread acceptance in Western art theory, as if 
the ancient ideal of kalokagathia had never existed, and as if the ideals of an otherwise 
autonomous pure art should be protected from any societal values.38
The modernist myths of originality, authenticity, uniqueness, universality, artistic 
genius, and autonomy were also inf luenced by the Russian early formalist school of 
Viktor Shklovsky and the semiotic analysis of art, wherein the issue of the arts’ au-
tonomy stemmed from political interventions in both art’s content and form.39 Joseph 
Kosuth published his early attack on the modernist aesthetics of Clement Greenberg, 
addressing Modernism’s fallibility deriving from its equation of aesthetics and art, 
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uated art.40 He was not yet ready, however, to fully abandon the understanding of art 
as an entity separate from society. The problems with calling for art’s autonomy from 
its contextual background have become clearer, although such anti-aesthetic art ten-
dencies had already co-existed with modernist art in the past, in avant-garde move-
ments in both East and West.41 
In this respect, attempts to detach art from the ethical, cultural and social codes 
and norms prevailing in the period and geopolitical context of its production became 
questionable and unattainable, for various geopolitical, sociological, and cultural rea-
sons. Thus, the reframing of the triangular relation between ethics, aesthetics and art 
is still partial, although the position of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline (and 
not only a modernist one) has weakened relevance in defining art. Modernist and for-
malist aesthetic ideals endured for only a couple of decades, but the unwinding of the 
short modernist time span via poststructuralist and postmodernist debates became a 
lengthy endeavour that continued throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and prevails 
even today.
Participatory art as a critique of institutional structures
I have argued elsewhere that the emergence of a participatory paradigm shift in the 
arts is urgent, stemming from the uneven development of theory, which lagged behind 
art practices that challenged institutional structures in art and culture.42 The shift 
from art that focused on the production of art objects towards art that implicated and 
engaged various subjects (such as art producers, mediators, audience members, and 
citizens), in order to create new and relevant relations amongst them, was imagined as 
an inevitable strategy of intervening in existing distinctions and hierarchies in order 
to change them, or to dismantle them entirely. This is one of the obvious reasons that 
participatory art, I would argue, has the potential to address, extricate and redress 
contentiousness in various cultural heritages and the issues as provenance, the decolo-
nization of museums, the repatriation of looted artefacts, etc.
However, it must be acknowledged that there are still tendencies to keep art dis-
courses away from issues of social justice and political reality — justified by the ab-
sence of relevant artworks (read: objects)—as well as to interpret art’s involvement in 
such changes as irrelevant and counter-aesthetic. Such tendencies implicate art-world 
structures in the overall socio-political and economic systemic structures, to which 
the art production system belongs by default. Ultimately, the remnants of modernist 
definitions of art are directly linked to this compromised position, to the production 
and distribution of art in the market, and to the other usual suspects of the prevail-
ing late capitalist and neoliberal economy. I want to stress, therefore, that some of the 
issues regarding aesthetic and artistic criteria for evaluating participatory art still re-
main unresolved, even as they remain pertinent to a more profound understanding of 
art’s changing role in society, and its effort to break with the inherited socio-political 
40   Kosuth, Art Af ter Philosophy and Af ter.
41   Huyssen, Af ter the Great Divide.
42   Milevska,  “Participatory  Art”;  Milevska,  On Productive Shame, Reconciliation, and Agency;  Milevska, 
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and economic relationships that facilitated the preservation of the strict division be-
tween art and society in the first place.
The fight with the formalist aesthetic canons and criteria that were instrumental 
to the emergence of “autonomy” as a privileged posture in and for artistic practice 
continues, inducing social change in the art world and elsewhere. Artistic concepts, 
genres and theoretical terms like community-based art, institutional critique, social in-
tervention, relational aesthetics, participatory art, socially engaged art and artivism — all 
conceived to provide adequate analytical means for better understanding the prob-
lems with such modernist dichotomous interpretations of the relations between art 
and society — survive. They continue to fight against conservative attempts in the art 
world to use autonomy as a tool for maintaining the status quo.
Adorno’s ref lections on the relationship between art and society gave way to differ-
ent interpretations of autonomy, so there can be several different levels of autonomy 
in art, which makes intersections across different levels and registers even more com-
plex.43 Thus a more specific analysis of conceptions of autonomy could clarify the inner 
paradox of arts’ claimed right to autonomy. Obviously, there is an overall distinction 
between social and aesthetic autonomy, but artists and their artworks also belong to 
differing and often contrasting registers of autonomy depending on their institution-
al affiliations and / or allies.
Representation, institutional critique and participation
The turn towards a participatory paradigm in the arts is based on the main assump-
tions in institutional critique that institutions, experts and artists have a monopoly on 
defining art and that they control access to its production. Also, they give priority to 
discussing problems on behalf of “others” (whose problems they discuss) and to repre-
sentations by proxy, thus giving priority for example to art “about” rather than to art 
“with” or “by” refugees. Starting with the 2015 photograph in which Ai Weiwei famous-
ly (re)staged a press photograph of the drowned Syrian infant refugee, Alan Kurdi, by 
posing his apparently lifeless body in the same position as was pictured in the original 
photograph, the questions of who represents, how and on whose behalf, raises serious 
questions about the various means, methods and regimes of representation employed 
when addressing the refugee crisis.44
Ai Weiwei’s practice was even more spectacularized, objectified and commercial-
ized in his metaphoric Law of the Journey (2017), where he filled a 70-meter-long inf lat-
able boat with 258 large faceless refugee figures filled with helium. In doing so, he 
created an ostentatious, oversized, and over-prized monument of the current prob-
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plore” the same topics, advertising the documentary as a “detailed and heartbreaking 
exploration into the global refugee crisis.”46
Distinguishing between two different types of participatory art projects could help 
clarify some of the contradictions between the enthusiastic aims of participatory art 
and the pitfalls set by institutional power: The first type, based on the various waves 
of artistic institutional critique is concerned with the critique of art institutions, and 
calls for more substantial participation within the art system, in the presentation 
and / or production of art projects and in making decisions regarding art.47 Such pro-
jects deal in a critical way with the relationship between a) art, art institutions and 
audiences, b) artists and art institutions (museum, gallery), and c) artists and curators. 
Although important, I see this first branch of participatory art as too self-referential 
and self-indulgent, and consequently easier to incorporate and co-opt within existing 
art institutions and immanent institutional frameworks.48
The second type of participatory art, that can be defined as “participatory institu-
tional critique,” aims towards a more substantial critique and a deeper societal change, 
beyond the confines of the art world. Participatory institutional critique has more am-
bitious goals and potentials, but it also faces stronger adversaries: the general political 
climate and its conf licts, or the inherited colonial pretext. Hence, the artistic goals 
and media of such projects vary: performing social and / or anthropological research; 
issuing calls for restitution, repatriation, and decolonization of institutions; engaging 
with conf licted local communities, often with unforeseeable but imminent results.49 
With this form too, pertinent questions remain: Which representations in which art 
objects, images, and spaces are considered contentious cultural heritages, and who 
decides this?50 How are they transmitted and ref lected in European “culturescapes” 
and “memoryscapes”? More precisely, in Regina Römhild’s words, “What we tend to 
forget is that this fragility and contestedness have always been the case. There was 
never a clear-cut, consensual entity called ‘Europe,’ nor a geographically defined con-
tinent or a cultural formation.”51 These issues are extrapolated regardless of whether 
the researched materials are included or displayed in collections of various European 
art and cultural institutions, or are presented in public spaces or kept in other contexts. 
Moreover, questions arise as to how and why these objects became contentious in first 
place.
Art involving refugees does not raise the question of whether and how artistic re-
search contributes to a politics of emancipation for the first time. The question of the 
relations between ethics and aesthetics — and form, social content, and conduct — in 
artistic research have been addressed in various academic and artistic contexts. The 











decisions towards the making of images and objects representing difficult ethical 
contents (dead and wounded bodies, human remains, Holocaust victims, poverty, 
amongst others) as well as their different approaches towards reproduction, display, 
distribution and circulation also have been debated in various contexts.52 These involve 
discussions around stereotypical and racialized representations, institutional reluc-
tance to acknowledge the questionable provenance of unlawfully acquired objects and 
unethical sponsorship, propositions for how to deal with the repressed memory of the 
spaces once inhabited by conf lict or marked with contested monuments dedicated 
to disgraceful historic figures or events, collective memory about commoning move-
ments that contested the appropriation of public space.53
Starting with invisible heritages and contentious objects, images and spaces (as I 
proposed in On Productive Shame, Reconciliation, and Agency), one needs to clearly de-
clare the urgent need to acknowledge past wrongdoings in order to rethink, decon-
struct and dismantle pre-existing regimes of representation and systemic malfunc-
tion, all the while proposing alternative trajectories for future research and more 
engaged participatory artistic practice. The application of various theoretical and re-
search methodologies (as developed in art history, museology, anthropology, ethnol-
ogy, sociology, pedagogy, political sciences) together with artistic research methods, 
artistic media, strategies and actions allows for specificity, appropriateness, appli-
cability, affordance and efficiency in accomplishing these challenging goals, on both 
ethical and conceptual levels.54
Some contemporary artistic strategies stem from the legacy of postcolonial and 
feminist critique, and the research practices around various theoretical analyses and 
case studies which have developed in the frame of the humanities and social sciences. 
Here, I refer to art projects that use different research means and methods, such as 
field trips, photography-as-research, interviews, focus groups, contextual inquiry, us-
ability studies, surveys, diaries, critical databases, video essays, forensic research, mil-
itant image research, institutional critique, thought experiments, social interventions, 
participatory research of vernacular art made by different self-taught artists and com-
munities, as well as elements of material culture, re-enactment, activist campaigns for 
naming and renaming, counter-monuments, social design, agonistic research, critical 
friendship, creative co-production, petition, public apology, manifestos, critical and 
social advertising, advocating and lobbying for decolonization, repatriation, return 
and restitution.55 Particularly important is for artists to team up with existing profes-
sionals and organizations that are completely dedicated to the issues stemming from 
the refugee crisis in order to avoid doing more harm than good.
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While audiences typically do not take an active part in the creative process of art’s 
production and presentation, participatory art argues that audiences should, precisely 
because of the many problematic decisions made by institutions that do not take into 
account the communities which are implicated and / or contested. Participatory art 
therefore offers an approach to artistic processes in which is the process is considered 
incomplete without the viewers’ involvement — turning audience members into co-
authors, editors, or active performers who complement and resolve the artist’s concept.
The main intent behind the emergence of participatory art is not simply to add a 
new genre to existing art genres and media. This conception is instrumental for chal-
lenging dominant forms and relationships in the art world: a small protected class of 
professionals which has a monopoly over making and defining art, and who conceive 
of the audience as the “other”: passive and marginal observers celebrating the results 
of the creation. Participatory art projects, and collaborative research with other pro-
fessionals continue to promote the understanding that an artwork is not just an object 
that you passively enjoy while quietly looking at it; it is rather a creation in which even 
non-specialized viewers actively participate, a dynamic collaboration between the art-
ist, the audience and their environment.
Often, objects are produced in and through such participatory processes, however 
these material outcomes are not the main priority because relational, interactive, and 
collaborative structures established in the process are also considered part of the art-
work. Thus, participatory projects often initiate the emergence of new communities 
and instigate new and complex relations between the artists, produced objects and 
images and participants.
Although the results of participatory art may be documented using photography, 
audio, video, broadcast media, or other media technologies, the artwork is really to be 
found within the interactions and relations that emerge from the audience’s engage-
ment with the artist and the situation created. Even so, participatory art cannot always 
overcome societal strictures, and despite the attempt to erase divisions between the 
artist as a producer and the audience as participant, very often new hierarchies are 
created depending on class, ethnicity, access, etc.
Given all of this, living with and within the current reigning contradictions in the 
art world is difficult. It is especially difficult to juggle all these contradictions for art-
ists and curators collaborating with high-profile art institutions with inherited co-
lonial or other contentious pasts. According to George Lipsitz, the inability to speak 
openly about contradictory consciousness from within or outside of institutions can 
lead to a self-destructive desire for ‘pure’ political positions that ultimately have more 
to do with “individual subjectivities and self-images” than with “disciplined collective 
struggle for resources and power.”56 Lipsitz states that “the ultimate goal behind the 
pertinent critique of the exclusive and hegemonic institutional models is to overcome 
the deterministic approach.”57
I would like to conclude with a similarly positive and optimistic understanding of 
participatory art. Its full potential is still to be unleashed and developed. This can hap-
pen only if achieving a quality of relationship among the participating subjects (artists, 




accepted as a possible ultimate goal of art. One should not expect this goal to yield 
any beautiful objects in the conventional sense. Regardless of whether this is inter-
preted as anti-aesthetic, counter-aesthetic, or artistic, it doesn’t allow institutions to 
perpetuate difficult issues and relations without acknowledging and challenging their 
problematic systemic nature. To challenge of the relations among the subjects that are 
instrumental for producing and transmitting contentiousness is one of the most perti-
nent aim of participatory art and artistic research employed in such projects.
The recent hateful outbursts from the far right in Europe and elsewhere (such as 
anti-Semitic and anti-Roma sentiments, racism towards Indigenous and Black popu-
lations, patriarchal violence towards women and prejudices and aggression towards 
LGBTQ communities) can be confronted only with clear critical arguments against 
similar hatred from the past entailed in some of the prestigious European art and cul-
tural institutions, and by establishing reciprocal and intersectional relations between 
art, academia and political activism that would work as control mechanism of the 
socio-political ruling socio-political structures.58 
I want to argue that contemporary art projects that focus on participatory research 
and collaboration have enhanced potentials for catalyzing social change and fighting 
systemic racism precisely because of their “affordance:” they focus on dialogical re-
lations rather than on objects and images that often lacked referencing contentious 
pasts. In this respect participatory art’s potentials for collaborations, alliances, com-
moning and non-hierarchical “we” that is not based on patronizing are undeniable, but 
only when imagined as parts of long-term structures rooted in communities, rather 
than one-off spectacles in restrictively art-designated spaces.
The urgent task of countering the re-racialization of a distinctly “European” iden-
tity, and of acting in solidarity with communities driven from the regions where they 
have lived for a long time — consider the Roma across Europe, the Albanians from Ser-
bia, or the Serbs from Croatia — or who have newly arrived as refugees, are two sides 
of the same coin. These are the main assumptions behind the participatory projects 
that invite and include refugees in the process of conceptualization or production of 
art projects.
Instead of dwelling on negatively charged memories, participatory projects mostly 
cherish research processes that deal with shared or multidirectional memory,59 and 
productive shame60 in a committed and catalytic way. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that the contradictions are not easy to circumvent. Regretfully, this affordance 
and potentiality is easily hindered by the concrete contexts of a spectacularized world 
of international art biennials’ “assembly line,” to which participatory art practices are 
not immune, but which they rather serve quite perfectly due to the numbers of partici-
pants and audiences they include and attract.
The main contradiction of the project Green Light — as in many other participatory 
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ternational exhibitions61—stems exactly from the fact that refugees without legal sta-
tus in Europe are for the most part not allowed to receive directly any compensation 
for their work,62 so that when they are engaged in participatory projects, the payment 
comes in the form of compensation or trampa (the simple exchange of labor for goods). 
Thus, even when Eliasson continues to criticize the political system — full of contradic-
tory protocols, rules and laws — and even when he honestly confesses and apologizes 
for the limitations of his understanding of the refugee crisis, he nevertheless fails to 
acknowledge the “hostipitality” at the heart of refugee participation.
The project Shamiyaana — Food for Thought: Thought for Change, presented by Rasheed 
Araeen at Documenta 14 in Athens (2017) also deserves a rigorous extrapolation in this 
context because it raises very sensitive ethical concerns. In the work, the artist and 
the Documenta 14 curators established a communal-like free-kitchen under a color-
ful Pakistani wedding tent installed at Kotzia Square. The project obviously aimed to 
attract refugees as a kind of compensation for the well-reported lack of financial sup-
port for refugees in Greece. However, its strategy of participation and hospitality (or 
rather “hostipitality”) faced many challenges and obstacles internalized in the context 
of the hierarchical art world and usual elitist divisions inevitably reinforced by art 
management in such huge events (due to budget and organizational restrictions). The 
main problem was that the project was based on the strategy of redistributing fund-
ing, and thus on delegating the performative agency to the institution (Documenta 14), 
in a kind of a philanthropic rerouting of the resources assigned to art, rather than to 
the refugees who became passive recipients of help (in the form of food). It was not so 
much a question of the formal and aesthetic aspects of the project, as its questionable 
and consequential ethics — particularly if one takes into account how sensitive the act 
of eating in public (in front of the elitist art professionals and other aficionados) may 
be for the vulnerable community of refugees.63 At the heart of the project’s problematic 
consequences was the fact that the project somehow contributed to the societal and 
class contradictions regardless of the artist’s sincere concerns and good intentions, in-
vested in societal transformations, and regardless of his hopes invested in the poten-
tial and agency of participatory art.
In another instance, when I visited the Venice Biennale in 2015, I came across a 
small sign simply stating “Anonymous Stateless Immigrants Pavilion — A New Pavil-
ion for the Unrepresented at Venice Biennale 2015;” I followed the arrows but did not 
find the Pavilion. Only much later, I found out that the work was by the Anonymous 













rinth within the Venice labyrinth of streets, consisting only of the graffiti-like text and 
arrows: signs that were meant to trick you into following the directions and imagining 
what such a pavilion might look like. There was no building, no installation, no spec-
tacle, no queues of visitors, no paid or unpaid artists, no paid or unpaid participants, 
no paid or unpaid attendants (some Pavilions go so far as to use the unpaid labour of 
students or refugees for attending to their expensively rented spaces).
The Anonymous Stateless Immigrants Pavilion was also a participatory project: 
any audience member who tried to find this project employed her own imagination 
and creativity while following the directions and inevitably activated the remnants of 
various already-seen representations of immigrants and refugees that are profoundly 
engraved and thus hard to be erased from the visual memory. Representation and 
participation are inevitably intertwined and only careful extrapolation and concep-
tualization of art works could think one from another and prevent the proliferation 
and perpetuation of the already internalized socio-political prejudices that are at work 
in the media, institutions and policies that regulate immigration and refugees inter-
state and inter-continental f lows.
Either You Get it Or You Don’t
A Conversation on LGBTQIA+ Refugees’s #Rockumenta Action
Sophia Zachariadi and Krista Lynes
In June 2017, the refugee rights group LGBTQIA+ Refugees Welcome abducted a participa-
tory artwork from the global contemporary art exhibition Documenta 14, held in Athens to 
highlight the city’s centrality to European imaginaries of crisis. They then released a ransom 
note and accompanying video via social media, in which they addressed the artist, Roger Ber-
nat, condemning the fetishization of refugees by Documenta, and highlighting the precarious 
conditions queer migrants face on a daily basis. This conversation between Sophia Zachariadi 
(LGBTQIA+ Refugees Welcome) and Krista Lynes seeks to trace the possibilities and predica-
ments of the art action, and its legacy for the group, for public art practice, and for thinking 
refugee rights in Athens and elsewhere.
KL: Can you begin by giving an account of how you came to participate in Documenta, and in 
Roger Bernat’s The Place of the Thing (2017) specifically?
SZ: The action took place in Spring 2017. The collective, LGBTQIA+ Refugees Welcome, 
was in a situation where it was faced with two reactions: first of all, people ignored the 
existence of this collective and this community — this population within the refugee 
population — and secondly, people were amazed that a collective for LGBTQI refugees 
existed, because it was the first time that a collective formed around a group of people 
who were claiming these specific rights. There aren’t collectives of women’s refugees, 
or refugees with disabilities … People were amazed by it, but at the same time, they 
were neglecting it. We had the same reaction from queer collectives. These were people 
whom you expect to show solidarity, but many were indifferent. They said “Ok, nice, 
this is very nice; it’s good that this exists,” but they didn’t do anything to help out. Most 
of the help came from abroad.
Some people who were part of the collective were a bit pissed off by this. So we de-
cided to fuck someone over. We didn’t know who it would be. Would it be Athens Pride 
[the organizers of the pride event]? The queer community who wanted to approach us 
often benefited from white privilege. It wasn’t their intention to exclude necessarily, 
but they weren’t in touch with other immigrant and non-white people. Their approach 
was a little bit too “Western.” 
Then, the proposal from Documenta came along, and we thought that this pre-
sented an opportunity to fuck someone over! It did, because Documenta was popular 
in Athens in 2017. It allowed us to be noticed, because people now learned of the exist-
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ence of this collective. At the same time, many knew of us before, but they didn’t do 
anything. We thought, “We will take 500 euros from the participation while doing very 
little, perfect!” and secondly, we will have more popularity. Prior to the event, we had 
approximately 1,000 “likes” on Facebook; immediately after, we had 3,000 “likes.” It’s 
not that this is very important, but it’s what happened to our visibility. After that, we 
had people reaching out to us to do research, to interview for a magazine or a newspa-
per, etc. So it was nice — a bit tiring but nice.
KL: What was your encounter with Roger Bernat and Documenta like?
SZ: First of all, someone came from Documenta, and invited LGBTQIA+ Refugees Wel-
come to be a part of the project. We decided to see what the project was about. The 
artist, Roger Bernat, came to us to explain his project. Refugees in the collective asked 
Bernat why he wanted to take the stone and bury it in Kassel. He answered, “This is 
something that either you get, or you don’t!” In my mind, I thought, “Okay, you are 
going to be double fucked!” and when I voiced this opinion to the collective, they said 
“Perfect!” [SZ and KL laugh] Let’s say that I had the instinct, and then everything came 
together. My instinct said, “We need to fuck someone over” and this was a very good 
moment to do this. The group agreed that we were going to do this because the artist 
was not very nice nor very polite!
KL: What were the challenges when you had to go through with the actual action? There is, of 
course, the symbolic resonance to it, accepting to participate, and then there is the actual “do-
ing” of the action itself.
SZ: We had no idea how to handle it. First, we wondered how we would interact with 
the stone. We decided first to steal it; we agreed, all of us! Then we thought we might 
smash it, destroy it. We thought to leave it somewhere where it would stay forever. We 
had many thoughts about how we might proceed. We thought how we might vandal-
ize the rock, but in the end we decided simply to steal the rock and write a ransom 
note that would include the story of the rock’s journey. We agreed collectively on the 
idea of a ransom note, but after we went around the circle in the group, and each con-
tributed an idea of where the stone might be (languishing without papers in a prison 
on the island of Samos, drowned and sunk to the bottom of the Mediterranean as EU 
coast-guards twiddled their thumbs, deported to Turkey after appealing twice, etc.). 
This was the strongest part of the ransom note, I think. This part of the project came 
completely from the refugees in the collective and not from the allies.
It was a better solution because it opened it up beyond the subject of Documenta. It 
was not simply an act of vandalism, an indication that we didn’t like Documenta. Our 
problem wasn’t with Documenta; it was that people were unaware of these refugees’ 
context, and the extra difficulties they are facing as both refugees and LGBTQI people.
KL: In this way, it recenters their experience, and allows space for it.
SZ: It’s like taking the popularity of Documenta and opening it up. This was part of the 
project that Roger Bernat missed. He couldn’t understand that “We don’t care about 
your project, my dear!” We were using it to talk about a wider subject and situation that 
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is happening all around the world. He couldn’t get that far, because he was narcissistic 
about the project.
This is why we had the idea beyond the project to do the hashtag #rockumenta, and 
to take the stone around the city, to the park, to asylum centers where it would wait in 
line. This never happened because of practical reasons — the rock was huge and dif-
ficult to carry. Also, after the press release from Roger Bernat [in which he claimed 
that LGBTQIA+ Refugees’ action activated the artwork and was therefore part of its 
concept], we didn’t want to continue engaging with the stone. We decided that we had 
completed the action and it was finished.
KL: The initial idea, then, was to carry the stone around the city to locations of importance to 
LGBTQI refugees and take pictures of it with the hashtag #rockumenta? 
SZ: Yes, and particularly the ones that are mentioned in the ransom note. Then we 
thought to add more, to have the stone have coffee, go for lunch, site see, whatever. In 
any case, after the action it was the Pride March, and the collective had many things 
to do. We could have continued the action from time to time, though, but we decided 
to end it.
KL: How did the performance work out on the day itself?
SZ: To be honest, in this collective, we never plan how we’re going to perform an ac-
tion. If someone wants to dance, we say “Perfect! Do you need something for the per-
formance? You need a dress? Ok!” and we help the person get a dress. We work out 
what money we can give to the different aspects of the performance. For Documenta, 
we had a very basic idea, which we didn’t even know would work. We didn’t know if 
someone from the artist’s team would accompany the stone or secure it when it was 
our turn, or take their own documentation of our performance. We thought that if 
there were someone accompanying us, we would tell them that some members of the 
group felt uncomfortable and would ask them to give us an hour for the performance 
and then return.
In the end, they left the rock and went away and let us be! So it was easier for us 
to take the rock and take the time we needed — to dance, or have fun. It was very free! 
We took scarves, masks, helmets etc to hide our faces, so were free to do whatever we 
wanted to do. What you see in the video is what happened during the two hours that we 
stayed at the Polytechnic School. The performance was completely random. There was 
make-up and scarves. People could dress as they liked. We went to a nearby house and 
got dressed. We played music, and someone spontaneously used the rock as a drum. 
We just had lots of fun! 
I was taking the video and dancing, trying to give some basic direction, but mostly 
following them. The only part that was directed, was when we recorded the group lift-
ing the rock up and carrying it away. It was very simple.
After this, we tried to put the rock into the trunk of a car. It was completely silly! 
It didn’t fit, so we had to carry the rock. We had many ideas about where we were go-
ing to put the rock, and we brought the rock to a nearby house and we left it there. We 
went to another house and prepared the video, did the voice overs. It was very close to 
the time when we were supposed to return the rock. We had already prepared the ran-
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som note, which we printed in multiples. We sent two “spies” (whom Roger Bernat and 
Documenta staff had never seen) who pasted it to the door of the Polytechnic School 
and scattered the f lyers around the entrance. We instructed them to stay there to see 
how they would react. They took photos from far away of Roger Bernat reading the 
ransom note! [SZ and KL laugh]
KL: So good!
SZ: And at the same time, we were uploading the video! [SZ and KL laugh] All this oc-
curred simultaneously, and the stone itself was 300 meters from the Polytechnic 
School in one direction; we were 300 meters from the School in another direction, and 
everything was actually extremely close to Roger Bernat.
KL: Then you posted the video and ransom note to Facebook and other sites?
SZ: Yes, and we sent press releases, which we sent to Greek and international newspa-
pers and the media more broadly.
KL: So the story emerged because you distributed your action, not because Documenta com-
plained about the rock being stolen?
SZ: Yes, although I’m sure Roger Bernat’s press release helped to circulate the story 
also. In any case, ultimately Documenta used our action to its own benefit. Because it 
was an interaction with the work, and they called it an interaction, and many people 
thought it was part of Documenta itself. We had anticipated this but we didn’t care. 
This is something where, “either you get it, either you don’t!!!” [SZ and KL laugh]
KL: Yes! Because Bernat responded to say that he had suspected something was in the air, that 
you had activated the work, and that this was all part of the larger piece itself … So, clearly, he 
didn’t get it!
SZ: But we don’t care! Our goal was visibility! Visibility of the existence of the collec-
tive, first, and secondly of the circumstances, the conditions, and the difficulties that 
LGBTQI refugees face in Greece.
KL: How do you think the staging of your encounter echoes some of the larger relations between 
a well-funded and enormously visible German exhibit coming to Greece in the first place?
SZ: Your question goes to the wider problem that we have: that basically in this genera-
tion, we are trying to mix activism with art, activism with food … This is not neces-
sarily a problem — feminists say that “personal is political”— but they don’t say to mix 
everything into a salad! Art isn’t necessarily political; political art doesn’t necessarily 
have a broader impact. Conversely, you can have actions that are even more political 
than political groups. I think the problem was Documenta, from the very beginning, 
was trying to touch on everything. Those who visited were artists, tourists, who came 
to visit for a few months, but nevertheless believed that they could talk about a country 
that has its own background, culture, political and economic situation, etc. One should 
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be cautious about talking about issues from which one is only remotely connected, that 
isn’t part of one’s life experience. It’s the same with movements like #BlackLivesMatter. 
The situation in Greece is so recent; it started only in 2010.
KL: Can you speak to what that action means for you now, two years later?
SZ: I’m very tired of Documenta and the whole discourse around it. #Rockumenta was 
a very interesting act, but we will never have the opportunity to do it again. It was the 
first time Documenta was held in Athens, and we were in the very beginning of the 
refugee crisis. This was the moment to do something; we didn’t even schedule it. The 
priority for us was actually the 500 euros the artist was offering to those who partici-
pated in carrying the stone, but we didn’t like the way the artist’s team approached us.
It’s interesting to me that many people have their own interpretation of the act we 
performed; they label it “anti-racist” (which it is, but in a different manner), “femi-
nist,” queer … People are obsessed with the symbolism of the action, which is tiring 
for me. People ignored the fact that what you had was a vulnerable group of people 
with completely different political, social, religious or cultural backgrounds; even how 
they understand their gender and sexual identity is completely different. Most peo-
ple wanted to see their own fantasy confirmed — their understanding, their position, 
their angle — but they didn’t have a need to come into contact with the people who 
performed #rockumenta and do a cultural exchange. They saw us as a political group. 
I told most of the allies who came that LGBTQIA+ Refugees Welcome is not a political 
group; what is political is the experience that these people hold. To call the group po-
litical is a colonizing gesture.
KL: What were the political investments in the action?
SZ: You know, in my analysis, the action was a way of raising our middle finger at Doc-
umenta. It’s very rare that vulnerable groups have the opportunity to do such a thing. 
What did they gain from the action? Nothing! They just had fun; this is also important. 
This is what’s important about the legacy of #Rockumenta. Normally, movements take 
action by marching, creating a spectacular or fabulous event. Very few decide to sit 
down with a group of people to understand their needs, to see how they see themselves 
and evaluate political actions with them. But most people want to take an act like 
#Rockumenta, analyze it, and put it somewhere to remember it, maybe do a PhD on it! 
I’m not minimizing the importance of doing research — this is an important part of the 
social work our cooperative EMANTES wants to do — but it makes me upset when the 
analysis trumps the lived experiences of people.
KL: It seems to me that that was the whole problem with Bernat’s art work — that it was not 
about contacting people, or finding out what people’s experience was, but rather about allocat-
ing space for you in a larger art project. One of the problems is how to respond in a way that 
isn’t on the terms of that invitation. Resistant actions of ten get reabsorbed by the artwork 
itself, and we’re not any further in understanding the real experiences of LGBTQI refugees. It 
strikes me how dif ficult it is to create new actions in this context, when they are always being 
recaptured, the conditions are always changing, and the landscape is already so determined. 
It’s hard to create something that isn’t already understood under a particular category, under 
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a particular f lag, or within a particular politics. This makes it impossible to understand what 
people need from telling their stories.
SZ: In my experience, this is impossible. I’m not there to do this for them. I’m not a god, 
or a savior. What can I do? Can I provide space for you? What do you need? Do you need 
someone to escort you to asylum services? Very nice! Providing a space where people 
can share experiences, not feel weird or uncomfortable. For example, now we’re run-
ning a project with a trans woman who has 12 years’ experience as a ballet dancer, be-
ing part of schools, doing Latin dance, hosting events. She works now as a sex worker, 
which isn’t a problem, but she would like to leave it for another job. We decided to find 
a space to rent and EMANTES will hire her to start dance classes. She can teach, but 
she can also express herself artistically. This is what I think the movement is missing: 
at the same time that it wants to help promote something, it also wants to promote 
itself as something unique to follow; so from the beginning the relation is not created 
in a context of self lessness 
KL: So what do you think the legacy was of the #Rockumenta action, then? Particularly versus 
doing community-based actions?
SZ: I guess it’s ironic, because in two minutes of video, you make a myth; you fanta-
size about LGBT liberation, refugee liberation, which is great! I had a moment when 
we were creating the video, just prior to posting it, I felt euphoric. But after that, the 
reality sets in. There are still the same people with the same problems — problems that 
would never occur to you.
KL: Do you feel then that it was too much? Too much to ask of peoples’ time and ef fort, given 
the long-term ef fects?
SZ: It was a really nice experience. My problem was in how it was received. It’s not 
about the act itself, but how you understand and evaluate it. How do people under-
stand the horrible things they see in photo or art exhibitions? These were my thoughts 
as a photographer: I don’t need to go there and take photos; I’m just going to help and 
most importantly to BE there, present, to experience it; f lesh and blood. It’s not a bad 
thing to take a photo. It’s a question of how the audience understands itself in this 
relationship.
So I’m left with the feeling that some things were done in vain, even though it 
wasn’t in vain. As a collective, we didn’t focus on this act. We did it, and then we moved 
on with our lives. But the allies and researchers who came had a different understand-
ing; they were obsessed with the thing! Which means that you’ve lost something in the 
process.
KL: Why do you think that was?
SZ: The people who came in solidarity but weren’t part of the act (or even those who 
were part of the collective almost from the start), didn’t understand that LGBTQIA+ 
Refugees Welcome wasn’t a political group in the way a Western perspective under-
stands it. If it were a political group, there wouldn’t be allies in it, because it wouldn’t 
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need them. From the beginning, there are power relations, whether you like it or not. 
There can’t be neutrality when the existing relations are unequal.
KL: So this was taken up as a political issue more than an issue for refugees?
SZ: It’s not that. I just don’t understand how people have the expectation that such 
acts will change things. When you have a large mass event — for example, let’s take 
May 1968 — people thought the world would change. It happened through art, through 
photography and video — the photo with the soldier and the girl offering him a f lower. 
In the contemporary moment, we shouldn’t expect that an event like Documenta or 
#Rockumenta can do something radical. It’s stupid; it’s a fantasy!
Basically, to my understanding, the difficulties are so massive that you need to 
do many interventions from many different sides. You need to use your imagination 
and be extremely f lexible, open-minded and patient and most importantly have no 
expectations. Things we do go above us; we don’t owe them, we just offer them to the 
universe let’s say! And that’s it.
#Rockumenta pointed a finger, and made the point through humor that there are 
some people who are facing really serious problems that larger audiences are not aware 
of. It wasn’t moralizing (“You should help LGBTQ refugees!”). Documenta has plenty of 
resources and money, and they come and say “Ah, do a little dance for us! We’ll give you 
500 euros!” It’s a combination of all these forces that makes the action unique. This is 
why I said it would never happen again. It’s the context that makes it unique.
KL: It was clearly a response to being asked to participate on the terms of the artist, and for his 
credit, in an event that billed itself as having a big political dimension and a big public audi-
ence. It erased the local context to make room for its own fantasy of what the political would 
look like in Athens. The #Rockumenta action itself then became iconic, it has its own magnetic 
force. But it’s interesting to think about all the stuf f that happens around that action, what is 
continuous with the action’s message, but largely invisible.
In relation to the documentation of #Rockumenta, what’s interesting to me is to think 
about how all these other issues are happening around that one action, and those things don’t 
get seen or visualized. It’s a way of moving away from the idea that you have one image, and 
that one image is the image that defines the political moment, that’s oppositional or political. 
We see it, and then we leave it behind. How can you represent the continuity of a set of ef forts 
visually, when #Rockumenta was just a blip in it? What you seem to be saying is that this will 
never happen again, it’s a reduction of what it is you do as a group, and it doesn’t represent all 
the things you want to do.
There’s a pleasure to me in seeing the continuity of the action over the space of its unfolding. 
Particularly in relation to your details about how heavy the stone was, for instance, and how 
you couldn’t fit it into the trunk of your car, or through the door of the house where you were 
keeping it. These images and stories are not about the symbolic moment or the face-of f between 
#Rockumenta and Documenta, but about what it takes to do political work, and to resist being 
captured by these politics, these stories, or these images. I wonder, in talking with you, what 
you think is the most meaningful intervention by LGBTQI+ Refugees?
SZ: Documenta wanted to use us, but we wanted to take this fact and use it for our own 
purposes. And it worked! I’m simply disappointed that people liked the glamorous 
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part, but very few of them would do the hard work of doing something that counts for 
an individual person — not for the symbolism, not for the politics. People don’t think 
about how difficult it is to create a collective, how difficult it is to keep it, and how dif-
ficult it is to work with vulnerable people. There are many things that I wouldn’t do for 
their politics, but I do them because they are more important. Their requests are more 
important than my political ideas.
KL: I’ve seen that the collective has organized a whole series of other artistic activities that are 
more grassroots, poetry readings, etc. Can you say something about how art functions in those 
spaces in a dif ferent kind of way?
SZ: The most valuable part of any kind of collaboration is to open a dialogue. The prob-
lem with Roger Bernat, as an example, is that he didn’t come to the collective to open 
up a dialogue about how to approach this project, to say “I have this idea, and you can 
do this or that, or propose something?” It was not a dialogue. It was, “I am using you, 
your body, to do something for me, to take my photos, to gather my material, to do 
the final act. It shouldn’t be that. But when someone comes to do a poetry workshop, 
and acknowledges that they come from a Western background, and that they have a 
skill — spoken word poetry for instance — and I can show this approach, but you can 
do whatever you want with it. The workshop leader never said “this is not the way to 
do things;” rather she encouraged everyone to do what they wanted with the approach. 
Here are the tools! If you want, you can use them; if you don’t want to, don’t. She en-
couraged participants — ”This is lovely! This is powerful!”— and let them do what they 
wanted. That is called a cultural dialogue or cultural exchange. We don’t know where 
the starting point is; we come from different locations. If one comes and says “I have 
the money, I have the crew; I have the material,” then this is a problematic starting 
point for cultural exchange.
KL: Can you talk about what the shif t from LGBTQIA+ Refugees to EMANTES entailed?
SZ: We have a dilemma in Greece, where either one does something institutional or 
one goes outside institutional structures. It’s a bipolar situation: if you do something 
on an institutional level, you’re not considered a movement, you’re basically banned. 
It’s another (mostly urban) myth.
KL: Is it about a kind of purity of politics?
SZ: Yes of course, but it’s also like a story that an old lady would tell you, “Don’t go over 
there; bad people will come.” But then you go and you see that there are a lot of people 
working very hard, with a very concrete set of thoughts about how to do things. The 
people who work institutionally are more ‘true’ because they’ve gone past the political 
correctness, the purity of politics. They understand the contradictions. I’ve been on the 
other side of this institution / activism divide, and so it is challenging for me to be part 
of building something in this gap between institutional work and working outside of 
it. EMANTES aims to work in this gap.
KL: What is the most important work that EMANTES has to undertake?
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SZ: With its legal entity, EMANTES has much more space than a grassroots initiative 
to put pressure on authorities regarding the rights of LGBTQI+ refugees and asylum 
seekers, to send reports to asylum services, to access camps and hot spots, to receive 
funds, to rent spaces etc.—in short, to do anything that is connected to EMANTES’ 
two cornerstones: psychosocial support and raising awareness.
KL: How do you work with the community to determine EMANTES’ actions?
SZ: It’s highly important, especially when you work with very vulnerable people, to help 
them feel strong again. EMANTES aims to work on a case by case, creating system-
atic and long-term support. It is not just about providing services but to give space to 
dialogue, to co-create an action plan according to each person’s needs and skills. It is 
about working together and respecting each other; it is about staying active.

23.1 
LGBTQIA+ Refugees Welcome, documentation of #Rockumenta action against 
Documenta 14, Athens, Greece (2017)
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LGBTQIA+ Refugees Welcome, documentation of #Rockumenta action against 
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Lies of the Land
Allan deSouza
I.
He wears the long white gown and kofi of the coastal people. Over one shoulder is slung 
a musket, over the other is a strap from which hangs a sword. His arms are stiff, one 
hand grasping the musket handle, the other within close reach of the sword. A wide 
belt pulled tight into his waist makes his chest appear thrust out like a soldier at at-
tention. His face is turned to one side, away from the camera, with his eyes seemingly 
focused at a point out of the camera’s frame. Closer inspection reveals his eyes to be 
angled back; not looking at, but watching the camera as if from behind the shelter of 
gauze. It’s an apprehensive gaze, knowing he is being recorded; turning his face away 
to avoid the camera’s scrutiny, but glancing back just to keep an eye on the watcher.
Born near the shores of Lake Nyasa, he was kidnapped as a child and transported to 
Zanzibar, where he was sold to an Arab merchant and taken to India. Freed at his mas-
ter’s death, his name being unknown — or at least untranslatable — he was renamed 
after the city where his master had lived. With his new moniker, Bombay, he returned 
to the continent of his original naming. And there, already reinvented, he might have 
been lost had he not also been rediscovered.
In 1856, two British Army officers, Richard Burton and John Speke, met in Bombay 
(the city) to plan an African expedition. Sailing from Bombay (the city) to Africa, they 
recruited a Swahili guide and his slave, four more African slaves, four Baluchi soldiers, 
an Arab and last, a Yau from Nyasa: Bombay (the man).
Knowing a little Hindustani from his days in Bombay (the city), Bombay (the man) 
was able to speak with Speke who spoke no other language to converse with the na-
tives. An Englishman and an African in East Africa who communicated only through 
Hindustani. A previously unimagined communing.
According to Richard Burton, Bombay had “A high narrow cranium, denoting by 
arched and rounded crown, fuyant brow and broad base with full development of the 
moral region, deficiency of the ref lectives, fine perceptives, and abundant animality.” 
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II.
According to David Livingstone’s diaries, Bombay had “lifted Speke out of the disa-
greeable position of being a silent onlooker […] Before getting him, Speke sat on his 
bottom only.” Not only did Speke become translatable, but he was given — by this re-
named man — the ability his name suggested: the power of his own voice.
The expedition went south and west and north and round and north again. But 
none of that matters since these paths were already well traversed by Africans. What 
does it matter — more pertinently, to whom does it matter?—whose pale feet stepped 
there first? Clearly it mattered to the owners of the pale feet. Not satisfied with having 
reached his goal — the source of the Nile — Speke returned for another long trudge, up, 
down, etc., this time with an old friend from his hunting days in India, Captain James 
Grant, whose skills included a “conciliatory manner with coloured men.”
Speke and Grant employed Bombay to organize and lead the caravan of porters, 
and to barter at villages. A lively trudge apparently, Grant remarking that, “Nothing 
can exceed the noise and jollity of an African camp at night. We, the masters, were 
often unable to hear ourselves talk for the merry song and laughter, the rattle of drums, 
jingling of bells, beating of old iron, and discordant talk going on round our tents.”
Speke, not the first nor the last to correlate Africans and rhythm, added, “song they 
have none, being mentally incapacitated for musical composition, though as timists 
they are not to be surpassed,” while also noting the hopelessness of the Indians at such 
entertainment.
In 1866, David Livingstone arrived in Bombay (the city), at a mission school to 
recruit whitened Africans for expeditions back in blackest Africa. Off they jolly well 
went, weighted down with weapons, camping equipment, scientific instruments, bar-
ter goods and gifts for local rulers, including merikani — cotton sheeting from Ameri-
ca — and kaniki — indigo cloth from India. A portentous meld of America, India, Brit-
ain and Africa. A previously unimagined community.
III.
In 1871, as every tinted urchin from the pink zone knows, Henry Stanley entered his-
tory, presumptuously. Born in Wales as John Rowlands, he was orphaned and worked 
his ship’s passage to America as a cabin boy. There, he was adopted by a New Orleans 
cotton broker, whose name he took. In other words, Stanley — like Bombay — was a 
renamed, self-made, made-up man.
Henry Stanley — as a journalist for the New York Herald and fresh from a story in 
Wyoming about the other kind of Indians — stepped off the boat at Zanzibar to look 
for Livingstone. It was an expedition, it could be said, by one white man to discover 
another white man, an Americanized Welshman in search of an anglicized Scotsman 
in darkest Africa. To lead the way, Stanley enlisted Bombay (the man).
Of the eighteen men recruited as guards by Bombay, Stanley noted that “They were 
an exceedingly fine looking body of men, far more intelligent of appearance than I 
could ever have believed African barbarians could be.” In defense of his expectations 
towards Africans, Stanley offered his own version of the some-of-my-best-friends-are 
… maxim: “I had met in the United States black men, whom I was proud to call friends.” 
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To Henry Stanley, Bombay was “a short slender man of 50 or thereabouts, with a 
grizzled head, an uncommonly high, narrow forehead, with a very large mouth, show-
ing teeth very irregular, and wide apart […] at his first appearance I was favorably im-
pressed with Bombay.” 
When Livingstone was duly discovered (another meld of Africa, Britain, America, 
and India — or at least Bombay), he noted the historic meeting with a sketch of Bom-
bay (the man), with the added, less historic description: “Square head of Bombay top 
depressed in centre.” 
IV.
In the 1939 film, Stanley and Livingstone, (shot at a Hollywood studio, with added stock 
footage of African animals) Stanley is thrown a red herring: led to a white man, he 
finds an albino. His (mis)guide asks, “You mean he’s a black white man?” and is an-
swered with, “No, he’s a white black man.” 
Stanley was “given” a seven-year-old slave. From Ndugu M’hali, My Brother’s 
Wealth, he was renamed Kalulu, Young Antelope (no record exists of the boy’s views on 
his demotion from family treasure to tourist pet). Stanley later took Kalulu — dressed 
in liveried splendor — to Europe, where he made a deep impression with his “excellent 
manners.” In London, Kalulu modeled for Madame Tussauds’ wax version of Stanley 
and Livingstone’s legendary meeting. In America, Kalulu appeared at Stanley’s pub-
lic lectures, entertaining audiences with Swahili songs. Two mementos remain: one, 
Stanley named his novel, a romantic evocation of Africa, My Kalulu; two, in 1877, Kalulu 
fell and drowned at a place Stanley subsequently named Kalulu Falls.
In 1875, Bombay (the man), who — if not fame, had by now gained a certain, per-
haps literal track record — was employed on another expedition, with Verney Cameron. 
Crossing Africa from Zanzibar to the west coast, Cameron was not quite as smitten, 
describing Bombay as having, “lost much of the energy he displayed in his journeys 
with our predecessors in African travel, and was much inclined to trade upon his pre-
vious reputation,” adding that he was “neither the ‘Angel’ of Colonel Grant nor the 
‘Devil’ of Mr. Stanley.” 
Africa’s greatest uncredited traveler, Bombay saw Africa’s surrounding waters, the 
Atlantic, the Indian, the Mediterranean and the Cape of Good Hope. Desiring another 
journey, he wrote to Grant: “Bana Grant, I, Bombay, send for my old master plenty sa-
laam. I have been many years with white men, Cameron, Speke, Stanley &c, but have 
not yet seen England their home, and as I am getting old, I should like to see the land 
of my old master before I die.” His wish, to follow his masters to their homeland, was 
not to be realized. Fittingly, he died in Zanzibar, an island one step off the mainland, 
f loating out towards Bombay (the city).
V.
In 1948, my father left Bombay (the city) and arrived in Nairobi, where he met my 
mother and where I was later born. An Indian in Africa, I was named after a popular 
American actor whose Anglo name my parents believed would also grant me some ease 
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of access within the then British colony: another potent meld — at least to me — of In-
dia, Africa, Britain and America.
In 1965 we left an independent Kenya for England, the land of the former masters. 
In 1980, I traveled to Bombay (the city). Standing at India Gate, I looked west towards 
my birthplace across the ocean. I imagined my father years before, standing in the 
same place, looking away from his birthplace.
Clad in a beige linen suit specially made for his journey, or perhaps bedecked in 
khaki and accessorized topi, my father steps off Indian ground. He grabs a railing and 
pulls himself up the steep gangplank as though the land refuses to let go. He totters for 
a moment, looking down to the water, unsure which direction to go — up onto the ship, 
or back down to the solid familiarity of land.
Does he remain on deck as the ship pulls away, until he can no longer see the fea-
tures in the rows of faces, until the faces themselves become a smear? Does he watch 
until the activity of the Bombay docks disappears, until the only building he can see is 
the gigantic arch of India Gate bidding him farewell as once it had welcomed English 
monarchy? Does he look until all he can see is water, all he can hear are the crash of 
waves against the ship and the wailing of seagulls? 
None before him have returned; he has no intention of being the first. Though 
many families have lost their sons to Overseas, they bear the loss proudly, with vis-
ible material compensations. With the money sent back, these families rebuild their 
houses in anticipation of their sons’ triumphant returns. As the years pass with no sign 
of the prodigals, blue airmail envelopes with colorful stamps are instead ceremonially 
withdrawn from glass cabinets and passed around as proof of distant loyalty.
VI.
All I have are fantasies and inventions of the passage from India to Africa. They fabri-
cate a genealogy; not a family tree, but a root of familiarity. I swaddle myself within 
this security blanket of imagined history. A re-collection of possibilities, of memory-
threads cast to the winds, drawn back and re-cast in different directions.
Would my father always be caught between east and west, south and north, be-
tween inside and outside; neither house nor field? Never knowing which way to turn, 
which way to pursue his dreams, to the rising or the setting sun? 
I used to say I was Kenyan, but people would just look at me expectantly. Relenting, 
I would mumble something about my grandparents being from India. An occasional 
colonial relic might jabber at me in Swahili or Hindi, and when I couldn’t reply in kind 
I would look like a perfect idiot or simply like a liar.
I’m not a proper Indian, from India; nor a proper African, though I’m from there. 
And what kind of name is mine, especially when attached to a face dark as mine? What 
does it mean for me to not know my “own” tongue, and to be able to slip into the Jamai-
canized cockney of an East London barrow boy? Or the jive of a Bronx B-boy? Should I 
be what you want? Why not be whatever I want? 
Where am I on the slippery road between one place and another? Am I fully here 
or is part of me always elsewhere? Am I this? Am I that? I rarely ask such questions, 
though I face them on a daily basis. I shape-shift partly in response to and partly in re-
volt against what’s expected of me. One day I’m Brazilian, another, Tahitian, or Maori, 
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Hawaiian. I even try Tasmanian. It’s a game to ward off stupid questions — do-you-a-
speak-a-Eng-lish? — and a way of refusing to be known.
VII.
I had a story with no beginning and no end. No past, no future, only the possibility 
of coming into being. A story, not so much recitation, but re-siting. Having changed 
places, stopped and restarted, this story is of the becoming, not just of the places — the 
changed from and the changed to — but of the changing; not just of the leaving and ar-
riving, but of the passage itself.
In the beginning was before the word. How then to tell the story of this beforeness? 
Of my story before it is spoken, before it descends from the convolutions of the mind to 
the slippery slope of the tongue? Of the history that names me? And what of the history 
that misnames me? 
How do I tell the story of what I believe to be my self — the differences and indiffer-
ences that I can’t translate, so that whenever I open my mouth to speak it’s always al-
ready of a middle with a missing beginning? All I can do is keep returning in hindsight, 
to middles, to beginnings, to what comes before: 
Vibrations tingle my body; soothing then forceful. They gribble up my chest, up 
to my face and for a brief, ghastly moment my eyeballs bounce in their sockets. I’m 
pushed back against the seat but manage to turn my face towards the window and see 
the ground racing past. Abruptly, the vibrations stop, my eyes stilled. We’re up. Off the 
ground. The world inside tips backwards the land outside falls away.
I push forward, face against the window. Roads tentacle in every direction, a maze 
of secrets. From up here, individuals are lost, each life a f leck of dust. Higher, trees 
and cars are bleached of color; higher, buildings become an indistinct fuzz of grays 
and browns. Higher, the main Nairobi-Mombasa road unravels like discarded string; 
higher, rivers and lakes glint silver, all other features little more than tonal disruptions 
against an overall haze. Higher still, all details disappear in washes of murky hues.
VIII.
I’m looking out at the ground below, 30,000 feet below says a crackling voice from 
an intercom or from inside my head; cruising at 500 mph it says, air temperature is 
-20. The meaningless numbers bear no relation to what my eyes tell me. I see fissures, 
crannies, gouges, lumps as far as where the world curves away. It could be a landscape: 
mountains and valleys, forests and plains. Or I could be a baby lying on my mother’s 
breast, her body the extent of my world, laid out below me with its enigmatic geogra-
phy: valleys and mountains, plains and forests.
I don’t know how many hours later it is, but we’ve reached the coast. The Mediter-
ranean, the voice says, surf frilling the strike of water and land with a ruff le collar. The 
plane slows to an immobile hover. I bathe my eyes in the turquoise sea beneath, then 
close them, f loating in an orange afterimage. It feels like we’ve left the world.
The planet continues its lumbering revolutions; people are laughing, crying, wars 
are fought, babies born.
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I wake with a start. The sound of the engines has changed, becoming more urgent. 
Seatbelts, the voice says. The plane tilts forward — Ladies and gentlemen, we shall be 
arriving at Heathrow Airport, London.
My stomach lurches with excitement. As if in response, the plane dips suddenly, 
plunging into clouds that could be the same as the ones over Nairobi. If I hadn’t been 
told by the voice I would have thought that we had just gone in a circle, or the earth 
might have turned one way and we’d gone the opposite way so that we hadn’t moved 
our position at all.
Clouds part in revelation: England, a patchwork of fields, each square hemmed 
neatly by hedges. A quilt of fables rushes up to greet me, of a land of glory and hope, 
of order and decency, of red letterboxes, of a white woman with a golden crown, of 
friendly blue bobbies.
As they say … the lie of the land.
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